In the Interest of A.M., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00694-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00694-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 467th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 24-9148-467

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to

A.M. On appeal, Father raises two issues. The first issue challenges one of the three

predicate grounds for termination recited in the trial court’s written order. The second

issue alleges that the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the

Department) violated statutory guidelines and deadlines, which violated Father’s due

process rights. The first issue fails to challenge all independent grounds supporting

termination, and the second issue was not preserved for appellate review. As a result,

we will affirm.

Background

On September 24, 2024, the Department filed a petition to terminate Father’s

parental rights.1 The Department sought termination pursuant to multiple predicate

grounds under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1).

After a bench trial, on December 10, 2025,2 the trial court terminated Father’s

parental rights pursuant to predicate grounds (B), (C), and (N). See Tex. Fam. Code

1 Father was referred to as the “presumed/alleged father of the child” in the petition. The results of a February 14, 2025 paternity test confirmed that Father is the biological father of the child. 2 The trial court granted a motion to extend the dismissal date in Father’s case from September 24, 2025, to March 28, 2026. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(b). Father was appointed counsel on September 15, 2025, and the trial court determined that Father’s court-appointed counsel had not had adequate time to communicate with Father, to prepare for trial, or to secure Father’s appearance for final trial—as Father had been incarcerated since January 1, 2025, for probation violations. Father pled true

2 Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(B), (C), (N). The trial court also found that termination was in the

best interest of the child. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). This appeal followed.

Unchallenged Predicate Grounds

To terminate parental rights, the Department must prove by clear and convincing

evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in Subsection 161.001(b)(1) and

(2) termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. §§ 161.001(b)(1)-(2), 161.206(a).

The Texas Family Code defines “clear and convincing evidence” to mean “the measure

or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007.

Only one termination ground—in addition to a best interest finding—is necessary to

affirm a termination judgment on appeal. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019).

When an appellant does not challenge an independent ground that supports the

judgment and termination is in the child’s best interest, this court may not address either

the challenged grounds or the unchallenged ground for termination. In re A.V.,

113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re G.V.S., No. 04-18-00563-CV, 2018 WL 6624398,

at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re B.M.,

No. 12-18-00094-CV, 2018 WL 4767179, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 3, 2018, no

to the alleged violations in two cases on July 24, 2025, resulting in punishment at confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of five years in one case and three years in the other.

3 pet.) (mem. op.); Fletcher v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 277 S.W.3d 58, 64–65 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

In Father’s first issue, he challenges the trial court’s finding of constructive

abandonment under Subsection (N), but he does not challenge the trial court’s findings

under Subsections (B) or (C) or under best interest. Because Father does not challenge

the trial court’s findings under the remaining predicate grounds or under best interest,

we are left with no choice but to overrule Father’s first issue.3 See G.V.S.,

2018 WL 6624398, at *3 (“[B]ecause we may affirm on any one ground, [the] failure to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings on the

remaining [] predicate grounds waives any complaint regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence to support [the challenged] predicate grounds.”); see also A.V., 113 S.W.3d at

362; In re K.L.G., No. 14-09-00403-CV, 2009 WL 3295018, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that unchallenged predicate

findings are binding on appellate court).

3 In his challenge to the trial court’s finding under Subsection (N), Father fails to make any reference to the record or to any case law—beyond reciting the standard of review—to support his analysis. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV, 674 S.W.3d 437, 446–47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pet. denied) (holding that “wholly inadequate” briefing does not present an adequate appellate issue). We construe briefs liberally, but we cannot “abandon our role as a neutral adjudicator and assume the role of an advocate.” In re C.R., No. 02-25-00152-CV, 2025 WL 3301062, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 26, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Craaybeek v. Craaybeek, No. 02-20-00080-CV, 2021 WL 1803652, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

4 Due Process Complaint

Father’s second issue alleges that the Department failed to abide by the statutory

guidelines of the Texas Family Code, restricting Father’s ability to properly participate

in the case and violating his due process rights. It appears that Father may be making

an argument that his service plan was premature—created while he was the “alleged

father” versus when he had been adjudicated a parent of the child. Compare Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 101.0015(a) (“‘Alleged father’ means a man who alleges himself to be, or

is alleged to be, the genetic father or a possible genetic father of a child, but whose

paternity has not been determined.”), with id. § 101.024(a) (defining “parent,” in part, as

“a man legally determined to be the father [or] a man who has been adjudicated to be

the father by a court of competent jurisdiction”).

However, Father did not object to the service plan or to his parentage in the trial

court; thus, any potential issues with the service plan were not preserved for our review.

See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Additionally, like in his first issue, Father does not provide

any legal authority to support his argument that his service plan resulted in a violation

of his due process rights—waiving this issue for our review. See Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d

851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“Failure to cite applicable authority or

provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal.”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

As a result, we overrule Father’s second issue.

5 Conclusion

Having overruled both of Father’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s termination

order. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice

Delivered: April 23, 2026