in the Interest of A.R.P., Children

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided July 30, 2014·No. 04-14-00140-CV·Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-14-00140-CV

In the INTEREST OF A.R.P., J.M.H., & T.A.H., Children

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas Trial Court No. 13-01-0023-CVA Honorable Thomas F. Lee, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 30, 2014

AFFIRMED

This is an accelerated appeal from an order terminating Sondra H.’s parental rights to

A.R.P., J.M.H., and T.A.H.; and Marc H.’s parental rights to J.M.H. and T.A.H. 1 The trial court

determined Sondra and Marc violated subsections (D), (E), and (O) of section 161.001(1) of the

Texas Family Code, and that termination was in the best interest of the children pursuant to section

161.001(2). On appeal, Sondra and Marc (hereinafter “the parents”) challenge only the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial court’s finding that termination was in

the children’s best interest. We affirm.

1 Sondra is the mother of A.R.P., J.M.H., and T.A.H. Marc is the father of J.M.H. and T.A.H. 04-14-00140-CV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may terminate parental rights only upon proof of clear and convincing evidence

that the parent has committed an act prohibited by section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code,

and that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 161.001(1), (2)

(West 2014). Clear and convincing evidence is “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id.

§ 101.007.

When conducting a legal sufficiency review in a parental rights termination case, we

consider “all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In

re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).

We give deference to the fact finder’s conclusions and presume the fact finder resolved any

disputed facts in favor of its finding, so long as a reasonable fact finder could do so. Id. We

disregard any evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved, or found to have been

incredible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts. Id. Credibility issues are generally

determined by the fact finder and we are not permitted to weigh credibility issues that depend on

the appearance and demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 573–74.

When conducting a factual sufficiency review in a parental rights termination case, we give

due deference to the fact finder’s findings and must refrain from substituting our judgment for that

of the fact finder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). “If, in light of the entire record,

the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding

is so significant that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction,

then the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

-2- 04-14-00140-CV

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the parents do not challenge the trial court’s finding that they violated

subsections (D), (E), and (O) of section 161.001(1). Therefore, we focus our review of the

evidence as it pertains to the trial court’s best interest finding.

There is a strong presumption that maintaining the parent-child relationship is in the child’s

best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). There is also a presumption that “the

prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s

best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). In determining whether termination of parental

rights is in the child’s best interest, courts may apply the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape

their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d

615, 618 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). These include, but are not limited to: (1)

the desires of the child, (2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the child, (3)

the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child, (4) the parental abilities of the

persons seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in

promoting the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency

seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) acts or omissions of the

parent which may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate, and (9) any

excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Evidence of every factor

need not be proven to find that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d

17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) became

involved in this case after it received a referral for parental drug use and negligent supervision.

The referral alleged the parents previously used, and were currently using, methamphetamine in

their house with the children present. The Department contacted the parents and interviewed -3- 04-14-00140-CV

Sondra. During the interview, Sondra agreed to submit to a drug test and tested positive for

methamphetamine. A search of the parents’ residence uncovered a “meth pipe” with

methamphetamine residue as well as a handgun, which Marc was not allowed to possess due to

his convicted felon status. As a result, the children were placed in foster care, and the Department

created a Family Service Plan with the goal of family reunification within one year. The

Department ultimately brought suit to terminate parental rights due to the parents’ continued drug

use, dishonest conduct, and uncooperative actions. The trial court held termination hearings on

January 9, 2014, and February 7, 2014. At the time of the hearings, A.R.P. was fourteen–years-

old, J.M.H. was six-years-old, and T.A.H. was five-years-old.

Grace Friesenhahn-Soliz, the parents’ therapist, recommended the children not be returned

to the parents. Friesenhahn-Soliz testified she had concerns regarding the parents’ instability

caused by their continued drug use, lack of stable employment, and lack of stable housing. She

was also concerned about Marc’s anger management issues, inability to control his emotions, and

impulse control issues. She testified Marc exhibited erratic behavior, such as sending her text

messages during the middle of the night and telling her “something about being like all other CPS

idiots.” She further testified the parents lacked a sufficient support system and that returning the

children to the parents would endanger them. Friesenhahn-Soliz stated the parents failed to

complete their counseling program, but acknowledged this may have been caused by a

miscommunication.

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Related

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419 S.W.3d 615 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2013)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
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In the Interest of H.R.M.
209 S.W.3d 105 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
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