in the Interest of C.A. and L.A., Children

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 12, 2018·No. 05-18-00645-CV·Published

Opinion

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 12, 2018

Court of Appeals S In The

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-00645-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.A. AND L.A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the County Court At Law No. 1 Kaufman County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 95793-CC

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Fillmore, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Whitehill

Appellant (Father) appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to his daughter

L.A.1 He asserts two issues:

(i) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and

(ii) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

We affirm, holding that (i) any error demonstrated in issue one is harmless because Father

does not challenge two other termination grounds found by the trial court and (ii) the evidence is

legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.

1 The other child listed in the case style, C.A., is not Father’s child. C.A. and L.A. have the same mother, and Mother’s parental rights as to both children were also terminated in this case. Mother did not appeal. I. BACKGROUND

Father and Mother have one child born by them, L.A. Father also had a child, L.S., with a

different woman. And Mother had another child, C.A., with a different man, R.J.B.

In August 2016, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed C.A.

and L.A. from Mother and Father’s custody and filed this case seeking to terminate both parents’

rights. The Department alleged that at the time C.A. was three years old and L.A. was six months

old.

Mother and Father answered. C.A.’s father never personally appeared, but an attorney was

appointed for him.

Temporary orders made the Department the children’s temporary managing conservator.

In May 2017, the parties signed a mediated settlement agreement imposing numerous requirements

on Mother and Father, such as paying child support and providing proof of employment. In June

2017, they signed a family service plan containing similar requirements.

C.A. and L.A. were placed with the same foster parents. In November 2017, the foster

parents intervened in the termination suit requesting (i) appointment as the children’s joint

managing conservators and (ii) termination of the children’s parents’ rights.

The case was tried without a jury. After one day of trial in January 2018, the court recessed

the trial so the parties could mediate the case. The trial resumed in April 2018 for four more days.

Mother’s affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was admitted into evidence. She

–2– also testified that there was an agreement that she would still have visits with the children four

times a year. Many other witnesses testified at trial, but Father did not.

The trial court rendered judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights as to both children

and Father’s parental rights as to L.A. The judgment also gave Mother quarterly supervised

visitation with the children, consistent with her testimony. It appointed the Department as

permanent managing conservator for both children. It also appointed C.A.’s father as her

possessory conservator.

Father timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Issue One: Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)?

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father engaged in the conduct

described in Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (F), and (O). In Father’s first issue, he

argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the findings under

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).

However, only one § 161.001(b)(1) predicate finding (plus a best-interest finding) is

necessary to support a judgment terminating parental rights. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)–(2). Father does not challenge the trial court’s findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(F)

and (O). Accordingly, any purported error in the court’s findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and

(E), (which we do not address), is harmless, because the findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(F) and

(O) would remain to support the judgment. See In re A.H.J., No. 05-15-00501-CV, 2015 WL

5866256, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 8, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

We overrule Father’s first issue.

–3– B. Issue Two: Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that terminating Father’s parental rights was in L.A.’s best interest?

Father’s second issue argues that the trial court’s best-interest finding is supported by

legally and factually insufficient evidence. We disagree for the reasons stated below.

1. Standard of Review

Because terminating parental rights implicates fundamental interests, the clear and

convincing standard of proof applies in termination cases. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex.

2014). “Clear and convincing evidence” is the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the

factfinder’s mind a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the matter to be proved. FAM.

§ 101.007.

Our standards of review reflect the elevated burden at trial. In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465,

475 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). Specifically, in both legal and factual sufficiency review,

we consider all the evidence. Id. Under both standards we defer to the factfinder’s determinations

as to witness credibility. Id.

In a legal sufficiency review, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if a reasonable

fact finder could have done so, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder

could not have done so. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). However, we do not

disregard undisputed facts that do not support the verdict. Id. at 113. If no reasonable fact finder

could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter to be proven is true, the evidence is legally

insufficient. Id.

In a factual sufficiency review, we likewise determine whether the fact finder could

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations. In re A.B.,

437 S.W.3d at 502. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could

not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.”

–4– Id. at 503 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). We must undertake an exacting

review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake. Id.

However, our review “must not be so rigorous that the only factfindings that could withstand

review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex.

2002).

2. Applicable Law

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