Opinion issued October 4, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-16-00300-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF B.M.C. AND C.M.C., Children
On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2015-01931J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court terminated the parental rights of S.M.C., a/k/a S.M.E.
(“Mother”), to her two children, B.M.C. and C.M.C. In three issues, Mother
argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s findings supporting termination of her parental rights pursuant to Texas
Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O) and 161.001(b)(2). We affirm. Background
B.M.C. and C.M.C. were born on August 9, 2009, and May 21, 2012,
respectively. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”)
became involved in the children’s lives in 2012 when Mother tested positive for
cocaine and marijuana at the birth of her youngest daughter, C.M.C., who also
tested positive for drugs in her system at the time of her birth. Mother was required
to move out of her home temporarily while C.D.F.C. (“Father”) cared for both
children. After completing a safety plan and submitting to numerous drug tests
with negative results, Mother was allowed to move back in with her children and
the 2012 case was closed.1
On February 18, 2015, DFPS received another referral regarding the
children based on allegations of neglectful supervision. While at school, B.M.C.
was overheard telling her classmates that her father had choked her mother. When
B.M.C. was pulled aside and questioned further, she demonstrated the act of
choking someone by placing her hand on her own neck, asserting that that was
what her father had done to her mother. She stated that her mother was held down
1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father, C.D.F.C. Father filed a separate notice of appeal on April 4, 2016, which was assigned appellate cause number 01-16-00308-CV. In an opinion dated June 2, 2016, this Court granted Father’s unopposed motion to dismiss his appeal, and, accordingly, he is not a party to this appeal.
2 and choked and that the choking only stopped when B.M.C. went and requested
help from neighbors who then intervened.
During a DFPS interview, Mother admitted to the domestic violence and
described an argument in which both she and Father became physically violent
with one another. She admitted that they frequently fought in front of the children,
even while the children were screaming and crying. Mother admitted that she had
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety, but that she had not
taken the medication prescribed to help her with her mental health issues for four
months prior to the interview.
The DFPS investigator observed that the home that Mother, Father, and the
children lived in had physical damage in the form of holes in the walls and floors,
and Mother admitted to the investigator that these holes were the result of the
parents’ fighting. Both Mother and Father were subjected to drug testing on
February 25, 2015, and the results for both were positive for cocaine.
With the parents’ agreement, DFPS placed the children in a Parental Child
Safety Placement with a family friend, Tanesha Cooks. On March 24, 2015, Cooks
requested that the children be removed because Mother came to Cooks’ home and
engaged in a shouting match through the door, demanding to see the children.
Mother also made threatening phone calls and sent threatening text messages.
Numerous efforts were made by DFPS to find another voluntary placement, but for
3 various reasons, including income and criminal history, the relatives suggested by
the parents were found to be unsuitable. The children were then placed in a foster
home, and the parents were given supervised visitation. The parents had originally
visited the children together, but due to an incident involving a violent argument
between the parents during the course of the visit, the parents were subsequently
required to visit the children separately.
On March 25, 2015, DFPS filed a petition seeking conservatorship of the
children and termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children.
The trial court signed an emergency order that same day and held an adversary
hearing in which it ruled that DFPS should remain the temporary managing
conservator of the children. On May 19, 2015, the trial court held a status hearing
at which Mother appeared and was represented by counsel. The trial court
approved DFPS’s service plan and ordered Mother to complete it. Both parents
were warned by the court that failure to complete the service plan could result in
termination of their parental rights.
Under the court-ordered service plan, Mother was required to maintain
steady employment and housing and to abstain from criminal activity. Specifically,
Mother was required to complete domestic violence and parenting courses, to
submit to psychological and psychiatric evaluations, to participate in individual
and substance abuse counseling, and to submit to random drug screenings. Mother
4 completed some, but not all, of these requirements, and DFPS moved forward with
its plans to terminate the parents’ rights to the children.
At the trial on March 1, 2016, DFPS presented evidence that Mother had not
completed either the individual therapy or the substance abuse training. DFPS
caseworker Chequetta Deadmon testified that she believed that Mother could have
completed the court-ordered service plan in the time given. Deadmon also testified
that Mother had previously participated in a drug treatment program, ending in
September 2015, but Mother had continued to test positive for drugs throughout
the course of participating in that program.
Deadmon testified that Mother tested positive for cocaine, benzodiazepines,
and alcohol on April 7, 2015. On May 19, 2015, Mother again tested positive for
cocaine, benzodiazepines, and alcohol, as well as synthetic marijuana. On August
20, 2015, Mother tested positive for synthetic marijuana, cocaine, benzodiazepines,
and alcohol. On November 10, 2015, Mother tested positive for synthetic
marijuana, cocaine, and benzodiazepines. Deadmon testified that she made diligent
efforts to engage Mother and get her services completed and that termination of
parental rights would be in children’s best interest because of Mother’s lack of
sobriety since the beginning of the case, her instability, and the lack of a safe and
appropriate home.
5 Deadmon testified that the children were doing well in their current foster
home. Deadmon stated that the children had no special needs and that the foster
parents were meeting all of the children’s basic psychological and emotional
needs. Deadmon noted that B.M.C. was in first grade and C.M.C was three years
old at the time of trial. The children were getting needed dental work, going to
school and daycare, and receiving love and support from their foster family.
Deadmon testified that the foster parents had intervened in the case, wanted to
adopt the children, and that DFPS supported this goal.
Etta Pickett, an Advocacy Coordinator at Child Advocates, Inc., served as
the children’s guardian ad litem and testified that their current placement was
meeting the children’s physical and emotional needs. Pickett stated that Child
Advocates supported the motion for the termination of parental rights and adoption
by the foster parents. Pickett testified that Child Advocates believed parental
termination was in the children’s best interest because the parents engaged in
ongoing domestic violence both before and after the children’s removal and
because there were observations of escalated verbal aggression in front of the
children during visits. Pickett testified that it was important that Mother receive the
necessary treatment for her substance abuse issues. She noted that B.M.C. had
issues with her teeth due to inappropriate care and diet for a child of that age and
had to undergo significant dental care. Pickett added that B.M.C. was in first grade,
6 was consistently attending school, was engaged and loved her classes, and was
making a lot of progress. She also noted that the children referred to their foster
parents as mom and dad.
The foster mother testified that the children had been in her home for eleven
months and that the children had bonded with her family, that she wanted to adopt
the children, that the children were involved in extracurricular activities, and that
she took care of their physical and emotional needs.
Mother testified that she had a “strong” bond with her children. She
acknowledged that she had a substance abuse problem and had tried to get help.
She testified that some of the drug tests performed for her caseworker and
psychiatrist were negative and that she had wanted to attend a second substance
abuse treatment program. However, she was unable to do so prior to trial because
DFPS did not set anything up until two weeks before trial. Mother stated that she
had an apartment.
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother violated
Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O) and that termination of her
parental rights to both children was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, the
trial court rendered its final judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to
B.M.C. and C.M.C. and naming DFPS as the permanent managing conservator.
This appeal followed.
7 Sufficiency of the Evidence
In three issues, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the trial court’s determinations that termination of her parental rights was proper
under Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O) and that, pursuant to
section 161.001(b)(2), termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best
interest.
A. Standard of Review
In a case to terminate parental rights brought by DFPS under section
161.001, DFPS must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the
parent committed one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying
termination and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 2016); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex.
2002). “Clear and convincing evidence” is “the measure or degree of proof that
will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007
(Vernon 2014); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009).
In conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a parental-rights-termination
case brought by DFPS under section 161.001, we must look at the entire record to
determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding,
is such that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction
8 about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore the burden of proof. See In re
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).
We “must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding
if a reasonable factfinder could do so,” and we “should disregard all evidence that
a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”
Id.; Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,
pet. denied).
In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we view the disputed or
conflicting evidence. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. We should consider
whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have
resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at
266. The evidence is factually insufficient only if, “in light of the entire record, the
disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of
the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a
firm belief or conviction” regarding the finding under review. In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 345 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
DFPS must establish both elements—that the parent committed one of the
acts or omissions enumerated in section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of
parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 23. Termination may not be solely based on
9 the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human
Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). However, “[o]nly one predicate
finding under section [161.001(b)(1)] is necessary to support a judgment of
termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
B. Findings Pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E)
Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) provides that a parent’s rights can be
terminated when she has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-
being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The parent’s
conduct must cause the endangerment, and the endangerment must be the result of
a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent rather than a
single act or omission. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723; In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,
125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). “‘To endanger’ means to expose a
child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health.”
Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723; In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (citing In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996)).
Endangerment of a child does not have to be established as an independent
proposition but can be inferred from parental misconduct alone. In re T.N., 180
S.W.3d at 383 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).
10 “‘[E]ndanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or [the]
potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, but that endangering
conduct need not be directed at the child,” and it is not necessary that the child
actually suffer injury. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012) (citing Boyd,
727 S.W.2d at 533); In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d at 383 (citing In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d
at 269); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (holding that endangering
conduct is not limited to actions directed toward child); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723
(endangering conduct may be inferred from parental misconduct even if conduct is
not directed at child and child suffers no actual injury). “[A] parent’s use of
narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an endangering
course of conduct,” and courts may look to evidence of parental conduct both
before and after a child’s birth and before and after a child’s removal from the
home to determine whether termination is appropriate. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at
345 (citing In re M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet.
denied)); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (explaining that relevant
conduct may occur either before or after child’s removal from home).
Here, DFPS presented evidence that Mother’s conduct, particularly her
continued drug use and participation in family violence, endangered her children.
C.M.C. was born with cocaine in her system because Mother used drugs while she
11 was pregnant. After DFPS established a family safety plan and Mother had
completed one substance abuse treatment program, she continued to test positive
during court-ordered drug screenings. Although Mother had enrolled in a second
drug treatment program, both DFPS and Child Advocates testified that Mother had
not demonstrated an ability to maintain her sobriety for an appropriate amount of
time.
DFPS also presented evidence regarding the environment in which the
children were raised. The children came into DFPS care for the second time in
2015 because of their exposure to domestic violence in the home. Upon
investigation, Mother admitted to participating in domestic violence. She stated
that she and Father would attack each other in front of the children while the
children were crying and screaming and that the fights were so violent that they
resulted in damage to the family home. The children had to be removed from the
parental safety placement with Mother’s friend Cooks after Mother arrived at
Cooks’ home, shouting and demanding to see her children. And while the children
were under DFPS care, caseworkers observed interactions between the Mother and
Father that resulted in the parents having to visit their children separately.
Accordingly, viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s finding, we conclude that the evidence supports a firm belief or conviction
that Mother “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons
12 who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being
of the child[ren].” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 345.
Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that she
engaged in conduct endangering her children’s well-being because she did not
engage in conduct or a course of conduct that endangered the children. Rather, she
argues that Father committed the domestic violence that resulted in the children
coming into DFPS care and that she was a victim of Father’s violence. However,
the evidence, including Mother’s own admissions, does not support this allegation.
Mother admitted to the DFPS investigator that both parents would physically
attack each other in the children’s presence, even as the children cried, to the
extent that they put holes in the walls and floors of their home. During supervised
visitation, the relationship between Mother and Father was so contentious that the
visits had to be altered to avoid confrontation. There is no evidence that the
tendencies for domestic disputes by either parent was resolved. See Walker, 312
S.W.3d at 617 (“Evidence as to how a parent has treated another child or spouse is
relevant regarding whether a course of conduct under section [161.001(b)(1)(E)]
has been established.”).
Furthermore, Mother’s argument does not address the evidence that she
engaged in ongoing substance abuse. Both Mother and C.M.C. tested positive for
13 drug use at the time of C.M.C.’s birth. DFPS intervened, Mother attended drug
treatment, and the children were returned to Mother’s care. Mother again tested
positive for drug use beginning in February 2015, when the children were referred
to DFPS because of B.M.C.’s report of domestic violence. In spite of receiving
subsequent drug treatment and other services, Mother repeatedly tested positive for
illegal drugs during the course of DFPS’s involvement with her family. Mother’s
failure to remain drug-free while under DFPS supervision supports the trial court’s
finding of endangering conduct. See id. at 617–18 (failure to remain drug free
constitutes endangering conduct, even without direct evidence that parent’s drug
use injured children, because it exposes children to possibility that parent may be
impaired or imprisoned); In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d at 383 (“A parent’s engaging in
illegal drug activity after agreeing not to do so in a service plan for reunification
with her children is . . . clear and convincing proof of voluntary, deliberate, and
conscious conduct that endangered the well-being of her children.”).
Thus, even considering the conflicting evidence, we cannot conclude that the
contrary evidence is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in conduct endangering her
children’s well-being. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345.
Because we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding pursuant to Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E),
14 we need not address Mother’s second issue challenging the other basis for
termination of her parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(O). See In re A.V.,
113 S.W.3d at 362 (“Only one predicate finding under section [161.001(b)(1)] is
necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest.”).
We overrule Mother’s first and second issues.
C. Finding on Children’s Best Interest
In her third issue, Mother argues that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination of her parental
rights was in the children’s best interest.
There is a strong presumption that the best interest of the child will be
served by preserving the parent-child relationship. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112,
116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). Prompt and permanent placement of the child in a
safe environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (Vernon Supp. 2016). The Family Code and the Texas
Supreme Court have both set out numerous factors to be considered in determining
a child’s best interest, including, among others: the child’s age and physical and
mental vulnerabilities; the frequency and nature of out-of-home placement; the
magnitude, frequency and circumstances of harm to the child, including current
and future danger to the child; whether there is a history of substance abuse by the
15 child’s family; the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive
environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; the child’s
family’s demonstration of adequate parenting skills, including providing the child
and other children under the family’s care with minimally adequate health and
nutritional care, guidance and supervision, and a safe physical home environment;
the stability of the home or proposed placement; and the parent’s acts or omission
indicating an improper parent-child relationship and any excuses for the acts or
omissions. See id. § 263.307(b); In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116; Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
This is not an exhaustive list, and a court need not have evidence on every
element listed in order to make a valid finding as to the child’s best interest. See In
re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The evidence supporting the statutory grounds for
termination may also be used to support a finding that the best interest of the child
warrants termination of the parent-child relationship. Id. at 28; In re N.R.T., 338
S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). Furthermore, the best
interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the
totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence. See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d
at 677. The best-interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the
parent. Id.
16 Here, multiple factors support the trial court’s finding that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. DFPS presented
evidence regarding Mother’s drug abuse and endangerment of the children, as
discussed above. DFPS presented evidence that, despite successfully completing a
drug treatment program, Mother failed to complete her family service plan by
failing to remain drug free, failing to obtain and maintain stable employment, and
failing to complete either the individual therapy or the substance abuse training.
Mother herself admitted to a DFPS investigator that she and Father engaged in
domestic violence in which they would sometimes assault each other and that the
children were exposed to this. DFPS also presented evidence of the extent of
Mother’s history of mental health issues and drug abuse, her unwillingness to
complete the necessary treatment or other court-ordered services, and her lack of
parenting skills. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b) (providing that, in
determining best interest of child, courts should consider circumstances of harm,
history of substance abuse, willingness to complete services, demonstration of
parenting skills, and any excuse for prior acts or omissions); In re E.C.R., 402
S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013) (holding that findings under section
161.001(b)(1)(O) that parent failed to complete court-ordered services can support
best interest finding); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (providing that, in
determining best interest of child, courts should examine stability of home and
17 proposed placement and parent’s acts or omissions indicating improper
relationship).
DFPS also presented evidence that B.M.C. was in first grade and C.M.C was
three years old at the time of trial. DFPS also presented evidence that B.M.C. had
been exposed to circumstances that were inappropriate for a child of her age and
development when she observed domestic violence between her parents and had to
seek help from her neighbors. B.M.C. also had not received adequate dental care.
DFPS presented evidence that C.M.C. was born with drugs in her system as a
result of Mother’s prenatal drug use. Thus, the children’s ages and physical and
mental vulnerabilities weigh in favor of termination of Mother’s parental rights.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b); In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116.
Regarding the children’s placement at the time of trial, DFPS indicated that
the children’s needs were being met by their foster parents, that they had bonded
with the foster parents, and that the foster parents wished to adopt them. DFPS
presented evidence that the children were getting needed dental work, going to
school and daycare, and receiving love and support from the foster family. Thus,
the stability of the proposed placement also weighs in favor of terminating
Mother’s parental rights. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b) (providing courts
should consider stability of proposed placement in determining children’s best
interest).
18 Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
finding, the evidence supports a firm belief or conviction that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 344; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b) (setting out non-
exclusive factors to consider in making best-interest determination).
Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the termination
of her parental rights is in B.M.C. and C.M.C.’s best interest. She argues that she
substantially complied with the requirements of her family service plan, and but for
the irresponsible handling of the referral for substance abuse classes and
counseling by DFPS, Mother would have completed all of her services. However,
the Family Code “does not ‘make a provision for excuses’ for a parent’s failure to
comply with the trial court’s order” to complete a family service plan, nor does it
“provide a means of evaluating partial or substantial compliance with a plan.” In re
S.Y., 435 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re C.R.,
263 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) and In re D.N., 405
S.W.3d 863, 877 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.)); see also In re E.C.R., 402
S.W.3d at 249-50 (holding that findings under section 161.001(1)(O) that parent
failed to complete court-ordered services can support best interest finding).
Mother’s argument that she substantially complied with her service plan and
that she was prevented from completing the plan by DFPS’s failure to provide
19 adequate service does not create a factual dispute as to her compliance; rather, it is
in the nature of an excuse for her failure to comply. See In re C.M.C., 273 S.W.3d
862, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (recognizing that
mother’s explanation for her failure to complete court-ordered parenting class was
excuse for undisputed failure to comply with court’s order and that Family Code
section 161.001(b)(1)(O) “does not make a provision for excuses”); Wilson v.
State, 116 S.W.3d. 923, 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). And other
evidence in the record contradicted Mother’s testimony regarding her ability to
complete her plan. Deadmon, the DFPS caseworker, testified that she believed
Mother could have completed her family service plan in the time given and that
Mother had participated in a drug treatment program ending in September 2015 but
kept testing positive for drug use during that program. A reasonable factfinder
could have chosen to believe Deadmon’s testimony that Mother could have
completed the family safety plan in the time given.
Mother also argues that she visited her children regularly and that she had a
very strong bond with her children. However, the record also indicates that Mother
engaged in domestic violence in front of her children, including an incident that
was observed during supervised visitation and resulted in the parents needing to
visit the children separately. And the record contains no evidence that Mother’s
ongoing substance abuse issues—dating back at least to DFPS’s first intervention
20 in the children’s lives in 2012 and continuing through the time of trial in March
2016—are likely to be any different going forward.
Viewing all of the evidence, as we must, we conclude that any disputed
evidence was not so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed
a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344. Thus, we conclude
that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. See id. at 344–
45.
We overrule Mother’s third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Brown.