in the Interest of C.F., K.F., K.F., J.F.K. and J.F., Children

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided June 23, 2011·No. 02-10-00202-CV·Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00202-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.F., K.F., K.F., J.F.K. AND J.F., CHILDREN

----------

FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ----------

This is a father’s appeal from a judgment terminating his parental rights to

his five children.2 Father challenges the trial court’s finding that he knowingly

placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that

endangered their well-being. He also claims that reunification, rather than

termination, is in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 2 Mother signed an affidavit of relinquishment and has not appealed the order terminating her rights to all five children. I. Sufficiency Standard of Review3

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001 (West Supp. 2010), 161.206(a)

(West 2008). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought

to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2008). Due process demands this

heightened standard because termination results in permanent, irrevocable

changes for the parent and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002);

see In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for

termination and modification).

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to

the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the trial court’s judgment with our

own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on

the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief

that the parent violated subsection (D) of section 161.001(1) and that the

termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the

child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.

2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a

factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth

3 Because Father challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we will review the background facts in the analysis of that issue.

2 of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at

108.

II. Endangerment

A. Applicable Law

Endanger means to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of

Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re J.T.G., 121

S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also In re M.C., 917

S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996). To prove endangerment under subsection (D) of

section 161.001(1), the Department of Family and Protective Services had to

prove that Father (1) knowingly (2) placed or allowed the children to remain (3) in

conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-

being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D); In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d 470,

474 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). “Under subsection (D), it is

necessary to examine evidence related to the environment of the child to

determine if the environment was the source of endangerment to the child’s

physical or emotional well-being.” In re M.C.T., 250 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Tex.

App.––Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). But to support a finding of endangerment, “the

parent’s conduct does not necessarily have to be directed at the child nor is the

child required to suffer injury.” Id. at 169. The specific danger to the child’s well-

being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone. Boyd, 727

S.W.2d at 533; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2004,

pet. denied).

As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and

instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. R.W., 129

3 S.W.3d at 739. Drug use and its effect on a parent’s life and his or her ability to

parent may also establish an endangering course of conduct. Id.; see Z.C., 280

S.W.3d at 474 (stating that a parent’s “drug use and drug-related criminal activity

may support a finding that the child’s surroundings endanger his [or her] physical

or emotional well-being”). Further, a parent’s mental state may be considered in

determining whether a child is endangered if that mental state allows the parent

to engage in conduct that jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the

child. R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739. To determine whether termination is necessary,

courts may look to parental conduct both before and after the child’s birth. In re

D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see In re

M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on

reh’g) (explaining that the “factfinder may infer from past conduct endangering

the child’s well-being that similar conduct will recur if the child is returned to the

parent”).

B. Applicable Facts

1. CPS

Cindy Martin, a family worker with the Department of Family and Protective

Services, testified that she became familiar with Father’s family in April 2008,

after a transfer from Montague County. CPS had been previously involved in

Montague County because of domestic violence. Martin could not find the family

to provide services until the end of May 2008 and thus was unable to provide

them with services. The first address she had was vacant. Martin found a

second address, but although she spoke with the family on the phone, made

appointments, and even met Father at her office once, every time Martin showed

4 up at the second address, the family was not there. Martin had to contact

relatives and eventually found the family living in a tent in the LBJ Grasslands. 4

Martin brought the family supplies, food, clothing, and shoes for the

children, who had none. The children told Martin that they had left their prior

house in such a hurry that they did not take shoes with them. Father and Mother

told Martin they left their home because there had been an electrical fire the day

of Martin’s scheduled home visit; however, when Martin had arrived the day of

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