In the Interest of C.C., Minor Child

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1073 Filed September 17, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C., Minor Child,

D.C.-M., Father, Appellant,

A.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mark C. Cord III,

Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

John S. Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant father.

Molly Vakulskas Joly of Vakulskas Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Timothy A. Scherle, Sioux City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2

GREER, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their respective

parental rights to C.C., born in July 2024. The mother challenges the termination,

arguing (1) the State did not prove statutory grounds for termination under Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(h)(4) (2025), (2) termination is not in the best interest of

the child, and (3) the juvenile court should have granted a six-month extension to

work toward reunification. The father solely challenges the finding as to his rights

under the same statutory ground for termination.

We affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating the mother’s and

father’s parental rights to C.C.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS) a few days after C.C.’s birth when it was reported that

C.C.’s urine tested positive for methamphetamine. The mother’s urine also tested

positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. This resulted in a founded child

abuse assessment for presence of illegal drugs in a child because the mother’s

substance use caused a positive test for C.C. At first the mother denied using

methamphetamine, but the father reported they usually used at the beginning of

the month. The father’s hair sample, collected in late July, also tested positive for

amphetamine and methamphetamine. In September, C.C. was adjudicated a child

in need of assistance (CINA).

HHS removed C.C. from parental custody soon after his birth; he was

initially placed with a foster family placement until a relative placement was

located. In August, HHS placed C.C. with the mother’s cousin. C.C. remained 3

with this relative placement through the termination proceedings—for most of his

first year of life. In his relative placement C.C. maintained contact with his

extended family. The mother’s cousin began taking steps to adopt the child. C.C.

has never been returned to parental care, had a trial home visit, or been in the

unsupervised care of his parents.

Prior to C.C.’s birth, the mother and father were unhoused and did not have

a stable place to raise the child. Yet, the parents made progress quickly; the month

after C.C.’s birth the parents began residing in a trailer home purchased by the

paternal grandmother. The mother began attending substance-use treatment

sessions in October, and it was reported she would finish treatment in May or

June 2025. The father began substance-use treatment in October as well and by

May 2025 it was recommended he continue outpatient sessions for a few more

weeks. The mother and father tested negative for all substances in

December 2024 and April 2025.

At a medication management appointment in November 2024, the mother

claimed she had not taken her mental-health medication for three months. She

had missed several appointments since August because she was overwhelmed or

had technical difficulties accessing virtual appointments. In January 2025, she had

missed three more appointments since her November visit and been out of her

medication for a few weeks.

The mother had a psychological evaluation in February 2025 but cancelled

her follow-up appointment for later that same month. The evaluation revealed

“multiple factors that interfere with parenting, which include illicit substance use,

intellectual/cognitive deficits, and emotional dysregulation.” In the evaluation it 4

was noted these factors interact in a way that causes vulnerability with parenting

and may degrade her parenting decision making. The evaluator recommended

the mother continue mental-health therapy, medication, and consider additional

services. But the mother continued to miss mental-health appointments after the

evaluation. If reunification occurred, oversight by HHS for a temporary amount of

time was recommended. In April, the mother reported she had been out of her

mental-health medications for over two months and was able to get them refilled.

The father underwent a psychological evaluation in March and was noted

to have below-average intelligence. He was diagnosed with a number of mental-

health disorders yet declined any mental-health medication support.

Shortly after removal the parents began having two-hour visits twice a week

with C.C. The father missed approximately one month’s worth of visits due to

being incarcerated in early 2025. Throughout HHS’s involvement, the parents

have lacked consistent attendance and sometimes had to end visits early, often

citing transportation issues. Despite having transportation services available to

them the parents did not use these services regularly. Nor have the parents been

consistent in providing necessities for all visits with C.C. At some visits the parents

have shown up with no supplies or an unwashed bottle.

Both parents successfully completed two parenting courses, the first course

in April and the second in May, that taught skills about safety concerns and

managing stress from a child. Even so, the most recent progress report cited

continuing parenting concerns. The mother made formula in a sports drink bottle

and offered it to the child, even after repeated prompts by the visitation specialist

not to give C.C. the bottle. The visitation specialist also reported that the parents 5

let C.C. practice standing in a way that could lead to injury, and the mother

suggested the child be placed on his back so he could “get a flat head.” The father

has reported frustration with C.C. because it can be unclear what the child wants.

And the father testified it took both parents to change C.C.’s diaper during their

visits with him because the child moved around and they were afraid to drop him.

In May, the parents reported to the social worker case manager that a

paternal aunt had used marijuana in their home. The aunt began living with them

at the request of the paternal grandmother. The father testified that the aunt invites

her friends over and plays loud music. He has smelled “weed” coming from her

room.1 The father, mother, and aunt all pay rent to live in the home. As the juvenile

court noted, because the aunt pays rent “[i]t could take time for her to be forced to

leave if she chose not to leave.”

In March, the State petitioned for termination of both the mother’s and

father’s parental rights to C.C. The grounds for termination alleged the child could

not be returned to the parents as neither parent had successfully addressed their

mental-health concerns or internalized parenting skills. The termination hearing

began in March and was finalized in May. At the hearing, a social worker case

manager testified that neither parent was on the path to obtaining unsupervised

visits with C.C. She testified that the main concern for both parents was their

mental health and medication management. The father later testified he was not

seeking mental-health treatment.

1 The mother testified contrary to this and claimed the aunt does not use substances and she may have smelled “skunk” instead of marijuana. 6

At the termination trial both parents argued a guardianship should be put in

place in lieu of termination. HHS argued C.C. was too young for a guardianship

and termination of the parents’ rights was in his best interest. The mother asked

for more time to utilize more services to better be able to care for the child. The

guardian ad litem (GAL) shared his concern about the parent’s ability to take care

of C.C. both at the time of the termination hearing and in the future “be it six months

or longer.” In May, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s and father’s parental

rights to C.C. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). Both parents now

appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

“We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839,

843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights

where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for

termination.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). “Evidence is

clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the

correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 435. “Our

primary concern is the best interests of the child.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798

(Iowa 2006).

III. Analysis.

Both parents challenge the termination of their respective parental rights.

We apply a three-step analysis when reviewing the juvenile court’s decision to

terminate parental rights, asking whether (1) a statutory ground for termination is

satisfied, (2) the child’s best interests are served by termination, and (3) a

permissive exception applies and should be exercised to preclude termination. 7

See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)–(3).

A. Mother’s Appeal2

We address each parent’s appeal separately. See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d

157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (“In termination of parental rights proceedings each parent’s

parental rights are separate adjudications, both factually and legally.” (cleaned

up)). We address the mother’s appeal first.

1. Statutory Ground for Termination. First, the mother argues the State

failed to prove Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) by clear and convincing evidence.

The mother only challenges the fourth element, which allows the court to terminate

parental rights when “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot

be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at

the present time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4);3 see In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d

703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpretating “at the present time” to mean at the time of

the termination hearing). At the time of the termination hearing the mother was not

2 The State argues the mother has waived error to all of her issues on appeal by

failing to make a substantive argument. We assume without deciding that the mother adequately briefed the issues we address, and we proceed to the merits related to those issues. 3 The other elements for termination under section 232.116(1)(h) are:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated [CINA] pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. At the time of the final day of the termination hearing in May 2025, C.C. was less than one year old, had been adjudicated CINA, and had been removed from the parent’s custody for the previous ten consecutive months. 8

in a position where she could care for the child. See In re J.R., No. 18-1247, 2019

WL 478690, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019) (affirming termination when the

mother could not perform basic parenting skills, like changing her child’s diaper).

Even with support available to her she concedes she could not have the child at

home without monitoring from HHS or help from others. Service providers also

could not recommend unsupervised care by the mother. Due to the “little progress

on the various issues” that prompted initial involvement by HHS, the GAL

recommended termination of both parents’ parental rights. Commendably, the

mother does seem to have improved in her sobriety. But she exhibited a lack of

consistency with mental-health treatment and limited parenting improvements.

Likewise, there is uncertainty with the paternal aunt still residing in their home and

issues with her prior substance use.

We will not gamble with this young child[]’s future by asking him to

continuously wait for a stable biological parent. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. As

observed by the juvenile court, the mother did not develop a capacity to care for

C.C. in a way to ensure his health and safety without ongoing support and

oversight. We find clear and convincing evidence for termination under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(h). See In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016)

(“A child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parent under

section 232.102 if by doing so the child would be exposed to any harm amounting

to a new child in need of assistance adjudication.” (cleaned up)); see D.W., 791

N.W.2d at 708 (recognizing that “lower mental functioning alone is not sufficient

grounds for termination,” but can be a contributing factor to a parent’s inability to

provide a safe and stable home). 9

2. Best Interest.4 Next, the mother argues termination of her parental rights

is not in the best interests of C.C.

In assessing best interests of a child we give primary weight “to the child’s

safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of

the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the

child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). When deciding what is in a child’s best interests

we consider what care the child would receive if returned to the parents. J.H., 952

N.W.2d at 798. To determine this “we look to the parents’ past performance

because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the

future.” J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa

1997)). As noted by the juvenile court, relevant considerations in best interest

analysis include the “mental capacity of a parent and the existence of a

preadoptive foster family in the life of a child.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708. C.C. has

been in the care of his mother’s cousin since he was less than two weeks old and

has developed successfully. She has provided for his needs, and she intends to

adopt the child. By the time of the termination hearing, the mother was unable to

internalize safe parenting techniques and care for C.C alone. We find termination

of the mother’s rights and adoption is in C.C.’s best interests

4 In the “Issue #2” section of her petition on appeal, the mother mentions in passing

that “a guardianship is in the best interests of the minor child to ensure the bond between CC and Mother remains intact.” But the mother fails to develop an argument beyond that, so we do not consider the guardianship issue. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (requiring petitions on appeal to “substantially comply with rule 6.1401—Form 5”), 6.1401—Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court made with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a particular part of the record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your position on appeal: . . . Include supporting legal authority for each issue raised, including authority contrary to appellant’s case, if known.”). 10

3. Additional Time. Lastly, the mother claims the juvenile court should have

granted additional time for her to engage with the services set forth in her

psychological evaluation. After the termination trial, the juvenile court may decide

to not terminate parental rights if it finds there is clear and convincing evidence

that CINA proceedings should continue and enter an order to extend the time for

reunification in accordance with section 232.104(2)(b). Iowa Code § 232.117(5).

The court may continue the proceedings for an additional six months if it finds “the

need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month

period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child

of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under

section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be

able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa

2014) (citation omitted). The mother only made small improvements in managing

her mental health and her parenting techniques with C.C. A delay would not be in

C.C.’s best interests; the social worker case manager testified that additional time

could be harmful to C.C. “given his age, he needs structure and a permanent

home.” We agree with the juvenile court that additional time is not warranted

because we cannot say the need for removal would be resolved within six months.

B. Father’s Appeal

The father only makes one argument on appeal: the State failed to prove a

statutory ground for termination.

Statutory Ground for Termination. The father asserts that the State failed

to prove termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) by clear and

convincing evidence. Pursuant to this paragraph a juvenile court may terminate 11

parental rights when the child cannot be returned to the care of the parent at the

time of the termination hearing, among other elements not in dispute here. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4). The evidence established that at the time of the

termination hearing the father was unable to care for C.C. See, e.g., In re R.B.,

No. 02-1824, 2003 WL 290028, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003) (affirming

termination of a father’s parental rights for several reasons including when he could

not demonstrate basic parenting skills necessary to care for his children and failed

to address his mental health with medication); J.R., 2019 WL 478690, at *2

(affirming termination when the mother struggled with basic skills, like changing a

diaper). Since C.C.’s birth, the child has never lived with the father. The social

worker case manager testified that the unaddressed concerns at the time of the

termination trial were the father’s mental health, substance use, and medication

management.

But there were also concerns related to the father’s ability to handle basic

care of C.C. The father mentioned stress from parenting C.C. during their visits—

only total four hours per week—and as the juvenile court and GAL pointed out

there are another 164 hours within the week to consider. Both parents struggled

with knowing what C.C.’s needs were, like if he was hungry. Even with the

assistance of parenting classes the father could not change C.C.’s diaper by

himself or consistently bring necessary items to care for C.C. during their visits.

Despite access to services, the father did not want to attend mental-health therapy

or take medications. At the termination hearing the social worker case manager

testified the father could not have C.C. in his custody. Admirably, the father

seemed to progress in his sobriety, but this alone was not enough to ensure safe 12

caretaking for C.C. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707–08 (affirming termination

despite the mother’s current commitment to sobriety because she could not

overcome her parenting deficiencies). Additionally, there was uncertainty as to

whether the paternal aunt will still reside in the home and concerns with her prior

substance use.

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights because the State

proved that the child could not be safely returned to the father’s custody at the time

of the termination hearing.

IV. Conclusion.

For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of both the

mother’s and father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.