In the Interest of C.K., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 25-1323
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1323 Filed October 29, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF C.K., Minor Child,

A.K., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Joan M. Black, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Michelle M. Jay of Bray & Klockau, P.L.C., Des Moines, Attorney and

Guardian ad Litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Langholz, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2025).1 She challenges each of the three steps

in our termination analysis and asks for more time to work towards reunification.

Following our de novo review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling.

See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022).

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

“She’s sunshine.” That’s how the mother described her three-year-old

daughter at the hearing to terminate her parental rights. The child was born

prematurely in January 2022 due to a condition called cytomegalovirus. She was

later diagnosed with other medical conditions, including cerebral palsy,

microcephaly, diffuse cerebral and cerebellar atrophy, and periventricular

leukomalacia. Because the child’s umbilical cord tested positive for marijuana at

birth, the Iowa Department of Human Services2 provided voluntary services to the

family for about six months.

The department became involved again in June 2024 on a report that the

mother was allowing a registered sex offender to care for the child and that there

was domestic violence in the home. The State petitioned to have the child

adjudicated in need of the court’s assistance. The mother stipulated to the

adjudication in August, and the child was allowed to remain in her custody under

1 The father consented to the termination of his parental rights and has not appealed. 2 In 2022, the Iowa Department of Human Services merged with the Iowa

Department of Public Health to create the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services. 3

the department’s supervision. But in October, the department’s social worker

noticed that the mother was acting erratically during a family-focused meeting. The

social worker asked the mother to participate in a drug test, which was positive for

methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. The child’s hair test was also

positive for the ingestion of methamphetamine and marijuana. The child was

removed from the mother’s custody at the end of October and placed with a foster

family, where she has since remained.

In the months between the child’s removal and the permanency hearing in

April 2025, the mother made minimal progress towards reunification. While the

mother’s supervised visits with the child were positive, her attendance at those

visits was inconsistent. She also failed to take advantage of the foster family’s

open invitation to their home for visits with the child. The mother attended only two

of the child’s sixty physical, occupational, and speech therapy sessions, and none

of the twenty-five medical appointments for the child. She waited until

January 2025 to complete a mental-health evaluation and did not complete a

substance-use evaluation until April—just before the permanency hearing. Out of

the thirty-four drug tests requested by the department, the mother only participated

in four—all of which were positive for illegal substances.3

The mother entered inpatient substance-use treatment in mid-May, close to

one month after the State petitioned to terminate her parental rights. She admitted

that she used methamphetamine the day before she went into treatment. But by

the termination hearing in July, she was forty-five days sober. She was also

3 All four tests were positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine; three were

also positive for marijuana. 4

participating in mental-health services. Despite these positive steps, the mother

agreed the child could not be safely returned to her custody. She testified that she

still needed to work on staying sober, obtaining a stable residence, and finding

employment. But she “begg[ed] for more time to be able to prove” that she could

safely care for her daughter.

The juvenile court denied the mother’s request and terminated her parental

rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). The court found that while the

mother wanted to parent her daughter,

by her own admission, she is not in a position to be a full-time parent at the present time. [The mother] believes she can be ready to parent [the child] in “a couple of months.” The Court is not convinced. [The mother] was very slow to engage in services. She has only been in treatment for a little over a month and her last use of methamphetamine was the day before she entered treatment. [The mother] is unemployed and does not have a home for [the child] to return to.

The mother appeals.

II. Analysis

In reviewing the juvenile court’s ruling, we use a three-step analysis that

asks whether (1) a statutory ground for termination is satisfied, (2) termination is

in the best interests of the child, and (3) any of the permissive exceptions to

termination should be applied. L.B., 970 N.W.3d at 313; see also Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)–(3). If all three steps support termination, we then consider any other

issues the parent raises, such as whether more time should have been granted.

See Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), 232.117(5). Although the mother has combined

some of these steps in her petition on appeal, we understand from her arguments 5

that she is challenging each of them and asking for an extension of time. On our

de novo review of the record, we conclude that her claims should be denied.

On the first step, the mother only challenges the final element of

section 232.116(1)(h)—that the child could not be returned to her custody at the

time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4) (requiring

“clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of

the child’s parents . . . at the present time”); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473

(Iowa 2018) (interpreting the statutory language “at the present time” to mean “at

the time of the termination hearing”). The mother argues that if she was given

more time to complete treatment and “establish housing in a safe environment,”

the child could be safely returned to her custody. This argument echoes the

mother’s concession at the termination hearing that she was not ready for the child

to be placed in her custody. That concession is clear and convincing evidence

supporting termination under section 232.116(1)(h). See In re M.S., 2025

WL 548519, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (collecting cases). It’s also

supported by the record.

After more than a decade of illegal substance use, the mother had been

sober for just forty-five days at the time of the termination hearing. And that

sobriety only occurred in a supervised setting. See In re P.F., No. 15-1103, 2015

WL 5970017, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (recognizing that sobriety in a

structured, custodial setting does not demonstrate an ability to maintain sobriety in

the community). While the mother has done well in treatment, she has a long road

ahead of her, which includes finding a home and a job. These struggles would be

difficult for any parent to overcome. They are even harder for the parent of a 6

medically fragile child. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 2006)

(explaining a child’s special needs must be evaluated in determining whether the

child can be safely returned to parental custody). As the juvenile court found,

attending to the child’s constellation of health conditions requires “a sober,

organized and attentive” parent. With the mother’s sobriety still in its early stages,

we agree with the court that the child could not be safely returned to her custody

at the termination hearing.

The mother combines the next two steps into one issue heading, which

asserts the juvenile court “erred when it determined that termination would be in

the child[]’s best interests pursuant to Iowa Code [s]ection 232.116(2)–(3).” She

focuses on her bond with the child, which is a relevant consideration in both steps.

See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (“A child’s mental and

emotional condition and needs is inherently impacted by the child’s bond with a

parent, so the parent-child bond is a relevant consideration in the best-interests

analysis.”); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (allowing the court to avoid

termination if there is “clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be

detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child

relationship”). Although blending these steps on appeal carries the risk of waiver,

we will consider both arguments here. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 534 n.2 (noting the

general rule that a party raising “both a best-interests and permissive-exception

argument . . . needs a separate issue heading and argument for each”).

The social worker, guardian ad litem, and foster mother all agreed that the

mother shared a close bond with the child. They each described how the child and

mother would “light up when they see each other.” But the defining elements of a 7

child’s best interests are the child’s safety and need for a permanent home. See

In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(2)

(requiring the court to give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child”). Unfortunately,

the mother could not provide those basic needs for the child, who was flourishing

in her foster home. The social worker testified at the termination hearing that in

the foster parents’ care, the child “went from surviving to thriving.” She had gained

weight, increased her mobility, and made progress in her communication skills.

The foster parents were dedicated to caring for the child long-term, and they

planned to maintain a relationship with the mother, who described them as

“amazing.” See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (considering the foster family’s

willingness “to permanently integrate the child”). Under this record, we conclude

that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

We also find the mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that “termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness

of the parent-child relationship.” Id. § 232.116(3)(c); see In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018) (placing the burden to prove a permissive exception

to termination on the parent resisting termination). The mother argues the “record

is replete with testimony supporting the closeness of [her] relationship” with the

child. That’s true, as discussed above. “Yet the existence of a bond is not

enough.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). The child, who was only

three years old at the termination hearing, had been removed from her mother’s

custody for eight months. The mother had limited involvement with her during that 8

period. Meanwhile, the child achieved stability in the foster home, where she was

doing well. Under these circumstances, we conclude the mother did not meet her

burden to prove the exception should be applied. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212,

225 (Iowa 2016) (finding the section 232.116(3)(c) exception did not apply despite

the existence of a bond where the children were young, had been out of the

mother’s custody for almost two years, and had achieved stability out of the

mother’s home).

Lastly, the mother claims that she should “be given a few more months,

under court supervision, to prove that she can care for the child and keep her safe.”

She does not, however, provide us with any “specific factors, conditions, or

expected behavioral changes which [would] comprise the basis for the

determination that the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of” the

requested extension. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). In any event, while we believe

the mother has the capacity to achieve sobriety and rebuild her life, it is not in the

child’s best interests to delay permanency in the hope she may eventually do so.

See In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Children simply cannot wait for

responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must

be constant, responsible, and reliable.”).

AFFIRMED.