In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00224-CV ___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF A.W. AND A.W., Children
On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325-674489-19
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants J.J. (Mother) and A.W. (Father) appeal the termination of their
parental rights to their two children, A.W. (Amy) and A.W. (Andy).1 Mother argues
that (1) because she completed her court-ordered service plan, due process required
that the children be returned to her care; and (2) there is insufficient evidence that
termination was in the children’s best interest.2 Father’s counsel, meanwhile, has filed
an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable, meritorious grounds for challenging
the termination of his parental rights. Because we agree with Father’s counsel and
conclude that Mother’s appeal likewise lacks merit, we will affirm.
I. Background
Domestic violence marked the relationship between Mother and Father. The
Department of Family and Protective Services repeatedly intervened, starting several
years before the termination case at issue here.
A. Prior Removal and Violence
In early 2020, the Department removed then-three-month-old Amy from
Mother’s and Father’s care due to reports of domestic violence between the parents.
1 We use aliases to refer to the children and their parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 At the time of the 2025 trial, Amy was five years old and Andy was four.
2 Less than a year later, in 2021, Andy was born, and he too was removed.3 Mother
worked with the Department to secure her children’s return, and in mid-2022—after
she moved into a new residence for which Father did not have the address—the
children were provisionally returned to her care. The trial court prohibited Mother
from allowing Father to interact with the children outside of his approved,
Department-supervised visitations, though.
Yet, within days, not only was Father at Mother’s new residence, but also the
police were dispatched to the home due to a verbal altercation between Mother and
Father. The trial court signed a temporary order enjoining the parents from coming
within 300 feet of one another or one another’s residences. Despite the injunction, a
month later, the police were called back to Mother’s residence for yet another incident
involving Father. A Department investigator later explained that Mother had “called
[Father] over” to her residence; that “there had been an incident”; and that Mother
had become so agitated, “erratic[,] and aggressive” that the police “did not feel that it
was safe for her to keep [Amy],” so they had left Amy with Father. The trial court
revoked the provisional return.4
3 By late 2021, the Department had been appointed permanent managing conservator of Amy, with Mother and Father having possessory rights. 4 In Mother’s attempts to get the children back after the provisional return was revoked, she filed an affidavit stating that the Department had “submitted false information” to remove the children and that Father “ha[d] not shown any aggression ever around the children.” [Capitalization altered.]
3 Nonetheless, in October 2022, Mother was appointed sole managing
conservator of the children, Father was given visitation rights, and the Department’s
case was closed. In light of the history of domestic violence, the custody order
provided for the parents to exchange the children at a neutral location unless they
agreed otherwise.
In the year that followed, the police responded to incidents at Mother’s
residence on more than twenty occasions. Initially, the officers warned Father to stay
away from Mother’s residence and cited him for criminal trespass, but they stopped
doing so when, after a few months, Mother admitted that she had periodically invited
or had allowed Father to come over. The numerous police reports from this time
period documented incidents ranging in severity from verbal altercations between
Mother and Father, to Father’s stealing Mother’s phone, to Father’s kicking in the
door, to Father’s choking Mother, to Father’s threatening Mother with a weapon.
Then, in November 2023, Mother again allowed Father to come to her
residence to exchange custody of the children, and when Father blocked Mother’s
driveway with his vehicle, Mother backed her vehicle into his while the children were
in the backseat. Father responded by pulling into the driveaway and intentionally
hitting Mother’s vehicle “so hard that [Mother’s] bumper . . . fell off” and “[h]er trunk
was completely smashed in.”
After the vehicle incident, Mother sought modification of the custody order.
The resulting modification prohibited Father from coming within 20 miles of
4 Mother’s residence and ordered Father to have a third party exchange the children on
his behalf. But Mother continued to allow Father to visit the children outside of the
modified order’s parameters.
Finally, in early January 2024, Mother and Father got into a physical fight
during a custody exchange. Mother described the fight for a Department investigator
by stating that Father had “thr[own] the child at her and spit in her face.” The
Department intervened.
B. Present Case and Violence
The Department sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights,
and the trial court ordered that the children be removed from their care.
1. 2024 Removal
When a Department investigator arrived at Mother’s home to pick up the
children for removal, Mother shut the door, grabbed a kitchen knife, and threatened
violence. The investigator later recalled Mother’s saying “something along the lines
of, [‘]Somebody is going to die today.[’]” Ultimately, removing the children required
the assistance of several police officers and an order permitting entry into Mother’s
residence. One of those officers later recalled Mother’s making suicidal threats such
as, “You’re going to have to kill me in order to take my children.”
2. Post-Removal Events
Meanwhile, the trial court ordered Mother and Father to comply with
Department-created service plans as conditions for their reunification with their
5 children.5 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 263.102, .106. Mother’s plan required her to,
among other things, complete domestic-violence-intervention programs and
individual therapy. Mother substantially complied with her service plan.6
But the violent encounters between Mother and Father continued. In April
2024, Father threatened several individuals at Mother’s home with a firearm. He was
arrested and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, for which
he remained incarcerated through the time of the 2025 termination trial.7
Mother took the opportunity to secure a new apartment and job, telling her
caseworker that she no longer had contact with Father and had moved on. But
Father’s jail records showed otherwise.
Mother visited Father twelve times during his first six months in jail, and she
talked to him on the phone more than seventy times. When confronted with these
records, Mother gave differing explanations, telling her caseworker that she was
5 Father did not complete his service plan. 6 Although Mother testified that she had completed all of her required services, her caseworker testified that she had tested positive for marijuana at one point and had not been discharged from her individual counseling at the time of trial. Nonetheless, the Department conceded that Mother had complied with her court- ordered services, and when the trial court announced and explained its findings at the trial’s end, it “recognize[d] that [M]other ha[d] completed her services.” 7 Father had prior convictions for, among other things, violation of a protective order (on multiple occasions), assault family violence by choking (on multiple occasions), and burglary of a habitation.
6 informing Father of the children’s status but later testifying that she was also sorting
out their intertwined finances and helping with Father’s business affairs.
Mother’s interactions with the Department were concerning in other aspects as
well. According to a Department investigator, at one of the initial hearings in the
case, Mother threatened to “kick [the investigator’s] a**” and “jumped at [her] . . . in
an aggressive manner as if she w[ere] going to swing on [her].” Mother exhibited
similar aggression towards her caseworker, who later testified that Mother had
“charg[ed] at [her]” and had “told [her] to tread lightly[] because she knew [the
caseworker’s] address to [her] home.” On another occasion, Mother became
“aggressive” during a visitation with the children, and when she was asked to leave,
she “refused” and “show[ed the caseworker] that she had a TASER in her bag.”
3. The Children
As for the children, their time in the Department’s care unearthed some of the
things they had experienced.
The children told their therapist about the violent dynamic between Mother
and Father and “the use of knives and a lot of physical aggression that they saw.”
Amy stated that “Mommy always had a cha-cha,” pointing to a kitchen knife and
explaining that “she saw Mommy mad with it.” The children also reported that both
Mother and Father had hit them on the legs, arms, and face. And, in addition to the
physical abuse, Amy made an outcry of sexual abuse, confiding in her therapist “[t]hat
a friend of Mommy’s touched her in her private part.”
7 The children also exhibited significant behavioral issues. The caseworker later
described how Andy had “open-handedly slap[ped] his foster mom,” and both the
caseworker and the children’s therapist reported that the children had thrown toys,
had kicked, had screamed, had used profanity, and had “struggl[ed] to interact with
peers.”
4. Trial and Judgment
The termination case proceeded to a bench trial in early 2025. Mother testified
that she had no plans to reunite with Father, described what she had learned in her
domestic-violence-intervention programs, and stated that Father’s incarceration had
given her the time and physical separation she needed to “detach[] away from him.”8
She offered evidence of her stable employment, appropriate housing, and plans for
the children.
The Department, in turn, offered evidence of Mother’s pattern of returning to
Father, her decision to stay in contact with him while he was in jail, her violent
tendencies, and the children’s behavioral issues. The Department conceded, though,
that the children had been shifted through a series of foster placements, with Amy
moving between six homes and Andy moving been five homes. At the time of trial,
the children were not placed together, and although the Department reported that it
When asked if she planned “to be back with [Father],” Mother responded, 8
“Absolutely not.”
8 had two paternal placements that would potentially allow the children to be reunited,
it was still reviewing the suitability of those options.
The trial court commented that it was “disappointed and disgusted when it
c[ame] to some of the [Department’s] placement issues.”9 However, it highlighted
Mother’s and Father’s history of domestic violence, it noted Mother’s pattern of
returning to Father and her decision to continue contacting him in jail, and it
expressed skepticism regarding Mother’s credibility overall. Ultimately, the trial court
found that both Mother and Father had endangered the children by their conduct and
environment10 and that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best
interest.11 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2).
II. Mother’s Appeal
Mother raises two issues: (1) whether due process required the children to be
returned to her care based on her completion of her service plan; and (2) whether the
9 In its termination order, the trial court directed the Department to arrange for joint sibling therapy and to present the court with proposed placements that would allow the children to live together.
The trial court also found that Father had constructively abandoned the 10
children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(N). 11 The trial court signed a termination order, then two weeks later, it signed another. The two orders were substantially similar, but the second order removed a handwritten note that had set a deadline for the Department to arrange for joint sibling therapy.
9 evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest
finding.12
A. Due Process
Mother first argues that her right to due process—as implemented and codified
in the Family Code—required the return of the children to her care because she
substantially complied with her service plan. See generally id. §§ 161.001(b), 263.102.
The Texas Legislature has “balance[d] the convergent and divergent interests of
parent and child” by enacting Section 161.001 of the Family Code, which establishes
“a two-part standard that permits termination of the parent–child relationship only if
(1) the parent’s acts or omissions satisfy at least one statutory [predicate] ground for
termination and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d
624, 629–30 (Tex. 2018); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re B.C., No. 02-24-
00541-CV, 2025 WL 1478178, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 22, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Mother’s argument centers on the first component—the statutory
predicate grounds listed in Section 161.001.
As Mother points out, one of Section 161.001’s statutory predicate grounds is
the parent’s failure to comply with her court-ordered service plan. See Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). According to Mother, because service-plan
noncompliance is a predicate ground for termination, id., and because another Family
Mother’s issues are reordered for organizational purposes. 12
10 Code provision—Section 263.102—requires the service plan to specify the “steps that
are necessary to . . . return the child to the child’s home,” id. § 263.102(a)(6)(A), the
Family Code as a whole “implicitly acknowledges” that “adherence to the service plan
prohibits the termination of . . . parental rights, regardless of any supplementary
[predicate] grounds [for termination].”13
Notably, Mother does not cite any case law to support her proposed
interpretation of the Family Code. And this is likely due to the volume of precedent
holding to the contrary: “[A] parent’s successful completion of a family service plan
does not guarantee reunification with [her] child.” In re A.F., No. 04-16-00008-CV,
2016 WL 3626235, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.);
In re A.C.B., 198 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (“[A] parent’s
compliance with a service plan does not preclude a finding that termination is in the
child’s best interest.”); In re M.G.D., 108 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“[W]e disagree that compliance with an agency’s family
service plan also renders termination impossible.”); see In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 544
& n.2 (Tex. 2020) (noting lower court’s unchallenged holding that there was
insufficient evidence of father’s noncompliance with service plan but nonetheless
recognizing that trial court could terminate rights under non-service-plan predicate
ground); In re B.J., No. 02-24-00428-CV, 2025 WL 646633, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort
In fact, Mother “contends that her adherence to the plan precluded the 13
Department from even initiating termination proceedings.”
11 Worth Feb. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to review predicate finding
regarding father’s noncompliance with service plan because “only one ground is
necessary for termination” and because the court had already held that a non-service-
plan predicate ground independently supported termination); In re A.O., No. 02-21-
00376-CV, 2022 WL 1257384, at *4, 8–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming termination based on non-service-plan predicate
ground despite mother’s having “completed all of the requirements in her service
plan”); see also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019) (recognizing that
termination may be based on “one or more of the twenty-one [statutorily] enumerated
grounds” so “[t]o affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only
one termination ground . . . [plus the] best interest finding”).
This well-established interpretation is rooted in Section 161.001’s plain
language. See Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 547 (interpreting another Section 161.001 statutory
predicate ground based on statute’s plain language). Section 161.001 lists the
predicate grounds with the disjunctive “or,” meaning that they are alternatives to one
another. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1); see White v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., No. 01-04-00221-CV, 2005 WL 174546, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Jan. 27, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing that “[t]he separate grounds
for termination are listed in the Texas Family Code[] joined with the disjunctive term
‘or’[, so] a court may base a termination . . . upon a finding that a parent engaged in
conduct described in any one of the alleged grounds”); In re J.M.C.A., 31 S.W.3d 692,
12 696 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (similar); see also Broadway Nat’l
Bank, Tr. of Mary Frances Evers Tr. v. Yates Energy Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tex. 2021)
(interpreting Property Code, citing dictionary definition of “or,” and noting that “this
Court has recognized that ‘or’ is typically understood as a disjunctive term, meaning
that either of the separated words or phrases may be employed without the other”).
Mother makes no mention of Section 161.001’s disjunctive phrasing. Cf. City of Lorena
v. BMTP Holdings, L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. 2013) (interpreting Local
Government Code and noting that “[w]e have previously held that the Legislature’s
use of the disjunctive word ‘or’ is significant when interpreting statutes”).
Nor does Mother explain how her proposed interpretation of the Family Code
would avoid rendering the non-service-plan predicate grounds meaningless.
According to Mother, none of Section 161.001’s non-service-plan predicate grounds
could support termination unless the trial court also found that the parent failed to
comply with her service plan—which is itself an independent predicate ground. See
generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1). But this would effectively nullify the
purpose of any non-service-plan predicate findings. Even if those predicate findings
could be used for tangential purposes in other contexts,14 they would be ineffective as
14 If a trial court finds that a parent’s actions meet certain endangerment-related predicate grounds, then the finding can be used to support the termination of the parent’s rights to other children in the future. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (listing as predicate ground that the parent has had her parental rights terminated “with respect to another child based on a finding . . . . [under] Paragraph (D) or (E)”). Consequently, an endangerment predicate finding would
13 a basis for termination. We cannot gut Section 161.001 in this manner. Rather, we
must “presume [that] the Legislature selected language in [the] statute with care and
that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind.” Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 547
(interpreting another statutory predicate ground and reiterating canon of
construction); cf. Broadway Nat’l Bank, 631 S.W.3d at 24 (reiterating “presum[ption
that] the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose”).
The other Family Code provision that Mother points to—Section 263.102—
does not support her proposed interpretation either. Mother emphasizes Section
263.102’s requirement that “[t]he service plan must . . . state steps that are necessary
to . . . return the child,” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.102(a)(6)(A), and she reasons that
such mandatory language means that the child “must” be returned to the parent upon
the completion of the “necessary” steps, see id. But Mother’s argument ignores the
distinction between a necessary condition and a sufficient condition. “Conditions that
are sufficient guarantee a result, while conditions that are merely necessary do not.”
Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Arce, 672 S.W.3d 347, 356 (Tex. 2023) (interpreting necessary-but-
not-sufficient condition in Insurance Code). Section 263.102 contemplates the
have future ramifications even if the trial court also found that the parent had failed to complete her service plan. See generally N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235–37 (discussing ramifications of endangerment findings). But even then, the endangerment finding would not be dispositive for purposes of the case then before the court. Cf. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 (Tex. 2024) (noting that “termination under [one predicate ground wa]s sufficient to reverse the judgment” but nonetheless reviewing endangerment predicate findings “because a finding . . . under those grounds may justify termination of parental rights to other children”).
14 latter—the steps “that are necessary to . . . return the child”—rather than the former.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.102(a)(6).
Thus, based on both well-established precedent and the plain language of the
Family Code, we overrule Mother’s first issue.
B. Best Interest
In her second and final issue, Mother argues that there was legally and factually
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the
children’s best interest.
1. Standard of Review
When reviewing the sufficiency of a best interest finding, we ask whether a
reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding
was true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545; A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31. Both legal and
factual sufficiency turn on this question; the distinction between the two “lies in the
extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” A.C.,
560 S.W.3d at 630–31. For legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the finding, R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 276; Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545; A.C.,
560 S.W.3d at 630–31, but for factual sufficiency, we consider the disputed evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding and weigh
its significance in light of the entire record. A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631; see In re J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Either way, neither sufficiency analysis allows us to
15 supplant the factfinder’s credibility determinations with our own. R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d
at 276; A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31.
2. Governing Law
As for the best interest inquiry itself, it “is child-centered, focusing on the
child’s well-being, safety, and development.” B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *5; A.O.,
2022 WL 1257384, at *13. Although we presume that the best interest of a child is
served by keeping the child and parent together, see B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *5, we
consider several other factors as well, including (1) the custody-seeking party’s plans
for the child; (2) the party’s parental abilities; (3) the programs available to assist the
party; (4) the emotional and physical danger to the child; (5) the emotional and
physical needs of the child; (6) the stability of the proposed placement; (7) the acts or
omissions of the parent indicating that the parent–child relationship is not a proper
one; and (8) any excuse for those acts or omissions.15 Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d
367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14.
3. Children’s Best Interest
As the trial court acknowledged, there is evidence on both sides of the best
interest issue.
On one hand, Mother
These factors are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, 15
at *14.
16 • completed her court-ordered services—including the domestic-violence- intervention programs—and continued to attend therapy at the time of trial, see B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *5 (noting in best interest analysis that father had completed most services); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14 (similar, noting that mother had completed services); see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing programs available to assist the parent as best interest consideration);
• regularly attended visitation with the children, see B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *5 (noting in best interest analysis that father had regularly attended visitation); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14 (similar, noting that mother had attended visitation); see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing parental abilities and acts demonstrating a proper parent–child relationship as best interest considerations);
• secured stable employment at a local municipal entity and held the job for approximately six months before trial, see B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *5 (noting in best interest analysis that father had maintained employment throughout the case); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14 (noting that mother had secured two jobs to provide for the children); see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing children’s physical needs as best interest consideration);
• leased an apartment that the caseworker agreed was suitable for the children, see B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *5 (noting in best interest analysis that father had secured “appropriate housing”); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14 (similar, noting that mother had secured stable housing); see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing children’s physical needs as best interest consideration); and
• arranged for the children to use her health insurance and to attend a local after- school program until she could pick them up each day, see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing parent’s plans for the children as best interest consideration). Meanwhile, the Department’s plans for the children were, in the trial court’s
words, “disappoint[ing].” Cf. id. (listing party’s plans as best interest consideration). It
was undisputed that
17 • Amy had been in six different placements; Andy had been in five; and at the time of trial, the children were not placed together,16 cf. id. (listing the stability of the home or placement as best interest consideration); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14–15 (recognizing that, “[g]enerally, it is in a child’s best interest to keep siblings together whenever possible”);
• although a psychological evaluation had recommended sibling therapy, the therapy was not occurring at the time of trial due to the distance between the children’s placements, see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing programs available to assist the party seeking custody as best interest consideration); and
• the Department was still reviewing long-term placement options for the children and did not have a confirmed placement that would allow the children to live together, see id. (listing the stability of the proposed placement as best interest consideration). All of this evidence weighed against a finding that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interest, and a reasonable factfinder could
not have ignored it. See A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31 (clarifying scope of evidence
considered in sufficiency review); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *14–15 (noting that,
when mother planned to keep siblings together and Department planned to split them
up in placements that were still under review, such evidence weighed against a finding
that termination was in the children’s best interest).
Nonetheless, other evidence raised significant concerns regarding the stability
of Mother’s home and the children’s emotional and physical safety in her care. See
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing the stability of the home and the emotional and
physical danger to the children as best interest considerations). And the “placement
The caseworker testified that part of the reason the children were not placed 16
together at the time of trial was due to Amy’s continued “aggressive” behavior.
18 of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a); A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *15 (quoting statute).
Mother had repeatedly failed to protect the children from Father’s violence:
• The children witnessed “a lot of physical aggression” between Mother and Father, including violence involving knives, cf. B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *6 (noting in best interest analysis that father had not only committed domestic violence against Mother but also had done so in front of the child);
• Even when court orders or police warnings protected Mother and the children from Father—as the temporary injunction, modified custody order, and criminal-trespass warnings had done—Mother continued contacting Father and inviting him to her residence; and
• In 2023—while the children were in Mother’s care—there were more than twenty domestic violence incidents between Mother and Father, including the vehicle incident that directly jeopardized the children’s safety. In addition, the record demonstrated that Mother had violent and erratic
tendencies of her own:
• The children told their therapist that both Mother and Father had hit them.
• Mother acknowledged that she had two convictions for assault family violence for hitting Father and for cutting him, cf. id. (noting father’s criminal history and pending charge for assaulting mother in best interest analysis).
• Mother had a pattern of aggression against other adults: she “jump[ed] at” the Department investigator,“charg[ed] at” her caseworker; warned the caseworker to “tread lightly[] because she knew [the caseworker’s home] address”; and issued violent and suicidal threats during the children’s 2024 removal. The record also showed that Mother’s violent home environment had
observable effects on the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing the
emotional danger to the children as best interest consideration). The children’s
19 therapist described the children’s “physical aggression” as consistent with kids who
had been exposed to domestic violence, and both the therapist and the caseworker
reported that the children’s behavior frequently regressed after visitations. Mother’s
testimony, meanwhile, indicated that she had failed to appreciate the effects on her
children’s behavior. In fact, she insisted that the children’s behavior was “on the
normal-kid level,” attributing their tantrums to their being kids.
Similarly, the record demonstrated that—despite Mother’s acceptance of
responsibility for some of her “bad choices”—she minimized the violence and
continued to maintain a relationship with Father:17
• The Department investigator testified that when she had spoken with Mother regarding the 2023 vehicle incident, Mother had stated that Father was a bad boyfriend but a good father and that she did not believe that he would hurt the children.
• Throughout 2024—while Mother was engaging in domestic-violence- intervention programs and telling her caseworker that she had no contact with Father—she was regularly visiting Father in jail and talking with him on the phone for extended periods of time.
17 Although Mother claimed that she had permanently “detach[ed]” from Father, there was evidence to the contrary, and the trial court was not required to believe her. Cf. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (reviewing endangerment finding and noting that, “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short[ ]duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices”); B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *7 (reviewing evidence that termination was in child’s best interest and noting that, although father had completed substance-abuse program and testified that he did not intend to drink or use drugs again, he had relapsed after prior participation in a substance-abuse program).
20 Based on the record, the factfinder could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that Mother could not or would not provide a safe, stable, nonviolent
environment for the children. So although the record contains evidence on both sides
of the best interest issue, a reasonable factfinder could have weighed all the evidence
and formed a firm belief that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. The evidence was factually sufficient. See A.O., 2022 WL
1257384, at *16 (noting that “[t]here [we]re factors on both sides of the best interest
issue” and that, although mother had “completed all of [her] services,” had secured
stable housing and employment, and had made plans for the children, other evidence
supported a firm conviction that termination was in children’s best interest). And
because the evidence is factually sufficient, it is necessarily legally sufficient as well. Id.
at *8.
We overrule Mother’s final appellate issue.
III. Father’s Appeal
As for Father’s appeal, his appointed appellate counsel has conducted a
conscientious review of the record and concluded that there are no meritorious
grounds for review.18 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400
Father’s counsel argues that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence 18
to support the trial court’s predicate finding that Father constructively abandoned the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(N); supra note 10. But as counsel acknowledges, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s other predicate findings, so the constructive abandonment finding is not dispositive and “this court [need] not reach the merits of th[e] point.” See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
21 (1967); In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, order) (holding
Anders procedures apply to parental termination appeals), disp. on merits, 2003 WL
2006583, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.
op.). Father’s counsel has filed an Anders brief, mailed a copy of his brief to Father,
informed Father of his right to request the record and to file a pro se response, and
provided Father with a motion template to facilitate his accessing the record. See
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014); B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *4. Father has neither sought access to
the record nor responded to his counsel’s Anders brief.19
After conducting our own independent review of the record, we agree with
Father’s counsel that there are no meritorious grounds for review. See B.C., 2025 WL
1478178, at *4 (noting in mother’s Anders appeal that “we independently examine[]
the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist”). Father
has a documented history of domestic violence, much of which occurred in the
children’s presence, and some of which involved them directly. Thus, evidentiary
sufficiency challenges to the trial court’s predicate and best interest findings would not
be meritorious. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (b)(2); B.C., 2025 WL
1478178, at *6–7 (noting that father’s criminal history and domestic violence
19 The Department opted not to file a response to Father’s counsel’s Anders brief but expressed its “agree[ment] . . . that Father has no meritorious grounds upon which to advance an appeal.”
22 supported findings of conduct-based endangerment of child and that termination was
in child’s best interest).
And nothing else in the record shows any other arguable ground for review.
The record does not reveal any jurisdictional flaws, see, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§§ 152.201, 263.401; it reflects the trial court’s compliance with the relevant statutory
procedures and deadlines, see, e.g., id. § 263.4011; and it demonstrates that Father had
effective legal representation in the trial court. In short, our independent review of
the record confirms that, as Father’s counsel concluded, Father’s appeal is frivolous.
See B.C., 2025 WL 1478178, at *4 (conducting brief Anders analysis and reaching
similar conclusion).
IV. Conclusion
Because Mother’s two appellate challenges fail and because Father’s appeal is
frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s termination order. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice
Delivered: August 28, 2025