In the Interest of: A.L.R., Appeal of: T.R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 665 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S39002-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: T.R., MOTHER : : : : : No. 665 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-33-OC-000005A-2024

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: January 8, 2025

Appellant, T.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the May 13, 2024 order entered

in the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas that terminated her parental

rights to her now-three-year-old child, A.R. (“Child”).1 Mother’s counsel, J.D.

Ryan, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and an Anders2 Brief,

to which Mother has not filed a response. Upon review, we grant counsel’s

petition to withdraw and affirm.

We glean the following factual and procedural history from the certified

record. Child is diagnosed with Cystic Fibrosis and requires ongoing

specialized medical care. On March 9, 2022, the Jefferson County Children

and Youth Services (the “Agency”) obtained emergency custody of Child after ____________________________________________

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, who is

not a party to this appeal.

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). J-S39002-24

Mother left Child in maternal grandmother’s care and was unavailable to sign

medical consents for necessary treatments for Child. The trial court

adjudicated Child dependent on March 30, 2022, due to a lack of proper

parental care and control with specific concerns regarding medical neglect.

On September 16, 2022, the Agency returned Child to Mother’s care. Once

again, Mother began to miss Child’s medical appointments and was

inconsistent in administering necessary medication to Child.

On January 31, 2023, the Agency once again obtained emergency

custody of Child after Mother compromised Child’s safety when she absconded

with Child without child’s medication and appropriate clothing. As a result of

this incident, Mother was incarcerated for ninety days, and the Agency placed

Child in a pre-adoptive foster home.3

The Agency set up Family Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives for Mother,

including the following: maintain appropriate housing that is medically

beneficial for Child, establish and maintain appropriate mental health,

complete drug and alcohol assessments, maintain consistent visitation with

Child, and independently coordinate and follow through with medical

appointments and care for Child.

Mother made minimal progress towards achieving her FSP objections.

Mother failed to complete a psychological assessment. Mother is non-

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3 It is unclear from the record if Mother was convicted of a crime and what, if

any, crime she was charged with.

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compliant with drug and alcohol treatment and has been “cited twice during

her probationary period for ongoing substance abuse.” Id. at 8.

Mother made minimal to no compliance with taking care of Child’s

medical needs. Mother failed to be proactive about arranging and attending

Child’s medical appointments. During a visit to Mother’s home, the Agency

caseworker observed Mother using a vape inside the apartment, which is

particularly unhealthy for Child’s chronic medical condition. Mother never

attended any of Child’s medical appointments, despite the Agency offering

notice and transportation. Mother attended supervised visits with Child but

was unable to properly administer necessary medication during the visits.

Specifically, Mother was “unable to properly give [C]hild the liquid thickener

for her swallowing so [Child] was not aspirating into her sinuses.” Id. at 16.

On November 3, 2023, the trial court suspended visits between Mother and

Child after Child began exhibiting adverse behaviors prior to the visits,

including skin-picking and projectile vomiting.

In the Fall of 2023, Dr. Carolyn Menta completed a bonding assessment

between Mother and Child. Dr. Menta observed that Child’s bond with her

foster parents was “secure[] and well[-]noted.” N.T. Hearing, 5/6/24, at 4.

Dr. Menta noted that Child had a bond with Mother, however, concluded that

“the bond was less secure” than Child’s bond with her foster parents. Id. Dr.

Menta opined that even though there was a bond between Child and Mother,

it “would not be detrimental” to Child if that bond were severed for the

purposes of adoption. Id. Finally, Dr. Menta concluded that a termination of

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Mother’s parental rights and prospective adoption by her foster parents would

be in Child’s best interest.

On March 14, 2024, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s

parental rights. The trial court appointed Greg Sobol, Esq., to serve as Child’s

legal counsel. The court held a hearing on May 6, 2024. The court heard

testimony from Joanna Welch, an Agency caseworker. Mother failed to

appear.

Ms. Welch testified in accordance with the above-stated facts.

Additionally, Ms. Welch testified that Child is doing very well in the foster

home. Ms. Welch explained that Child has Cystic Fibrosis with a double stop

mutation, which is significant because “currently right now all of the [Cystic

Fibrosis] medications that are available on the market are only one genetic

stop mutation, not two[,]” making Child’s condition “even more specialized

than just your typical [Cystic Fibrosis] diagnosis.” Id. at 11. Ms. Welch

explained that the foster parents have offered Child consistent medical care

and, as a result, Child’s lung function has stabilized rather than regressed.

Specifically, Child has “been able to pass her swallowing tests, she’s no longer

aspirating into her sinuses that could cause an infection.” Id. at 11-12. Ms.

Welch explained that Child “does remain colonized for MRSA however due to

the [foster] family’s high practice of – of hygiene and [their] continued

attention to her medical needs, there’s not been an additional MRSA

infection[.]” Id. at 12. Ms. Welch explained that due to her positive progress

in the foster home, Child has been stepped down to bi-yearly medical

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appointments versus quarterly medical appointments. Ms. Welch testified that

“right now, [Child]’s only [Cystic Fibrosis] treatment is the high salts solution,

breathing treatments, the vibrating vest to knock the junk out of her lungs.

Until there is a double stop mutation medication developed for her condition.

Handwashing, lots of handwashing.” Id. at 13. Ms. Welsh testified that foster

parents take care of all of Child’s basic, social, emotional, and specialized

medical needs and that Child’s behavior and social skills have improved while

in the home.

On May 10, 2024, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to

Child. Mother timely appealed. Both Mother and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On August 15, 2024, Attorney Ryan filed an Anders brief indicating that,

upon review, Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Mother failed to respond.

In the Anders brief, counsel indicated that Mother wished to raise the

following issues for our review:

I. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)?

II. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)?

III. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5)?

IV. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8)?

V. Whether the lower court erred in determining [that] termination was in the best interest of [C]hild, in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?

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Anders Br. at 4.

A.

As a preliminary matter, we address appellate counsel’s request to

withdraw as counsel. “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may

not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the

request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.

Super. 2010). In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to

Anders, our Supreme Court has determined that counsel must meet the

following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Counsel has complied with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as

counsel. Additionally, counsel confirms that counsel sent Mother a copy of the

Anders brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter explaining to Mother

that she has the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and to raise any

additional points. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa.

Super. 2005) (describing notice requirements).

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Because counsel has satisfied the above requirements, we will address

the substantive issue raised in the Anders brief. Subsequently, we must

“make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago,

978 A.2d at 355 n.5 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Yorgey,

188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (noting Anders requires

the reviewing court to “review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with

consideration first of issues raised by counsel”).

B. In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, this

Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion is

supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,

591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a

petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings

of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports

them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial

court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse merely because

the record could support a different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give

great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand observations of

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the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he trial court is

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise

free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the

evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted).

It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make

decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot

be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent

and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an

undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.”

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n

recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the

moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing

evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as

to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs

termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially,

the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d

1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, “[t]he

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that

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the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated

in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court

then engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best

interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree

with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). We concentrate our analysis on Section

2511(a)(2).

Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights where the

petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by

the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,

827 (Pa. 2012). The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section

2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative

misconduct; those grounds may also include acts of refusal as well as

incapacity to perform parental duties. In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d

1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by In re K.T.,

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296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts

toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re

C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, a “parent’s vow to

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or

disingenuous.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

Finally, sincere efforts to perform parental duties may still be insufficient

to remedy an incapacity. Id. at 1117. This is because subsection (a)(2)

“emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential parental care,

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being[,]”

especially “where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is

no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” Id. (citation omitted).

Instantly, the trial court found that Mother’s continued refusal to provide

Child with necessary specialized medical care has caused Child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for her physical or

mental well-being. The trial court opined:

[C]hild’s medical condition makes it imperative that Mother schedule and keep medical appointments, be available to the medical professionals treating her daughter, and take extra measures necessary to properly treat her at home, as well. Mother could not or would not do any of that. Even with Agency staff and the [c]ourt telling her what she needed to do to appropriately care for [Child], she declined to cooperate. In special cases like this, performing parental duties requires more than is demanded of the average parent, and Mother made it clear over a lengthy period of time that she would not rise to the

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challenge for [Child]’s benefit. Her refusal has left [C]hild dependent for well over a year.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/18/24, at 1.

Based on our review, we conclude the court properly exercised its

discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights. The court heard undisputed

testimony that Mother made minimal to no progress with taking care of Child’s

medical needs. N.T. Hearing at 8. Mother failed to schedule and attend Child’s

medical appointments, failed to stop vaping inside of her home, and failed to

learn how to administer necessary medication to Child. Id. at 8, 12, 16. The

record supports the trial court’s findings that Mother refused to provide

essential parental care for Child. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

C.

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that

terminating the parental bond will have on the child. This Court reviews

“whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).

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“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the

nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child with close

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such

bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). The fact that a child has a bond with a parent “does not

preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897

(Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the trial court must examine the depth of the bond

to determine whether the bond is so meaningful to the child that its

termination would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship.

Id. at 898. Moreover, the trial court may consider intangibles, such as the

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the adoptive

resource. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the

concern is the needs and welfare of the child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.

Instantly, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental

rights was in Child’s best interest. The trial court opined:

[C]hild has been thriving in the care of her pre-adoptive parents – the people with whom she has most closely bonded – and will continue to have her physical, emotional, developmental, and special medical needs met in their home. As the record reflects, therefore, the [c]ourt did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights; it entered an order that was warranted by her own conduct and would best serve [C]hild’s needs.

Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2.

The record supports the trial court’s findings. The court heard

undisputed testimony that Child has a secure bond with foster parents, who

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meet her social, emotional and medical needs, and that it would not be

detrimental to Child if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. N.T. Hearing

at 4. As the record supports the trial court’s findings, we discern no abuse of

discretion.

D.

In summation, following our review of the issues raised in counsel’s

Anders brief, we agree with counsel that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights. In addition, our

independent review of the proceedings reveals there are no issues of arguable

merit to be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.

DATE: 1/8/2025

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