Opinion issued March 19, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-18-00907-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF B. S. C. F. AKA B. F. C., Appellant
On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2017-00823J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated appeal, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(a–1); TEX. R. APP.
P. 28.1, 28.4, F.C. (“Father”) challenges the trial court’s decree terminating his
parental rights to his minor child, B.S.C.F. aka B.C.F. (“Betty”). Betty was placed
in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and
Protective Services shortly after she was born. Her five half-siblings, none of whom are related to Father, were already in the Department’s custody due in large
part to the deplorable living conditions in which a Department investigator had
found them several months earlier. As the case proceeded, the Department
discovered that K.W.F.R. (“Mother”) had used cocaine while pregnant with Betty
and had a pending felony drug charge in Louisiana state court. Three of Betty’s
half-siblings then accused Father of sexual abuse and various other misconduct,
and a fourth half-sibling began to exhibit signs of past sexual abuse. Betty’s half-
siblings never retracted their outcries, which remained consistent throughout the
case, and the trial court eventually terminated Father’s parental rights to Betty. In
three issues, Father contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the trial court’s findings under Section 161.001 of the Family Code. See
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2).
We affirm.
Background
Mother has six children with three men: Brenda, Fred, Heather, Hailey,
Kelly, and Betty.1 Brenda, Fred, and Heather share the same father. Hailey and
Kelly share the same father. Betty is the subject child of this suit. Father is Betty’s
biological father. He is not related to Mother’s other children.
1 We refer to Mother’s children by pseudonyms. 2 Mother and Father move from Louisiana to Texas after Mother posts bail for a felony drug possession charge
Mother and Father began dating in 2013. Around three years later, in early
January 2016, Father moved in with Mother and her five children, Brenda, Fred,
Heather, Hailey, and Kelly. At the time, they were living in Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana. Betty was not yet born.
Shortly after Mother and Father started living together, Mother was pulled
over while driving in Jefferson Parish. The police searched her vehicle and found
over 70 grams of cocaine. Mother was arrested and charged with felony possession
of a controlled substance and spent the next three days in jail. Mother then posted
bond and was released on bail.
While on bail, Mother moved with Father and her five children from
Jefferson Parish to Houston, Texas. Mother then failed to appear for a hearing in
her drug case in Louisiana, and the Louisiana trial court revoked Mother’s bail and
issued a warrant for her arrest.
The Department is appointed temporary managing conservator of Mother’s five oldest children
In May 2016, Mother took Brenda, then seven years old, to the emergency
room. About a month earlier, Brenda had contracted headlice. Mother did not
immediately seek treatment, and the infection progressively grew worse. Mother
eventually attempted to treat the infection with kerosene, which irritated Brenda’s
3 scalp and caused painful burning, prompting Mother to take Brenda to the
emergency room. The hospital treated and discharged Brenda and then sent a
referral to the Department accusing Mother of neglectful care.2
The Department sent an investigator to Mother and Father’s home. The
investigator described the conditions of the home as “deplorable.” There was
exposed wiring and a “massive hole” in the wall. There was no electricity or
running water; the children said they were using the neighbor’s hose to fill a
bucket and bathe in the backyard. The children had no beds. The children had no
food. And one of them sneaked out of the house through a window during the
investigator’s inspection.
The investigator interviewed Mother and Father. They told her that they had
moved from Louisiana to Texas looking for work. Mother said that she did not use
drugs and did not have a criminal record. She did not disclose that she was
pregnant.
The Department filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
Brenda, Fred, Heather, Hailey, and Kelly, who were then seven, five, four, three,
and two years old. The Department was appointed temporary managing
conservator of the five children. Brenda, Fred, and Heather were placed with their
2 We note that Mother is from Central America, where kerosene is a common remedy for headlice. Once common in the United States, kerosene has been displaced as a lice treatment by various modern licecides, which are safer and more effective. 4 biological father and stepmother. Hailey and Kelly were placed with a foster-to-
adopt family.
Mother underwent a substance abuse assessment and again denied any drug
use. Mother then submitted to drug testing and tested positive for cocaine. After
testing positive, Mother admitted to using cocaine on at least three prior occasions.
The Department investigated Mother’s history in Louisiana and learned of her
pending felony drug charge. The Department also learned that Mother was
pregnant. The Department instructed Mother to inform the caseworker when the
baby was born.
Mother gave birth to Betty in late November 2016. She did not notify the
caseworker. Over the following two months, Mother failed to respond to the
caseworker’s inquiries, leading the Department to believe Mother was attempting
to hide Betty’s whereabouts. The Department eventually located Mother and Betty
in early January 2017.
The Department is appointed temporary managing conservator of Betty
In February 2017, the Department filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to Betty. The Department was appointed temporary
managing conservator of Betty, and Betty was placed with the same foster-to-adopt
family as Hailey and Kelly. The trial court later signed an order approving and
requiring Mother and Father to follow family service plans prepared for them by
5 the Department. The plans included the statutorily-required admonishment that
failure to comply could result in the termination of their parental rights.
Mother’s other children accuse Father of sexual abuse and other misconduct
As the case proceeded, Mother’s three oldest children accused Father of
sexual abuse. The initial outcry was made in March 2017 by Brenda, who told her
stepmother that Father had inappropriately touched her and her younger siblings.
Brenda’s stepmother reported the outcry to the caseworker, who, in turn, reported
the information to the police and arranged for the children to be interviewed at The
Children’s Assessment Center. During the interviews, Brenda, Fred, and Heather
confirmed that they had been inappropriately touched by Father.
After their outcries, the three older children made additional disclosures and
allegations. Brenda disclosed that she had once been left alone at their house and
that people had come to the house to do drugs. Fred disclosed that, at some point,
he and his siblings had been living with Mother and Father in a hotel. Fred said
that at the hotel he was exposed to pornography and that Mother and Father would
have sex in front of him and his siblings. Both Brenda and Fred said that Father
had guns. All three older children said they were scared of Father, did not feel safe
around Mother, and were angry with Mother for not protecting them.
Meanwhile, the fourth child, Hailey, who had been placed with a different
family, began engaging in behavior suggesting that she, too, had been sexually
6 abused or exposed to sexual abuse. Hailey began rubbing up on her dolls; touching
her younger sister, Kelly, on her genitals (over her clothes); and acting out
inappropriate touching and kissing. As a result, Hailey was placed in therapy.
The trial court suspended visitation for both Mother and Father.
The case is tried to the bench, and the trial court terminates Father’s parental rights
In February 2018, the case was tried to the bench. The evidence presented to
the trial court included the medical records relating to Brenda’s trip to the
emergency room; the recorded CAC interviews of Brenda, Fred, and Hailey; the
results of Mother’s drug tests; and various documents relating to Mother’s criminal
history. Four witnesses testified: the caseworker, Mother, a special investigator,
and Father.
Caseworker’s testimony. The caseworker testified that Father had
completed everything in his family service plan except the continued parenting
classes. But, she admitted, his failure to do so was not necessarily his fault because
the Department had delayed in arranging that service for him.
The caseworker stated that the Department sought termination of Father’s
parental rights to Betty because Father continued to be in a relationship with
Mother even though Mother had endangered Betty and because Mother’s older
children had accused Father of sexual abuse. She testified that Father had admitted
that he had been in a relationship with Mother for four years, which indicated that 7 he was aware of Mother’s criminal history and drug use. She further testified that
Father had failed to address the allegations of sexual abuse in counseling. She
explained that Father adamantly denied any inappropriate contact with Mother’s
children and believed that the children’s biological father had coached them into
accusing him of sexual abuse. She admitted that the Department did not have any
corroborating evidence aside from the children’s outcries. But she also confirmed
that the children never retracted their outcries of sexual abuse and were consistent
throughout the entire case. And, she further noted, the fourth child, Hailey—who
was not living with three older children—had exhibited signs of sexual abuse.
The caseworker testified that Hailey, Kelly, and Betty were thriving with
their foster-to-adopt family and that Hailey’s behavior had improved with therapy.
She stated that the children’s foster parents already had children of their own and
wanted a big family. She testified that she believed Betty would regress if removed
from her current home. She explained that Betty had bonded with her foster-to-
adopt family and that they were the only family Betty knew.
Mother’s testimony. Mother admitted that there was a warrant for her arrest
for possession of cocaine. She stated that she had not taken care of the warrant
because she had been in poor health. She further admitted that in January 2016 the
police found cocaine during a search of her vehicle. She initially denied that she
had to post bond to be released from jail, but she later admitted that her bond had
8 been revoked in that case. Mother said that she wanted the trial court to give her
the opportunity to solve her problem with her warrant in Louisiana for her arrest.
Mother testified that she did not believe Father had sexually abused her
children. Mother explained that during the times the abuse was allegedly occurring,
she never left the children by themselves and never saw any sign of sexual abuse.
She stated that the children never made an outcry to her. She further stated that
Father did not own a gun and had never had one in front of the children.
Mother testified that she and Father owned a three-bedroom mobile home.
She stated that it had running water and electricity and was suitable housing. She
also stated that Father made sufficient income to provide for Betty.
Mother testified that she had told Father that she used drugs before she met
him. She also acknowledged that she used drugs after she began dating Father, but
she claimed that it had only been once and that Father was unaware of it. Mother
testified that she began living with Father on January 5, 2016. She then
acknowledged that she had been arrested for felony possession on January 13 and
spent the following three days in jail. When it was brought to Mother’s attention
that she had been arrested eight days after she said she and Father began living
together, Mother changed her testimony, said she had been mistaken about the
date, and clarified that they moved in together on January 25, not January 5.
Mother then testified that her children had stayed with friends when she was in jail.
9 Special investigator’s testimony. The special investigator testified that she
had assisted the attorney ad litem as an investigator and a child abuse expert. She
testified that, in her opinion, Mother’s and Father’s parental rights should be
terminated. She emphasized that Mother had a pending felony warrant, had left
Louisiana while out on bond, and had a criminal record that included multiple
convictions for theft and assault. And she emphasized that Father had been
credibly accused of sexual abuse. The special investigator recounted the three
oldest children’s outcries and CAC interviews, and she opined that Hailey’s
conduct indicated that she had been sexually abused or witnessed sexual abuse.
Father’s testimony. Father testified that he did not know about Mother’s
arrest for felony possession when he met her and that he only learned of it after
they had started dating. He noted that he had once gone with her to pay a ticket, but
he stated that he did not know what the ticket was for.
Father admitted that he was dating Mother when she was arrested in January
2016. He admitted that he knew Mother was out on bond when they moved from
Louisiana to Texas. And he admitted that he knew Mother was supposed to appear
at court in Louisiana when they were in Houston three months later. He testified
that he did not know that Mother’s bond had been revoked.
Father admitted that, when the children were removed from their home, the
home had no electricity or running water, and the children were bathing outside
10 with a bucket. Father admitted that Mother had used cocaine while pregnant with
Betty and that this constituted endangering conduct. He said that he did not know
whether it was safe for Mother to be around the children and that he had remained
in a relationship with her because he did not think they were going to have so
many problems.
Father testified that if Mother was arrested for a possession charge, he would
take care of Betty and the children. When asked how, he said that both he and
Mother had family who could look after them while he worked. But he did not
identify any particular relative who might be able to help. Father stated he had
encouraged Mother to turn herself in for her active warrant, but he admitted that
she had failed to do so in over two years.
After the trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to Betty.3 In
its termination decree, the trial court found that termination of Father’s parental
rights was justified on grounds of endangerment and failure to comply with court
orders and was in Betty’s best interest. Father appeals.
Sufficiency of Evidence
In three issues, Father contends that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that (1) termination was justified on
3 The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights. 11 grounds of endangerment, (2) termination was justified on grounds of failure to
comply with court orders, and (3) termination was in Betty’s best interest.
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Under Section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department may petition a
trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship. The trial court may grant the
petition if the Department proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the
parent committed one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying
termination and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM.
CODE § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of
proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007.
Section 161.001 lists 21 acts and omissions justifying termination of the
parent-child relationship. Id. § 161.001(b)(1). “Only one predicate finding under
section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there
is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re A.M., 495
S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003)).
In determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest, courts
consider the nine nonexclusive factors listed by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley
v. Adams: (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
12 child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5)
the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the parent’s acts
or omissions that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper
one, and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–
72 (Tex. 1976).
Further, “the same evidence of acts or omissions used to establish grounds
for termination under section 161.001(1) may be probative in determining the best
interests of the child.” In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
In a legal-sufficiency review in a parental-rights-termination case, we look at
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
could do so, disregarding all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved or found incredible. Id.
13 In a factual-sufficiency review in a parental-rights-termination case, we
determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a
firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s allegations. In re
C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). By focusing on whether a reasonable
factfinder could form a firm conviction or belief, the appellate court maintains the
required deference for the factfinder’s role. Id. at 26. “An appellate court’s review
must not be so rigorous that the only factfindings that could withstand review are
those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We should consider whether
disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that
disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “If, in
light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could
not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not
reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually
insufficient.” Id.
B. Sufficiency of predicate finding
We begin by considering Father’s first issue in which he contends that there
is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
termination was justified on grounds of endangerment under subsections (D) and
(E). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). We focus our analysis on
subsection (E). Termination is justified under subsection (E) if the trial court find
14 that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Within the context of subsection (E), endangerment encompasses “more
than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal
family environment.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533
(Tex. 1987). To “endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to
jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health. Id.
It is not necessary to establish that a parent intended to endanger a child to
support termination under subsection (E). See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270
(Tex. 1996). Nor is it necessary to establish that the parent’s conduct was directed
at the child or caused actual harm; rather, it is sufficient if the parent’s conduct
endangers the child’s well-being. See Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective
Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
“Evidence as to how a parent has treated another child or spouse is relevant
regarding whether a course of conduct under section E has been established.”
Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet.
denied); see also Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617 (same).
The endangering conduct does not have to occur in the child’s
presence. Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617. The conduct may occur before the child’s
15 birth and either before or after the child’s removal by the Department. Id. A
parent’s past endangering conduct may create an inference that the past conduct
may recur and further jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or emotional
well-being. See In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no
pet.). “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and
instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re R.W.,
129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
Here, there is evidence that Father engaged in endangering conduct by
sexually abusing Mother’s older children and exposing them to sexually
inappropriate conduct and material. See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724 (evidence
regarding how parent treated other children is relevant when determining whether
termination is justified on grounds of endangerment); Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617
(same); see also Wyatt v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 193 S.W.3d 61, 68
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (proof of endangering conduct
against mother’s older children could support finding under subsection (E) as to
newborn even though child was taken from mother at birth). This evidence
includes:
• Brenda’s initial outcry that Father had inappropriately touched her and her younger siblings;
• Brenda, Fred, and Heather’s subsequent CAC interviews, in which they confirmed that they had been inappropriately touched by Father and exposed to pornography and sex while living in the hotel; 16 • Brenda, Fred, and Heather’s statements to the caseworker that they did not feel safe with Mother and feared Father; and
• Hailey’s sexualized touching and play, which the caseworker and special investigator explained was indicative of past sexual abuse.
Father argues that this evidence is insufficient to support a finding of
endangerment because there were no criminal charges filed against him and no
physical evidence to corroborate the children’s outcries. We disagree.
Evidence that Father had been charged with sexual assault or indecency was
not necessary to show that Father had inappropriately touched the children. See In
re H.D., No. 01-12-00007-CV, 2013 WL 1928799, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] May 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that proof of criminal charges
filed in response to child’s sexual abuse outcry was unnecessary to establish
endangerment). Although there was no physical evidence to corroborate the
children’s statements, there was evidence that indicated the children were being
truthful. The children never retracted their outcries and remained consistent
throughout the case. And Hailey showed signs of sexual abuse even though she
never made an outcry and was placed with a different family than her three older
siblings, undercutting Father’s theory that Brenda, Fred, and Heather’s biological
father coached them into accusing him of sexual abuse.
There is also evidence that Father engaged in endangering conduct by failing
to protect Betty and her half-siblings from Mother’s illegal drug use and other 17 illicit activity in their home. See In re S.K.A., No. 10-08-00347-CV, 2009 WL
2645027, at *9 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 19, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding
father’s failure to protect unborn child from mother’s drug use sufficient to
establish endangerment under subsection (E)). Although Mother and Father
provided testimony indicating that Father did not become aware of Mother’s drug
use until after this case had been filed, the trial court could have reasonably
disbelieved such testimony given the other evidence presented. First, Mother’s
oldest child, Brenda, disclosed that people came to the home to do drugs, which
suggests that drug use occurred openly in the home. Second, Mother initially
testified that she started living with Father on January 5, 2016—eight days before
she was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. Third, Mother tested positive for
cocaine while pregnant with Betty and later admitted to past cocaine use. On this
evidence, the trial court, as factfinder, could have reasonably found that Father
knew Mother was involved in illegal drug behavior, knew it was going on in their
home, and did nothing to prevent Betty and her half-siblings from being exposed to
the dangers from such activity.
We hold that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that termination was justified under subsections (E). Therefore,
we overrule Father’s first issue without addressing whether there is legally and
factually sufficient evidence to support termination under subsection (D). Father’s
18 second issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the alternative predicate
finding—that termination was justified for failure to comply with a court order
under subsection (O). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O). However, because
we have found that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support
the predicate finding of endangerment, we need not address Father’s second issue.
See In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d at 580.
C. Sufficiency of best-interest finding
Next, we consider Father’s third issue, in which he contends that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
termination of his parental rights was in Betty’s best interest. We consider the
evidence supporting each of the nine non-exhaustive Holley factors.
First factor: Betty’s desires. Father correctly states that Betty is too young
to express her desires. He admits that she is presumably bonded to her foster
parents. But he also contends that she is presumably bonded to him as well and that
this weighs in his favor. We disagree.
“When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may
consider whether the children have bonded with the proposed adoptive family, are
well-cared for by them, and whether they have spent minimal time with a parent.”
See In re T.M., No. 01-16-00942-CV, 2017 WL 1885406, at *9 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, it is undisputed
19 that Betty has bonded with her proposed adoptive family, is well-cared for by
them, and has spent minimal time with Father. Betty was removed as an infant and
has been with her current foster-to-adopt parents for the majority of her life; they
are the only family she knows. There is no basis to presume Betty has bonded with
Father because the trial court suspended his visitation after Mother’s other children
accused him of sexual assault.
Second factor: Betty’s present and future emotional and physical needs.
Father admits that Betty is “thriving” with her foster family and that “all of her
physical and emotional needs are being met.” But he contends there is no
guarantee that her foster family will continue to satisfy her physical and emotional
needs and that this weighs in his favor. We disagree. Father does not support his
contention with any evidence; it is purely speculative. And the evidence that is in
the record—including the evidence of sexual abuse and the deplorable condition of
the home at the beginning of the case—indicates that it is Father who may be
unable to satisfy Betty’s emotional and physical needs.
Third and eights factors: the present and future emotional and physical
danger to Betty and acts or omissions indicating an improper parent-child
relationship. Father admits that Betty’s foster home is safe and stable. But he
again contends that there is no guarantee it will remain safe and stable and that this
weighs in his favor. And again, we disagree. Father does not base his contention on
20 any evidence. He disregards the evidence indicating that he would pose a danger to
Betty if reunited with her. As discussed, the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to find that Father sexually abused Mother’s children and placed them in
an unsafe environment and failed to prevent Mother from using cocaine while
pregnant with Betty. Such inappropriate conduct in the past permitted the trier of
fact to infer that behavior would continue to be a threat for Betty in the future. See
Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724 (“Evidence that a person has engaged in abusive
conduct in the past permits an inference that the person will continue violent
behavior in the future.”).
Fourth factor: the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody.
Father acknowledges that Betty’s foster parents want to adopt Betty and her two
other siblings. And he admits that they have demonstrated adequate parenting
skills. But he suggests this factor nevertheless weighs in his favor because he
wants to parent Betty, too. This disregards the danger Betty’s older siblings
experienced while Father was living them—namely a home without running water
or electricity and exposure to drugs, pornography, and other illicit behavior. The
evidence of Father’s past bad parenting permitted an inference that Father’s bad
parenting would continue in the future.
Fifth factor: the programs available to assist these individuals to
promote the best interest of the child. Father states, “presumably,” he “would be
21 given a modified [family service plan] upon restoration of his parental rights.” But
he fails to identify the programs that would be offered under such a plan.
Sixth and seventh factors: the plans for the child by these individuals or
by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the home or proposed
placement. Father admits that Betty’s foster home is safe and stable and that her
foster parents have appropriate plans for her future. He further admits that his plans
for Betty’s future are unknown. The only plan he suggested was that he would take
care of Betty, but his actions showed he was inappropriate in his idea of care. In
the meantime, Betty and her two siblings were thriving with the foster parents who
wanted a big family and wanted to adopt Betty with her two siblings. Because the
need for permanence is a paramount consideration in determining a child’s present
and future needs, the trial court had more than sufficient basis to find termination
of Frank’s parental rights was in Betty’s best interest. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 263.307(a) (“In considering the factors established by this section, the
prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to
be in the child’s best interest.”).
Ninth factor: any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. In his brief,
Father admits that he “has no excuses for his acts or omissions.”
Considering the Holley factors and reviewing all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable trier of
22 fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the best interest of Betty. Moreover, none of the disputed
evidence was so significant that the factfinder could not have formed such a firm
belief or conviction. We therefore conclude that the evidence was both legally and
factually sufficient to support termination of Father’s parental rights to Betty. We
overrule Father’s third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s decree.
Laura Carter Higley Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.