J-A09020-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: R.S., FATHER : : : : : No. 1369 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No(s): CP-02-DP-0000662-2022, FID:02-FN-000749-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: R.S., FATHER : : : : : No. 1373 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No(s): CP-02-DP-0000204-2022
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2025
R.S. (Father)1 appeals from the orders changing the permanency goals
of his children K.S. (born in September of 2021) and A.S. (born in October of
2022) (collectively, Children) from reunification to subsidized permanent legal
custody (SPLC). Father argues that the dependency court erred by refusing ____________________________________________
1 B.A. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. J-A09020-25
to permit unsupervised visits between Father and Children. Father also
contends that the dependency court erred by ordering Father to complete
permanency plan goals that were vague, unnecessary, overly burdensome,
punitive, and/or served no purpose. Father additionally claims that the
dependency court erred by refusing to find that the Allegheny County Office
of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) failed to make reasonable efforts to
assist Father in achieving his permanency plan goals. Lastly, Father argues
that the dependency court abused its discretion by granting SPLC to Children’s
paternal grandfather. We affirm.
The dependency court summarized the factual and procedural history of
this matter as follows:
[K.S.] was born September **, 2021. He was adjudicated dependent by this court on April 20, 2022. [A.S.] was born October **, 2022. She was adjudicated dependent by this court on November 9, 2022. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1), both Mother and Father, stipulated to unexplained injuries to [K.S.] This court heard testimony regarding allegations that at 6 months old, [K.S.] presented with a fracture of his left humerus and the physician later discovered healing fractures of his right first rib, left sixth rib, left seventh rib and five vertebrae. At that time his only caregivers were his Mother and Father. Both Mother and Father underwent CYF investigations and the results were unfounded for [] Parents. However, a second Childline [report] as to Father was indicated. Additionally, there is an indicated Childline [report] on an [] unknown person. This court heard testimony regarding drug and alcohol issues and a conviction for the criminal charges of endangering the welfare of children [(EWOC)2] regarding Mother . . . . The [dependency] court also heard testimony regarding anger issues and a conviction for the ____________________________________________
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a)(1).
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criminal charge of endangering the welfare of children regarding Father[3] . . . . The criminal court had issued a no contact order between the Mother and [K.S.] and also between Father and [K.S.] until 2028.[4] However, this criminal court order has been modified to allow [] Parents to have CYF [] supervised visits with [] Children. Both Mother and Father have completed certain types of treatment programs, such as anger management, and parenting, but the discussion as to what happened with [K.S.] and what the triggers were are not known and have not been addressed. Both parents currently have supervised visitation with [] Children. Both parents visit twice per week for half a day each.
[] Children have been in placement with Father’s step-father [(Paternal Grandfather)], since October 23, 2022 for [K.S.] and July 15, 2022 for [A.S.]. [K.S.] was adjudicated dependent by this court on April 20, 2022. [A.S.] was adjudicated dependent by this court on November 9, 2022.
Dependency Ct. Op., 11/11/24, at 2-3 (some formatting altered).
On September 12, 2023, the dependency court entered a permanency
review order indicating that Father was having coached visitation with Children
twice per week and stating that if CYF “is unable to assure visits at least
[twice] per week, a finding of no reasonable efforts will be made.”
Permanency Review Order, Docket No. 204-2022, 9/12/23, at 2-3. The
dependency court also ordered that Parents undergo individual forensic
____________________________________________
3 Specifically, Father pled guilty to EWOC, graded as a felony and the criminal
court sentenced Father to five years of probation. See Permanency Review Order, Docket No. 204-2022, 9/12/23, at 2; N.T., 5/22/53, at 53, 79.
4 The criminal court ordered that as a condition of Father’s probation, Father
was to have no contact with Children except for visitation supervised by CYF. See N.T., 1/31/24, at 50-51, 78; N.T., 5/22/53, at 38-39, 53; N.T., 9/25/24, at 94-95; N.T., 10/30/24, at 152.
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evaluations and interactional evaluations with Terry O’Hara, Ph.D.5 Id. at 3.
The dependency court held a permanency review hearing on January
31, 2024. At that hearing, Dr. O’Hara recommended, among other things,
that Father engage in parent child interactive therapy (PCIT), additional anger
management, and blended case management. See N.T., 1/31/24, at 17-18,
26. Dr. O’Hara also requested that he be provided with any police reports
reflecting potential violence between Mother and Father to determine the
extent of any potential inter-partner violence (IPV) involving this family. See
id. at 18. Dr. O’Hara further concluded that there were “unknown risk factors”
involved in this case because Father’s explanation of how he injured K.S.’s
arm did not explain the severity of K.S.’s overall injuries. See id. at 31-40.
CYF caseworker Kellie Pavilonis testified that CYF was willing to make a
referral for parents to start PCIT. See id. at 63-64. Ms. Pavilonis explained
that CYF has had difficulties with transporting Children to and from supervised
visitation with Parents because of the distance between Parents’ residence and
Paternal Grandfather’s residence. See id. at 52-57. Children had arrived late
to supervised visits with Parents and some visits were cancelled because
Children would not have arrived on time. See id. at 54-55, 64-65; see also
id. at 71-72 (reflecting that Kasey Toomey, a visitation specialist at the
5 Throughout his initial and reply brief, Father spells Dr. O’Hara’s name as “Ohara.” The correct spelling appears to be “O’Hara.” See N.T., 9/25/24, at 5.
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Children’s Institute, also testified about transportation difficulties resulting in
cancellation of Children’s supervised visits with Parents).
On February 8, 2024,6 the dependency court entered an order directing
Father to complete a mental health evaluation and follow any and all of its
recommendations, continue with anger management treatment, engage with
PCIT, and follow all of Dr. O’Hara’s recommendations. See Permanency
Review Order, Docket No. 204-2022, 2/8/24, at 2-3.
At the May 22, 2024 permanency review hearing, Ms. Pavilonis testified
that Paternal Grandfather and Children would be moving from a one-bedroom
apartment into a four-bedroom home the following day. See N.T., 5/22/24,
at 5; see also N.T., 1/31/24, at, 58-59. Ms. Pavilonis opined that a change
of placement “would be detrimental since [] Children have been placed with
Paternal Grandfather pretty much the entirety of this case. [C]hildren are
doing very well in this care. They are thriving. . . They are very happy.” N.T.,
5/22/24, at 6 (some formatting altered); see also id. at 34. Ms. Pavilonis
acknowledged that there were still issues with a “lack of transportation[]” for
supervised visitation. Id. at 8; see also id. at 65, 70 (reflecting that Kendra
Kirkland, a visitation specialist at the Children’s Institute also testified that
two of Children’s supervised visits with Parents were cancelled because of
transportation difficulties since she began supervising visitation). Ms.
6 The dependency court’s order is dated January 31, 2024, but the dependency
court notified the parties of the entry of its order on February 8, 2024. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b); Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b).
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Pavilonis testified that CYF could not proceed with unsupervised visitation
between Father and Children because Father’s probation condition did not
allow it. See also id. at 37, 40.
Ms. Pavilonis further explained that while CYF had made referrals for
PCIT in the past, the referral process had changed, and it was Father’s
responsibility to contact a therapist who provided PCIT and to schedule an
appointment. See id. at 19-20, 48-49. Father testified that prior to April of
2024, it was his understanding that CYF would make a referral for PCIT on his
behalf. See id. at 90-91.
Maternal Grandmother testified that she is an approved foster parent
and that her home is an available placement option for Children. See id. at
73-76. Father testified that he believed that placing Children with Maternal
Grandparents was in Children’s best interest. See id. at 92-96. Father also
explained that at that time, he and Paternal Grandfather did not have a
relationship, and Paternal Grandfather did not communicate with him about
Children. See id. at 92, 97, 101.
At the conclusion of the May 22, 2024 hearing, Parents requested that
the dependency court change Children’s placement from Paternal Grandfather
to Maternal Grandparents. See id. at 108-09, 113-15. Additionally, Father
requested that the dependency court find that CYF had failed to provide
reasonable efforts towards achieving Children’s permanency goal of
reunification because CYF was not willing to move towards unsupervised
visitation and because of the ongoing transportation difficulties. Id. at 115-
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17. The dependency court found that CYF had provided reasonable efforts
and denied the request to change Children’s placement. See id. at 122-27.
Father’s permanency plan goals remained in place. See Permanency Review
Order, Docket No. 204-2022, 5/24/24, at 3.
On June 5, 2024, Father filed a motion for special relief requesting,
among other things, that the dependency court cancel the upcoming goal
change hearing, clarify Father’s permanency plan goals, permit unsupervised
visitation, change Children’s placement from Paternal Grandfather to Maternal
Grandparents, and find that CYF failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve
reunification. See Father’s Mot. for Special Relief, 6/5/24, at 7-23
(unpaginated); see also Father’s Suppl. to Mot., 7/31/24, at 1-6
(unpaginated). The dependency court did not rule on Father’s motion for
special relief prior to the September 25, 2024 permanency review and goal
change hearing.
Further, on August 23, 2024, CYF filed a motion to inform the
dependency court, which alleged that Mother had been observed leaving
Maternal Grandparents’ residence on August 3, 2024, when Children were
staying with Maternal Grandparents although Mother did not have supervised
visitation. See CYF’s Mot. to Inform, 8/3/24, at 1-2 (unpaginated). On
August 29, 2024, the dependency court entered an order prohibiting Children
from staying overnight with Maternal Grandparents. See Order, Docket No.
DP-204-2022, 8/29/24.
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At the September 25, 2024 hearing, Dr. O’Hara recommended that
Father attend additional anger management training and for the treating
clinician to be informed of Father’s EWOC conviction. See N.T., 9/25/24, at
18-21. Dr. O’Hara explained that he was concerned about Parents having
unsupervised contact with Children because K.S. had “sustained substantial
acute and healing injuries[,]” which medical experts determined was physical
child abuse and there were unknown risk factors in this case because there
had been no explanation for how K.S. sustained those injuries. Id. at 18; see
also id. at 48.
Ms. Pavilonis testified that Children are in daycare for up to eight hours
per workday depending on Paternal Grandfather’s work schedule. See id. at
101. Between September 7 to September 13, 2024, Children were placed in
respite care with a foster parent who works with Paternal Grandfather while
Paternal Grandfather went on vacation. See id. at 76-78, 101-03. During
that time, the respite caregiver also dropped Children off at daycare. See id.
at 103.
Ms. Pavilonis further explained that when Children arrived for supervised
visitation on September 9, 2024, Parents contacted her claiming that Children
were wearing the same clothes from their previous visit on September 5 and
that Children smelled bad. See id. at 76. Further, Ms. Pavilonis indicated
that A.S. “had what appeared to be significant rash and a goose egg on . . .
the left side of her forehead.” Id. According to Ms. Pavilonis, the respite
caregiver stated that when she dropped Children off at the daycare earlier that
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day, A.S. did have eczema but A.S. did not have a bruise on her head. See
id. at 96-97. CYF’s driver noticed that A.S. had a bruise on her head when he
picked Children up from daycare. See id. After the end of the supervised
visit, Ms. Pavilonis called the driver and directed the driver to go to the
Children’s Hospital. See id. at 77. There, a doctor diagnosed A.S. with an
eczema outbreak and a CT scan was negative for any skull fractures or
bleeding in her brain. See id. A.S. had already been treated for eczema in
the past and the doctor prescribed more of the same cream to treat her flare-
up. See id. A.S.’s eczema has since cleared up. See id. at 78. No reports
of child abuse were filed against Paternal Grandfather or the respite caregiver.
See id. at 77.
Further, Ms. Pavilonis testified that she is aware that Paternal
Grandfather and Father have a strained relationship, and Paternal Grandfather
has only sporadic communication with Mother. See id. at 98-99. Ms.
Pavilonis stated that she believes that Paternal Grandfather and Parents could
use a texting application to communicate and to share information about
Children’s medical appointments and that she would look for one to
recommend to them. See id. at 100. The dependency court ordered that
Father complete a new anger management course. See id. at 106. The
dependency court continued the permanency review and goal change hearing
to October 30, 2024.
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The dependency court entered an order denying Father’s June 5, 2024
motion for special relief on September 26, 2024.7 On October 10, 2024,
Father filed a motion for recusal to supplement the record regarding several
off-the-record discussions the dependency court had with counsel during the
May 22, 2024 and September 25, 2024 hearings. See Father’s Mot. for
Recusal and to Suppl. the Record, 10/10/24, at 10-13, 31-34 (unpaginated).
The dependency court denied Father’s motion for recusal and to supplement
the record on October 24, 2024.8
The dependency court resumed the permanency review and goal change
hearing on October 30, 2024. During that hearing, Ms. Pavilonis testified that
communication between Paternal Grandfather and Parents had been an
ongoing problem, and it had not improved between May and October. See
N.T., 10/30/24, at 39-41, 89, 93; see also id. at 123 (reflecting Mother’s
7 Father filed appeals from that order at each trial court docket number. This Court quashed those appeals as interlocutory on November 15, 2024. See In re K.S., 1284 WDA 2024 (per curiam order); In re A.S., 1299 WDA 2024 (per curiam order).
8 We note that in the statement of the case portion of his brief, Father describes some of these off-the-record discussions between the dependency court and counsel at the September 25, 2024 hearing. See Father’s Brief at 20-25. Father has not filed a statement in the absence of a transcript pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1923. Therefore, this Court may not consider any of Father’s representations regarding these off-the record discussions. See In re J.F., 27 A.3d 1017, 1023 n.10 (Pa. Super. 2011) (noting that this Court cannot consider items that do not appear in the certified record and that “[i]t is [the] appellant’s responsibility to provide a complete certified record on appeal” (citation omitted and some formatting altered)).
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testimony that Paternal Grandfather has not informed her about Children’s
medical appointments).
Ms. Pavilonis further testified that CYF did not have concerns about
Children’s safety while they have been placed with Paternal Grandfather, but
she recommended a change in the daycare facility that Children attend
because the daycare staff have not been able to explain how A.S. was injured
there. See id. at 82, 87-89; see also id. at 120-22 (referencing Mother’s
testimony concerning the bump and bruise on A.S.’s head during the
September 9, 2024 visitation). Lastly, Ms. Pavilonis testified that CYF had
never considered adoption as a goal for Children. See id. at 87. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the dependency court entered orders changing
Children’s permanency goals from reunification to SPLC.
Father timely appealed the goal change orders and simultaneously filed
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) on November 5, 2024. On November 18, 2024, Father filed an
application to amend his concise statements. The following day, CYF filed an
answer in opposition to Father’s application to amend. The dependency court
did not rule on Father’s request for leave to amend his concise statements.
Nevertheless, Father filed amended concise statements on November 21,
2024. The dependency court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining its
decision to change Children’s permanency goals to SPLC. See Dependency
Ct. Op., 12/11/24.
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On appeal, Father raises the following issues for review, which we
restate as follows:
1. Did the dependency court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit unsupervised visits with the parents?
2. Did the dependency court abuse its discretion by refusing to change the placement of Children from Paternal Grandfather to Maternal Grandparents, which was contrary to the best interests of Children?
3. Did the dependency court abuse its discretion when it ordered goals that were vague, unnecessary, overly burdensome, punitive, and served no purpose other than to prevent and delay reunification?
4. Did the dependency court abuse its discretion by refusing to find that CYF failed to make reasonable efforts to assist Father achieve his goals?
5. Did the dependency court abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to cancel the goal change hearing, and when it granted the goal change to SPLC because closing the case with SPLC was not a better permanency option than reunification or changing placement of Children to Maternal Grandparents?
Father’s Brief at 4.9
9 Father’s statement of the questions involved consists of three questions. However, for the sake of clarity and the ease of analysis, we have separated Father’s three questions into five distinct issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (requiring that “[t]he statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail”). Further, to the extent that Father argues that the dependency court abused its discretion by prohibiting overnight visits between Children and Maternal Grandparents between August 29, 2024 and October 30, 2024, that issue is waived because it is not fairly suggested by Father’s statement of questions involved. See id.; see also Boutte v. Seitchik, 719 A.2d 319, 326 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating that “issues that are not set forth in the statement of questions presented or reasonably suggested thereby are deemed waived”).
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Waiver
Before we address the merits of Father’s issues, we must first determine
if he has preserved his issues and properly developed them on appeal. This
Court may raise this issue of waiver sua sponte. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours,
939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007). “The issue of waiver presents a
question of law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary.” Trigg v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC,
229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).
Issues that are not raised in an appellant’s concise statement are waived
on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that issues not included
in a Rule 1925 concise statement are waived); see also Dietrich v. Dietrich,
923 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007). Additionally, in a children’s fast track
appeal, “[t]he concise statement of errors complained of on appeal shall be
filed and served with the notice of appeal” required by Rule 905. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). However, this Court may decline to find waiver where
the appellant in a child’s fast track case files a late concise statement if the
late filing did not prejudice the other parties. See, e.g., In re K.T.E.L., 983
A.2d 745, 747-48 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Further, this Court has explained that a subsequently filed amended or
supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement will not preserve issues for appeal
unless the party requests and receives leave of court to file that statement.
See C.L. v. M.P., 255 A.3d 514, 519 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (noting
that the trial court granted the mother leave to amend her concise statement
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and the trial court treated the amended concise statement as timely filed);
see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 900 A.2d 936, 939 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(holding that issues raised in an appellant’s untimely supplemental concise
statements that were filed without leave of court were waived on appeal).
Additionally, it is well-established that “[t]he opportunity for, and the
extent of, a reply brief is limited. . . . [A]n appellant is prohibited from raising
new issues in a reply brief.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 219
n.8 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Reginelli v. Boggs, 181 A.3d
293, 307 n.15 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that “an appellant is prohibited from
raising new issues in a reply brief” (citation omitted)). “When an appellant
uses a reply brief to raise new issues or remedy deficient discussions in an
initial brief, the appellate court may suppress the non-complying portions.”
Fahy, 737 A.2d at 219 n.8 (citations omitted).
First, we note that Father raises several issues in his reply brief for the
first time. These include his claims that CYF violated Father’s right to due
process by not calling the anger management clinician nor offering the anger
management curriculum into evidence and that granting SPLC to Paternal
Grandfather will effectively terminate Father’s relationship with Children.
Father’s Reply Brief at 6-9, 11-16. Because Father did not raise these claims
in his initial appellate brief, they are waived. See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 219 n.8;
see also Reginelli, 181 A.3d at 307 n.15.
Next, as stated above, Father filed concise statements simultaneously
with his notices of appeal. Father then filed an application to amend his
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concise statements, which CYF opposed. The dependency court never ruled
on Father’s application. Therefore, any issues that Father has only raised in
his amended concise statements are waived. See C.L., 255 A.3d at 519 n.5;
see Jackson, 900 A.2d at 939. However, because we conclude that the
issues Father raised in his initial appellate brief are included within his initial
Rule 1925 concise statements, we may address the merits of those issues.
Visitation
In his first issue, Father argues that the dependency court erred by
refusing Parents’ request to have unsupervised visits with Children. Father’s
Brief at 32-48. Specifically, Father claims that “[t]hroughout this entire case,
no witness with personal knowledge expressed any concern about [Father’s]
parenting skills or his interactions with his children during visits.” Id. at 32
(citing N.T., 10/30/2024, at 44-45, 146-147). Father contends that Dr.
O’Hara’s opinion that Father presents a risk to Children is contradicted by the
testimony of the visitation supervisors and is not supported by personal
knowledge. Id. at 34-47. Father claims that Dr. O’Hara’s recommendations
“must be weighed against the uncontradicted testimony of multiple
professionals,” who supervised father’s visitation with Children and their
recommendation that Father be permitted to have unsupervised visitation with
Children. Father’s Reply Brief at 5-6. Father further argues that the
dependency court committed legal error by relying on Father’s purported
refusal to admit that he had intentionally abused K.S. Father’s Brief at 36
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(citing In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 601 (Pa. Super. 2006)); see also Father’s
Reply Brief at 9-10.
This Court has explained that
the standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.
In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831, 834 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted); see also
In re L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining that “[t]o hold
that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was
manifestly unreasonable, that the court disregarded the law, or that its action
was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will” (citation omitted)).
Our Supreme Court has explained that
[appellate courts] are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact-specific determinations. Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they have presided over several other hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must defer to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be placed on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success of the current permanency plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial court.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
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In child dependency proceedings, the health and safety of the child
“supersede[s] all other considerations.” In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1220 (Pa.
Super. 2008).
In A.K., the dependency court adjudicated two children dependent after
the children were admitted to a hospital with “extensive bruising,” “dried blood
under [their] fingernails and toenails,” and multiple fractures. A.K., 906 A.2d
at 598. “Both parents were eventually convicted of child endangerment
charges in connection with these injuries[,]” and the criminal court imposed
sentences of incarceration for both parents. Id. After a permanency hearing,
the dependency court issued an order changing both children’s permanency
goals from reunification to adoption. See id. at 599. On appeal, this Court
held that the dependency court “erred in assigning the parent[s’] failure to
admit that they intentionally abused their children determinative weight[.]”
Id. at 601.
Specifically, the A.K. Court explained that the parents “accepted
responsibility for their actions or inactions by pleading guilty to the child
endangerment charges.” Id. at 600. In that case, the mother testified that
while she initially believed the father’s explanations for the children’s injuries,
with the benefit of hindsight she acknowledged that she should have taken
the children to the hospital. See id. “Additionally, [the] mother testified that,
if the children were returned to her, she would comply with any conditions
that the agency would require, even ceasing contact with [the] father if need
be.” Id. (some formatting altered). Lastly, although the father in A.K.
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continued to deny that he intentionally harmed the children (which the
dependency court did not find to be credible), this Court observed that the
father was not a continuing threat to the children because he was still serving
his sentence of three to ten years of incarceration. See id.
Here, the dependency court explained its decision to deny Father’s
request for unsupervised visitation with Children as follows:
[This decision] has nothing to do with across the street [i.e., the criminal court]. But the order here is for the visits to be supervised. That’s my court order. It remains in effect. I’m not concerned with everything that goes on over in criminal court. Not my issue.
In regard to the motion to modify [Father’s probation conditions] that, again, not my issue. Because even if it’s nullified, we don’t know if this court at this particular time is going to change the visits from being supervised anyway. So it could be unsupervised over there, it’s still supervised here today. As my court orders have indicated it remains that way at this particular time.
N.T., 10/30/24, at 175-76.
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the dependency court. See L.V., 127 A.3d at 834. Essentially, Father invites
this Court to reweigh factual evidence presented at the permanency review
hearings and to reweigh the credibility of witnesses, which this Court will not
do. See R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Further, we conclude that the facts of this
case are distinguishable from those of A.K. In both A.K. and this case, the
parents pled guilty to criminal charges related to their children’s injuries. See
A.K., 906 A.2d at 600. However, the A.K. Court held that the father did not
present an ongoing threat to the children because he was still incarcerated
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and the mother testified that she was willing to cease contact with the father
if the agency required that as a condition of reunification. See id. Here,
Father received a sentence of probation, has regular supervised visitation with
Children, and Mother and Father attend supervised visitation together. See,
e.g., N.T., 5/22/53, at 38-39; N.T., 10/30/24, at 96. Therefore, we conclude
that the dependency court was permitted to consider Father’s refusal to admit
that he intentionally caused K.S.’s injuries in determining whether
unsupervised visitation was in the best interests of Children. See generally
R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, Father is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Change of Placement
In his second issue, Father argues that the dependency court erred by
refusing Parents’ request to have Children’s placement changed from Paternal
Grandfather to Maternal Grandparents. Father’s Brief at 48-62. Specifically,
Father contends that it was not in Children’s best interest for them to remain
in placement with Paternal Grandfather because (1) Children have a two hour
round trip twice per week between Paternal Grandfather’s home and Parents’
home for supervised visitation, (2) Children spend between thirty-two and
forty hours per week in day care, and (3) Children were placed in respite care
for a week when Paternal Grandfather was on vacation. Id. at 48-53, 56-58.
Additionally, Father notes that on September 9, 2024, while Children were in
respite care, Children arrived for supervised visitation wearing the same
clothes they had been wearing several days earlier, Children smelled, and A.S.
had both a head injury and an eczema flare up. Id. at 58-59. Father contends
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that the only reasons CYF gave for opposing changing Children’s placement
from Paternal Grandfather to Maternal Grandparents was Father’s criminal
probation condition and the length of time Children had already been placed
with Paternal Grandfather. Id. at 52.
Further, Father asserts that Paternal Grandfather refuses to
communicate with Parents regarding Children, including about Children’s
medical appointments. Id. at 59-62. Particularly, Father claims that Paternal
Grandfather failed to inform Father that Children had been taken to a hospital
on September 9, 2024 in connection with the aforementioned head injury and
eczema. Id. at 59-60.
Lastly, Father argues that Children should be placed with Maternal
Grandparents because Maternal Grandmother is a certified foster parent and
Children have a strong bond with Maternal Grandparents. Id. at 49-50, 54.
Before we address the merits of Father’s issue, we must determine if he
properly developed them for appellate review. See Tucker, 939 A.2d at 346
(explaining that this Court may raise this issue of waiver sua sponte). “It is
well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the
argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to
relevant authority.” In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c) (providing that the
argument section of an appellate brief shall contain discussion of issues raised
therein and citation to pertinent legal authorities and references to the
record). “Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim
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with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other
meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” M.Z.T.M.W.,
163 A.3d at 465-66 (citation omitted and formatting altered).
Here, Father has not cited any legal authority in support of his claim
that Children’s current placement with Paternal Grandfather is not in their best
interest or that placing Children with Maternal Grandparents is in Children’s
best interests. Further, although Father argues that CYF’s reliance on the
length of time Children have been placed with Paternal Grandfather is not a
sufficient reason to deny the requested change and maintain the current
placement, Father has not cited any authority about what factors a court
should or must consider when deciding a request to change a dependent
child’s placement. For these reasons, we conclude that Father has waived this
issue. See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66.
Even if Father had not waived this issue, we would conclude that Father
is not entitled to relief. After a trial court has adjudicated a child dependent,
it may “address custody issues and make a disposition of the case consistent
with the best interests of the child.” In re L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (citations omitted). Further, this Court has explained that
“[w]hen a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper placement turns
on what is in the child’s best interest, not on what the parent wants or which
goals the parent has achieved.” In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super.
2006) (citation omitted).
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At the May 22, 2024 permanency review hearing, the dependency court
explained that although there had been argument that Paternal Grandfather
had not been caring for Children appropriately, the dependency court had not
heard any evidence supporting those claims. See N.T., 5/22/24, at 122. The
dependency court further explained that while there had been difficulties in
ensuring that there was transportation for Children to attend supervised
visitation with parents and issues that Children arrived for visitation periods,
this was not a basis to alter Children’s placement with Paternal Grandfather.
See id. at 122-23.
Subsequently, at the October 30, 2024 goal change hearing, the
dependency court ordered that Children were to remain in placement with
Paternal Grandfather but ordered that he could not use the same daycare
where Children had been injured. See N.T., 10/30/24, at 175-77.
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the dependency court. See L.V., 127 A.3d at 834. Essentially, Father invites
this Court to reweigh factual evidence presented at the permanency review
hearings and to substitute our conclusion about which placement is in
Children’s best interest for that of the dependency court’s, which this Court
will not do. See R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even if Father had not
waived this claim for lack of development, he would not be entitled to relief.
Father’s Permanency Plan Goals
Next, Father argues that the dependency court abused its discretion in
setting permanency plan goals that are vague, overly burdensome, and/or
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punitive. Father’s Brief at 62-77. First, Father argues that the dependency
court erred by relying on Dr. O’Hara’s recommendation that Father engage in
parent child interactive therapy (PCIT) because PCIT is focused on helping
parents learn how to address children’s behavioral issues, which were not
present in this case. Id. at 66-68. Next, Father contends that although he
completed an anger management program in April of 2024 and CYF was
satisfied that Father had completed that permanency plan goal, the
dependency court ordered Father to complete an additional course of anger
management based on Dr. O’Hara’s recommendation. Id. at 68-69, 71.
Father claims that this order lacks support in the record because Dr. O’Hara’s
conclusions are inconsistent with those of Ms. Pavilonis, the CYF caseworker.
Id. at 69, 73. Next Father argues that Dr. O’Hara’s recommendation that
Father participate in blended case management also lacks support in the
record. Id. at 73-75. Father further contends that he does not qualify for
blended case management under Department of Human Services guidelines.
Id. at 74-75. Lastly, Father argues that the goal of IPV counseling lacks
support in the record and is not related to achieving the goal of reunification
with Children. Id. at 76-77.
Here, Father has not cited any legal authority in support of his claim
that the dependency court abused its discretion by ordering permanency plan
goals other than boilerplate claims that the plan goals are vague, unnecessary,
overly burdensome, punitive, and/or serve no purpose. Although Father has
cited the Department of Human Services’ blended case management
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guidelines, he has not cited any legal authority to support his claims
concerning the propriety of ordering blended case management and whether
a parent fits the requirements. Additionally, Father has not cited any authority
about what factors a court should or must consider when setting permanency
plan goals for parents and the connection between those goals and achieving
reunification between parents and their children. Nor has Appellant set forth
how the dependency court abused its discretion in its decisions. For these
reasons, we conclude that Father has waived these issues. See M.Z.T.M.W.,
163 A.3d at 465-66.
CYF’s Reasonable Efforts
Next, Father argues that the dependency court abused its discretion by
refusing to find that CYF failed to provide reasonable efforts towards reunifying
Children with Father. Father’s Brief at 77-83. Specifically, Father contends
that CYF failed to schedule both the initial and follow-up psychological
evaluations and parent-child interactional evaluations within a reasonable
time. Id. at 79-80, 82. Father also asserts that CYF was either dishonest or
negligent in informing Father that CYF would make a referral for PCIT on
Father’s behalf only to later inform Father that CYF could not make that
referral. Id. at 63-64. Further, Father claims that throughout this case, CYF
failed to provide reasonable efforts because CYF failed to ensure Children were
transported to and from Paternal Grandfathers’ residence to Parents’
residence for supervised visitation. Id. at 82-83.
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At each permanency hearing, the trial court must determine “[w]hether
reasonable efforts were made to finalize the permanency plan in effect.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(5.1). This Court has observed that
neither federal nor Pennsylvania law defines “reasonable efforts.” Pennsylvania Court’s Office of Child and Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, § 19.9.1, at 19-33 (2014). Notwithstanding the lack of a legal definition, we discern the following from prior cases. Because the focus of the Juvenile Act is on the dependent child, as opposed to parents, any services for parents must directly promote the best interests of the child. In re J.R., 875 A.2d [1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2005)]. “By requiring only ‘reasonable efforts’ to reunify a family, the statute recognizes that there are practical limitations to such efforts.” Id. at 1118 n.5 (citing 4[2] Pa.C.S. §§ 6351(e) & (f)). “It is not sufficient for the court to find simply that an action will promote family reunification; the court must also determine whether the action constitutes a reasonable effort towards reunification.” Id. (emphasis in original). This Court has stressed that the agency is not expected to do the impossible and is not a “guarantor of the success of the efforts to help parents assume their parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 959 (Pa. Super. 1990)).
In re C.K., 165 A.3d 935, 941-42 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnotes omitted).
Here, the dependency court specifically concluded that CYF had made
reasonable efforts with respect to transportation at the May 22, 2024
permanency review hearing. See N.T., 5/22/24, at 122. In reaching that
conclusion, the dependency court explained:
[W]e’re living in a world today, [where] transportation is an issue, and it’s not going to be something that’s guaranteed. Never has been, never will be. That’s not CYF’s job. CYF’s job is to basically try to do transportation, make sure visits occur, make up for visits with time, and time during the days and time as well, which they’ve been doing.
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Id. at 123.
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the dependency court. See L.V., 127 A.3d at 834. We agree with the
dependency court that transportation cannot be guaranteed, and this Court
has recognized that there are practical limitations to an agency’s efforts. See
C.K., 165 A.3d at 941-42. We also discern no merit to Father’s claim that CYF
failed to provide reasonable efforts regarding scheduling evaluations for
Children and providing Father with a referral for PCIT. Ms. Pavilonis, a CYF
caseworker, testified that while CYF had made referrals for PCIT in the past,
the referral process had changed, and it was Father’s responsibility to contact
a therapist who provided PCIT and to schedule an appointment. See N.T.,
5/22/24, at 19-20, 48-49. As stated above, there are limitations to what an
agency such as CYF can accomplish and it is not a guarantor of success. See
C.K., 165 A.3d at 941-42. Therefore, Father is not entitled to relief on his
claim.10
10 We note that Father also argues that CYF failed to provide reasonable efforts
because CYF did not provide Father with a copy of Dr. O’Hara’s updated evaluation until the day before the September 25, 2024 hearing, which did not provide Father with sufficient time to address any of the concerns in that evaluation. Father’s Brief at 81-82. Father did not request a continuance to have more time to review the report nor did Father object to its production on the eve of the hearing, therefore this issue is waived. See In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that a party must “must object to errors, improprieties or irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process” to provide the trial court an opportunity to address the error).
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Goal Change
Next, Father argues that the dependency court abused its discretion by
changing Children’s permanency goals from reunification to SPLC. Father’s
Brief at 84-86. Specifically, Father contends that “the record does not support
the conclusion that reunification failed because of” Father. Id. at 85. Father
claims that the dependency court and CYF failed to properly apply the Juvenile
Act by deferring to the criminal court’s probation order which restricted Father
from having contact with Children except for visitation supervised by CYF. Id.
at 85-86. Father asserts that this was error because that probation condition
is illegal. Id. at 86.
Here, Father has not cited any legal authority in support of his claim
that the goal change to SPLC was not in the best interests of Children. Nor
has Father explained why the criminal court’s probation order is illegal nor
why the dependency court erred by deferring to that order. For these reasons,
we conclude that Father has waived this issue. See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at
465-66.
Even if Father had not waived this issue, we would conclude that Father
is not entitled to relief. Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides that at a
permanency review hearing, the trial court can determine that placement with
a guardian with permanent legal custody is appropriate in cases “where the
return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption
is not best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3). Therefore, “[i]n order for
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the court to declare the custodian a ‘permanent legal custodian[,]’ the court
must find that neither reunification nor adoption is best suited to the child’s
safety, protection[,] and physical, mental[,] and moral welfare.” In re S.H.,
71 A.3d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
This Court has explained that “SPLC transfers permanent legal custody
to the dependent child’s legal custodian without requiring the termination of
natural parental rights. When deemed appropriate, the trial court has the
power to permit continued visitation by the dependent child’s natural parents.”
In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004).
This Court has explained that “the concept of permanency means not
leaving a child in foster care ‘limbo’ and instead ensuring the child lives in a
‘permanent, safe, stable, and loving home[],’ whether with the child’s family
or an ‘alternative permanent family.’” In re J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 657 n.11
(Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted); see also In re Adoption of G.R.L.,
26 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that the Juvenile Act’s “goal of
preserving the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when
considering the best interests of children, but must be weighed in conjunction
with other factors” (citation omitted)).
However, this Court has noted that “SPLC offer[s] less stability than
adoption because parents may petition the court to attempt to re-gain custody
at any time[.]” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 946-47 n.9 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citation omitted); see also S.H., 71 A.3d at 982 (explaining
that a parent may petition the trial court “to regain custody of a child who is
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the subject of an award of permanent legal custody”); Pennsylvania
Dependency Benchbook, 3rd Ed. (2019), at § 12.4, p. 12-6 (stating that “[i]n
the hierarchical scheme of permanency options, permanent legal
custodianship is less desirable than reunification or adoption, but preferable
to permanent relative placement and another planned permanent living
arrangement” (citation omitted)).
Here, the dependency court explained:
In this case pursuant to a criminal court order, both Parents are not permitted to have custody of [] Children until at least 2028. Completely separate and apart from the criminal court order, this court has ordered that the goal has been changed from reunification to SPLC. Paternal Grandfather is available to provide appropriate care for [] Children and this also provides access for the parents in a supervised visitation situation. Additionally, the Maternal Grandparents are also available to visit with [] Children as often as they would request. During this time, each Parent is to continue to work on their parenting skills as well as their life skills as ordered by this court. All of this is in the best interests of [] Children. This court is acutely aware of the challenges faced by each Parent as they await the conclusions of their respective criminal cases while [] Children continue to progress and mature outside of [] Parents’ home. This court believes that it is in the best interests of [] Children to remain in the care of [] Paternal Grandfather and still be able to spend necessary quality time with [] Parents through supervised visits. This court further believes that it is in the best interests of [] Children for [] Parents to continue to remain vigilant in honing their parenting skills while continuing to address their own issues of anger management, and drug and alcohol concerns.
It is evident to this court that the goal should be SPLC, and this would best meet the needs and welfare of [] Children by providing reliable consistent parenting in their young lives. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the decision of this court should be affirmed.
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Dependency Ct. Op., 11/11/24, at 5 (some formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the dependency court. See L.V., 127 A.3d at 834. We agree with the
dependency court that due to the criminal court’s probation condition, Father
is not able to have contact with Children outside of supervised visitation, and
reunification is not best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of Children. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3). Additionally,
the CYF caseworker testified that adoption was not considered an appropriate
goal for Children. See N.T., 10/30/24, at 87. Therefore, we discern no abuse
of discretion by the dependency court by granting SPLC to Paternal
Grandfather, who has had custody of Children throughout the history of this
case. See S.H., 71 A.3d at 978. For these reasons, Father is not entitled to
relief on this claim.
Father’s Application for Post-Submission Communication
Lastly, we address Father’s application for post-submission
communication. Therein, Father requests that this Court accept copies of the
notes of testimony of the April 2, 2025 permanency review hearing and the
dependency court’s order of the same date terminating these dependency
matters and order the dependency court prothonotary to certify all items on
the dependency court’s dockets. Appl. for Post-Submission Commc’n,
4/13/25, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Additionally, Father requested to submit
additional briefing regarding whether the termination of the dependency cases
and the criminal court’s probation condition restricting Father from having
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contact with Children except for visitation supervised by CYF violates his due
process rights. Id. at 2 (unpaginated). Lastly, Father requests that this Court
issue an order “instructing the criminal court that it maintains jurisdiction to
modify the condition of probation as necessary to preserve the family and to
serve the best interests of [] Children, notwithstanding the pending appeal.”
Id. (some formatting altered).
Before we address the merits of Father’s application, we must examine
whether we have jurisdiction to grant Father the relief he requests. See, e.g.,
In re Z.V., 158 A.3d 665, 669 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that “[i]t is well
settled that jurisdictional issues, . . . raise legal questions over which our
review is de novo and plenary, and which may be considered sua sponte”
(citation omitted)). It is well-established that “[j]urisdiction is vested in the
Superior Court upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal.” In re R.Y., Jr.,
957 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “Courts cannot
assume jurisdiction they do not possess, nor can parties confer jurisdiction on
the court; jurisdiction is conferred solely by the Constitution and laws of the
Commonwealth.” Weliver v. Ortiz, 291 A.3d 427, 437-38 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(citation omitted). Further, the Judicial Code provides that “[a]n appellate
court may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any order brought
before it for review, and may remand the matter and direct the entry of such
appropriate order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be
just under the circumstances.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 706.
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Here, Father has appealed from the dependency court’s October 30,
2024 orders changing Children’s permanency goals from reunification to SPLC,
and not from the April 2, 2025 orders. See Notice of Appeal, Docket No. 204-
2022, 11/5/24; Notice of Appeal, Docket No. 662-2022, 11/5/24. Therefore,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the April 2, 2025 orders and may not
grant relief in connection with those orders. See R.Y., Jr., 957 A.2d at 783;
42 Pa.C.S. § 706. Likewise, this Court does not have jurisdiction to issue any
order to the criminal court in an entirely separate matter even if that matter
involves Father. See R.Y., Jr., 957 A.2d at 783; 42 Pa.C.S. § 706. For these
reasons, we deny Father’s application for post-submission communication.
Orders affirmed. Appellant’s application to submit post-submission
communication denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.
DATE: 9/30/2025
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