In the Interest of A.H., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: 25-0291
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0291 Filed May 7, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF A.H., Minor Child,

M.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to

her daughter under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (f) and (l) (2024).

AFFIRMED.

Bryan Webber of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Congarry D. Williams, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SANDY, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to

her daughter, A.H., under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (f) and (l)

(2024). The mother contests the grounds for termination, argues termination is not

in the child’s best interests, and alternatively contends that the child should have

been placed in a guardianship. Finding the grounds for termination have been

met, termination is in the child’s best interests, and that guardianship is not a viable

alternative to termination, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s

parental rights to the child.

I. Backgrounds Facts and Proceedings

The child was born in October 2019. The father’s parental rights were

terminated in 2021. The child has an older maternal half-sibling born in 2008. The

family originally came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services in 2018 due to the mother’s use of methamphetamine in front of the

sibling. The mother continuously tested positive for methamphetamine during

those proceedings—including while pregnant with the child. The mother declined

further drug testing after the child’s birth. That refusal and the department’s

concern that the mother was continuing to use prompted the department to file a

child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) petition for the child. That case was closed

when a guardianship was established with the maternal grandmother in 2021. The

guardianship was closed in 2022 at the grandmother’s request, and the child was

returned to the mother’s custody.

The department received a report in December 2022 that the mother was

using methamphetamine while the child was in her care. The department set up 3

a safety plan with the mother, which required the child to be returned to the

grandmother’s care. In April 2023, the State applied for the child’s temporary

removal and petitioned to have the child adjudicated as a CINA. Those filings were

predicated on the mother’s arrest for operating while intoxicated and possession

of methamphetamine and her continued refusal to drug test or otherwise engage

in services offered by the department. The juvenile court adjudicated the child as

a CINA in May, removed the child from the mother’s custody, and ordered that the

department prepare a case permanency plan.

In April 2024, a permanency hearing was held, and the department reported

that the mother continued to test positive for controlled substances and refused to

acknowledge her substance use. She would not engage in inpatient treatment or

mental-health and substance-use services provided by the department. The

department reported its belief that the mother was permitting the biological father,

who has a history of domestic violence and methamphetamine use, to see the

child. The juvenile court identified termination as the permanency goal, and the

State subsequently filed for termination of the mother’s parental rights in May.

The termination trial was held in July. The department highlighted the

mother’s substance use and her failure to complete treatment despite twice

beginning treatment. It also expressed concern with her continued relationship

with the biological father and failure to take steps to address her diagnosed mental-

health issues. During her testimony, the department case worker confirmed that

the mother would smoke “up to a gram” of methamphetamine a day, which she

opined is “a lot of methamphetamine.” 4

At trial, the mother testified that she has been using methamphetamine

since 2013 and that she had used methamphetamine a week before trial. She

claimed to have left treatment at Clearview Recovery stating, “I don’t believe I

needed treatment” due to “the state of the facility” “being less than standard.” She

claimed to have left treatment at the YWCA “[b]ecause [she] thought [she] was

going to be able to have [her] daughter there with [her] after the first day, and it did

not happen.” She claimed to not be in treatment at House of Mercy because “they

had a very long wait,” although when asked if she was on the wait list, she

responded, “I’m not sure. I believe so.”

At trial, the mother was asked what, after nearly six years involvement with

the department, would be different if the juvenile court granted more time in this

case. She simply responded, “Me.”

Following trial, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights.

The mother now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review parental termination proceedings de novo. In re L.T., 924

N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019). We give weight to, but are not bound by, the

juvenile court’s factual findings. In re M.D., 921 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 2018).

Our paramount concern is with the children’s best interests. L.T., 924 N.W.2d

at 526.

III. Discussion

We review terminations of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 with

a three-step analysis. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Under the

first step, we determine whether any ground for termination under 5

section 232.116(1) has been established. Id. If so, we then determine whether

the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the

termination of parental rights. Id. at 706–07. Finally, if we do find that the statutory

best-interest framework supports the termination of parental rights, we consider

whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of

parental rights. Id. at 707.

Additionally, “[w]hen the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more

than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground

we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

A. Grounds for Termination

The mother argues the juvenile court “erred when it terminated [her]

parental rights . . . pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).” Specifically she

contends the State did not prove by “clear and convincing evidence that the child

cannot be returned to [her] custody” at the present time. See id.

§§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), .102; see also D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting “present

time” to mean the date of the termination hearing).

“A child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parent . . . if by

doing so the child would be exposed to any harm amounting to a new [CINA]

adjudication or without remaining a [CINA].” In re S.C., No. 15-0262, 2015

WL 2089743, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015).

At the time of trial, the mother had been in treatment for “mental health

therapy” for three weeks at UCS Healthcare. The mother has consistently failed

to take advantage of the services offered by the department over the past six years.

She has twice started and quit treatment services. She could not say definitively 6

that she was on the waitlist for substance-use treatment at House of Mercy.

Considering that the motivating factor for the department’s involvement in this case

is the mother’s substance use, we do not believe the child can be returned to her

custody at the present time. Her “eleventh hour attempt to prevent termination” by

seeking treatment at UCS is even less persuasive when considering that, by her

own admission, her methamphetamine use was continuing up to a week before

the termination hearing. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994). That

reality gives us little reason to expect that “the need for removal ‘will no longer exist

at the end of [an] additional six-month period,’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323

(Iowa 2021) (citation omitted), let alone that the child could be returned at the

present time.

B. Best Interests

The mother next argues termination is not in the child’s best interests due

to the mother-child bond and because the child is in the “legal custody of a relative.”

We choose to interpret the mother’s mother-child bond argument as a best-

interests challenge rather than as a permissive exception challenge “because [her]

issue heading referenced only best interests and that is the thrust of [her]

argument.” In re L.A., ___ N.W.3d ___, ___ n.2, 2025 WL 855764, at *3 n.2 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2025). And the child is in the legal custody of the department, not a

relative.

Under Iowa Code section 232.116(2), we “give primary consideration to the

child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and

growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs

of the child.” The child cannot be deprived “of permanency after the State has 7

proven a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a

parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d

100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). “[W]e look to the parents’ past

performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of

providing in the future.” In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (citation

omitted).

The mother’s sole contentions supporting her mother-child bond argument

are that “[n]o evidence was presented by the State denying the presence of the

parent-child bond” and “both the testimony taken at trial as well as the reports

admitted into evidence provided support [the m]other’s assertion as to the

significance of the parent-child bond”—with no citation to the record.

Although the department case worker testified that she observed “a strong

bond” between the mother and the child during a visit, she also confirmed that her

“recommendation today is not based upon the lack of a bond between mother and

daughter, but moreover the other surrounding impacts regarding the mental health

and substance abuse concerns.” We agree. A strong bond cannot outweigh the

consistent and significant harm the mother has introduced into the daughter’s life

by her consistent methamphetamine use.

As we have said before, “Methamphetamine is a scourge.” In re K.L.,

No. 17-0346, 2017 WL 2465817, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2017). “A parent's

methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.” In

re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020). In J.P.,

we found that any benefit from the parent-child bond was outweighed by the harm 8

from the parent’s methamphetamine use as recently as two months before the

termination hearing. See id.

The mother has not demonstrated a history of sobriety during the child’s life.

She has consistently used methamphetamine, and she has not consistently cared

for the child. She has failed to make use of the services offered by the department.

Termination is in the child’s best interests.

C. Guardianship

The mother argues that the juvenile court should have placed the child in a

guardianship rather than terminating her parental rights. “[A] guardianship is not

a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477

(Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). In addition, the mother bears the burden of

convincing us of such. Id. at 476.

Although there are instances where guardianship is appropriate, see id.,

such is not the case here. Guardianship has already been explored and attempted

with the child’s maternal grandmother. That guardianship was dissolved at the

grandmother’s request less than a year after being granted. We will not delay the

child’s permanency because, “in these circumstances a guardianship is woefully

inadequate to achieve the sort of stable, nurturing and permanent home she both

needs and deserves.” See id.

We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.