In the Interest of B.B., S.B. and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 26, 2025
Docket10-25-00044-CV
StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of B.B., S.B. and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of B.B., S.B. and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of B.B., S.B. and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00044-CV

In the Interest of B.B., S.B., and J.B., Children

On appeal from the 52nd District Court of Coryell County, Texas Judge Cheryll Mabray, presiding Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-55657

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The father of B.B., J.B., and S.B. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s

order terminating his parental rights. 1 Following a bench trial, the trial court

determined that Father had violated Family Code subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and that termination was in the children’s

best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). In his sole issue, Father

contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the

trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We

will affirm.

1 The parental rights of the mother of B.B., J.B., and S.B. were also terminated, but she has

not appealed. Authority

The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and

will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002)

(legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).

The trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and

demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under

section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two

elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or

omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation,

and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020)

(mem. op.), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not

relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d

at 381.

In this appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency to

support the trial court’s finding regarding only the second element, i.e., that

termination was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we need only

address that element.

In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 2 In determining the best interest of a child, several factors have been

consistently considered, which were set out in the Texas Supreme Court’s

opinion of Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley

factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical

needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger

to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals

seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the

plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the

acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child

relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of

the parent. Id. This list is not exhaustive but simply identifies factors that

have been or could be pertinent in the best-interest determination. Id. at 372.

There is no requirement that all these factors be proven as a condition

precedent to parental termination. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The absence of

evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably

forming a strong conviction that termination is in the children’s best interest.

Id. In fact, while no one factor is controlling, the analysis of a single factor

may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination

is in the children’s best interest. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 268 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 3 The Holley factors focus on the best interest of the children, not the best

interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907

S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). And evidence relating to the

predicate grounds under subsection 161.001(b)(1) may be relevant to

determining the best interest of the children. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.

Discussion

Father argues that the Department failed to present evidence of the

needs and desires of the children, despite the children’s ages and verbal ability

to express their desires. Father further asserts that the evidence “focus[ed] on

things that had happened years ago [and] not on how the changes the parents

made now reduced the likelihood of relapse in the future.” Father contends

that the Department has therefore failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut

the strong presumption that the best interest of the children will be served by

preserving his relationship with his children. We disagree.

The first factor that we consider is the desires of the children. See Holley,

544 S.W.2d at 371–72. At the time of trial in January 2025, B.B., S.B., and

J.B. were seven, five, and three years old, respectively. The children did not

testify at trial, but the evidence indicated that they were bonded to both Father

and the fictive kin parents with whom they had been placed. The CASA

testified that S.B. has a “really good bond” with his fictive kin father and calls

him “Dad.” The CASA also stated that S.B. was sad about being removed from

In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 4 his parents’ care in April 2024. S.B. was very upset and crying about the

experience. S.B. had nightmares following being removed from his parents’

care, but the nightmares seemed to subside after the first few weeks. The

caseworker for the Department further testified that before Father was

incarcerated on October 20, 2024, S.B. asked to see him.

The second factor that we consider is the emotional and physical needs

of the children now and in the future. See id. The CASA testified that when

the children were removed from the parents’ care in April 2024, seven-year-old

B.B. was mostly nonverbal. By the time of trial, B.B. was more vocal but still

not talking in full sentences. B.B. was also not yet fully potty-trained.

Therefore, at that time, B.B. was in special-education classes at school, where

he received occupational, physical, and speech therapy.

As for S.B., he was described at trial by the CASA as “a very traditional

five-year-old” who is very talkative and sweet. The CASA further stated that

she has seen S.B. flourish by having the very defined routine that he has at

the fictive kin placement. The CASA said that S.B. seems more secure and

comfortable. Finally, the CASA testified that by the time of trial, three-year-

old J.B. was babbling and playing with his siblings and had really blossomed

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Related

In Re J.O.A.
283 S.W.3d 336 (Texas Supreme Court, 2009)
Williams v. Williams
150 S.W.3d 436 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
Dupree v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services
907 S.W.2d 81 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Ray v. Burns
832 S.W.2d 431 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
In the Interest of L.M.
104 S.W.3d 642 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
in the Interest of J.D., a Child
436 S.W.3d 105 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2014)
in the Interest of B.H.R., a Child
535 S.W.3d 114 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2017)
in the Interest of I. D. G. v. A. G., E. R. G. and R. J. G., Children
579 S.W.3d 842 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2019)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
96 S.W.3d 256 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of A.M.
385 S.W.3d 74 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2012)
In the Interest of J.M.T.
519 S.W.3d 258 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2017)
In re Interest of A.R.C.
551 S.W.3d 221 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2018)

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In the Interest of B.B., S.B. and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-bb-sb-and-jb-children-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2025.