Opinion issued March 12, 2026.
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00846-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF A.Y., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-02054J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This accelerated appeal arises from a suit brought by the Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) to terminate a parent-child relationship.
After a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of A.Y. (“Mother”)
to her minor child, “Adam,”1 based on its findings that she engaged in the
1 We use aliases for the child and Father to protect the child’s identity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). endangerment grounds for termination and failed to comply with the court-ordered
family service plan requirements,2 and that termination of the parent-child
relationship was in Adam’s best interest.3
Mother challenges the trial court’s ruling in six issues, contending the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings
supporting the termination of Mother’s parental rights, and the trial court did not
have the authority to terminate her rights under a repealed statute.
We affirm.
Background
Adam was born at the end of March 2024. At the time, Mother was living with
Adam’s maternal grandmother (Grandmother), but Grandmother kicked her out of
the home about a week later. DFPS received a report that Mother took Adam to see
J.N., the man Mother believed to be Adam’s father. While at J.N.’s house, Mother
and J.N. got into an argument, and Mother called her boyfriend to pick her up. When
her boyfriend arrived, J.N. shot him. Adam was with Mother and J.N. when the
shooting occurred.
2 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P). 3 The trial court also terminated the rights of Adam’s unknown father. See id. § 161.002.
2 According to the report, J.N. appeared to be intoxicated and “was waving
around the gun inside the residence prior to the shooting.” Mother would later tell a
DFPS investigator J.N. was “high off synthetic marijuana” during the incident and
that “he takes pills off the street.” After the shooting, J.N. was incarcerated. He told
DFPS that he did not know if he was the father and declined to speak with DFPS
further. J.N. submitted to a DNA test, which showed he was not the father.
At the investigator’s initial meeting with Mother, DFPS recommended
Mother for domestic violence services. Mother enrolled in late April but told the
investigator that she could not participate because her phone was not working. A
couple months later, Mother emailed DFPS reporting that she was participating in
counseling.
Mother agreed to submit to random drug testing but did not appear for testing
requested by DFPS three different times in July and August 2024.
In late August, the DFPS investigator requested a police welfare check on
Adam and Mother because Mother was not answering her phone. A background
check revealed that Mother had been arrested and incarcerated in June 2024 for
possession of methamphetamine, and during the welfare check, she was arrested on
an open warrant for bond forfeiture.
Mother had history with DFPS involving her two older children. The first
report, made in April 2019, involved an allegation of physical abuse made after one
3 of Mother’s older children was shot during a drive-by shooting and the other child
had access to illegal drugs that Mother used. The DFPS investigation was unable to
determine whether this report was true. Another report, made in January 2021,
alleged neglectful supervision and that Mother lacked a stable home. The DFPS
investigation concluded there was reason to believe this report was true. The older
children no longer live with Mother.
According to the CASA report, Mother had a criminal history that included a
conviction for possession of a controlled substance and aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon and had pending criminal charges for theft and possession of a
controlled substance.
In the home study of Grandmother, the DFPS investigator determined that
Grandmother was not an appropriate caregiver because she had history with DFPS
involving drug use and untreated mental health issues. The Mother’s brother, who
also lived in Grandmother’s home, had criminal history involving drug possession
charges. Based on DFPS’s safety concerns with Grandmother being Adam’s primary
caregiver, the trial court ordered Adam’s removal and placed him in DFPS’s care.
After Adam’s removal, the trial court ordered Mother to comply with the
DFPS family service plan, which included: (1) maintaining a safe and stable home;
(2) obtaining verifiable employment; (3) participating in parenting classes;
(4) completing a psychological evaluation, substance abuse assessment, and
4 domestic violence assessment; (5) participating in random drug testing; (6) attending
weekly NA meetings and participating in an outpatient program; and (7) attending
all hearings, visits, and planning sessions involving Adam.
David Lee, DFPS conservatorship worker, testified about Mother’s
compliance with her family service plan. Mother did not provide a stable home. Lee
learned the day of trial that Mother was staying with her new baby’s father, whom
Lee had not met.
Mother did not have verifiable employment, and she did not participate in
parenting classes. Although she completed the psychological evaluation and
substance abuse and domestic violence assessments, she did not follow the
recommendations, which included individual therapy, random drug testing,
substance abuse counseling, and domestic violence counseling. She did not
participate in any individual therapy. She was unsuccessfully discharged from
domestic violence counseling after she missed consecutive sessions. She attended
substance abuse counseling on and off but did not complete it.
Lee recounted that although Mother submitted to some random drug tests, she
tested positive throughout the pendency of the case and did not appear for multiple
random drug tests. Mother used drugs during pregnancy with both Adam and the
new baby.
5 Lee testified that Mother’s visitations were suspended after she was observed
feeding Adam whole grapes at a visit when he was seven months old, shortly after
she tested positive for methamphetamines. After that visit, the trial court ruled that
Mother would not be able to attend visits unless her drug levels dropped and she
participated in substance abuse therapy.
Lee testified that Adam is in a stable home with his foster family and that he
was meeting his developmental milestones and bonding with the other child in the
home. He further testified that it was not in Adam’s best interest to be returned to
Mother because she had engaged in conduct harmful to Adam and continued to test
positive for illegal substances during the case and while she was pregnant with her
CASA volunteer Melanie Beck confirmed that Adam was meeting his
milestones. She testified that it was in Adam’s best interest to stay with the family
he had been living with because he was in a safe, drug-free environment.
Mother acknowledged that she tested positive for drugs while she was
pregnant with her new child born during the pendency of this case, but she testified
that the last time she used illicit drugs was eight months before trial and that her
recent drug tests were negative. She admitted she was unsuccessfully discharged
from domestic violence counseling because she missed three appointments. She
explained that she had asked the service provider to text her because she didn’t have
6 her email address, but the provider emailed her instead. On another occasion, she
was “busy” and “couldn’t make” the appointment. She also acknowledged she did
not do the substance abuse counseling or individual therapy but explained that she
missed the substance abuse classes because she had premature labor and was on bed
rest. She testified that she wants to see Adam and would comply with the classes
now.
Mother explained she was unemployed because after she gave birth to her new
baby by C-section, she had to be on bed rest, but she planned to get a job when
physically able. On cross-examination, though, Mother admitted that she did not
have a job or stable home during the pendency of the case.
Mother further testified that she had been living with Grandmother but now
lives with the father of her new baby at his grandmother’s house and that a DFPS
worker had been to the home. She testified that the father of the new baby is
employed, and that he had to take a drug test and has two kids who do not live with
him. She admitted that the father of the new baby has a criminal past but was not
sure what it was, and she agreed that she has a pattern of getting involved with people
with not very good backgrounds.
Mother testified she did not know who Adam’s father was. In addition to
Adam, she has two older children who did not live with her and her new baby who
was still living with her.
7 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother violated
Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (O), and (P), and that termination
of Mother’s parental rights was in Adam’s best interest. The trial court terminated
Mother’s rights and appointed DFPS as Adam’s sole managing conservator.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues, Mother asserts that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that
she engaged in the predicate acts set forth in Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D),
(E), (O), and (P) and that termination of her parental rights was in Adam’s best
interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), (b)(2).
A. Standard of Review
The natural right existing between a parent and child is of constitutional
dimensions, frequently characterized as far more precious than any property right.
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Accordingly, a parent has a
commanding interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). Thus, we strictly
scrutinize termination proceedings and construe involuntary termination statutes in
favor of the parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20.
At the same time, a parent may forfeit his or her parental rights based on his
actions or omissions. In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 850 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
8 Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Parental rights are accorded only to natural parents who
are fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361
(Tex. 2003). Though a natural parent faces losing his or her highly-protected parental
rights in a termination proceeding, the State’s primary focus is to protect the child’s
best interests. Id.
Because the burden of proof in termination proceedings is clear and
convincing evidence, a heightened standard of review in an evidentiary challenge is
required. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). Thus, under either legal
sufficiency or factual sufficiency review, we determine whether the evidence is such
that a trier of fact could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. Id.; In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). The “distinction
between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence
contrary to a finding may be considered.” In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 850.
In determining whether the legal sufficiency of the evidence supports the trial
court’s termination of parental rights, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” In
re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (internal quotations omitted). “However, we may not
disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding.” Id. (internal quotations
9 omitted). In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in this context, the evidence is
factually insufficient if, “in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant
that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.” In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).
Under these standards, the factfinder remains “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741. In a bench trial,
the trial court, as factfinder, weighs the evidence and resolves evidentiary
inconsistencies and conflicts. In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
B. Applicable Law
Family Code Section 161.001(b) authorizes an “involuntary termination of
parental rights if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence both that a parent
engaged in one or more enumerated predicate grounds for termination and that
termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 701–02
(Tex. 2022); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U), (b)(2). Generally, “[o]nly
one predicate ground and a best interest finding are necessary for termination, so ‘a
court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a
challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on
10 more than one ground.’” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at 702 (quoting In re N.G., 577
S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019)).
Although only one predicate ground is necessary to support a judgment of
termination, we may not bypass evidentiary challenges to subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)—“the so-called endangerment grounds.” In re J.W., 645
S.W.3d at 748. “Those grounds bear special significance because termination of a
parent’s rights under either can serve as a ground for termination of his [or her] rights
to another child.” Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Because prior termination for endangerment provides a sufficient basis for a
future termination, due process and due course of law require us to detail our analysis
if we affirm the termination under either subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E). In re
N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 237.
C. Endangerment Findings
‘“To endanger’ means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a
child’s emotional or physical health.” Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 723 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Though “endanger” means “more than
a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family
environment,” the conduct does not need to be directed at the child, and the child
does not need to suffer injury. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 748.
11 1. Section 161.001(b)(1)(D)
Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) authorizes a trial court to order
termination of a parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional wellbeing of
the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
The endangerment analysis under subsection (D) focuses on the evidence of
the child’s physical environment but allows termination if DFPS proves the parent’s
conduct caused a child to be placed or remain in an “endangering environment.”
Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 721.
The endangering “conditions or surroundings” include “[i]nappropriate,
abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home or with whom
the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in the home . . . .” Id. Subsection
D allows termination based on a single act or omission. Id.
2. Section 161.001(b)(1)(E)
Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) authorizes a trial court to order
termination of a parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (E), DFPS must
12 prove that the parent engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct that endangered the child, rather than a single endangering act or omission,
as permitted by subsection (D). Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723.
“A child is endangered if his environment creates a potential for danger that
the parent disregards.” In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from
parental misconduct standing alone, and endangering conduct need not be directed
toward the child. Id; In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021). “Conduct that
subjects a child to life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical
and emotional well-being.” Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723.
“Intentional criminal activity that exposes a parent to incarceration is conduct
that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re V.V., 349
S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Although
“mere imprisonment will not, standing alone, constitute engaging in conduct which
endangers the emotional or physical well-being of a child,” incarceration supports
an endangerment finding “if the evidence, including the imprisonment, shows a
course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional
wellbeing of the child.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312–13 (quoting Tex. Dep't of
Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533–34 (Tex. 1987). Thus, a parent’s criminal
history—considering “the nature of the crimes, the duration of incarceration, and
13 whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists”—may support a finding
of endangerment. Id. at 313.
“[E]ndangering conduct may include the parent’s actions before the child’s
birth . . . including evidence of drug usage.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex.
2009). Endangerment does not require a parent’s drug use to directly or physically
harm the child or to be done in the child’s presence. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d
269, 278 (Tex. 2024); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d at 831. “[A] parent’s use of narcotics
and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of
conduct.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345.
“A reviewing court should not evaluate drug-use evidence in isolation; rather,
it should consider additional evidence that a factfinder could reasonably credit that
demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’”
In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. Thus, a parent’s “decision to engage in illegal drug
use during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a
child, may support a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the
child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d at 832. And “[a]
parent’s past endangering conduct may create an inference that the past conduct may
recur and further jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or emotional
wellbeing.” In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2018, pet. denied).
14 3. Analysis
Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support termination under
subsection (D) because DFPS must have determined there was no endangerment
when DFPS allowed Adam to remain in her possession following the incident where
J.N. shot Mother’s boyfriend. Additionally, Mother contends that the positive hair
tests for illegal drugs were insufficient to support the endangerment finding under
subsection (E) because her urine tests were consistently negative.
DFPS responds that Mother cites no authority, and DFPS knows of none,
showing parental conduct that does not create an immediate danger warranting
emergency removal results in per se insufficient evidence to support endangerment
findings under subsections (D) or (E), or that DFPS’s determination not to remove a
child at some point during an investigation constrains a trial court’s review of the
parent’s conduct prior to removal. DFPS further responds that she offered no support
for her contention that a clean urine sample would negate a hair sample showing
drug use and that Mother failed to address all the other evidence supporting the trial
court’s endangerment findings.
The evidence before the trial court supports an inference that Mother’s
conduct endangered Adam’s physical or emotional well-being. Parental conduct that
15 presents a substantial risk of harm to the child allows a factfinder to reasonably find
endangerment. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. “[A] parent’s continued
association with a known abuser is a conscious choice that endangers a child’s
physical and emotional wellbeing because it exposes the child to the possibility of
violence.” In re D.D.D., No. 01-23-00078-CV, 2023 WL 4872399, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Mother knew that by taking Adam to see J.N. at two weeks old, she was
exposing him to substantial risk of harm. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. The
evidence shows that J.N. had repeatedly engaged in violent criminal conduct
directed at Mother, including a conviction for assault of a pregnant person. This
assault took place while Mother was pregnant with Adam, yet Mother took Adam to
J.N.’s residence only a few months later. Mother reported that J.N. was “high off
synthetic marijuana” while she and Adam were at J.N.’s residence, and DFPS’s
investigation revealed that J.N. was waving a gun around inside the residence, got
into an argument with Mother, and when Mother’s boyfriend came to pick her up,
J.N. shot him. Mother admitted at trial that J.N. “assaulted [Mother’s boyfriend] with
a deadly weapon right in front of [Adam].”
After J.N. was arrested and incarcerated following the shooting, DFPS did not
immediately seek to remove the child from Mother but offered domestic violence
counseling services and initiated a home study of Grandmother’s home to determine
16 whether it would be safe for Adam to reside there. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 262.101(a)(6) (requiring DFPS to make “reasonable efforts, consistent with the
circumstances and providing for the safety of the child, were made to prevent or
eliminate the need for the removal of the child”). After failing to participate in drug
testing three times, she was charged with possession of methamphetamines and
arrested on an open warrant. See In re B.S., No. 01-22-00826-CV, 2023 WL
3099904, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(acknowledging that intentional criminal activity that exposes parent to incarceration
is conduct that endangers child’s physical and emotional well-being). Based on
Mother’s refusal to submit to drug testing, her arrest and incarceration for possession
of methamphetamine, and her positive drug test shortly after removal, the trial court
could have reasonably concluded that Mother was using illegal drugs before Adam
was removed from her custody. See In re L.D., No. 01-17-00471-CV, 2017 WL
6374663, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 14, 2017, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (holding that parent’s refusal to submit to drug testing supported conclusion he
was using drugs). DFPS’s home study of Grandmother revealed Grandmother also
had a history of drug use, her own history with DFPS, and untreated mental health
concerns. And Mother’s brother, who also lived in the home, had a history of drug
possession charges.
17 Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs repeatedly during the
pendency of this case, from less than two weeks after removal to two months before
trial commenced and did not participate in drug testing on several dates. See In re
A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)
(explaining that “a parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the
pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child, may
support a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s
physical or emotional well-being”). Although Mother had a recent negative drug
test, her history of illegal drug use, including during pregnancy, supports an
inference of endangerment. See Interest of J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 317 (Tex.
2021).
Despite recent developments showing possible progress by Mother, the trial
court could have reasonably determined any evidence of improvement was short-
lived and outweighed by the extent of her prior drug use and her exposure of Adam
to dangerous circumstances. See Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 726; In re J.O.A. 283 S.W.3d
at 346 (deferring to trial court to weigh evidence of significant recent improvements,
especially of short duration, against probative value of irresponsible choices).
Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,
and considering any undisputed evidence to the contrary, we conclude that a
factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother
18 engaged in a course of conduct that endangered Adam’s physical and emotional
well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
Further, considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and
contradicting the finding, a factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered Adam’s
physical and emotional well-being. See id. Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support these predicate findings supporting termination of
Mother’s parental rights. We need not address the trial court’s remaining predicate
findings. See In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at 702.
We overrule Mother’s first and second issues.
D. Best Interest
Mother also contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in Adam’s
best interest.
The best interest prong focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and
development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Several nonexclusive
factors guide the factfinder’s best-interest determination, including: (1) the child’s
emotional and physical needs; (2) present and future physical and emotional danger
to the child; (3) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (4) those
individuals’ plans for the child and the stability of the home; (5) the plans for the
19 child by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the proposed placement;
(6) the parent’s acts or omissions that may suggest the existing parent–child
relationship is improper; and (7) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.
(the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).
We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in Family Code section 263.307.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 n.29. Proof of each
of these considerations is not a condition precedent to termination. In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 27. The analysis may include direct and circumstantial evidence, the
totality of the evidence, and subjective factors. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Here, several factors support the
trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Adam’s best
interest.
The evidence that Mother knowingly exposed Adam to a violent drug user
who assaulted her while she was pregnant with Adam supports the trial court’s best
interest finding. The factfinder may infer physical and emotional danger to Adam
now and in the future from the evidence that Mother exposed him to domestic
violence. See In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 116–17; TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(7),
(12)(E).
At the time of trial, Adam was about 16 months old. When a child is too young
to express his desires, the factfinder may consider that the child has bonded with the
20 foster family, that the foster family has taken good care of him, and that the child
has spent minimal time with a parent. In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d at 834. About four
months after birth, Adam was placed with the foster family and has been cared for
by them ever since. Adam’s child advocate described him as a very happy baby who
is meeting all his milestones and in a safe, drug-free environment. Mother has not
seen Adam since her visits were suspended by the trial court following her positive
result for methamphetamine. Three months later, she had another positive drug test
and was unable to have her visits reinstated.
Evidence of Mother’s past pattern of drug use, including through two
pregnancies and during the pendency of the case, is relevant, not only to her
parenting abilities and the stability of the home she would provide, but also to
Adam’s emotional and physical needs, now and in the future, and to the emotional
and physical danger to Adam, now and in the future. See In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d
at 834; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(8). “A factfinder may afford great
weight to the significant factor of drug-related conduct.” In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d
at 834.
Although Mother’s drug test was negative in June, such a recent improvement
does not negate her history of drug use. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346.
Continued drug use through the pendency of the case also indicates an inability or
unwillingness to prioritize the burdens and responsibilities of parenthood ahead of
21 the desire for intoxication, an impaired condition that is not compatible with the care
of a young child like Adam. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 825 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.).
Further, the evidence showing that Mother failed to complete court-ordered
programs and services supports the trial court’s best interest finding. A parent’s
failure to take the initiative to complete the services required to regain possession
the child supports an inference that such parent does not have the ability to motivate
herself to seek out available resources needed now or in the future. In re J.M.T., 519
S.W.3d at 270.
At trial, Mother acknowledged that she did not have employment and had
recently moved in with her new baby’s father, who has a criminal record. Although
she testified that she put in applications for her own apartment and planned to look
for a job, there was no evidence that she would be able to obtain an apartment or
employment. The trial court may infer from her lack of income and stable housing
that she is unable to provide for a child’s emotional and physical needs. See id.
In contrast, both the DFPS caseworker and CASA advocate testified that the
foster parents provide a stable home for Adam, that Adam has bonded with the foster
family, and that Adam is thriving in the foster placement. They both opined that it
was in Adam’s best interest for him to remain in his foster placement.
22 We defer to the trial court’s assessment of the witness’s credibility and
demeanor in crediting this testimony as evidence in favor of the trial court’s
best-interest finding. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. “[I]n a bench trial, the
judge as the trier of fact weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses
and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies.” In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 117.
Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s
best-interest finding, and considering any undisputed evidence to the contrary, we
conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that a termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Adam’s best interest. See In re
J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741.
Further, considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and
contradicting the trial court’s finding, a factfinder reasonably could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that a termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Adam’s
best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25–26.
For these reasons, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient
to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–
32.
We overrule Mother’s sixth issue.
23 Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s decree terminating the parent-child relationship
between Mother and Adam.
Clint Morgan Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.