in the Interest of A.M. and A.M., Children

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 30, 2021·No. 05-21-00170-CV·Published

Opinion

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 30, 2021

In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00170-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M. AND A.M., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 354th District Court Hunt County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 87085

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Carlyle

Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to A.M.

and A.M. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

After Mother and Father separated, their children, A.M. and A.M., lived with

Mother. The Department began investigating Mother after it received reports of

abuse and neglect in Mother’s home. When Mother failed a court-ordered drug test,

the Department contacted Father and informed him it was removing the children

from Mother’s care. Rather than bringing the children to the Department as

instructed, Father withdrew the children from their school and tried to evade the

Department. The Department located and took custody of the children in March 2019, when Father tried to enroll them in a new school. After the removal, the

Department lost contact with Father, who became incarcerated in November 2019.

Based on concerns raised during its investigation, the Department sought to

terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.1 At Father’s trial, Department

caseworker Lee Ann Walston detailed her efforts to locate Father and engage him in

services aimed at reunification. She explained that Father did not cooperate and did

not maintain contact with either the Department or the children. She noted that

Father never visited the children while she was assigned to the case, and she opined

that, because Father was incarcerated, he could not provide a safe and stable

environment for them. Moreover, because he failed to maintain contact with the

Department or complete any services to alleviate its concerns, the Department had

no reason to think he could provide for the children. Ms. Walston believed

termination was in the children’s best interest.

Marsha Womack, a caseworker who took over the case from Ms. Walston,

also detailed her efforts to work with Father towards reunification. She testified that

she wrote Father monthly to update him about the children and explain the

Department’s plan for them, and she called him on several occasions. She sent Father

the service plan the Department created for him, which he acknowledges receiving

1 The trial court terminated Mother’s rights at a February 2020 hearing, but Mother is not a party to this appeal. –2– in July 2020, and she asked if there were any services he could complete while

incarcerated. She also investigated Father’s relatives for potential placements, but

she could not find a suitable candidate. She said that, while she was assigned to the

case, Father asked about the children only once, and he neither visited them nor

provided anything for them. Like Ms. Walston, Ms. Womack opined that Father

cannot provide a safe environment for the children because he is incarcerated and

because he has done nothing to alleviate the Department’s concerns about placing

the children in his care. Ms. Womack likewise believed termination was in the

children’s best interest.

CASA advocate Roxanne Turner testified that she has seen vast improvement

in the children since the beginning of the case. In opining that termination would be

in their best interest, she voiced concerns about allegations of physical abuse and

neglect by Father. She also testified that the children are anxious and afraid about

seeing Father again.

In his testimony, Father disputed the Department’s account of its interactions

with him. He said he tried to contact the Department many times, but nobody would

return his calls. He also said he visited the children once, but the Department cut the

visit short after the children became upset. He thus chose not to visit them again

because he did not want to traumatize them. He admitted using drugs after the

children were removed from his care, and he acknowledged he was serving time for

–3– criminal offenses for which he was arrested while the case was pending. He also

admitted he could offer neither a suitable caregiver nor a plan to provide for the

children during his incarceration. Father acknowledged he was accused of

disciplining the children by striking them with a coat-hanger, but he denied that

allegation.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court terminated Father’s parental rights on

the ground that he constructively abandoned the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)(N). Father appeals, contending the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (i) and (iii) of

family code section 161.001(b)(1)(N). See id.

A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship only if it finds by

clear and convincing evidence that: (1) one or more of the statutory grounds for

termination enumerated in the Texas Family Code has been established; and (2)

termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b). “Clear and convincing

evidence” is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.” Id. § 101.007.

Our standards of review on appeal reflect the elevated burden of proof at trial.

In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014); In re A.T., 406 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). Both legal- and factual-sufficiency reviews require

–4– us to review the evidence to determine whether the factfinder reasonably could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were established.

See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002); In re L.E.H., No. 05-18-00903-

CV, 2018 WL 6839565, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The difference between the two reviews lies primarily in the way we consider

evidence contrary to a finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018).

Our review of legal sufficiency requires us to view all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the finding. Id. Thus, we assume the factfinder resolved all factual

issues in favor of the finding and disregard all disputed evidence to the contrary. Id.

at 630–31. Our review of factual sufficiency, in contrast, requires us to weigh the

disputed evidence contrary to the finding and determine whether, in light of the entire

record, the evidence that could not reasonably be credited in favor of the finding is

so significant that it would prevent the formation of a firm belief or conviction that

the finding is true. Id. at 631. In applying this standard, we must be mindful not to

scrutinize the evidence to the point where “the only factfindings that could withstand

review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,

26 (Tex. 2002).

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