In the Interest of C.S., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 25-0520
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0520 Filed June 18, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF C.S., Minor Child,

A.M., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Grishma Arumugam of GPA Legal LLC, Davenport, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Brian Patrick Donnelly, Clinton, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

In terminating the mother’s parental rights to her child, born in 2023, the

juvenile court concluded: “Bottom line, this mother has failed to stop her drug use.”1

That drug use spanned decades and involved multiple substances—including

methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana—and it ultimately led to the

termination of the mother’s parental rights to her four oldest children. In this appeal

for her fifth and youngest child, the mother purports to challenge each of the three

steps in our termination analysis. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3) (2025); In re

L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). She also requests “additional time for

rehabilitation.” We affirm upon our de novo review of the record. L.B., 970 N.W.2d

at 313.

The first step of our analysis considers whether there are statutory grounds

for termination. Id. The juvenile court found the State proved three: Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(d), (g), and (h). The mother does not identify which of these

grounds she is contesting. Instead, she contends: “One of the statutory grounds

for termination includes a parent’s inability to provide for the child’s needs due to

mental health issues or other conditions, with evidence that the child cannot be

returned to the parent’s custody within a reasonable time.” And she argues “that

additional time for rehabilitation could allow her to meet the child’s needs.”

Generously construed, this argument might encompass a challenge to

paragraph “g,” which requires proof “that an additional period of rehabilitation

would not correct the situation.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g)(4). Or it could be a

1 The court’s termination ruling placed the child in the father’s sole legal custody. 3

challenge to paragraph “h,” which requires proof “that the child cannot be returned

to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present

time,” id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4), although our supreme court has interpreted “at the

present time” to mean at the time of the termination hearing. In re A.M., 843

N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). But it cannot be stretched—without undertaking the

mother’s advocacy ourselves—to include paragraph “d.”2 See Ingraham v.

Dairyland Mut. Ins., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits of this

case would require us to assume a partisan role and undertake the appellant’s

research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse to assume.”); In re C.B., 611

N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all encompassing argument is insufficient

to identify error in cases of de novo review.”). So we affirm on that unchallenged

ground.3 See In re R.S., No. 22-0196, 2022 WL 4362192, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Sept. 21, 2022) (holding that a parent’s failure to challenge one of the grounds for

termination allows us to affirm on that ground without analyzing the others).

Under step two, which asks whether termination is in the best interest of the

child, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement

for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

2 Paragraph “d” requires proof that after “the child in need of assistance adjudication, the parents were offered or received services to correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d)(2). 3 In any event, we find upon our de novo review of the record that the State proved

by clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate under each ground cited by the juvenile court because of the mother’s continued substance use and failure to complete treatment. See L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313 (“The burden is on the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the requirements for termination have been satisfied.”). 4

The mother argues the “love and care” that she showed for the child “during

supervised visits, as well as [the child’s] attachment to her, suggest that

maintaining their relationship could serve his emotional needs.” Unfortunately,

love is not enough. See In re T.A.H., No. 01-258, 2002 WL 181051, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002). The defining elements in the best-interest analysis are the

child’s safety and need for a permanent home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748

(Iowa 2011). Although the mother had a stable residence, she could not ensure

the child’s safety because of her untreated and ongoing substance use. See In re

J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“A parent’s

methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.”).

During his short time in the mother’s custody, the child was the subject of several

child protective assessments, including one for failure to thrive and another that

was opened after the mother assaulted the father while he was holding the child.

The child also tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. We agree with the

juvenile court that termination is in the child’s best interests.

The third step of the analysis considers whether any permissive exceptions

to termination should be applied. L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. The mother relies on

the parent-child bond exception in section 232.116(3)(c). But the juvenile court

never ruled on this exception. So error was not preserved for our review. See In

re A.M., No. 25-0138, 2025 WL 1177810, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2025)

(finding error not preserved on permissive exception argument because juvenile

court did not rule on it). Even so, while the mother may have shared a bond with

the child, she did not meet her burden to prove that termination would be

detrimental to him. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). 5

Finally, the mother urges us to consider “whether granting additional time,

rather than terminating parental rights, would better serve the child’s long-term

interests.” Granting a parent more time is appropriate only if the record shows

“that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at

the end of the additional six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b); see also id.

§ 232.117(5). We agree with the juvenile court’s reasons for denying the mother’s

request: “[T]his mother has failed to complete any programs so many times before,

has continued to use drugs, did not enter any programming until after this petition

was filed, and left that attempt at in-patient treatment last month after only [a

week].” See In re B.S., No. 12-1609, 2012 WL 5534169, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 15, 2012) (“The parents’ eleventh hour attempts to prevent termination by

engaging in services do not overcome their years of addiction and instability.”).

We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.