in the Interest of Amanda Rae Bullock, a Child

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 23, 2001
Docket07-01-00096-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of Amanda Rae Bullock, a Child (in the Interest of Amanda Rae Bullock, a Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of Amanda Rae Bullock, a Child, (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

NO. 07-01-0096-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

OCTOBER 23, 2001

______________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF AMANDA RAE BULLOCK, A CHILD

_________________________________

FROM THE 320 TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 55,506-D; HONORABLE DON EMERSON, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

This appeal arises from the termination of the parental rights of appellants Holli Rene Sinclair (Holli) and Andy Lee Bullock (Andy) to their daughter Amanda Rae Bullock (Amanda).  Holli and Andy have each perfected appeals and submitted separate briefs challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment.  For the reasons discussed below, we overrule those challenges and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Amanda was born September 8, 1994.  In a 1997 suit affecting the parent-child relationship, appellants were declared the parents of Amanda.  Holli was named managing conservator and Andy was named possessory conservator.  Based on allegations of physical abuse, the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (the Department) took possession of Amanda on July 30, 1999, and filed a motion to modify the prior order.  It sought temporary orders restricting the parents’ possession of the child, and after a hearing, permanent modification of conservatorship.

In February 2000, the Department filed an amended petition seeking termination of Holli and Andy’s parental rights.  The petition alleged five grounds for termination, that they:  1) placed or allowed Amanda to remain in conditions which endangered her physical or emotional well-being, 2) engaged in conduct which endangered her physical or emotional well-being, 3) had been convicted of the death or serious injury of a child under section 22.04 of the Penal Code, 4) failed to comply with a court order setting conditions of reunification, and 5) used a controlled substance “in a manner that endangered the health and safety of the child(ren).”  

The case was tried to a jury in November 2000.  The sole ground for termination presented to the jury was whether appellants engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Amanda with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.  The jury found that the parental rights of both should be terminated.  The trial court rendered an order of termination on December 19, 2000, and both parties timely perfected their respective appeals.

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code (Vernon Supp. 2001).  It requires the Department to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions, and that termination be in the best interest of the child.   Id.  Here, the Department relied on section 161.001(1)(E).  Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.   In re G.M. , 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980).  This is an intermediate standard falling between the preponderance of the evidence standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal proceedings.   Id.  This heightened burden is necessary because the termination of parental rights is a matter of constitutional dimensions.   Id. at 846.

Our review of appellants’ legal sufficiency challenges requires us to consider only the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding, disregard evidence to the contrary and uphold the finding if there is any probative evidence to support it.   In re King’s Estate , 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).  Although there has been some difference of opinion regarding the standard of review, we continue to adhere to the view that the standard of appellate review does not change when the burden to establish a fact is by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re M.D.S. , 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999, no pet.).  Nevertheless, in applying that standard, the weight of evidence necessary to support a verdict must be higher.   In re D. T. , 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).  Therefore, in reviewing factual sufficiency challenges, we are to consider all the evidence to determine whether reaching a firm belief or conviction that the allegation was true is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  To hold otherwise would nullify the heightened burden of proof required at trial.  

Termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.   Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).  While "endanger" means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.   Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987); In re S.F. , 32 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.).   

We first consider the challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.  The Department’s evidence primarily consisted of a single factually specific act of physical harm by each parent and a course of conduct which, while not directed to Amanda, it contends threatened her physical or emotional well-being.  

The State presented evidence that the Department became involved with the couple in April 1999, when Holli’s son Billy set fire to Amanda’s hair with a lighter and an aerosol can, prompting Andy to spank Billy severely.  Holli believed Andy’s response was excessive and called the police.  As a result, Andy was arrested and subsequently convicted of injury to a child.  In June of that year, Holli was arrested and convicted of assault based on an event where she restrained Amanda by holding her around the waist and neck.  The only evidence of physical harm to Amanda were “red marks” on her neck. In the same occurrence, Andy was charged with disorderly conduct.

The State also relies on the following evidence relevant to Andy.  A caseworker testified that Holli told her Andy was abusive to the children, without specifying the conduct that formed the basis of that statement.  Andy admitted that he had been arrested for domestic violence, but did not state when.  Holli testified that on one occasion when she picked Amanda up after she had stayed with Andy and Andy’s girlfriend, Amanda had numerous marks on her body.

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Related

Doyle v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services
16 S.W.3d 390 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
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715 S.W.2d 629 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)
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685 S.W.2d 18 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
In Re King's Estate
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979 S.W.2d 818 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd
727 S.W.2d 531 (Texas Supreme Court, 1987)
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