In the Interest of A.N.I., a Child v. .

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 13, 2025
• Docket: 04-24-00389-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00389-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.N.I., a Child

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020CI24031 Honorable Tina Torres, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 13, 2025

REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART

This is an appeal from purported clarification orders arising from an enforcement action in

a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. We reverse and remand in part, and affirm in part.

BACKGROUND

Richard Nelson Ingraham and Gypsy A. Wright are the parents of nine-year-old A.N.I. On

October 13, 2023, the trial court signed a final judgment that (1) appointed Richard and Gypsy as

the child’s joint managing conservators, (2) awarded Richard the exclusive right to designate the

child’s primary residence, (3) established visitation for Gypsy along with procedures for the pick

up and return of the child, (4) specified terms for the parents to communicate electronically with

the child when he was not in their possession, and (6) ordered Gypsy to pay Richard child support. 04-24-00389-CV

On January 23, 2024, Richard filed a motion to enforce the final order, alleging Gypsy

violated the order by: (1) failing to pay monthly child support on eight occasions; (2) failing to be

physically present at the designated exchange location on three occasions; and (3) denying Richard

his right to have electronic communications with the child on six occasions. On March 19, 2024,

the trial court held a hearing on the motion to enforce. During the hearing, Richard sought

clarification of some of the provisions in the prior judgment. As to the enforcement motion, only

two witnesses—Gypsy and Richard’s counsel—testified. In her testimony, Gypsy acknowledged

she had not made every monthly child support payment as ordered, but she also asserted her

financial circumstances precluded her from making all payments as they came due. Gypsy also

testified about her decision to change the platform the parties used for electronic communications

with the child. In his testimony, Richard’s counsel testified about his attorney’s fees in the case.

At the end of the hearing, Richard asked the trial court to hold Gypsy in contempt for failing to

pay child support.

On May 6, 2024, the trial court signed an order that (1) denied Richard’s motion to enforce

and his request for attorney’s fees, and (2) purportedly clarified some of the provisions in the prior

final judgment. Richard appealed. 1

APPLICABLE LAW

Chapter 157 of the Texas Family Code governs enforcement actions in suits affecting the

parent-child relationship. A trial court is authorized to clarify a previous judgment in an

enforcement action “if the court finds, on the motion of a party or on the court’s own motion, that

1 “A contempt order is not reviewable by appeal.” In re E.H.G., No. 04-08-00579-CV, 2009 WL 1406246, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 20, 2009, no pet.). Nevertheless, rulings on issues unrelated to a contempt finding may be reviewed in a direct appeal. See id. (concluding appellate court had jurisdiction to review arrearage judgment). The issues raised in this appeal do not involve contempt findings and, therefore, we have jurisdiction to review them on direct appeal. See id.

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the order is not specific enough to be enforced by contempt.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.421(a). “The

only basis for clarifying a prior decree is when a provision is ambiguous and non-specific.” Lundy

v. Lundy, 973 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. denied). Additionally, the trial “court

may not change the substantive provisions of an order to be clarified.” TEX. FAM. CODE §

157.423(a). “A substantive change made by a clarification order is not enforceable.” Id. §

157.423(b). We review a trial court’s clarification rulings in a suit affecting the parent-child

relationship under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See In re E.H.G., 2009 WL 1406246, at *6.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Richard argues the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) it failed to make

a finding that the altered provisions were ambiguous; (2) the altered provisions were not

ambiguous and, therefore, they could not be clarified in an enforcement proceeding; and (3) the

altered provisions impermissibly modify the prior judgment. Richard also argues the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his request for attorney’s fees.

1. Provisions Requiring Conservators to be “Physically Present” at “Exchanges”

Richard argues the trial court abused its discretion by altering the provisions in the prior

judgment requiring Richard and Gypsy to be “physically present at all exchanges.” The prior

judgment stated:

It is ORDERED that RICHARD [] and GYPSY [] must be physically present at all exchanges. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the exchange will be forfeited if RICHARD [] or GYPSY [] are not physically present at the time of the exchange for their designated visitation.

The prior judgment also stated:

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Order, the following general terms and conditions of possession of a child apply without regard to the distance between the residence of a parent and the child:

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(a) Surrender of Child by RICHARD []. RICHARD [] shall surrender the child to GYPSY [] at the beginning of each period of possession of GYPSY[‘S] [] possession at the Walmart located at 2406 N. Main, Belton, Texas 76513. 2

(b) Surrender of Child by GYPSY []. At the end of each period of GYPSY[’S] [] possession, GYPSY [] shall surrender the child to RICHARD [] at the residence of 2406 N. Main, Belton, Texas 76513.

….

(d) Designation of Competent Adult. Either conservator may designate a competent adult to pick up and return the child, as applicable. A conservator or a designated competent adult shall be present when the child is picked up or returned.

The order challenged on appeal, the May 6, 2024 order, states that the prior judgment is

clarified as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that either RICHARD [] or GYPSY [] may designate a competent adult for exchanges of the child, if and when the other parent is unable to personally be present for an exchange of the child (i.e., grandparents). At any and all exchanges, all adults shall remain in their respective vehicles as the child walks to the other’s vehicle unless it is unsafe for the child to walk on his own from one vehicle to another. Any and all adults present at exchanges are ordered to refrain from engaging in harassing or threatening behavior toward one another during exchanges of the child.

On appeal, Richard argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make an express

finding that the physical presence requirement in the prior judgment was ambiguous and not

specific enough to be enforced by contempt. Richard further argues that by altering the prior

judgment to permit him and Gypsy to designate a competent adult to replace them during

exchanges of the child, the trial court made an impermissible substantive modification to the prior

judgment.

The invited error doctrine bars a party from complaining on appeal about a specific action

he requested from the trial court. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2005);

2 The record showed Richard and the child live in San Antonio, Texas, and Gypsy lives near Dallas, Texas.

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Ne. Tex. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Hodges, 158 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1942) (“It is an

elementary principle supported by many authorities that a litigant cannot ask something of a court

and then complain that the court committed error in giving it to him.”). At the hearing, Richard

indicated that the physical presence and exchange provisions of the prior judgment were not

specific enough to be enforced by contempt and he asked the trial court to clarify them. 3 Thus,

Richard invited any error related to the provisions’ ambiguity and the trial court’s authority to

clarify them. See In re R.H.B., 660 S.W.3d 136, 154 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.)

(appeal & orig proceeding [mand. denied]) (declining to consider appellant’s contention on appeal

that trial court lacked the authority to clarify provisions when he argued in the trial court that the

provisions were “not specific enough to hold [him] in contempt”); In re C.G., No. 02-20-00087-

CV, 2020 WL 4518590, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (concluding

appellant invited error by encouraging the trial court to take specific action and then faulting it for

taking such action).

But even if these complaints were not barred by the invited error doctrine, we conclude

that the provisions in question were non-specific and ambiguous. “[F]or a person to be held in

contempt for disobeying a court decree, the decree must spell out the details of compliance in clear,

specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know exactly what duties or

obligations are imposed upon him.” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Ex

parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967)). “[T]o be enforceable by contempt, the order must

clearly, specifically, and unambiguously state the conduct required for compliance.” In re Luther,

620 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex. 2021). “The order’s interpretation may ‘not rest upon implication or

3 When the trial court began reviewing the physical presence and exchange provisions, Richard’s counsel stated: “Again, this is somewhat of a clarifying issue . . . .” Later, the trial court asked Richard’s counsel, “So you want clarification on . . . her not being present at the exchanges?” Richard replied, “Yes.” Richard’s counsel did not correct Richard’s statement.

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conjecture.’” In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Slavin, 412 S.W.2d at 44.)

“If the order’s interpretation requires inferences or conclusions about which reasonable persons

might differ, it cannot support a contempt judgment.” Id. We interpret the language in a judgment

in a family law case as we do other judgments. See Higgins v. Higgins, 514 S.W.3d 382, 388 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied). We construe the judgment as a whole to harmonize and

give effect to the entire judgment. Id. Whether a provision in a judgment in a family law case is

ambiguous is a question of law. Id.

Here, the physical presence and exchange provisions in the prior judgment stated: “It is

ORDERED that RICHARD [] and GYPSY [] must be physically present at all exchanges. IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that the exchange will be forfeited if RICHARD [] or GYPSY [] are not

physically present at the time of the exchange for their designated visitation.” At the hearing,

Gypsy stated these provisions “had nothing to do with dropoff. Like me giving the child back to

[Richard].” She added: “[T]he specific language used was for the forfeit of pickup.” On the other

hand, Richard asserted that the language in question applied to all exchanges—both pick up and

drop off—of the child. Richard further claimed the physical presence provisions were in the prior

judgment because he did “not want to deal with [Gypsy’s] parents. I should be dealing with the

mother of the child, not her parents.”

After considering the parties’ arguments at the hearing and reviewing the prior judgment

as a whole, we conclude that with regard to Gypsy’s physical presence at the exchanges of the

child, the prior judgment failed to “spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific and

unambiguous terms so that [Gypsy] will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are

imposed upon [her].” See In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 223; In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d at 722.

Accordingly, we conclude the provisions in question were ambiguous and non-specific and could

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not be enforced by contempt. See In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 223; In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d at

722. Because the provisions in question were not clear, specific, and unambiguous and could not

be enforced by contempt, the trial court was authorized to clarify them. See TEX. FAM. CODE §

157.421(a) (“[A] court may clarify an order rendered by the court in a proceeding under [Chapter

157] if the court finds, on the motion of a party or on the court’s own motion, that the order is not

specific enough to be enforced by contempt.”).

Richard also argues the trial court abused its discretion because the alterations it made to

these provisions constituted impermissible substantive modifications to the prior judgment.

However, a party cannot raise a complaint for the first time on appeal; instead, the record must

show that the party raised his complaint in the trial court and that the trial court ruled on the

complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Holland v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex.

1999). Here, the record shows that the trial court did not inform the parties of its ruling on the

physical presence and exchange provisions until after the hearing. It also shows that Richard’s

counsel prepared the May 6, 2024 order, which was signed by the trial court at a motion to enter

order hearing. But nothing in the record before us shows that Richard complained to the trial court

that its alterations to the physical presence and exchange provisions were impermissible

substantive modifications to the prior judgment. Because Richard makes this complaint for the

first time on appeal, it is not preserved for appellate review. See Ihnfeldt v. Reagan, No. 02-14-

00220-CV, 2016 WL 7010922, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 1, 2016, pet. denied) (holding

appellants waived complaint asserting that declaratory judgment was an improper form of relief

when they did not raise the complaint in the trial court); Ortiz v. Collins, 203 S.W.3d 414, 427

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding appellate complaint was waived when

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the record failed to show appellant filed motions for new trial or to modify the judgment or

otherwise brought the alleged error in the judgment to the trial court’s attention).

2. Frequency of Electronic Communications

Richard next argues the trial court abused its discretion by altering the provision in the

prior judgment entitling him to daily fifteen-minute electronic communications with the child

during the child’s extended visits with Gypsy. The prior judgment provided, in relevant part:

Each parent shall have video contact daily during periods longer than a weekend beginning at 8:00 p.m. and ending at 8:15 p.m. During the weekends, the video contact shall be on Saturday.

The trial court’s May 6, 2024 order provides:

On Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays of each month, the parent who is not in possession of the child shall be entitled to electronic communication with the child between 8:00 p.m. and 8:15 p.m. on each of those specific days.

On appeal, Richard argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing the

frequency of the electronic communications with the child from daily to Tuesdays, Thursdays, and

Saturdays because the frequency of the electronic communications with the child was not

ambiguous and, therefore, this part of the provision was not subject to clarification. We agree with

Richard’s argument. At the hearing, Richard sought clarification regarding the platform the parties

would use for electronic communications, but he did not seek clarification of the frequency of the

communications. The prior judgment, which plainly provided that the parent not in possession

during extended visitation periods was entitled to daily electronic communications, was clear,

specific, and unambiguous regarding the frequency of these electronic communications.

Accordingly, this part of the prior judgment was not subject to clarification. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 157.421(a) (providing only orders not specific enough to be enforced by contempt may be

clarified in enforcement proceedings); Lundy, 973 S.W.2d at 688 (stating the only basis for

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clarifying a prior order is when a provision is ambiguous and non-specific). Furthermore, by

altering the frequency of the electronic communications from daily to Tuesdays, Thursdays, and

Saturdays the trial court made an impermissible substantive change to the prior judgment. 4 See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.423(a) (“A court may not change the substantive provisions of an order to

be clarified under this subchapter.”). We, therefore, conclude the trial court abused its discretion

by changing the frequency of each parent’s electronic communications with the child.

3. Failure to Order Attorney’s Fees

Richard finally argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for

attorney’s fees. Section 157.167(a) of the Texas Family Code states: “If the court finds that the

respondent has failed to make child support payments, the court shall order the respondent to pay

the movant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and all court costs in addition to the arrearages.” TEX.

FAM. CODE § 157.167(a).

At the hearing, Gypsy testified that she worked part-time as an independent contractor, and

her contracts “fluctuated in cost.” Gypsy also testified that she did not make every child support

payment because she was unable to pay them as they became due. Gypsy added that her financial

situation was so dire that her lights were almost shut off. Gypsy further testified that although she

did not pay her child support on time, she did pay a lump sum the month before the hearing

meaning she was caught up on her past due child support. The trial court denied Richard’s motion

for enforcement of child support and his request for attorney’s fees.

Here, the trial court did not find that Gypsy failed to make child support payments. To the

contrary, it expressly found that Gypsy “was financially unable to pay” child support for each of

the months alleged in Richard’s motion. “In Texas, inability to pay child support is an affirmative

4 During the hearing, the trial court informed the parties of its electronic communications ruling, and Richard objected to the ruling. Accordingly, this complaint is preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

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defense to the offense of contempt that must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ex

parte Roosth, 881 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding); see TEX. FAM. CODE §

157.008(c) (providing obligor may plead affirmative defense of inability to pay to motion for

enforcement of child support); In re Smith, 354 S.W.3d 929, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, orig.

proceeding) (providing obligor must prove an inability to pay defense by a preponderance of the

evidence). Because the trial court did not find that Gypsy failed to make child support payments,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering Gypsy to pay Richard’s attorney’s fees

under section 157.167(a). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.167(a).

CONCLUSION

The part of the trial court’s order reducing electronic communications with the child from

daily to Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court

for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The remainder of the trial court’s order is affirmed.

Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

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