Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00044-CV
In the Interest of B.B., S.B., and J.B., Children
On appeal from the 52nd District Court of Coryell County, Texas Judge Cheryll Mabray, presiding Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-55657
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The father of B.B., J.B., and S.B. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s
order terminating his parental rights. 1 Following a bench trial, the trial court
determined that Father had violated Family Code subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and that termination was in the children’s
best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). In his sole issue, Father
contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We
will affirm.
1 The parental rights of the mother of B.B., J.B., and S.B. were also terminated, but she has
not appealed. Authority
The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and
will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002)
(legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).
The trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and
demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two
elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or
omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation,
and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020)
(mem. op.), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not
relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d
at 381.
In this appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency to
support the trial court’s finding regarding only the second element, i.e., that
termination was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we need only
address that element.
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 2 In determining the best interest of a child, several factors have been
consistently considered, which were set out in the Texas Supreme Court’s
opinion of Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley
factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical
needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger
to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals
seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the
plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the
acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of
the parent. Id. This list is not exhaustive but simply identifies factors that
have been or could be pertinent in the best-interest determination. Id. at 372.
There is no requirement that all these factors be proven as a condition
precedent to parental termination. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The absence of
evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably
forming a strong conviction that termination is in the children’s best interest.
Id. In fact, while no one factor is controlling, the analysis of a single factor
may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination
is in the children’s best interest. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 268 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 3 The Holley factors focus on the best interest of the children, not the best
interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907
S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). And evidence relating to the
predicate grounds under subsection 161.001(b)(1) may be relevant to
determining the best interest of the children. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
Discussion
Father argues that the Department failed to present evidence of the
needs and desires of the children, despite the children’s ages and verbal ability
to express their desires. Father further asserts that the evidence “focus[ed] on
things that had happened years ago [and] not on how the changes the parents
made now reduced the likelihood of relapse in the future.” Father contends
that the Department has therefore failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut
the strong presumption that the best interest of the children will be served by
preserving his relationship with his children. We disagree.
The first factor that we consider is the desires of the children. See Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. At the time of trial in January 2025, B.B., S.B., and
J.B. were seven, five, and three years old, respectively. The children did not
testify at trial, but the evidence indicated that they were bonded to both Father
and the fictive kin parents with whom they had been placed. The CASA
testified that S.B. has a “really good bond” with his fictive kin father and calls
him “Dad.” The CASA also stated that S.B. was sad about being removed from
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 4 his parents’ care in April 2024. S.B. was very upset and crying about the
experience. S.B. had nightmares following being removed from his parents’
care, but the nightmares seemed to subside after the first few weeks. The
caseworker for the Department further testified that before Father was
incarcerated on October 20, 2024, S.B. asked to see him.
The second factor that we consider is the emotional and physical needs
of the children now and in the future. See id. The CASA testified that when
the children were removed from the parents’ care in April 2024, seven-year-old
B.B. was mostly nonverbal. By the time of trial, B.B. was more vocal but still
not talking in full sentences. B.B. was also not yet fully potty-trained.
Therefore, at that time, B.B. was in special-education classes at school, where
he received occupational, physical, and speech therapy.
As for S.B., he was described at trial by the CASA as “a very traditional
five-year-old” who is very talkative and sweet. The CASA further stated that
she has seen S.B. flourish by having the very defined routine that he has at
the fictive kin placement. The CASA said that S.B. seems more secure and
comfortable. Finally, the CASA testified that by the time of trial, three-year-
old J.B. was babbling and playing with his siblings and had really blossomed
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00044-CV
In the Interest of B.B., S.B., and J.B., Children
On appeal from the 52nd District Court of Coryell County, Texas Judge Cheryll Mabray, presiding Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-55657
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The father of B.B., J.B., and S.B. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s
order terminating his parental rights. 1 Following a bench trial, the trial court
determined that Father had violated Family Code subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and that termination was in the children’s
best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). In his sole issue, Father
contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We
will affirm.
1 The parental rights of the mother of B.B., J.B., and S.B. were also terminated, but she has
not appealed. Authority
The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and
will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002)
(legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).
The trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and
demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two
elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or
omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation,
and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020)
(mem. op.), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not
relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d
at 381.
In this appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency to
support the trial court’s finding regarding only the second element, i.e., that
termination was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we need only
address that element.
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 2 In determining the best interest of a child, several factors have been
consistently considered, which were set out in the Texas Supreme Court’s
opinion of Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley
factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical
needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger
to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals
seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the
plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the
acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of
the parent. Id. This list is not exhaustive but simply identifies factors that
have been or could be pertinent in the best-interest determination. Id. at 372.
There is no requirement that all these factors be proven as a condition
precedent to parental termination. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The absence of
evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably
forming a strong conviction that termination is in the children’s best interest.
Id. In fact, while no one factor is controlling, the analysis of a single factor
may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination
is in the children’s best interest. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 268 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 3 The Holley factors focus on the best interest of the children, not the best
interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907
S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). And evidence relating to the
predicate grounds under subsection 161.001(b)(1) may be relevant to
determining the best interest of the children. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
Discussion
Father argues that the Department failed to present evidence of the
needs and desires of the children, despite the children’s ages and verbal ability
to express their desires. Father further asserts that the evidence “focus[ed] on
things that had happened years ago [and] not on how the changes the parents
made now reduced the likelihood of relapse in the future.” Father contends
that the Department has therefore failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut
the strong presumption that the best interest of the children will be served by
preserving his relationship with his children. We disagree.
The first factor that we consider is the desires of the children. See Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. At the time of trial in January 2025, B.B., S.B., and
J.B. were seven, five, and three years old, respectively. The children did not
testify at trial, but the evidence indicated that they were bonded to both Father
and the fictive kin parents with whom they had been placed. The CASA
testified that S.B. has a “really good bond” with his fictive kin father and calls
him “Dad.” The CASA also stated that S.B. was sad about being removed from
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 4 his parents’ care in April 2024. S.B. was very upset and crying about the
experience. S.B. had nightmares following being removed from his parents’
care, but the nightmares seemed to subside after the first few weeks. The
caseworker for the Department further testified that before Father was
incarcerated on October 20, 2024, S.B. asked to see him.
The second factor that we consider is the emotional and physical needs
of the children now and in the future. See id. The CASA testified that when
the children were removed from the parents’ care in April 2024, seven-year-old
B.B. was mostly nonverbal. By the time of trial, B.B. was more vocal but still
not talking in full sentences. B.B. was also not yet fully potty-trained.
Therefore, at that time, B.B. was in special-education classes at school, where
he received occupational, physical, and speech therapy.
As for S.B., he was described at trial by the CASA as “a very traditional
five-year-old” who is very talkative and sweet. The CASA further stated that
she has seen S.B. flourish by having the very defined routine that he has at
the fictive kin placement. The CASA said that S.B. seems more secure and
comfortable. Finally, the CASA testified that by the time of trial, three-year-
old J.B. was babbling and playing with his siblings and had really blossomed
since being removed from his parents’ care.
On the other hand, at the time of trial, Father had been in the Coryell
County Jail since October 20, 2024. Father explained that he was jailed after
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 5 the State filed a motion to revoke his probation. He had previously received a
ten-year sentence, probated for ten years, for the offense of manufacture or
delivery of a controlled substance. Furthermore, at the time of trial, Father
had a new charge for manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in
addition to the motion to revoke.
The need for permanence is the paramount consideration for the
children’s present and future physical and emotional needs. In re A.R.C., 551
S.W.3d 221, 227 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at 87.
A parent’s incarceration is relevant to his ability to meet the children’s present
and future physical and emotional needs. A.R.C., 551 S.W.3d at 227. Further,
a parent’s incarceration at the time of trial makes the children’s future
uncertain. Id.
The third factor that we consider is the emotional and physical danger
to the children now and in the future. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Regarding this factor, Father asserts that the record does not include any
evidence of the present emotional and physical danger to the children. But
evidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to measure a parent’s future
conduct. See Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex. App.—Austin
2004, pet. denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992,
no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”); see also In re V.A., No. 13-06-00237-CV,
2007 WL 293023, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 1, 2007,
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 6 no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering parent’s past history of unstable housing,
unstable employment, unstable relationships, and drug usage).
As stated above, Father has not challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the predicate findings, which included finding that Father
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or
surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and
finding that Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with
persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or
emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). While
these unchallenged findings do not relieve the Department of its burden to
prove best interest, the evidence supporting these findings may also be
probative of best interest. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
The caseworker in this case testified that the parents’ history with the
Department dates to 2017. B.B. was removed from the parents’ care at that
time because of medical neglect and drug use. The parents thereafter worked
their service plan, and B.B. was eventually returned to the parents’ care. In
2022, all three children were then removed from the parents’ care because S.B.
and J.B. tested positive for methamphetamines. However, again, the parents
worked their service plan, and the children were eventually returned to the
parents’ care. But in April 2024, all three children were again removed from
the parents’ care. At that time, S.B. and J.B., along with the parents, tested
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 7 positive for methamphetamines. It is well established that a parent’s use of
illegal drugs and drug-related criminal activity may qualify as conduct that
endangers a child’s physical and emotional well-being. A.R.C., 551 S.W.3d at
227; see J.O.A., 293 S.W.3d at 345.
Father testified that during the time leading up to the children being
removed from his care, he was living in a home with the children, his wife who
is also the mother of the children, his parents, A.H. who had been Father’s
girlfriend when she first moved in, A.H.’s children, and A.H.’s babysitter.
Father further admitted that all the adults in the home except for his parents
were using methamphetamines. Father stated at trial that he would not refer
to A.H.’s babysitter as a drug dealer, but Father admitted that A.H.’s
babysitter provided drugs to him, his wife, and A.H. Father further explained
that he did not use drugs in front of his children but that the adults did use
methamphetamines in the garage of the home. When asked if the garage was
a separate structure from his home, Father replied that it was not; the garage
was connected to the home.
The evidence further showed that not only did Father use illegal drugs
before the children were removed from his care but that Father continued to
use illegal drugs during the pendency of this case. When the children were
removed from his care in April 2024, Father’s nail drug test results were
positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and marijuana. In July 2024,
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 8 Father’s hair-follicle drug test results were again positive for amphetamines,
methamphetamines, and marijuana. In August 2024, Father’s hair-follicle
drug test results were then positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines. And in October 2024, Father’s hair-follicle drug test
results were positive for methamphetamines even though the caseworker
testified that Father had completed inpatient rehab on October 7, 2024. Father
testified that he had last used methamphetamines about ten months before
the date of trial and had no explanation for how he could have tested positive
in October 2024.
The fourth and fifth factors that we consider are the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody and the programs available to assist those
individuals. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Father asserts that the record
is devoid of evidence regarding his ability to care for the children. However, in
reviewing the parental abilities of a parent, a factfinder can consider the
parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs
of the children. In re I.D.G., 579 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019,
pet. denied). A factfinder “may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet a
child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet a
child’s needs in the future.” In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 9 The evidence in this case showed that Father had a history of drug abuse
and that the children had twice been removed from Father’s care because they
had tested positive for methamphetamines. Furthermore, at the time of trial,
Father had been in the Coryell County Jail since October 2024. The
caseworker testified that before going to jail, Father had worked some services.
He had attended therapy and protective parenting. But even evidence of a
recent improvement does not absolve a parent of a history of irresponsible
choices. In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied).
The caseworker further testified that Father had completed a
psychological evaluation that indicated that Father did not demonstrate the
skills necessary to provide proper parenting care to his children. Regarding
Father’s parenting abilities, the evaluation noted that Father lacked insight
into his problems. The evaluation further stated that Father did not
demonstrate the skills necessary to provide proper parental care to his children
due to his failure to deal with his anger, drug abuse, and marital problems.
The psychologist therefore stated in the evaluation that he could not at that
time, nor in the future, foresee Father becoming competent or minimally
adequate to parent a child.
On the other hand, the caseworker testified that the children were placed
with fictive kin who were family friends through church. The caseworker
stated that although the fictive kin parents had nine children in their care at
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 10 the time of trial, the fictive kin parents had done a great job of providing for
the children. The CASA also testified that the fictive kin parents had been
dedicated to working with the children, and the CASA detailed how each of the
children had grown and “blossomed” in the care of the fictive kin parents.
The sixth and seventh factors that we consider are the plans for the
children by the individuals or agency seeking custody and the stability of the
home or proposed placement. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The factfinder
may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and
consider “whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or
weak and ill-defined.” J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119–20. A parent’s failure to show
that he or she is stable enough to parent children for any prolonged period
entitles the factfinder “to determine that [the] pattern would likely continue
and that permanency could only be achieved through termination and
adoption.” In re B.S.W., No. 14-04-00496-CV, 2004 WL 2964015, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). A factfinder
may also consider the consequences of its failure to terminate parental rights
and that the best interest of the children may be served by termination so that
adoption may occur rather than the temporary foster-care arrangement that
would result if termination did not occur. In re B.H.R., 535 S.W.3d 114, 124
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.). The goal of establishing a stable,
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 11 permanent home for a child is a compelling state interest. Dupree, 907 S.W.2d
at 87.
Here, the caseworker testified that the fictive kin parents are willing to
adopt all three children. On the other hand, as stated above, at the time of
trial, Father had been in the Coryell County Jail since October 2024. Father
nevertheless argues in his brief that his parents’ home “shows signs of
providing continued stability for the children.” But the caseworker confirmed
at trial that the children had been living in that very home on both occasions
when two of the children tested positive for methamphetamines, causing all
three children to be removed from their parents’ care.
The eighth and ninth factors that we consider are the acts or omissions
of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a
proper one and any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The evidence discussed above indicates that Father’s
relationship with B.B., S.B., and J.B. is not a proper one, and any excuses for
Father’s acts or omissions have been discussed above.
There is a strong presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to
preserve the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). However, considering all the evidence
here in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and considering the
evidence as a whole, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 12 firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Father’s sole issue and affirm
the trial court’s order of termination.
MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 26, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06
In the Interest of B.B., J.B., and S.B, Children Page 13