IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1916 Filed April 24, 2024
IN THE INTEREST OF A.V., A.V.-N., A.V., and S.C., Minor Children,
M.V.-C., Mother, Appellant,
J.C., Father of S.C., Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, Charles D. Fagan,
Judge.
A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for
appellant mother.
J. Joseph Narmi, Council Bluffs, for appellant father of S.C.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
William Early, Harlan, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
GREER, Judge.
This appeal concerns four minor children—Ad.V., born May 2015; S.C.,
born June 2017; A.V.-N., born July 2019; and Ar.V., born February 2021. The
mother (M.V.-C.) of all four children and S.C.’s father (J.C.) separately appeal the
termination of their parental rights. At the time of the termination proceedings,
Ad.V. resided with her biological father, A.S., and the fathers of A.V-N. and Ar.V.
were unknown.1 Upon our review, we affirm the termination as to both parents—
M.V.-C. and J.C.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
This family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and
Human Services (the department) in June 2021 after the department received
allegations that J.C. was sexually abusing Ad.V. As part of the investigation of the
allegations, Ad.V. and S.C. participated in forensic interviews. During her
interview, Ad.V. described J.C. touching and licking her “vagina” as well as putting
his penis in her “pee hole” and mouth. She said that “excited stuff comes out of
his penis” and that the “excited stuff” would get on her belly. She reported that she
could not push him off her because “he’s too big and too strong.” S.C. shared that
J.C. touched his “wee-wee” and spanked him with a belt and a stick. The
allegations led to a founded sexual abuse investigation by the department. The
State filed child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) petitions for all four children.
1 Although efforts were made to DNA test other potential fathers, at the time of the
termination trial, the parental rights of the two unknown fathers of A.V.-N. and Ar.V. were also terminated. 3
All four children were removed from the mother’s home in July via ex parte
removal order and placed in the custody of the department; they have been out of
parental custody continuously since that time. The juvenile court confirmed the
removal later that month and ordered visitation at the discretion of the department
but ordered that J.C. was to “have no contact with the children at this time due to
[the] pending sexual abuse investigation.” The children were all adjudicated CINA
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (d) (2021) in August. The
mother reported that she was seeking a divorce from J.C.; yet, law enforcement
and the mother’s therapist observed them together in the community and the
mother’s vehicle parked at J.C.’s home.
Ad.V. exhibited behavioral issues including sleepwalking, nightmares,
hoarding food, and eating out of the trashcan. S.C. also struggled with behavioral
issues2 including sleepwalking, nightmares, hoarding food, eating out of the
trashcan, bedwetting, and soiling himself. On one occasion his foster father found
him with no pants on, and S.C. stated that that was how he played at the mother’s
home. At visits with the mother, department social work case managers reported
concerns with finding bedbugs in Ar.V.’s diaper and a family centered services
worker reported that the mother used a dirty highchair and bottle with the children.
Because of the bedbug infestation, one of the foster families demanded video
rather than in-person visits so that the children would not potentially bring bedbugs
into the foster family’s home. Visits were moved to a public location where the
2 S.C. was diagnosed with depression, autism, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and panic disorder. 4
mother had one fully supervised two-hour visit with all four children a week,
although the mother frequently cancelled visits. Ad.V. told her foster mother and
a social work case manager that she did not want to see the mother and was not
comfortable being around her. S.C. would claim that he had a stomachache and
could not go to visits; he made these statements to his foster parents and teachers.
In January 2022, paternity testing confirmed J.C. as S.C.’s biological father.
In May, the mother had a full bedbug extermination performed on the home and
visits moved back to the mother’s home. However, at a visit in July, the social
work case manager noticed the home smelled of cat urine and learned that the
mother had at least four adult cats, four kittens, and a puppy; one of the adult cats
was pregnant. There was also animal waste on the floor and, because the litter
box did not have enough cat litter, pee on the floor as well.
In August, the no-contact order between J.C. and S.C. was lifted. Visits
between J.C. and S.C. began in October, and S.C. would hit, kick, and bite himself
afterwards. J.C. had two fully supervised two-hour visits with S.C. per month, and
the mother’s visits with S.C. were decreased to the same frequency. Department
caseworkers reported that J.C. did not seem to know what to do with a child of
S.C.’s age, and S.C. did not want to go to visits. The mother had a fifth child, T.C.,
in November. This child was not removed from the mother’s custody.3 At a visit
between the children and the mother in January 2023, the family centered services
worker noted that the mother was unable to supervise all five children
3 T.C. is also not part of our case. 5
simultaneously and relied on the worker for help. The mother was employed on
and off during this time.
A petition to terminate both parents’ rights was filed in May. It cited issues
with safety and lack of adequate supervision in the mother’s home along with the
mother’s difficulty in maintaining stable employment in its petition to terminate the
mother’s parental rights. In its petition to terminate J.C.’s parental rights, it pointed
to the lack of significant improvements in his parenting skills and S.C.’s behavior
the days following visits with his father. At that time, Ad.V. had been placed in the
care of her biological father since June 2022; A.V.-N. and Ar.V. were placed
together in foster care, and S.C. was placed with a separate foster care family.
The department continued to offer family safety, risk, and permanency services;
foster care placement; supervised visitations; mental-health services/treatment;
transitional services; family team meetings; and both individual and family
counseling/therapy services.
The court held a termination hearing over two days in July and September.
At the hearing, the social work case manager testified that there was very little
evidence of bonding between J.C. and S.C. The case manager also clarified that
the department had concerns about the safety of all of the children while they were
all in the mother’s care together; the department had not opened a case for T.C.
because T.C. was the only child currently in the mother’s care, and the mother did
not have issues with one child at a time. In addition, the case manager
acknowledged that J.C. has two older children, one who was believed to be
seventeen years old and one that was an adult. The family centered services
worker testified that she did not believe that any extra visits between J.C. and S.C. 6
would allow for J.C. to progress in parenting skills because the department had
“been doing this since February and there hasn’t been any progression.” She
added that the mother cancelled about one visit per month. The mother testified
that she was pregnant again and due in April 2024. She also stated that she
caught S.C. “in the room with Ad.V., and I had to separate them and scold them
both and tell them why what [S.C.] was doing to [Ad.V.] was not appropriate.”
The mother and J.C. both moved to dismiss the petition to terminate their
parental rights or to continue it for six additional months. They argued that because
they both have other children in their care—the mother has T.C. and J.C. has his
seventeen-year-old—that there must not be concerns with their parenting. The
court denied the motions and terminated the mother’s rights to all four children
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2023); to Ad.V., S.C., and A.V.-N. under
paragraph (f); and to Ar.V. under paragraph (h). It terminated J.C.’s rights to S.C.
under section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). The court stated that it “does not feel that
causing continued trauma is warranted given the parents’ inability to form bonds
with their children and the ongoing harm shown.” Furthermore, the court found
that “[r]easonable, but unsuccessful, efforts were made to reunify the children with
their parents.” The mother and J.C. separately appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d
27, 32 (Iowa 2022). We give careful consideration to the court’s factual findings
and determinations based on in-person observations, but we are not bound by
them. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). “[O]ur fundamental concern” 7
in review of termination proceedings “is the child[ren]’s best interests.” In re J.C.,
857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014).
III. Analysis.
In general, we follow a three-step analysis in reviewing the termination of a
parent’s rights. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). We first consider
whether there is a statutory ground for termination of the parent’s rights under
section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we look to whether termination of the parent’s
rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Third,
we consider whether any of the exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3)
should be applied. Id. We review only those steps that are actually raised and
briefed on appeal by the parent challenging termination. See Hyler v. Garner, 548
N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996). We address each parent’s appeal separately.
A. Mother’s Appeal.
The mother challenges the juvenile court’s ruling as to the statutory grounds
for removal, reasonable efforts on the part of the department, and the best interests
of the children.
1. Statutory Grounds. First, the mother argues that the State did not meet
its burden to prove the statutory grounds for termination. “There must be clear and
convincing evidence of the grounds for termination of parental rights.” In re M.W.,
876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). But “we may affirm the . . . order on any ground
that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 8
703, 707 (Iowa 2010). Here, we choose to focus on paragraphs (f)4 and (h),5 which
both require clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned
to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code
§§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 223 (interpreting “at the present
time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).
The mother’s arguments regarding the statutory grounds all relate to her
own testimony about her home and ability to provide and care for her children. But
the State presented testimony to the contrary, including testimony by multiple
department staff members describing the state of the mother’s home as unclean
and unsafe for the children. Bedbugs in the home are a health concern. See In
re Z.I., No. 20-1473, 2021 WL 811130, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021); In re
4 The court may order the termination of parental rights under paragraph (f) if it
finds that all of the following have occurred: (1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated [CINA]. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the present time. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). The mother only challenges the fourth element. 5 The court may order the termination of parental rights under paragraph (h) if it
finds that all of the following have occurred: (1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated [CINA]. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the present time. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The mother again only challenges the fourth element. 9
T.P., No. 18-1159, 2018 WL 4381550, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018)
(describing the bedbug infestation as an issue with the cleanliness of the home).
On top of cleanliness issues, the children shared concerns about “bad
people” the mother associated with who scared them or caused them to feel
unsafe. It appeared the mother lacked insight about decisions she was making
that directly impacted the children’s safety. To this end, the department noted the
mother’s history of associating with people who had criminal records that included
being on the sexual abuse registry and who were involved with substance use and
abuse allegations. The mother also did not fully acknowledge the sexual abuse by
J.C. against Ad.V. and continued to have interactions with J.C. “[R]efusal or
inability to address the danger of sexual abuse” amounts to a safety risk to the
children. In re A.S., No. 22-0260, 2022 WL 1100304, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13,
2022); accord In re D.D., 955 N.W.2d 186, 192–93 (Iowa 2021). During the
pendency of the case, it became clear that the mother talked to the children about
topics that were not age-appropriate, told the children to lie, and struggled with
basic parenting skills during her two-hour visits. The department had concerns
over the mother’s mental health, but the mother was not always forthcoming about
her treatment and was often hostile and volatile in her interactions with the
department. The mother’s therapist noted serious concerns about the mother’s
decision-making ability and lack of insight over how to keep her children safe from
future harm.
Furthermore, the mother never progressed beyond supervised visits with
the children. See In re C.N., No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Feb. 5, 2020) (“[The mother] never progressed to unsupervised visits or trial home 10
visits. Without this necessary progression, we cannot say the children could have
returned to the mother’s care.”). “We look to the past for indicators of what is likely
to occur in the future.” In re M.P., No. 19-0995, 2019 WL 5063337, at *5 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 9, 2019); see also In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (“When
making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may
indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” (citation
omitted)). Thus, without any demonstrated progress through improvement in
cleanliness or semi-supervised visits in the mother’s home, we find that the State
presented clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to
her custody at the time of the termination hearing.
2. Reasonable Efforts. The mother asserts that the one, two-hour visit per
week did not constitute reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children. But to
preserve a challenge to reasonable efforts, our case law generally requires that a
parent complain to the juvenile court directly “to demand other, different or
additional services.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
Furthermore, a parent cannot challenge reasonable efforts for the first time on
appeal or even first raise a challenge at the termination hearing. See In re E.H.,
No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). A parent
must alert the juvenile court of any perceived deficiency in services “at the removal,
when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.” In re C.H.,
652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). When a parent fails to timely request additional
or different services, the parent waives any reasonable-efforts challenge. Id.
Here, the mother never timely informed the court of any deficiency in services, so
her reasonable-efforts challenge is waived. 11
3. Best Interests. First, we note that the strength of the parent-child bond
is not one of the considerations in the best interests analysis. See In re A.B.,
No. 23-0235, 2023 WL 3335422, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (“In
considering the best interests of the children, we are required to use the best-
interests framework set out by our legislature. And that framework does not
include the word ‘bond.’” (internal citations omitted)); In re E.S., No. 23-0590, 2023
WL 4104126, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2023) (“Consideration of the parent-
child bond is not a part of our best-interests analysis.”).
Removing the reference to the strength of the bond between the mother
and the children, the mother makes only the following argument on best interests:
“There was insufficient evidence presented that it is in the children’s best interest
to permanently sever the child-parent relationship. It would be detrimental to the
well-being of the children should parental rights be terminated.” Without
developing how the facts in this record support her position or citing legal authority,
we find that this argument is waived. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The
petition on appeal must substantially comply with rule 6.1401—Form 5.”), 6.1401—
Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court made
with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a particular part of the
record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your position on appeal
.... General conclusions . . . are not acceptable. Include supporting legal
authority for each issue raised, including authority contrary to appellant’s case, if
known.”); see also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all
encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo
review.”). 12
B. J.C.’s Appeal.
J.C. argues that the statutory grounds for termination were not met,
termination of his rights is not in S.C.’s best interests, the department failed to
make reasonable efforts to reunify him and S.C., and the strength of their bond
precludes termination.
1. Statutory Grounds. Here, again, we choose to focus on termination under
paragraph (f). See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (allowing court to affirm termination
on any ground supported by the record). J.C. only challenges the fourth element
of this paragraph: that there was clear and convincing evidence that S.C. could not
be returned to his custody. J.C. contends that he has been a good and appropriate
father to S.C. in spite of S.C.’s severe behavioral issues and the allegations of
sexual abuse against him. Yet, at the same time that J.C. argues that S.C. is only
with him for a few hours a month and thus S.C.’s behaviors cannot be blamed on
him, he also contends that more time with him would remedy S.C.’s behavioral
issues and resolve the claims against him. We disagree. J.C. never progressed
beyond fully supervised visits and failed to demonstrate that returning S.C. to his
care would not cause S.C. further harm. See C.N., 2020 WL 567283, at *1; J.E.,
723 N.W.2d at 798. And J.C. does not address the sexual abuse allegations made
by Ad.V. or S.C. See In re L.H., 904 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Iowa 2017) (noting “the
common sense notion that, ordinarily, all siblings are at risk when one child has
been sexually abused” (citation omitted)). Here, again, we recognize that “refusal
or inability to address the danger of sexual abuse” amounts to a safety risk to the
child. A.S., 2022 WL 1100304, at *3; accord In re M.L., No. 11-1326, 2011 WL
5389620, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011) (“The fact remains that the parents 13
have ‘no insight in what happened so that it’s not going to happen again.’ Without
that insight, the services provided to, and received by, the parents cannot ensure
that an abused child . . . would be safe.”). Thus, because of the safety risk to S.C.,
we find that the State has met its burden and the statutory ground for termination
was met.
2. Best Interests. Here, J.C. asserts that S.C. should be with his two half
siblings and, thus, termination is not in S.C.’s best interests. Yet, we note that one
of the half-siblings is already an adult and living out of state and the other is
seventeen years old. The existence of the one half-sibling in the home does not
change our analysis. While there is “a preference to keep siblings together,” the
“preference is not absolute” and must give way to the children’s best interests.
J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 800. In considering the best interests of the child we “give
primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). As our case
law provides, the defining elements in the child’s best interests are the child’s
safety and need for a permanent home. J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 801 (Cady, J.,
concurring specially). Both S.C.’s safety and need for a permanent home point
towards termination, for the same reasons discussed above. Because multiple
department workers noted that J.C. was unsure what to do with a child of S.C.’s
age and J.C. failed to address the sexual-abuse allegations against him by S.C. or
Ad.V, S.C.’s best interests require termination.
3. Reasonable Efforts. Next, J.C. repeatedly argues that four hours of
visitation a month did not constitute a reasonable effort to reunify him with S.C. He 14
claims that he made requests for reasonable efforts at the May 2022 and January
and April 2023 hearings. But in the May 2022 order, the court found reasonable
efforts had been made and noted that J.C. was under a no-contact order as to S.C.
and would not have therapeutic visitation until it was deemed appropriate by S.C.’s
therapist. Likewise, the January6 and April 2023 orders confirm reasonable efforts
being made without any notations of a request for more time or other services by
J.C. Even so, he did not request transcripts of those hearings or cite to any places
in our available record for support of his claimed reasonable-efforts requests.
Thus, we are unable to verify if J.C. did, in fact, make timely challenges.
However, assuming without deciding that he did, “the nature and extent of
visitation is always controlled by the best interests of the child.” In re M.B., 553
N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a) (“A
child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern in making reasonable
efforts.”). Applying the best-interest-of-the-child standard to visitation frequency
and duration “may warrant limited parental visitation.” M.B., 553 N.W.2d at 345;
accord id. (finding no failure to make reasonable efforts when the department did
not increase visitation because the mother had “demonstrated an inability to make
those changes in her life essential to proper parenting, including her continued
codependency on abusive males”). Here, given the ongoing sexual abuse
allegations against J.C. by Ad.V. and S.C., which included a no-contact order that
was not lifted until August 2022, we find that the visitation afforded J.C. was
reasonable and the department did not fail to make reasonable efforts.
6 As of January, J.C. still had not completed the mental-health evaluation with a
parenting assessment requested by the department. 15
4. Permissive Exception. As a final argument, regarding the permissive
exception J.C. writes that “[c]learly there is a very-very-very strong bond” between
him and S.C. and “[d]ue to the closeness of the parent-child relationship,
terminating [his] parental rights would be absolutely devastating” to S.C. “The
court need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if the court
finds . . . [t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be
detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child
relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). However, “the existence of a bond is
not enough. The law requires clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child . . . .’” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa
2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). And the burden is on J.C. to prove
such a detriment to S.C. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018)
(providing the parent has the burden to establish a permissive exception to
termination should be applied).
Here, not only has J.C. not met that burden, but evidence in the record
establishes the contrary. S.C. often did not want to attend visits with J.C., telling
his foster family and his teachers that he did not want to go and that his stomach
hurt. When S.C. did attend, he exhibited increased behavioral issues afterwards
including hitting, kicking, and biting himself. Such a reaction does not evidence
the type of strong bond that J.C. claims and does not overcome the advantage to
S.C. of termination. Thus, we decline to rely on the permissive exception in this
instance. 16
IV. Conclusion.
Because we conclude after our de novo review of the record that a statutory
ground for termination was met as to each child and the mother has waived her
challenges to reasonable efforts and the best interests of the children, we affirm
the termination of her parental rights. We also affirm the termination of J.C.’s
parental rights to S.C., holding that a statutory ground for termination was proved
by clear and convincing evidence, termination is in S.C.'s best interests, the
department made reasonable efforts at reunification, and the strength of J.C.’s
bond with S.C. does not overcome the advantage of termination.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.