in the Interest of B. G. M., a Child

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 4, 2011·No. 06-10-00022-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-10-00022-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.G.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 115th Judicial District Court Marion County, Texas

Trial Court No. 08-00106

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Bud and Rhonda Marks, parents of B.G.M., appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship brought by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS). B.G.M.‘s aunt, Sally Tarter, as well as B.G.M.‘s sister, Tiffany Parsley, and her husband, John Parsley, intervened in the suit and sought conservatorship of the child. Trial to a jury resulted in a unanimous finding that possession of the child by her parents would significantly impair the child‘s physical health or emotional development and that Tarter should be appointed managing conservator of the child. The trial court‘s judgment appointed Tarter sole managing conservator of B.G.M.; listed Bud, Rhonda, and Tiffany as possessory conservators; gave only Rhonda limited telephone and therapeutic visitation rights; and ordered Bud and Rhonda to pay child support.

The Markses appeal the trial court‘s judgment alleging that the evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption that it is in B.G.M.‘s best interest to appoint them as joint managing conservators. They also complain that the trial court erred when it admitted a summary of an investigator‘s testimony and notes of his investigation over hearsay and bolstering objections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Judgment A. Standard of Review

The best interest of the child is always the primary consideration in determining issues of conservatorship, access, and possession. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (West 2008); In re M.T.C., 299 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.). Because the trial court is in a position to analyze the facts with regard to issues of conservatorship, control, possession, child support, and visitation, the trial court is given ―wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.‖ Id. (quoting Stallworth v. Stallworth, 201 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982)). For that reason, a trial court‘s order regarding conservatorship is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.; In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007); Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451; In re Marriage of Edwards, 79 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court‘s decision. Id.; In re J.P.C., 261 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).

Section 153.131 of the Texas Family Code creates a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents as managing conservators is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a) (West 2008); M.T.C., 299 S.W.3d at 481. It provides:

[U]nless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the

child‘s physical health or emotional development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator or both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the child.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a).

The legal and factual sufficiency of the court‘s findings or implied findings may be challenged on appeal. Agraz v. Carnley, 143 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). A finding that the appointment of a parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child‘s physical health or emotional development is governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.005 (West 2008); J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616.

An adult‘s future conduct may be somewhat determined by recent past conduct; however, evidence of past misconduct, in and of itself, may not be sufficient to show present unfitness. Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Specific acts or omissions of a parent implicating a significant impairment to a child‘s emotional development may be inferred from direct evidence. Id. However, this link between the parent‘s conduct and harm to the child may not be based on evidence that merely raises a surmise or speculation of possible harm. Id. ―[I]n an original proceeding for a conservatorship determination, even ‗evidence that the nonparent would be a better custodian‘ is insufficient to support the appointment of a nonparent as managing conservator in preference to a parent.‖ M.T.C., 299 S.W.3d at 481 (quoting Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990)). ―Rather, the nonparent is required to ‗affirmatively prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

appointment of the parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child, either physically or emotionally.‘‖ Id. (quoting Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167). A nonparent may overcome the presumption by producing evidence of ―a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical . . . abuse by [a] parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child.‖ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (West 2008).

B. Factual Background 1. B.G.M.’s Medical Condition and Treatment Rhonda and Bud have been married for twenty-nine years. Their first daughter, Tiffany, is a twenty-five-year-old paralegal. Their second daughter, B.G.M., was born prematurely with cerebral palsy, a permanent, nonprogressive condition which results in tightness of the ligaments or tendons. Her cerebral palsy led to complications with her lower extremities, preventing her from walking normally. Because she was born to parents living below the poverty level, B.G.M.‘s medical treatment was facilitated by her receipt of Medicaid. Her parents took her to Dr. Marc Edman Kimball in Marion County for regular treatment for several years. Dr. Kimball said B.G.M. was ―well at that time other than her cerebral palsy.‖ He emphasized that she ―had a normal MRI of the head‖ and that nothing would prevent her from learning and growing emotionally and intellectually.

When B.G.M. turned four, her parents began reviewing her schooling options. They were afraid to place B.G.M. in regular school because she required constant supervision. Rhonda

testified that she called a local school to ask ―[i]f there would be a lot of stairways for her to crawl up and down. She couldn‘t step up real high at the time . . . .‖ Rhonda was concerned that ―the kids would make fun of her and laugh at her in school because she had a limp leg.‖ Bud testified he also contacted a special educator who told him to work with B.G.M. at home until she was ―physically able to enroll.‖ Rhonda claimed she spoke with Dr. Kimball, who agreed that it would be all right to homeschool B.G.M. The decision was made that Bud would administer the homeschooling. A ―MEDICAL RELEASE/PHYSICIAN‘S STATEMENT‖ signed by Dr. Kimball stated that ―father is caring for [B.G.M.] . . . home schooling her. She needs supervision.‖ The Markses ―went and got school disk[s] and stuff like that to work with her at home on the computer and books.‖ Rhonda, however, was mentally deficient, had an eighth-grade education, and Bud only completed the tenth grade.

In 2006, when B.G.M. was approximately eight years old,1 her parents moved to Lubbock, Texas, without their oldest daughter.2 B.G.M. was not taken back to Marion County for treatment

1 B.G.M. was born on February 2, 1998.

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