In the Interest of A.G.D.M., a Child v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Interest of A.G.D.M., a Child v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of A.G.D.M., a Child v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00397-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.D.M., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 72nd District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-505,390, Honorable John C. Grace, Presiding
August 4, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
This appeal is one more chapter in the ongoing familial relationship between AM,
his ex-wife SJ, and their child AGDM. See, e.g., In re A.G.D.M., 533 S.W.3d 546 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2017, no pet.); In re A.G.D.[M.], No. 07-15-00201-CV, 2016 Tex. App.
LEXIS 688 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Marriage of
McDaniel, No. 07-13-00372-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1697, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Feb. 19, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). This time, AM appealed from an October
2024 final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. He prays that “the ruling
be remanded for the trial so that a proper decision on possession and access can be
rendered.” We interpret this as his desire to appeal the trial court’s declaration that “Petitioner’s request for possession and/or access to the child is denied.” In so ordering,
the trial court allegedly abused its discretion. We affirm.
Background
AGDM was born to AM and SJ in 2012. Shortly before AGDM’s birth, AM was
convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to ninety-seven months in
federal prison. While AM was in prison, SJ divorced him. Through the decree, the trial
court appointed AM the possessory conservator of his daughter; yet, it denied the
imprisoned father access to or visitation with his child.
Eventually, AM served his sentence, resulting in his exit from prison. Though
freed, there remain conditions to his continued release that last until 2029. One such
condition dictates that he “shall have no unsupervised contact with persons under the age
of 18,” which age period includes AGDM.
Through his first effort to change the terms of custody and visitation since his
release, AM petitioned the court to modify its existing orders and grant him “possession
of the child pursuant to the provisions of a Standard Possession Order as that term is
defined by the Texas Family Code.” In response, SJ petitioned for an increase in child
support. An evidentiary hearing ensued. Thereafter, the trial court denied the requests
of both AM and SJ, though both remained AGDM’s possessory and managing
conservators, respectively.
Issue Two
AM proffered two issues for review.1 The first concerned the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying several findings of fact entered by the trial court. The second
1 Appellant’s brief contains multiple inaccuracies that proofreading should have discovered. Many
related to wrong citations to the reporter’s record. 2 encompassed the denial of AM’s petition and request therein; according to appellant, the
decision constituted an instanced of abused discretion. We note that the former argument
is actually subsumed within the latter via the applicable standard of review. So, we
address issue two now and overrule it.
Our analysis begins with a description of the standard of review. It is one of abused
discretion. In re D.N.W., No. 05-23-01104-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 9124, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Discretion is abused when the trial
court’s decision is arbitrary and unreasonable or lacks reference to guiding principles. In
re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196–97 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Under that
standard, allegations attacking the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence underlying
the decision are not independent grounds for reversal but, rather, factors in determining
the presence of abused discretion. See In re Marriage of Tuttle, 602 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2020, no pet.). Moreover, the standard obligates us to affirm the decision
if meritorious on any ground, even one unmentioned by the trial court or litigants. See
Falcon v. State, Nos. 07-22-00301-CR, 07-23-00019-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9442, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 19, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); Payton v. Ashton, 29 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
As previously mentioned, AM petitioned the court for implementation of a standard
possession order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.312(a) (specifying the standard
possession order when parents reside within 100 miles of each other). Such an order
generally affords a possessory conservator the authority to possess the child for extended
periods. See, e.g., § 153.312(b)(2)(A) (allowing the possessory conservator to have the
child for up to thirty days during the summer). Yet, again, one of the conditions of
3 supervised release from prison barred AM from being in the unsupervised presence of
people under eighteen years old. That the provision necessarily encompassed AGDM
given her age was not disputed. So, to award AM access to and custody of his daughter
per a standard possession order would be to invite violation of a condition of supervised
release imposed by the federal government. He could not be in the child’s unsupervised
presence for any period of time, much less the extended periods contemplated by a
standard possession order. Given those circumstances, we cannot say that the trial
court’s decision denying AM standard possession of AGDM per § 153.312 of the Family
Code was unreasonable, arbitrary, or without evidentiary support.
And, contrary to AM’s suggestion otherwise, the trial court did not order that he
have “no contact” with or otherwise be totally denied access to AGDM. No such provision
appears in the trial court’s order. Admittedly, within the findings of fact issued by the trial
court one finds the statement: “[i]t is in the best interest of the child for Petitioner to have
no contact with the child.” (Emphasis added). Yet, findings of fact and conclusions of
law explain the reasons for an order or judgment; they do not change the order or
judgment. In re Gillespie, 124 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
orig. proceeding) (en banc); Pursley v. Ussery, 982 S.W.2d 596, 599 n.2 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). No doubt, an edict barring AM from all contact with
AGDM is much more severe than merely denying AM standard possession of the child.
The former would effectively alter the order which simply denied what AM requested via
his petition to modify. And, the rule uttered in Gillespie and Pursley prevents that from
occurring. So, in short, AM was not ordered to forgo all contact with his daughter. We
4 construe the order under appeal as merely denying him possession and access to AGDM
per the terms of a standard possession order discussed in § 153.312.
It is not lost on us that the relationship between AM and SJ is rather acrimonious.
Indeed, the trial court faulted both of them for the impediment to a better relationship
between AM and AGDM. Evidence does indicate that the child’s mother has actively
thwarted that relationship. Yet, we cannot agree with AM’s suggestion that the order
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