In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R v. Jr., and F.K v. Children v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 04-25-00794-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00794-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.I.M.H., S.R.V. Jr., and F.K.V., Children

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-PA-01616 Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 25, 2026

AFFIRMED

This case involves the termination of parental rights to two children, who were ten and

seven years old at the time of trial. 1 Both parents appeal the trial court’s order terminating their

parental rights. Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

grounds for termination and the best-interest finding. Father challenges only the trial court’s best-

interest finding. We affirm the trial court’s order.

1 To protect the identity of the minor children, we will refer to appellants as “Mother” and “Father” and to their children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). 04-25-00794-CV

BACKGROUND

Mother and Father had two children together, S.R.V., Jr. and F.K.V. 2 On October 11, 2024,

the Department filed an original petition for protection of a child, for conservatorship, and for

termination in suit affecting parent-child relationship and for emergency removal of the children

due to ongoing concerns regarding Mother’s substance use in the presence of the children and

domestic violence. At the time of removal and at trial, the children were living with their maternal

grandmother.

On October 24, 2024, a full adversary hearing was held. Mother appeared via zoom and

Father appeared through counsel. At that time, the trial court granted the Department temporary

managing conservatorship. A family service plan was created which required Mother to submit to

a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, to attend counseling sessions, to complete parenting

classes, and to submit to a drug and alcohol dependency assessment and random drug testing.

Mother signed her plan.

Because Father was sent to a nine-month drug treatment program after being released from

prison, with no access allowed, he did not sign a family service plan until April 7, 2025. A full

adversary hearing was held as to Father’s rights on August 19, 2025, which resulted in no change

in status or placement of the children. Father finally contacted the Department in September 2025,

two months before trial, but refused to engage in any services.

On October 10, 2025, the trial court issued an order retaining the suit on the court’s docket,

extending the automatic dismissal date to April 11, 2026 and setting the matter for final trial on

November 14, 2025. The trial was completed on November 17, 2025. On December 1, 2025, the

2 The trial court did not terminate the parental rights of Mother and another father, (L.H.) to an older child, A.I.M.H., who was seventeen years old at the time of trial. Instead, the Department was named sole managing conservator of A.I.M.H., with both parents named as possessory conservators. Neither parent appeals this ruling.

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trial court issued its order terminating Mother’s rights to S.R.V., Jr. and F.K.V. under Texas Family

Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (P) 3 and terminated Father’s rights to S.R.V., Jr. and

F.K.V. under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N) and (P). The trial court also

found termination of both parents’ rights was in the best interest of the children under Texas Family

Code section 161.001(b)(2).

FACTS

On initial referral, Mother admitted to using marijuana and methamphetamine every other

day. Mother identified a safety plan placement for the children, but when that person tried to kill

himself in front of the children, the children were then placed with maternal grandmother. Maternal

grandmother then called the Department to make another referral because of Mother’s continued

substance abuse and an incident during which she threw a dresser to the ground when she was

angry with maternal grandmother. When an investigator went to Mother’s home, a rock of

methamphetamine was found among Mother’s things. The caseworker also testified Mother’s

home smelled like marijuana.

Mother refused to participate in an inpatient drug treatment program, leading the

Department to refer her to a virtual one. Mother began the program but was discharged for failing

to attend and check in. The Department then tried to re-engage Mother in another program but she

refused. Out of thirty-six drug tests requested, Mother tested positive on thirty-three of them,

including one just two weeks before trial.

3 At the time the original petition was filed, Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(P) provided that termination could be supported by a finding that a parent “used a controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and (i) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (ii) after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, continued to abuse a controlled substance. That provision is now, as of September 1, 2025, set forth under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O). TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O).

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Father completed a court-ordered, nine-month drug treatment program but refused to

comply with the Department’s requests for drug tests afterwards. He said he first needed to address

his “demons” and “voices,” specifically referring to diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,

depression, and anxiety. He testified that he had attended only one session with a psychiatrist, a

few weeks before trial, and had obtained a prescription for medication. But, instead of getting his

prescriptions filled, he chose to take pills he obtained from the street to self-medicate.

Mother was also referred to counseling and exhibited behaviors that were concerning,

including expressing suicidal ideation in front of the children and even talking to the caseworker

about self-harm just a week before trial. Yet, she was discharged from counseling for missing

appointments and not taking seriously the issues that led to removal. Mother did re-engage in

counseling but did so just a few weeks before the trial setting.

In addition to substance abuse and mental health issues, the Department raised domestic

violence as an issue warranting concern. The caseworker testified that the children jump when

someone moves too quickly, exhibiting trauma from prior violence, and the older child had a panic

attack during a visit when he thought Father had arrived. At trial, Mother testified Father had been

violent 4 and that the children were legitimately concerned about their safety in his presence, but

she intended to still co-parent with him. The Department and Mother’s counselor expressed

concerns about Mother’s statement to them of her desire to reunite with Father, evidenced by the

fact that the two did actually reunite after he was released and during the pendency of the

termination proceedings. In fact, Father testified he is still in a relationship with Mother. Mother

exhibited a desire to keep Father in the lives of the children by bringing him to visits and engaging

4 Father denied ever laying a hand on Mother and also denied having a lengthy criminal history despite admitting to arrests for burglary, possession of heroin, DWI, domestic violence, theft, resisting arrest, and lying about his identification

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him on phone calls with the children during her visits, even after the Department asked her not to

do so. Father refused to engage in services, including domestic violence classes.

In terms of the ability to provide a stable environment for the children, Mother admitted

she has not been employed for two years but sometimes bakes cakes from her home that she sells.

Father was also unemployed and did not have a place of his own to live, choosing instead to either

stay with Mother or with his own mother.

The caseworker testified that the lack of permanency has impacted the kids emotionally.

The children are currently with their maternal grandmother who wishes to adopt them. The

caseworker testified that the children are doing well, that the younger child has come out of his

shell and is engaging much more than before, and that maternal grandmother is ensuring they

continue with therapy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A suit involving the potential termination of a parent’s right to a child is of constitutional

import. See In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied). But

a parent’s rights “are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional

underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical

interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26

(Tex. 2002). Striking that balance, a trial court may terminate a parent-child relationship, pursuant

to Texas Family Code section 161.001, only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence one

predicate ground enumerated in subsection (b)(1) and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)–(2); see, e.g., In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. 2024). Clear

and convincing evidence requires proof that will produce in the factfinder’s mind “a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.

This heightened standard “guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while

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retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.” In re O.N.H., 401

S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).

When reviewing the evidence in a parental termination case, we apply the well-established

standards associated with both a legal and factual sufficiency review. In re J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d

51, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied). First, in a legal sufficiency review, we “view

the facts in a light favorable to the findings of the trial judge, who heard the testimony, evaluated

its credibility, and dealt the closest with the evidence at hand.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 276

(Tex. 2024) (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tex. 2021)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder. Instead, the factfinder

is the sole judge of evidentiary weight and credibility, including witness testimony. In re J.O.A.,

283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). We will “defer to the [factfinder’s] determinations, at least so

long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573

(Tex. 2005) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In our review, we must assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding

if a reasonable factfinder could do so. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). While we will

disregard all evidence contrary to a factfinder’s determination if a reasonable factfinder could have

disbelieved or found it to have been incredible, we will not disregard undisputed evidence even if

it does not support the trial court’s finding. Id.; see, e.g., C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 308.

In our factual sufficiency review, we consider the entire record and determine whether, in

light of the entire record, any disputed evidence “is so significant that a factfinder could not

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction” on the challenged finding. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

at 266.

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LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE PREDICATE GROUNDS FOR THE TRIAL COURT’S TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS

Mother, but not Father, challenges the trial court’s finding that termination is proper under

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1). Mother’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to

multiple predicate grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1), specifically (D), (E), and (P). Only one

predicate violation under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a termination order. See In

re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re F.B.C.L., No. 04-20-00477-CV, 2021 WL

1649221, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

However, regardless of our holding with regard to subsection (P) of section 161.001(b)(1),

we must still consider Mother’s issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E) because termination under subsection (D) or

(E) may serve as the basis for a future termination of parental rights. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

230, 234 (Tex. 2019); see also In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022) (“[W]e may not bypass

Father’s evidentiary challenges to Subsections (D) and (E), the so-called endangerment grounds.

Those grounds bear special significance because termination of a parent’s rights under either can

serve as a ground for termination of his rights to another child.”). Therefore, we begin by analyzing

the sufficiency of evidence under subsection (D) and (E).

Termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)

To terminate parental rights pursuant to subsection (D), the Department must prove by

clear and convincing evidence the parent knowingly placed the child in or allowed the child to

remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). “Conditions or surroundings” establishing endangerment

include “[i]nappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home or

with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis.” In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d

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494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). An environment that endangers the child may be

created by the physical living conditions in the child’s home or by the conduct of a parent living

in the home, or both. In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 108–09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no

pet.). A parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in an endangering environment when

the parent is aware of the potential danger but disregards it. M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d at 502. A child

may therefore be endangered when the home environment creates a potential for emotional or

physical injury even where the injurious conduct is not directed at the child and the child does not

suffer injury. Tex. Dep’t of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); I.N.D.,

2020 WL 2441375, at *3.

Under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Department must show—also by

clear and convincing evidence—that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child

with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of

the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under this subsection, the focus is on the effect

of the parent’s conduct, which must be the result of a conscious course of conduct rather than a

single act or omission. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125–26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no

pet.). “It is not necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually

be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct

creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards.” In re R.S.-T., 522

S.W.3d 92, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.); see also J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345

(“[E]ndangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the child.”). “Courts may further

consider parental conduct that did not occur in the child’s presence, including conduct before the

child’s birth or after he was removed from a parent’s care.” In re A.B.R., No. 04-19-00631-CV,

2020 WL 1159043, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

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The evidence in this case, detailed above, is clear that Mother’s own actions have subjected

the children to an environment riddled with her own illegal substance abuse, domestic violence

committed by Father, and mental health concerns that neither she nor Father have satisfactorily

addressed. “Parental and caregiver illegal drug use and drug-related criminal activity [] supports

the conclusion that the children’s surroundings endanger their physical or emotional well-being.”

In re J.A.B., No. 04-23-00907-CV, 2024 WL 1421986, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 3,

2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2003, no pet.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749 (“Certainly,

Mother’s use of controlled substances while pregnant created a dangerous environment for [the

child]”). “Domestic violence, want of self-control and propensity for violence may be considered

as evidence of endangerment.” See R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 110. Further, the evidence established

that Mother has minimized the concerns about her own substance abuse and domestic violence

committed by Father, has continued a relationship with Father despite the violence, and continues

to engage the children with their Father, even after testifying the children have reason to be scared

of him.

Based on the evidence detailed above, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or

conviction Mother’s actions and the environment she subjected them to endangered both children

and constituted grounds for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and

(E). I.N.D., 2020 WL 2441375, at *3; J.A.B., 2024 WL 1421986, at *2; J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125;

J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. We therefore hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s findings under both subsections (D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); J.O.A., 283 S.W.3dn at 345-46.

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Termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(P)

Because legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s termination on

grounds (D) and (E), and a finding of only one ground for termination is necessary to support

termination, we need not consider whether the evidence would support termination under

subsection (P). See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT TERMINATION IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN

Mother and Father argue the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the

trial court’s findings that termination of their parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

Under Texas law, “there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served

by keeping the child with a parent.” In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

However, a trial court must also presume “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a

safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). In making a

best-interest determination, the factfinder looks at the entire record and considers all relevant

circumstances. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27–29 (Tex. 2002).

The Texas legislature codified certain factors to use in determining the best interest of a

child, including:

(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;

(2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements;

(3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child;

(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department;

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(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home;

(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home;

(7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home;

(8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home;

(9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified;

(10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision;

(11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time;

(12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child and other children under the family’s care with:

(A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care;

(B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent with the child’s physical and psychological development;

(C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s safety;

(D) a safe physical home environment;

(E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even though the violence may not be directed at the child; and

(F) an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities; and

(13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b); see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 n.29 (Tex. 2018) (recognizing

statutory factors as additional factors for consideration). Even before the legislature took action to

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codify section 263.307(b), the Texas Supreme Court, in Holley v. Adams, identified factors to

determine the best interest of a child:

(A) the desires of the child;

(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;

(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;

(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;

(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;

(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;

(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

The Department does not have to prove every factor for a trial court to find termination is

in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. In our review of the trial court’s best-interest

findings, we must consider “the totality of the circumstances” in light of these factors to determine

whether sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding. In re B.F., No. 02-07-334-CV, 2008

WL 902790, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Additionally, “[a]

trier of fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct and determine whether

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

“The evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination may also be used to support

a finding that the best interest of the child warrants termination of the parent-child relationship.”

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In re S.M.G., No. 01-17-00056-CV, 2017 WL 2806332, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

June 29, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “Evidence of a parent’s unstable lifestyle, including

habitual drug and alcohol use, can support the conclusion that termination is in the child’s best

interest.” In re F.M., No. 14-18-00384-CV, 2018 WL 4925127, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Oct. 11, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(8) (providing as

one factor whether there is history of substance abuse by child’s family or others who have access

to child’s home). “While the recent improvements made by [a parent in a termination proceeding]

are significant, evidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively

negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d at 346.

B. Analysis

Here, the evidence detailed above describes two parents who have done little to address the

issues leading to removal of the children. Both continue to use illegal drugs. Both have failed to

address the domestic violence in their relationship. And while Mother has recently re-engaged in

counseling and Father had one appointment with a psychiatrist just prior to trial, the evidence fails

to demonstrate improvement in terms of either parent’s mental health struggles. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 263.307(b)(3), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (11); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Further, Mother

admits that Father is violent and that the children have legitimate concerns of safety around him,

yet she displays no protective instinct toward them when it comes to him. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b)(1), (5); Holley, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (factors A, C, D, E).

Mother and Father’s failure to successfully complete their family service plans, in fact,

Father’s refusal to engage at all, also supports the trial court’s best interest finding. See Holley,

544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also, e.g., In re B.R.T., No. 04-22-00416-CV, 2023 WL 29381, at *6

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(Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 4, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence parent did not complete

family service plan is probative of child’s best interest).

Finally, we must consider the character of the placement of the children—with their

maternal grandmother—who by all accounts is meeting the needs of the children, the fact that the

caseworker testified the lack of permanency is negatively impacting them, and the desire of the

grandmother to adopt them. All of this weighs in favor of termination.

Here, applying our standard of review for legal sufficiency and viewing the evidence in a

light favorable to the trial court’s findings, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably

formed a firm belief or conviction termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the

best interest of both children. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 276; In re J.O.H., 617 S.W.3d 596, 599

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.) (holding that, in considering child’s best interest, parent’s

future conduct may be judged by past conduct). Turning to factual sufficiency, we further conclude

that when viewing the entire record, any evidence contrary to the finding is not so significant that

it would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming the same firm belief or conviction

termination of parental rights was in the best interest of S.R.V., Jr. and F.K.V. See J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

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