NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER :
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: No. 1277 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Dated September 9, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000079-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.J. MOTHER :
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: No. 1278 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered September 9, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000081-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER :
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: No. 1279 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered September 9, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000080-2024
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 2, 2026 E.J. (“Mother”) appeals from the September 9, 2025 orders entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas that terminated her parental rights to seven-year-old A.N.J., ten-year-old A.L.J., and thirteen-year-old A.B.J. (collectively, “Children”). Upon review, we affirm.
Mother and B.J. (“Father”) are parents to Children.1 Mother has a history of substance abuse and intimate partner violence (“IPV”) between her and Father. The Allegheny County’s Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“the Agency”) has been involved with the family since 2016. In January 2022, the Agency removed Children from parents’ home due to concerns with IPV, substance abuse, and inappropriate discipline of A.B.J. In February 2022, Mother participated in a drug and alcohol assessment through Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery (“POWER”). The assessment recommended that Mother participate in intensive outpatient treatment for use of opioids, cocaine, and cannabis. Mother failed to follow through. Despite this, in July 2022, the trial court dismissed the Agency’s dependency petition and returned Children to Mother’s care. In November 2022, the Agency received a report concerning truancy, and in December 2022, the
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights to Children. Father is not a party to this appeal.
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Agency received a report that Mother was treated at Presbyterian Hospital after Father threw her over a balcony and police arrested him.
On or around March 2023, Mother dropped Children off at the home of their maternal aunt (“Maternal Aunt”). Around the same time, the Agency once again received a referral for concerns of IPV, substance abuse, and truancy. Mother reported to the Agency that she had left Father because she was afraid that he would kill her and Children. Mother also admitted that one of the children was stuck with one of the old intravenous drug needles that was lying around parents’ home. Mother agreed to go to a Women’s Center and Shelter but left two days later and returned to Father. In May 2023, the Agency obtained emergency custody of Children and placed them in kinship care with Maternal Aunt in a pre-adoptive home where they remain.
In July 2023, Mother made a self-referral to POWER for drug and alcohol and mental health treatment. POWER diagnosed Mother with opioid use disorder, cocaine use disorder, cannabis use disorder, other specified anxiety disorder, and other specified depressive disorder. Mother submitted to a drug screen which was positive for marijuana, buprenorphine, cocaine, and fentanyl. Mother followed POWER’s recommendation that she engage in POWER Restore, which is an inpatient and withdrawal management unit, and she entered inpatient care.
On August 2, 2023, the trial court adjudicated Children dependent. The court ordered Mother to complete drug and alcohol treatment, mental health
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treatment, IPV counseling, and parenting classes. The court also ordered Mother to attend supervised visitation two times per week.
In August 2023, A Second Chance, Inc. began to supervise twice-weekly visits between Mother and Children.
Mother successfully completed inpatient treatment with POWER Restore and, upon discharge on September 27, 2023, Mother followed POWER’s recommendation to enter POWER House, a halfway house. On October 12, 2023, Mother left against facility advice.
In October 2023, the Agency referred Mother to Arsenal parenting program. Mother only attended two sessions and was subsequently discharged due to lack of engagement.
Mother’s whereabouts were unknown from November 2023 until February 2024. Notably, on November 17, 2023, Mother had her last visit with Children until October 30, 2024, approximately 11.5 months later.
On August 26, 2024, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
From October 30, 2024, through February 26, 2025, Mother had the opportunity to visit Children fifteen times but only attended four visits. On February 26, 2025, Mother visited with Children for the last time. Mother had the opportunity to visit Children eight more times and missed all eight visits.
On June 2, 2025, the trial court held a termination of parental rights hearing. The Agency presented testimony from Eric Bernstein, Psy.D., licensed psychologist and expert in psychology and child psychology; Rachel
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Wagner, program director at POWER; James Middleton, director of transportation at A Second Chance, Inc.; Tarraca Jackson, manager of drug screening at Allegheny County Health Department (“Health Department”); and Deborah McAllister, Agency caseworker. Mother did not testify on her own behalf or present any witnesses.
Dr. Bernstein testified that he conducted an individual evaluation of Mother, an interactional evaluation of Children and Mother, and an interactional evaluation of Children and Maternal Aunt. He explained that Mother failed to complete the individual psychological evaluation, so he did not reach conclusions regarding her diagnoses. Mother self-reported major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. Dr. Bernstein testified that Mother’s interaction with Children was “overall a positive interaction” and that Mother “put forth an effort to appear cheerful and engaged.” N.T. Hr’g, 6/2/25, at 30.
Dr. Bernstein testified that Maternal Aunt’s interaction with Children was “generally positive[.]” Id. at 16. He informed the court that Maternal Aunt provided a “thorough accounting of [C]hildren’s well-being, challenges, adjustments, and overall needs.” Id. Dr. Bernstein testified that Maternal Aunt has enrolled Children in trauma counseling and school-based therapy, Maternal Aunt has advocated for individual education plans for A.L.J. and A.N.J., and that Children are all struggling from past food insecurity and associated nightmares.
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Dr. Bernstein explained that the oldest child, A.B.J., “presented himself in low energy and generally passive[,]” explained that his parents’ relationship is “off and on” and that he prefers for them to be separated, and “expressed a combination of happiness and sadness” when he visits with Mother. Id. Dr. Bernstein stated that A.B.J. expressed a preference to be adopted by Maternal Aunt and stated he would feel “glad” that he would not have to see his parents fight and would not “have to barely eat.” Id. at 20-21.
Dr. Bernstein testified about the potential impact of IPV upon children who have observed it. He stated, “if it is persistent and [] the children are subject to that exposure and have experienced a sense of helplessness and powerlessness which is oftentimes common, it can create difficulties in their own lives specific to, for example, insecurity, lack of self-confidence, fearlessness, interpersonal conflict with peers or others, acting out behavior, heightened anxiety[, n]ightmares, bedwetting.” Id. at 31.
Dr. Bernstein testified that, at the time of the evaluation, Children’s safety could not be ensured in the care of their parents. Dr. Bernstein opined that Mother was not in a position to reunify with Children due to her unaddressed IPV issues, her substance abuse, and her unaddressed neglect of Children. Dr. Bernstein testified that he did not believe that a termination of Mother’s parental rights would cause extreme distress or harm to Children and opined that their relationship with Maternal Aunt would remedy any sadness caused by termination. Finally, Dr. Bernstein testified that Maternal
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Aunt is an appropriate adoptive resource and that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in Children’s best interest.
Ms. Wagner testified in accordance with the above-stated facts.
Additionally, she testified that after Mother left POWER House against facility advice, POWER attempted outreach and did not receive a response from Mother.
Mr. Middleton testified in accordance with the above-mentioned facts.
In addition, he testified that that A Second Chance, Inc., offered Mother a total of 49 visits and Mother attended 16 of the visits from August 16, 2023, through the date of the termination hearing. He explained that during the supervised visits, Mother was affectionate, Children were excited to see Mother, and no safety issues were identified.
Ms. Jackson testified that between July 2022 and May 2025, the Health Department called Mother in for 99 urine screens, and she only appeared for 5.
Ms. McAllister testified in accordance with the above-stated facts. In addition, she testified that Mother failed to complete a mental health evaluation until February 2025. She explained that Aria housing program offered to pay for two years of housing for Mother but Mother “fell off.” Id. at 143, 159. Ms. McAllister testified that Mother failed to attend any school meetings, IEP meetings, medical appointments, or A.N.J.’s dental surgery. Ms. McAllister confirmed that Mother failed to complete an outpatient drug and alcohol program, IPV counseling, and parenting classes. Ms. McAllister further
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confirmed that Mother’s whereabouts were unknown from November 2023 through February 2024 prompting the family to file a missing persons report. She testified that when Mother reestablished contact in February 2024, Mother informed the Agency that she had been living in a tent city because she was depressed about not seeing Children over the holidays. Ms. McAllister explained that Mother did not visit Children again until October 2024, approximately 9 months later.
Ms. McAllister testified that Children have each disclosed witnessing Father hit Mother. She explained that Children have improved significantly in Maternal Aunt’s care. She informed the court that A.B.J. is receiving trauma therapy, school-based therapy, family therapy, and attends a Boys to Men mentoring program. A.L.J. completed trauma therapy on May 30, 2025, and participates in Girl Scouts. A.N.J. is being evaluated for abandonment issues and receives kindergarten-based support.
Ms. McAllister testified that Mother has failed to meet any of her court-
ordered goals and cannot reunify with Children at this time. Ms. McAllister opined that termination of parental rights would be in Children’s best interest.
On September 9, 2025, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (b).
Mother timely appealed. Both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that [the Agency] met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hildren pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
3. Did Mother waive her right to challe[]nge the trial court’s decision to terminat[e] her parental rights under 23 P[a].C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b)?
Appellant’s Br. at 10.
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In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, this Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the trial court’s determination is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if the record supports them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse merely because the record could support a different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand
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observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody[,] and control of their children. It cannot be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs termination of parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
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2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights[,]” the court then engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted).
Notably, we need only agree with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). We concentrate our analysis on subsection 2511(a)(1).
Section 2511(a)(1) provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights if the petitioner establishes that “[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). Although the statute focuses on an analysis of the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, “the court must consider the whole history of a given case” and may consider a parent’s inaction before the six-month statutory provision. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 758. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly defined “parental duties” in general as the affirmative obligation to provide consistently for the physical and emotional needs of a child:
Parental duties are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. Parental
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duties are carried out through affirmative actions that develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and association. The performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental responsibilities.
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
It is well-settled that “a parent’s efforts are always considered in light of existing circumstances.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To that end, even where the evidence clearly establishes [that] a parent has failed to perform affirmative parental duties for a period in excess of six months as required by Section 2511(a)(1), the court must examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of parental rights.” Id. at 593 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court has explained:
Consideration of the totality of the circumstances includes evaluation of the following: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). . . . It is within this framework that a court determines whether a parent has faced barriers that prevented the parent from maintaining the parent-child relationship. What constitutes a “barrier” in the context of a Section 2511(a)(1)
analysis is a finding within the discretion of the trial court, and what may constitute a barrier necessarily will vary with the circumstances of each case.
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Id. (citations omitted).
Notably, “a parent’s efforts to enforce his or her legal custody rights unquestionably establishes the affirmative performance of a positive parental duty[.]” Id. at 594. Finally, “[w]ith respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) . . . the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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In her first issue, Mother avers that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). Mother’s Br. at 22. Mother argues that the Agency presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Children or failed to perform parental duties. Id. To support this argument, Mother emphasizes that she successfully completed inpatient treatment at POWER Restore. Id. at 26. Mother further argues that she followed up with mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment as she self-reported to Dr. Bernstein. Id. at 27. Mother’s arguments are devoid of merit.
The record is replete with evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). The trial court credited testimony that Mother failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment, IPV counseling, and parenting classes. The court opined:
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The quest for affirmative action by Mother to show she did not abandon [C]hildren is [just not] part of this record. We know that Mother does not have her substance abuse under control in that window. Efforts in February 2022 failed. That inability to succeed in her treatment efforts continued in May and July 2023. In September 2023, she completed an inpatient program. However, she did not complete the next step, a halfway house. On October 12, 2023, she left said halfway house “against facility advice.’’ The caseworker, Ms. Deborah McAllister, testified that Mother has not provided any documentation to show completion of a treatment program. Nor did Mother produce any negative drug test results.
Mother's inaction is not limited to her substance abuse. Mother and Father have a history of [IPV], from which Mother has been unable to separate herself. It first surfaced in 2016. In 2022, the [A]gency received information that Father threw Mother over a balcony railing. Mother’s need for dental work at that time corroborated the event. That was not the only incident in 2022.
In April, Mother delivered [C]hildren to [Maternal Aunt] because, as she stated, Father threatened to kill her and [C]hildren.
Tr. Ct. Op., 3/12/26, at 9-10 (unpaginated; internal citations omitted). The trial court also placed great weight on evidence that Mother was inconsistent with visitation and never progressed past supervised visitation.
Additionally, Mr. [] Middleton oversaw the transportation and supervision of visits between the parents and [C]hildren. Mr.
Middleton testified that, from the end of February 2025 through the end of April 2025, Mother was scheduled to meet with [C]hildren on eight (8) occasions, which calculates to roughly once a week. She missed each of these scheduled visits.
Id. at 10. The court found that Mother had failed to perform parental duties for Children for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition and beyond, as evidenced by her lack of contact with Children and her refusal to complete her court-ordered objectives. The court emphasized that the Agency gave Mother tools to overcome her obstacles to
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reunification, but Mother failed or refused to take advantage of them. The court opined: “Mother is dealing with a two-headed monster. She struggles with substance abuse. She has a partner who is physically abusive to her. That combination is fatal to her efforts to provide essential care to [C]hildren. [T]hese circumstances are not new, and they have existed for the entirety of the case.” Id. at 11.
The record supports the trial court’s findings. We decline to usurp the court’s credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
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Regarding Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that terminating parental rights will have on the child. We review the court’s conclusion as to “whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005). “The court must consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). If a bond exists, the court must consider whether terminating parental rights would destroy an “existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109 (citation omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762–63.
Finally, in weighing the difficult factors discussed above, courts “must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citation and emphasis omitted). Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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Mother avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it terminated her parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 2511(b). Mother’s Br. at 28. Mother argues that the trial court should have considered Dr. Bernstein’s testimony that the interaction between Mother and Children was positive as well as Mr. Middleton’s testimony that Children were excited to see Mother
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during visits. Id. at 29. Mother also argues that she “loves [Children] and has much to offer for their benefit.” Id.
Upon review, the trial court did consider and credit testimony from Dr.
Bernstein and Mr. Middleton that Mother’s interactions with Children are generally positive and that Mother loves Children. However, the court recognized that just because Mother and Children have some positive interactions when Mother sporadically shows up to supervised visits does not mean that Mother and Children have a parent-child bond and found that “Mother’s bond with [C]hildren was not such that it would preclude a termination of her parental rights.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 17. The trial court placed weight on Dr. Bernstein’s testimony that Mother cannot ensure Children’s safety, that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause Children harm, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in Children’s best interest. The court emphasized Dr. Bernstein’s testimony that Mother’s past behaviors indicate that Children’s safety “cannot be assured” if they are in Mother’s care. Id. at 15. The court credited Dr. Bernstein and Ms. McAllister’s testimony regarding Children’s loving relationship with Maternal Aunt and the progress they have all made in her home. The court opined:
This picture is quite different [with Maternal] Aunt[.] The caseworker testified that all of the children have improved since living with [Maternal A]unt. That improvement comes directly from having all of their needs met. These beliefs from Ms.
McAllister were corroborated by Dr. Bernstein. . . For [C]hildren to thrive, they need the things which [Maternal A]unt has been able to provide them.
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Id. The court concluded that the “innate amount of love Mother has for [C]hildren is simply not enough. Dr. Bernstein opined that termination would not cause extreme distress or harm to any of the children. In conjunction, Dr. Bernstein believes, as does this [c]ourt, that termination would best meet the needs and welfare of these three children.” Id. at 17 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s findings. Mother asks us to reweigh the evidence, which this Court simply cannot do. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
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In conclusion, our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings.
We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b). In light of our disposition, we decline to address Mother’s remaining issue or Mother’s arguments as they relate to other subsections of Section 2511.
Orders affirmed.
DATE: 9/2/2026