In the Interest of A.E., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 8, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00473-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00473-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.E., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325-691939-20

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this ultra-accelerated appeal,1 Appellant A.K. (Mother) appeals the trial

court’s order terminating her parent–child relationship with her daughter A.E.

(Daughter).2 The trial court found that the Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) had proved three conduct-based grounds for termination

and that termination was in Daughter’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2). The trial court awarded permanent managing

conservatorship of Daughter to the Department. Mother timely appealed.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Mother’s

appeal is “without merit and frivolous.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45,

87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief

1 See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate courts to dispose of appeals from judgments terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal is filed). 2 Daughter’s parent–child relationship with her father was also terminated, but no appeal was filed on the father’s behalf. The father did not appear at the termination trial.

2 meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.

We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record

and to file a pro se response, but she has not done so.3 The Department has declined

to file a responsive brief.

III. DISCUSSION

When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also

3 Mother’s appointed appellate counsel sent Mother a letter informing her of the Anders brief and of her right to review the appellate record and file a response. We too sent Mother a letter notifying her of her right to file a pro se response. Those letters were sent to the address listed for Mother in the trial court’s termination order. Our letter was returned to us with the notation “return to sender attempted – not known unable to forward.” We then found another address listed for Mother in the appellate record, and we directed Mother’s appointed appellate counsel to re-send his letter to Mother at that address. Counsel complied. We also re-sent our letter notifying Mother of her right to file a pro se response to the other address listed in the record. Our second letter was also returned to us with the notation “return to sender attempted – not known unable to forward.” Despite our attempts to contact Mother, we have not received any response from her. See In re C.C., No. 02-23-00062- CV, 2023 WL 4781201, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing court’s attempts to notify mother of her right to file a response to an Anders brief and affirming termination of her rights despite court’s letters to her being returned); In re E.L., No. 02-17-00247-CV, 2017 WL 6047671, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (similar); see also In re B.D., No. 02-21-00194-CV, 2021 WL 5028439, at *2 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 28, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Mother . . . bore the responsibility to notify her counsel . . . or . . . this court . . . of changes to her contact information.”).

3 consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-

18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief and the appellate record.

Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without

merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D.,

279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the

trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship between Mother and

Daughter.

Mother’s counsel did not file a motion to withdraw, and the record does not

show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the

appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J.,

501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly,

Mother’s counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the Texas Supreme

Court unless otherwise relieved. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28; see also Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).

4 IV. CONCLUSION

We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the

trial court’s termination order.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Delivered: April 8, 2025