In the Interest of C.E., Minor Child, A.E., Mother

Court of Appeals of Iowa

In the Interest of C.E., Minor Child, A.E., Mother

DecidedSeptember 27, 2017

Docket17-0995

StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of C.E., Minor Child, A.E., Mother (In the Interest of C.E., Minor Child, A.E., Mother) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In the Interest of C.E., Minor Child, A.E., Mother, (iowactapp 2017).

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Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0995 Filed September 27, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF C.E., Minor Child,

A.E., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Montgomery County, Amy L.

Zacharias, District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her now-one-

year-old son. AFFIRMED.

Justin R. Wyatt of Woods & Wyatt, P.L.L.C., Glenwood, for appellant

mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Karen L. Mailander of Mailander Law Office, Anita, guardian ad litem for

minor child.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. 2

TABOR, Judge.

A mother, Ashley, appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her

parental relationship with now-one-year-old C.E. Her main argument for reversal

is that the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) placed too much

emphasis on a September 2015 psychological evaluation expressing the

pessimistic view that her parenting deficiencies would not improve over time.

Ashley also contends the DHS incorrectly believed her speech impediment—a

motor-skills disorder called apraxia—constituted an intellectual disability that

hindered her parenting skills. After independently reviewing the record,1 we

conclude neither of those issues clouded the juvenile court’s judgment in the

child-welfare proceedings. Like the juvenile court, we find clear and convincing

evidence in the record to support terminating Ashley’s parental rights to her son.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Born in late July 2016, C.E. was removed from the care of his mother

while still in the hospital. The removal was prompted by the concerns of a child

protection worker who had observed Ashley struggling to meet the basic needs

of her older child, J.E., who had been previously removed from Ashley’s care.2

The child protection worker described Ashley’s “disengagement” during

interactions with J.E.—Ashley would “be texting even while feeding” the baby and

1 We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo, which means examining both the facts and law and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented. See In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them weight, especially when witness credibility is critical to the outcome. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). Proof must be clear and convincing, which means we see no “serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). 2 The custody of J.E. is not a subject of this appeal. 3

“slightly slapped [J.E.’s] hand and said ‘bad girl’ while [J.E. was] drinking her

bottle.” The DHS exhibit in support of C.E.’s removal also included the following

quotations from a psychological evaluation of Ashley completed by Dr. Rosanna

Jones-Thurman on September 14, 2015:

[T]he examiner believes that [Ashley] will continue to show obviously the low cognitive functioning, which will not change over time, but a minimization of responsibility and accountability, as well as not acknowledging some of the issues and problems as they are. Certainly there appear to be difficulties with understanding correct parenting and Ashley really shows no emotion here today. Certainly there appear to be some significant mental health issues and problems here that will not go away with any amount of counseling or education. At this point in time, the examiner would not recommend that [Ashley] have her child back even with family supervision as it appears that there are too many negative and hostile dynamics within the family as well.

At the hearing on C.E.’s removal in early August 2016, Ashley’s attorney

complained the State “cherry picked” language from Dr. Jones-Thurman’s report

favorable to its position. In its temporary-removal order, the court approved a

second psychological evaluation for Ashley “to determine if there has been any

progress made.” C.E. was placed with a foster family.

In September 2016, Ashley had three two-hour supervised visits with C.E.

each week. The Boys Town FSRP (family safety, risk and permanency) worker

allowed Ashley’s mother and sister to attend the interactions. According to the

FSRP reports, Ashley struggled with calming C.E. when he was fussy and

passed him to her mother when he cried. On September 22, 2016, the juvenile

court adjudicated C.E. as a child in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code

section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2016). 4

In late September 2016, Ashley underwent a second psychological

evaluation—this time with Dr. Jamie Ryder. While noting possible underreporting

of negative information by Ashley, Dr. Ryder developed an overall impression

that Ashley met the criteria for an unspecified adjustment disorder—due to

“stressful situations related to DHS involvement with her children and not having

either of her children in her custody at this time.” In closing, the psychologist

asserted: “At this time, there is no information present to me through the course

of this evaluation or otherwise that would suggest she is not capable of

successfully parenting her children.”

In October 2016, Ashley cancelled six of twelve scheduled visits with C.E.

In its dispositional order in late October, the juvenile court determined Ashley had

not offered any legitimate reasons for cancelling visits, and the court suspected

she may have been focusing more on her boyfriend than her son. The court also

noted the contradictory findings from Dr. Jones-Thurman and Dr. Ryder, musing:

“It is almost as if two different people were the subject of the psychological

evaluations.” The court decided “it would be helpful to have an updated

psychological evaluation” from Dr. Jones-Thurman because Ashley’s

“circumstances have changed” since her original evaluation.

Ashley underwent her third psychological evaluation on January 17, 2017.

Dr. Jones-Thurman initially reviewed her September 2015 findings when she

diagnosed Ashley with “ADHS, Unspecified Depressive Disorder, and Mild

Intellectual Disability.” In Dr. Jones-Thurman’s second evaluation, Ashley scored

in the average to below-average range on IQ tests. Dr. Jones-Thurman’s second

report found Ashley to be more emotionally stable, “despite her cognitive 5

limitations.” Dr. Jones-Thurman still was not sure Ashley could parent her child

without any help, but encouraged the DHS to give Ashley the opportunity to try

“to help raise her son.”

The juvenile court held a permanency hearing in early March 2017. In its

order, the court discounted the value of the psychologists’ reports: “Frankly, from

the [c]ourt’s perspective, the three evaluations submitted are not that useful to

the [c]ourt’s determination as to what the permanency goal should be. Each

report is vastly different from the prior report making it difficult to find any of them

are dispositive on this topic.” The court instead focused on the inconsistency in

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