in the Interest of A.R., B.R., Jr., and B.R., Children

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 6, 2023
Docket06-22-00065-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of A.R., B.R., Jr., and B.R., Children (in the Interest of A.R., B.R., Jr., and B.R., Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of A.R., B.R., Jr., and B.R., Children, (Tex. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-22-00065-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., B.R., JR., AND B.R., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. FA-21-45542

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION

Based on allegations of abuse and neglect, the Department of Family and Protective

Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children, ten-

year-old Anna, nine-year-old Ben, and five-year-old Brynn.1 The children’s maternal

grandmother, Tanya, and her common-law husband, Aaron, intervened and asked to be named as

the children’s sole managing conservators. A Fannin County jury found that Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights should be terminated and that neither Tanya nor Aaron should be named

as conservators. Consequently, the trial court entered a judgment that terminated parental rights,

dismissed the petition in intervention, and appointed the Department as the children’s permanent

managing conservator.

On appeal, Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

jury’s findings that (1) they knowingly placed or allowed their children to remain in conditions

or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, as described by Ground

D of the parental-rights termination statute; (2) they engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the

children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-

being, as described by Ground E;2 and (3) termination of parental rights was in the children’s

best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). Tanya and Aaron also

filed a notice of appeal and argue in their appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by

To protect the children’s identity, we will refer to the children and their family members by pseudonym. See TEX. 1

R. APP. P. 9.8. 2 The jury also found that Father failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the children’s return. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). 2 failing to grant their oral motion to continue the jury trial and by denying their motion for a

directed verdict.

We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s Ground E findings that Mother

and Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Anna, Ben, and Brynn with persons who

engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. Because we also

find that sufficient evidence supported the best-interest findings, we affirm the judgment

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. As to the petition in intervention, we find no

error in the trial court’s decision to deny Tanya and Aaron’s motions for a continuance and

directed verdict. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Decision to Terminate Parental Rights

A. Standard of Review

“The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional

dimensions.” In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting

Horlick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to

make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.’” Id. (quoting Troxel

v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). “Because the termination of parental rights implicates

fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at

trial.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). This Court is required to

“engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to

support the termination of parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500).

“[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Id. (quoting

3 In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick,

685 S.W.2d at 20)).

Termination of parental rights requires “clear and convincing evidence[] that the parent

has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the

child[ren]’s best interest.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d

796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is that ‘degree of proof that will

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations

sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007) (citing In re J.O.A.,

283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). “This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the

evidence.” Id.

“In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005)

(per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). We

presume that the jury, “acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a

reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have

reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re

J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).

“In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the [jury]

could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d

4 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably

could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘“whether the evidence is such that a

fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . .

allegations.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting In

re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002))); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002). “If,

in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have

credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have

formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. (quoting In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). “‘[I]n making this determination,’ we must undertake ‘an exacting

review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’” Id.

(quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).

“We also recognize that the . . . fact-finder . . . is the sole arbiter of a witness’ demeanor and

credibility, and it may believe all, part, or none of a witness’ testimony.” In re A.M., No. 06-18-

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