in the Interest of B.J.H.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 24, 2021
• Docket: 09-21-00035-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-21-00035-CV ________________

IN THE INTEREST OF B.J.H. ________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. F-237,173 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.J. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter,

B.J.H. 1 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds

exist for termination of I.J.’s parental rights, and termination of rights was in B.J.H.’s

best interest. 2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2). I.J.’s

court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel asserts there

are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386

1 To protect the minor’s identity, we use initials for the child and her mother. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights, but he is not a party to this appeal. 1 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no

pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel

certified I.J. was served with a copy of the Anders brief filed on her behalf. This

Court notified I.J. of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the deadline for

filing the response. This Court did not receive a pro se response from I.J. We have

independently reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any

appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new

counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating I.J.’s parental rights.

We deny the motion to withdraw filed by her court-appointed appellate counsel,

because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex.

2016). In the event I.J. decides to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas,

counsel’s obligations to I.J. can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies

the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

AFFIRMED.

________________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice

2 Submitted on June 1, 2021 Opinion Delivered June 24, 2021

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.