In the Interest of: A.H., Appeal of: M.H.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 1469 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A13014-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: M.H., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1469 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-04-DP-0000029-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: May 6, 2025

M.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the order adjudicating dependent her

minor daughter, A.H., born November 2010.1 We affirm.

By way of background, Beaver County Children and Youth Services

(“CYS”) first became involved with Mother on July 16, 2024, when she called

and requested assistance with her adult son, who eventually moved out of the

home. CYS received a second referral the next month when T.H., the older

half-sister of A.H., ran away and was voluntarily committed to a hospital. The

agency thereafter performed a home visit wherein it learned that Mother was

having financial troubles and that the house was being run by a generator

because the electricity had been shut off.

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1A.H.’s father was not involved in the underlying proceedings and has not appealed. J-A13014-25

Most pertinent here, a third referral was made to CYS on September 20,

2024. In the early hours of that morning, Mother got into an argument with

T.H. and demanded that she hand over her cell phone before going to school.

T.H. refused, and Mother either slapped or struck her. A.H. was standing

nearby and observed the incident. Mother then recruited another adult son

to restrain T.H while Mother grabbed a bottle of bleach, opened it, and threw

it at T.H. The bleach made contact with her face and clothing and also struck

A.H.

T.H. reported the incident to a school resource officer later that morning

and complained of having a burning sensation in her eyes and on her face.

The officer in turn contacted police and CYS. T.H. was transported to the

hospital, where her eyes were flushed. Responding officers interviewed

several people, including T.H. and Mother. All of them confirmed the same

general circumstances surrounding the dispute, except Mother claimed that

the bottle in question only contained water. Officer Christopher Stitt of the

Beaver Valley Regional Police Department executed a search warrant on

Mother’s house, collecting two bottles of bleach and multiple articles of

clothing from the girls that he testified smelled of bleach. Mother was

criminally charged with simple assault and recklessly endangering another

person with respect to her conduct toward T.H.

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Based on the above, CYS filed a petition for dependency as to both A.H.

and T.H.2 Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court placed both girls

in licensed kinship non-family care, specifically with the family of one of T.H.’s

friends, with whom A.H. was acquainted. The court conducted an adjudication

hearing on October 22, 2024, and the evidence therein bore out the above

events.

Additionally, CYS presented testimony from several of its employees

outlining Mother’s confrontational communication with the agency during the

course of its involvement. Particularly, Kylie Ackerman, an intake case

worker, stated that Mother largely refused to aid CYS in preparing a family

finding report as to the girls and was not willing to provide the name or contact

information for A.H.’s father.3 Leann Miller, a protective case worker,

indicated that in the month between the incident involving the bleach and the

dependency hearing, Mother would not permit any home visits and would only

correspond concerning visitation of the girls. CYS also introduced into

evidence copies of several text messages illuminating Mother’s combative

language when communicating with CYS personnel. Nonetheless, the agency

2 The court adjudicated T.H. dependent in a separate case. Mother did not appeal that matter, and thus we focus on the facts as they pertain to A.H.

3 Another witness confirmed that CYS eventually obtained what it believed to

be the name of A.H.’s father but could not establish contact with him despite several attempts.

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represented to the juvenile court that the goal for A.H. was reunification with

Mother.

The court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of

testimony. It ultimately entered an order on October 28, 2024, finding A.H.

dependent and calling for her continued kinship placement. Mother timely

filed both a notice of appeal and a statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i). The juvenile court authored a responsive opinion. Mother

presents three issues for our consideration:

I. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in finding [A.H.] to be a dependent child without proper care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other control necessary for her physical mental, or emotional health, or morals?

II. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in removing [A.H.] from the home of Mother. . ., finding that the placement in license kinship non-relative care was the least restrictive placement that meets the needs of the child?

III. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in determining that reasonable efforts were made by [CYS] to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of [A.H.] from the home?

Mother’s brief at 7 (some capitalization altered).

In her first issue, Mother attacks the court’s finding of dependency as to

A.H. We begin with the relevant legal principles:

Our standard of review for a dependency adjudication requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. We therefore review for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if, in reaching a conclusion, it overrides or misapplies the law, or the record shows that the trial court’s judgment was

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either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will.

Interest of J.R., ___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 797841 at *4 (Pa.Super. March 13,

2025) (cleaned up).

CYS’s petition requested that A.H. be found dependent pursuant to

subsection (1) of the Juvenile Act’s definition of “dependent child.” This

applies to a child who:

is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). To adjudicate a child dependent, a court must

determine that this requirement is satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.

See Interest of Q.R., 199 A.3d 458, 467 (Pa.Super. 2018). In that vein:

“Clear and convincing” evidence has been defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

[Further, i]n accordance with the overarching purpose of the Juvenile Act to preserve the unity of the family wherever possible . . ., a child will only be declared dependent when he is presently without proper parental care and when such care is not immediately available. This Court has defined “proper parental care” as that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.

Id. at 467-68 (cleaned up).

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In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the juvenile court cogently explained the

rationale for its decision to adjudicate A.H. dependent. It began by noting

that it found all the testimony presented by CYS to be credible. See Juvenile

Court Opinion, 12/23/24, at 26. These attestations collectively showed that

Mother intentionally struck T.H. and threw bleach onto her in anger, which in

turn got into T.H.’s face and eyes, and that the substance also splashed onto

A.H. Id. at 26-27. The court found Mother’s conduct to be both “dangerous”

and “alarming” with respect to not only T.H. but also A.H., and demonstrative

of Mother’s “uncontrolled, explosive, and unpredictable behavior” that “placed

the children at risk.” Id. at 27-28. The court acknowledged that A.H. was

not the direct recipient of Mother’s punishment on the occasion in question

but asserted that A.H. was nonetheless endangered during the incident and

that our case law calls for courts to scrutinize the safety of children in such

situations. Id. at 26, 28 (citing In re G.T., 845 A.2d 870 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

It resolved that “Mother’s callous use of bleach as a weapon in a way that

foreseeably exposed each child to that product, led to the conclusion that each

child was dependent. This was a conclusion necessary to mitigate any future

risk to [A.H.]’s physical, mental and emotional wellbeing.” Id. (some

capitalization altered).

In arguing that the court erred, Mother avers that “[t]here was no

testimony indicating that any of [Mother]’s children, including . . . A.H., ever

lacked proper education or subsistence. There was no evidence or testimony

presented that [Mother] used alcohol or a controlled substance that place[d]

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the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk.” Mother’s brief at 14. She

also accuses the court of finding A.H. dependent merely because of the

incident involving T.H. Id. She recounts that there was no testimony that

A.H. suffered from any trauma or physical harm from the occurrence. Id. at

15. Mother additionally criticizes the juvenile court for relying on In re G.T.,

as that case entailed significantly more severe facts involving two siblings

being adjudicated dependent when the younger sibling was found to be

suffering from shaken baby syndrome, but the other was unharmed. Id. at

15. Mother concludes:

The incomparability in severity between the present incident, and the [facts] leading to adjudication found in the precedent the [juvenile] court relies on, coupled with its own categorization of the physical and emotional harm to A.H. as “potential”, do not meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence that the minor child A.H. is a dependent child.

Id. at 16-17.

Upon review, we determine that the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion in finding A.H. dependent. To begin, it is clear from the court’s

thorough analysis that it did not do so solely because it reached the same

dependency determination as to T.H. Instead, it considered both Mother’s

prior history with CYS and the entirety of the bleach incident, which included

A.H.’s witnessing of the violence and her exposure to the bleach that, in fact,

injured T.H. The court explicitly weighed the fact that Mother’s uncontrolled

behavior has a substantial risk of affecting A.H., even if she was not the

intended victim during the event in question. It also correctly noted that

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pursuant to our case law, a parent’s dangerous conduct can form the basis of

a finding of dependency, even if the child in question is not harmed. See,

e.g., In re G.T., 845 A.2d at 873 (noting that a parent’s failure to seek

medical attention for a child “evidenced extremely poor judgment” which

put all household children at risk, and the fact that one child “suffered no

adverse effects from this decision is both irrelevant and fortuitous”). Finally,

to the extent that Mother argues that the court erred in finding that the

substance used in the attack was bleach, as opposed to water, we defer to the

court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record,

particularly Officer Stitt’s testimony. See N.T. Hearing, 10/22/24, at 78-79

(stating that upon executing a search warrant, he noticed a potent odor of

bleach within the house near the area of the altercation, on the clothes

gathered from there, and the recovered empty bleach bottle). No relief is

due.

We address Mother’s remaining two issues together. She collectively

contends that the court erred in finding that kinship placement was the least

restrictive placement option and that CYS failed to sufficiently prove that it

undertook reasonable efforts prior to the removal of A.H. and her sister. See

Mother’s brief at 17-20. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351, upon a finding of

dependency, a court may transfer temporary custody to “[a]ny individual

resident within or without this Commonwealth, including any relative, who,

after study by the probation officer or other person or agency designated by

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the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care for the

child.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a)(2)(i). However,

Prior to entering any order of disposition under subsection (a) that would remove a dependent child from his home, the court shall enter findings on the record or in the order of court as follows:

(1) that continuation of the child in his home would be contrary to the welfare, safety or health of the child; and

(2) whether reasonable efforts were made prior to the placement of the child to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, if the child has remained in his home pending such disposition; or

(3) if preventive services were not offered due to the necessity for an emergency placement, whether such lack of services was reasonable under the circumstances; or

(4) if the court has previously determined pursuant to [§] 6332 (relating to informal hearing) that reasonable efforts were not made to prevent the initial removal of the child from his home, whether reasonable efforts are under way to make it possible for the child to return home; and

(5) if the child has a sibling who is subject to removal from his home, whether reasonable efforts were made prior to the placement of the child to place the siblings together or whether such joint placement is contrary to the safety or well-being of the child or sibling.

The court shall not enter findings under paragraph (2), (3) or (4) if the court previously determined that aggravated circumstances exist and no new or additional reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the home or to preserve and reunify the family are required.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(b).

In addressing these two claims, the juvenile court stated:

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[T]he facts presented at adjudication established that an incident of abuse occurred to [A.H.]’s sibling, which exposed the child herself to a situation of potential physical and emotional harm. Given this family’s two prior agency referrals, a disruptive and . . . uncooperative [Mother], and an extremely hazardous incident, removing the child from the home of [Mother] is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of [A.H.] at this time.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 12/23/24, at 29 (some capitalization altered). As to

the reasonable efforts taken by CYS, the court noted that the credible

testimony from the various witnesses “showcased how the [a]gency made

multiple attempts to communicate and work with” Mother. Id. at 30. It found

that she often refused to cooperate with CYS and was combative, highlighting

that she denied multiple requests for home visits. Id. at 30-31. Based upon

the above, the court concluded that A.H.’s best interest would be served by

placement outside the home away from Mother and in the same location as

T.H. Id. at 31.

Mother again counters that this case is not so serious as to warrant

placement outside the home, like in the cases relied upon by the juvenile

court, such as in In re G.T. See Mother’s brief at 17. She further asserts

that the court erroneously applied a “best interests of the child” standard,

which is not the proper test for determining placement. Id. at 18. Mother

avers that the court neglected to provide “any supportive reasons why there

were no less restrictive alternatives [to out-of-home placement] available.”

Id.

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With respect to CYS’s efforts, Mother emphasizes portions of the notes

of testimony purportedly showing that she had “abundant communication”

with the agency. Id. at 19. She contends that this debunks the court’s

assertion that CYS struggled to communicate with her. Id. Mother concedes

that her language may have been confrontational in the months following

CYS’s filing of the dependency petition, but that it was civil beforehand. Id.

at 19-20. She argues in sum that “[t]here is nothing [i]n the record indicating

what efforts were made to prevent the placement of the child outside of the

home.” Id. at 20.

We find that the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the record

and free of error. Our review of the court’s order of adjudication and

disposition demonstrates its consideration of the required matters enumerated

at § 6351. Based on Mother’s dangerous conduct toward T.H., which also

placed A.H. at risk, the court was within its rights to find that keeping A.H.

within the home “would be contrary to [her] welfare, safety or health[.]” 42

Pa.C.S. § 6351(b)(1). This is particularly true in light of Mother’s then-recent

history of referrals to CYS concerning her difficulties in (1) handling the

behavior of an adult son, (2) addressing T.H.’s mental health issues and

threats of self-harm, and (3) maintaining a steady income so as to keep the

electricity running in the house.

Furthermore, the testimony from the dependency hearing established

that CYS took steps to potentially reduce the likelihood of necessary

placement, but Mother refused to cooperate. She would not aid in the

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preparation of the family finding report, provide the name or contact

information for A.H.’s father, or communicate with case workers for any

matter other than visitation. Even when Mother did correspond, she was

combative in her language and otherwise hostile toward CYS’s case workers.

Most critically, she would not permit any home visits to allow CYS to ensure

the safety of the home environment for the children.

In short, we have no cause to disturb the juvenile court’s order finding

A.H. dependent and continuing her placement with a licensed kinship non-

family.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 5/6/2025

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