Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00842-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., a Child
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023CI18641 Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding 1
PER CURIAM
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 23, 2025
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
On December 9, 2024, appellant, proceeding pro se, filed a “Special Notice of Direct
Appeal,” and, on December 17, 2024, appellant filed an “Amended Notice of Appeal.” Appellant’s
notices of appeal do not specify a judgment or other order from which appellant appeals. On
December 27, 2024, the clerk’s record was filed, and it does not contain a final judgment. “Unless
specifically authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only to review final
judgments.” McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2018); accord
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
1 The Honorable Laura Salinas is the presiding judge of the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas; however, appellant complains of actions by the Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa and the Honorable Christine Vasquez-Hortick, sitting by assignment. 04-24-00842-CV
Because the clerk’s record does not include a final judgment and because appellant had not
directed us to an appealable interlocutory order, we ordered appellant to show cause why this
appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). On
February 11 and 21, 2025, appellant filed responses, one of which was titled “Specific Court
Orders Trial Court Violated.” Additionally, the court reporters filed volumes of the reporter’s
record from hearings in the underlying trial-court cause number 2023CI18641, and a reporter filed
a transcript from a hearing held in trial-court cause number 2023CI24589. Prior to our show cause
order, appellant had filed a brief.
In appellant’s filings he broadly complains that he has been wrongly denied possession of
his son, B.M. In the underlying trial-court cause number, 2023CI18641, appellant filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus seeking the return of B.M. to his possession. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 157.372. 2 The Family Code provides for a writ of habeas corpus as “a ready means for
deliverance of a child from unlawful detention.” Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex.
1978) (orig. proceeding) (discussing prior statute); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.372. “Upon
proof of the bare legal right of possession, the grant of the writ of habeas corpus should be
automatic, immediate, and ministerial.” In re deFilippi, 235 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2007, no pet.) (citing Schoenfeld v. Onion, 647 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1983) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) and Strobel, 565 S.W.2d at 239). Attached to appellant’s petition is an
order of termination in cause number 2011-PA-02952 from the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar
County, Texas, signed in 2012, which orders appellant appointed permanent managing conservator
of B.M.
2 Appellant later filed an amended petition and then a second amended petition. Our discussion refers to appellant’s second amended petition.
-2- 04-24-00842-CV
On October 13, 2023, in cause number 2023CI18641, the 166th Judicial District Court
signed an “Order for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus,” which ordered the respondent, T.M.O., 3
to bring B.M. to the court on November 6, 2023, “to determine whether the Petitioner has a
superior right to possession of the child[] and whether the child[] should be returned to the
Petitioner.” The clerk’s record also includes a second “Order for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” signed on November 6, 2023, setting a hearing date of November 20, 2023, and
specifying a similar purpose. The reporter’s record includes a transcript from a November 6, 2023
hearing, at which T.M.O. did not appear. The reporter’s record also includes a transcript from a
November 20, 2023 hearing, at which T.M.O. appeared through her attorney. T.M.O.’s attorney
represented that T.M.O. had not been served prior to the November 6, 2023 hearing. At the
conclusion of the November 20, 2023 hearing, the trial court stated: “I’m not going to issue the
habeas today. I’ll take it under advisement.”
The court reporter who transcribed the November 20, 2023 hearing in the 166th Judicial
District Court also transcribed a hearing that occurred later that day in the 285th Judicial District
Court in cause number 2023CI24589. 4 This second transcript concerns a hearing held on an
application for temporary restraining order made by T.M.O. in a separate trial-court proceeding.
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court stated that it would sign a temporary restraining
order, providing that T.M.O. would be appointed as a joint managing conservator of B.M. The trial
court stated that the temporary restraining order would expire on December 4, 2023, and the parties
and the trial court scheduled a hearing to be held prior to that date. Appellant’s brief and replies to
our show cause order specify that appellant complains about further actions taken by the 285th
Judicial District Court in cause number 2023CI24589, including temporary orders that were
3 To protect the identity of the minor child B.M., we refer to the respondent by her initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 4 The reporter filed this transcript in the appellate record of the instant appeal.
-3- 04-24-00842-CV
purportedly entered on May 14, 2024; however, these matters are not reflected in our appellate
record. 5 On December 9, 2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal in cause number 2023CI18641,
from which this appeal arises.
“Appellate review is ordinarily limited to final judgments. An appellate court has no
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless review is conferred by statute.” Harley
Channelview Properties, LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024)
(footnotes omitted). In our show cause order, we required appellant to direct us to an appealable
order. Appellant responded by directing us to various interlocutory orders and actions made by the
166th Judicial District Court and 285th Judicial District Court; however, appellant has not directed
us to a final judgement (other than the 2012 order of termination, which he does not challenge), or
an appealable interlocutory order.
To the extent appellant wishes to challenge either “Order for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” the orders are not appealable. See Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d 409, 409 (Tex. 1980)
(holding order that granted writ of habeas corpus for possession of a child not appealable);
Nydegger v. Breig, 740 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding order
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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00842-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., a Child
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023CI18641 Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding 1
PER CURIAM
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 23, 2025
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
On December 9, 2024, appellant, proceeding pro se, filed a “Special Notice of Direct
Appeal,” and, on December 17, 2024, appellant filed an “Amended Notice of Appeal.” Appellant’s
notices of appeal do not specify a judgment or other order from which appellant appeals. On
December 27, 2024, the clerk’s record was filed, and it does not contain a final judgment. “Unless
specifically authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only to review final
judgments.” McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2018); accord
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
1 The Honorable Laura Salinas is the presiding judge of the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas; however, appellant complains of actions by the Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa and the Honorable Christine Vasquez-Hortick, sitting by assignment. 04-24-00842-CV
Because the clerk’s record does not include a final judgment and because appellant had not
directed us to an appealable interlocutory order, we ordered appellant to show cause why this
appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). On
February 11 and 21, 2025, appellant filed responses, one of which was titled “Specific Court
Orders Trial Court Violated.” Additionally, the court reporters filed volumes of the reporter’s
record from hearings in the underlying trial-court cause number 2023CI18641, and a reporter filed
a transcript from a hearing held in trial-court cause number 2023CI24589. Prior to our show cause
order, appellant had filed a brief.
In appellant’s filings he broadly complains that he has been wrongly denied possession of
his son, B.M. In the underlying trial-court cause number, 2023CI18641, appellant filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus seeking the return of B.M. to his possession. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 157.372. 2 The Family Code provides for a writ of habeas corpus as “a ready means for
deliverance of a child from unlawful detention.” Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex.
1978) (orig. proceeding) (discussing prior statute); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.372. “Upon
proof of the bare legal right of possession, the grant of the writ of habeas corpus should be
automatic, immediate, and ministerial.” In re deFilippi, 235 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2007, no pet.) (citing Schoenfeld v. Onion, 647 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1983) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) and Strobel, 565 S.W.2d at 239). Attached to appellant’s petition is an
order of termination in cause number 2011-PA-02952 from the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar
County, Texas, signed in 2012, which orders appellant appointed permanent managing conservator
of B.M.
2 Appellant later filed an amended petition and then a second amended petition. Our discussion refers to appellant’s second amended petition.
-2- 04-24-00842-CV
On October 13, 2023, in cause number 2023CI18641, the 166th Judicial District Court
signed an “Order for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus,” which ordered the respondent, T.M.O., 3
to bring B.M. to the court on November 6, 2023, “to determine whether the Petitioner has a
superior right to possession of the child[] and whether the child[] should be returned to the
Petitioner.” The clerk’s record also includes a second “Order for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” signed on November 6, 2023, setting a hearing date of November 20, 2023, and
specifying a similar purpose. The reporter’s record includes a transcript from a November 6, 2023
hearing, at which T.M.O. did not appear. The reporter’s record also includes a transcript from a
November 20, 2023 hearing, at which T.M.O. appeared through her attorney. T.M.O.’s attorney
represented that T.M.O. had not been served prior to the November 6, 2023 hearing. At the
conclusion of the November 20, 2023 hearing, the trial court stated: “I’m not going to issue the
habeas today. I’ll take it under advisement.”
The court reporter who transcribed the November 20, 2023 hearing in the 166th Judicial
District Court also transcribed a hearing that occurred later that day in the 285th Judicial District
Court in cause number 2023CI24589. 4 This second transcript concerns a hearing held on an
application for temporary restraining order made by T.M.O. in a separate trial-court proceeding.
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court stated that it would sign a temporary restraining
order, providing that T.M.O. would be appointed as a joint managing conservator of B.M. The trial
court stated that the temporary restraining order would expire on December 4, 2023, and the parties
and the trial court scheduled a hearing to be held prior to that date. Appellant’s brief and replies to
our show cause order specify that appellant complains about further actions taken by the 285th
Judicial District Court in cause number 2023CI24589, including temporary orders that were
3 To protect the identity of the minor child B.M., we refer to the respondent by her initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 4 The reporter filed this transcript in the appellate record of the instant appeal.
-3- 04-24-00842-CV
purportedly entered on May 14, 2024; however, these matters are not reflected in our appellate
record. 5 On December 9, 2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal in cause number 2023CI18641,
from which this appeal arises.
“Appellate review is ordinarily limited to final judgments. An appellate court has no
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless review is conferred by statute.” Harley
Channelview Properties, LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024)
(footnotes omitted). In our show cause order, we required appellant to direct us to an appealable
order. Appellant responded by directing us to various interlocutory orders and actions made by the
166th Judicial District Court and 285th Judicial District Court; however, appellant has not directed
us to a final judgement (other than the 2012 order of termination, which he does not challenge), or
an appealable interlocutory order.
To the extent appellant wishes to challenge either “Order for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” the orders are not appealable. See Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d 409, 409 (Tex. 1980)
(holding order that granted writ of habeas corpus for possession of a child not appealable);
Nydegger v. Breig, 740 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding order
that denied writ of habeas corpus for possession of a child not appealable); see also Maadani v.
Ward, 611 S.W.3d 460, 461–62 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); cf.
Mergerson v. Daggett, 644 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. 1982) (“This Court has on numerous occasions
enforced the rights of managing conservators by mandamus.”).
5 On March 25, 2025, appellant filed a “Motion to Accept Crucial Documents,” which includes copies of orders described in this opinion and eight of nine pages of temporary orders, purportedly entered in cause number 2023CI24589. The date of the temporary orders is not reflected, and the temporary orders do not include a signature by a judge. We deny appellant’s “Motion to Accept Crucial Documents” because appellant has not complied with the applicable appellate rules to make these documents part of the appellate record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1–34.6; In re W.T.H., No. 04-16-00055-CV, 2017 WL 603649, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (refusing to consider documents attached to an appellate brief “because they are not part of the record on appeal”); Save Our Springs All., Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871, 892 (Tex. App.–Austin 2010, pet. denied) (“We are limited to the appellate record provided.”). In any event, for the reasons that follow, the outcome of this appeal does not depend on whether these documents are included in the appellate record.
-4- 04-24-00842-CV
To the extent appellant wishes to challenge temporary orders, “the Legislature expressly
has prohibited review of temporary orders” by interlocutory appeal. Harley Channelview
Properties, 690 S.W.3d at 41 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.507); cf. In re Sanchez, 228 S.W.3d
214, 217 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (orig. proceeding) (“Mandamus is the
appropriate mechanism to challenge temporary orders made while a child custody modification
suit is pending[.]”).
Therefore, even if we liberally construe appellant’s notice of appeal to challenge orders
and actions from both the 166th Judicial District Court and 285th Judicial District Court in various
trial-court cause numbers, appellant has not directed us to an appealable order. See Harley
Channelview Properties, 690 S.W.3d at 37; McFadin, 539 S.W.3d at 283. Accordingly, we lack
jurisdiction and must dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a); Kelley v. Homminga, No.
25-9013, 2025 WL 826530, at *3 (Tex. Mar. 14, 2025) (“When a court lacks jurisdiction over a
case, the only correct disposition is dismissal because the court lacks power to do anything else.”).
-5-