in the Interest of B.B., a Child

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided March 5, 2020·No. 02-19-00250-CV·Published

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00250-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.B., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court Parker County, Texas Trial Court No. CV18-0185

No. 02-19-00251-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.C., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court Parker County, Texas Trial Court No. CV14-1484

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parent–child relationships between Appellant J.B. (Mother)1 and children A.C. (Amy) and B.B. (Brad).2 In four issues, Mother challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s best-interest findings and the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the endangerment findings and the findings that she failed to comply with court-ordered services to obtain the children’s return. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). Because we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the endangerment findings and that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the best-interest findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

BRIEF FACTS

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department)

removed four-year-old Amy and three-year-old Brad from Mother after she hit Brad three times in the face, bruising his head and causing his eardrum to burst, and after

1 The trial court also terminated the rights of the children’s respective fathers, but only Mother appeals.

2 We use aliases to refer to the subject children, their families, and their foster families. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (requiring courts to use aliases to refer to minors in parental-rights termination cases and, if necessary to protect the minors’ identities, to also use aliases to refer to their family members); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d).

the doctor examining Brad’s injuries saw signs of probable sexual abuse, which Brad attributed to Mother’s live-in boyfriend (Boyfriend). When the children were forensically interviewed, Amy reported that Boyfriend had sexually abused her as well. Mother was indicted for injury to a child regarding Brad’s injuries and jailed until January 2019. By the time of the trial, more than fifteen months after the removal, the children had been in three different foster homes. Their maternal grandmother (Grandmother), with whom the children had lived much of their lives and who had ongoing visitation with the children during the case, had intervened in the suit, asking to be named the children’s sole managing conservator. The trial court heard testimony from witnesses including Grandmother and her husband (Grandfather) (collectively, Grandparents), the current foster mother (Foster Mother), the forensic interviewer, Department personnel, the children’s clinical therapist, their behavioral therapist, and their guardian ad litem (GAL). Mother was called as a witness, but the criminal charges against her remained pending at trial; she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when questioned on the stand.

The Department and Amy’s father wanted termination of Mother’s parental rights with no possessory rights awarded to Grandmother. Grandmother, Mother, and the children’s attorney ad litem and GAL opposed termination and wanted the children to be placed with Grandmother, with Mother having supervised access to them. In its termination order, the trial court awarded Grandmother “access/visitation” with the children for one weekend every other month with the

condition that she provide no access to the terminated parents. Grandmother did not appeal.

DISCUSSION

In her first and second issues, Mother contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that she knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). In her third issue, she contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specified the actions necessary for her to obtain the children’s return. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). In her fourth issue, she challenges the trial court’s findings that termination of her parent–child relationships with Amy and Brad is in the children’s best interests. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

I. Standard of Review

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the Department must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that the parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and 2) that termination is in the children’s best interests. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).

Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged findings—here, the endangerment and noncompliance findings—to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). We assume that the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them or the judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). Here, we review the whole

record to decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department proved either endangerment ground or the noncompliance ground and that the termination of the parent–child relationships would be in the children’s best interests. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.

II. Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Mother’s repeated invocations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

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