In the Interest of A.D.M. Jr., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 04-25-00043-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00043-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.D.M. JR., a Child

From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023PA01182 Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 18, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellant R.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights

to her child, A.D.M. Jr. (born 2023). 1 In four issues, Mother argues the evidence is legally and 0F

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under Texas Family Code

section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and the trial court’s finding that termination was in

A.D.M.’s best interest. We affirm the termination order.

1 To protect the privacy of the minor child, we use initials or pseudonyms to refer to the child, his biological parents, and his current caregiver. TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 04-25-00043-CV

BACKGROUND

On the day of A.D.M.’s birth in July of 2023, the Texas Department of Family and

Protective Services (the “Department”) received a report of “mom and dad being incarcerated, and

mom being positive for illegal substances with a newborn.” At that time, both Mother and

A.D.M.’s father, A.D.M. Sr. (“Father”), had been charged but not yet tried in connection with an

April 2023 incident that resulted in the death of A.D.M.’s older sibling, R.M. The Department

removed A.D.M., obtained temporary managing conservatorship over him, placed him with his

paternal grandmother, C.T. (“Grandmother”), and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights. The Department also created a family service plan requiring Mother to,

inter alia, maintain and provide proof of “a safe and stable home”; complete a Department-

approved domestic violence course and “demonstrate an understanding of the newly acquired

skills in her current relationship and/or future romantic relationships”; comply with random drug

testing; and complete a substance abuse assessment “and follow any recommendations by the

service provider.” The Department ultimately pursued termination of Mother’s parental rights. 2 1F

Seventeen months after removal, the trial court held a one-day bench trial at which Mother

appeared. The trial court heard substantive testimony from eleven witnesses: (1) Jessica Barrera,

the Department investigator who removed A.D.M.; (2) Anita Seamans, a Department special

investigator who interviewed Mother and Father after the April 2023 incident; (3) Tracy Vigil, the

Department caseworker assigned to this case; (4) Wendy Legler, a mental health counselor with

Crosspoint, the facility Mother moved into after her release from jail; (5) Frederick Washington,

Mother’s former substance abuse counselor at Crosspoint; (6) David Rodriguez, a Bexar County

pretrial services employee; (7) Britney Durham, Mother’s defense attorney in the criminal case

2 The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to a voluntary affidavit of relinquishment. Father is not a party to this appeal.

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arising from the April 2023 incident; (8) Marisol Morales, a social worker with the Bexar County

Public Defender’s Office who was providing counseling to Mother at the time of trial; (9) Mother;

(10) a CASA volunteer; and (11) Grandmother. 3 After hearing the evidence, the trial court signed 2F

an order terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and entered a finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights

was in the best interest of A.D.M. Mother appealed.

ANALYSIS

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The involuntary termination of a natural parent’s rights implicates fundamental

constitutional rights and “divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and

powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent.” In

re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “As a result, appellate courts must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination

proceedings in favor of the parent.” Id. The Department had the burden to prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, both that a statutory ground existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights and

that termination was in A.D.M.’s best interest. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206. “‘Clear and

convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”

TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s order of

termination, we apply well-established standards of review. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263–

64 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

3 The Department also called a twelfth witness, a San Antonio police officer who testified that he did not remember responding to any incidents involving Mother or Father. The officer did not offer any substantive testimony.

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findings, we look “at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine

whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was

true.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) (citation omitted). In reviewing the factual

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider disputed or conflicting evidence. Id. at 345. A factual

sufficiency review requires us to consider the entire record to determine whether the evidence that

is contrary to a finding would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or

conviction that the finding is true. See id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the weight and

credibility of the evidence. Id. at 346.

Statutory Termination Grounds

Applicable Law

In her first three arguments on appeal, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency

of the evidence to support the trial court’s predicate findings under subsections (D), (E), and (O).

In general, assuming a best interest finding, only one predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1)

is necessary to support a judgment of termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).

However, because termination under subsections (D) or (E) may have implications for a parent’s

parental rights to other children, appellate courts must address a parent’s challenges to a trial

court’s findings under those subsections. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 236–37 (Tex. 2019) (per

curiam).

“Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.” In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d

117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Subsection (D) allows a trial court to terminate

parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed

or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Under

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subsection (D), the trial court examines “evidence related to the environment of the children to

determine if the environment was the source of endangerment to the children’s physical or

emotional well-being.” In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. “‘Environment’ refers to the acceptability

of living conditions and a parent’s conduct in the home.” In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). “A child is endangered when the environment

creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but consciously disregards.” Id. A parent

does not need to know for certain that the child is in an endangering environment. In re R.S.-T.,

522 S.W.3d 92, 109 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). Awareness of a potential for danger

is sufficient. Id. In a subsection (D) analysis, the relevant period for review is before the

Department removes the child. In re J.R., 171 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2005, no pet.).

Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with

persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the trial court determines

whether there is evidence that a parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act endangered the child’s

physical or emotional well-being. See In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. “It is not necessary that the

parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is

endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential for danger

which the parent is aware of but disregards.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 110 (internal quotation

marks omitted). In a subsection (E) analysis, the relevant period for review is wider than that

involved in subsection (D) and can encompass parental conduct that did not occur in the child’s

presence, including conduct before the child’s birth or after the child was removed from a parent’s

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care. In re K.J.G., No. 04-19-00102-CV, 2019 WL 3937278, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life

of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re

R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

Application

Mother argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under

subsections (D) and (E) because A.D.M. was removed shortly after his birth and Mother therefore

“never had an opportunity to parent the child after his birth and the child was never in any danger.”

The Texas Supreme Court has held, however, “that endangering conduct is not limited to actions

directed towards the child” and “may include the parent’s actions before the child’s birth, while

the parent had custody of older children[.]” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. We therefore decline

to reverse the subsection (D) and (E) findings on this basis.

Under subsection (D), “a single pre-removal act, omission, or incident can support

termination.” In re A.O., No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL 1257384, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, the evidence showed that on April 12, 2023, three

months before Mother gave birth to A.D.M., she engaged in an altercation with Father that resulted

in the shooting and eventual death of A.D.M.’s older sibling, R.M. The Department’s special

investigator, Seamans, interviewed Mother on the day of the shooting and testified in this trial as

follows:

[Mother] told me that she had been arguing with [Father] and that the argument had started upstairs in the apartment of her sister and that it continued downstairs where [Father] was trying to leave.

And he had gotten into his car, and [Mother] placed herself in the open V of the doorway to prohibit [Father] from being able to leave the location.

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While standing there continuing the argument, [Mother’s] sister came downstairs holding the baby, [R.M.]; and that while standing and arguing, [Mother] took the baby and put it on her right hip.

So she was holding the child on her right hip standing in the open doorway of the vehicle leaning into the driver’s compartment arguing with [Father].

The story diversed [sic] a little bit there. [Father] told me that [Mother] brought the gun, and [Mother] said that [Father] brought the gun, but a gun was produced.

And [Father] was seated in the vehicle; [Mother] was bent over into the compartment with the child on her right hip, and a struggle over the weapon ensued.

And during the struggle over control of the weapon, the weapon discharged.

[The bullet] traveled in a vertical line across the abdominal area of [Mother], and then entered the baby [R.M.] and traveled up into the baby’s abdominal area and a little higher up into the chest cavity.

The baby was operated on and died on the operating table at about 10:20 that evening.

Seamans further testified that she later interviewed Mother a second time, and Mother “told [her]

the same story, and she didn’t divert from that.” Mother did not cross-examine Seamans or

otherwise dispute her testimony on this issue.

There is no evidence that A.D.M. was injured in this incident. However, parental conduct

during pregnancy can constitute endangerment of the fetus. See, e.g., In re M.K.V., 648 S.W.3d

478, 486 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.); In re K.L.B., No. 14-09-00061-CV, 2009 WL

3444833, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). Additionally,

“when parents injure or harm one of their children, a factfinder may infer that the parents have

endangered their other children.” J.B.M.H. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-

00661-CV, 2023 WL 2920315, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 13, 2023, pet. denied). Even if we

assume the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mother herself introduced the gun into the

confrontation, Seamans’s testimony showed that Mother engaged in a physical struggle with

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Father over a gun while she was: (1) holding R.M.; and (2) pregnant with A.D.M. Seamans’s

testimony also tended to show that Mother could have avoided the altercation if she had not tried

to prevent Father from leaving. Based on that evidence, the trial court could have reasonably found

that Mother knowingly placed both children in conditions or surroundings that endangered their

physical well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D).

Unlike subsection (D), subsection (E) requires evidence of a voluntary and deliberate

endangering course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. See, e.g., In re F.S.F., No. 04-

24-00125-CV, 2024 WL 3800662, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem.

op.). “Subsection (E) is not limited to actions directed towards the child . . . nor is it limited to the

parent’s pre-removal actions.” In re A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *9 (internal quotation marks

omitted). A trial court conducting a subsection (E) analysis may consider actions that occurred

before the child’s birth, while the child was not in the parent’s presence, and while the child was

in the Department’s custody. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. “The specific danger to the

child’s well-being need not be established as an independent proposition, but may be inferred from

parental misconduct.” In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 331 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.)

(op. on reh’g) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mother was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in connection with

R.M.’s death. She was jailed on that charge at the time of A.D.M.’s removal, but she was released

from jail approximately five months before the trial in this case and presented uncontroverted

evidence that the State had agreed to dismiss the charge against her in exchange for her testimony

against Father. Accordingly, there was no evidence that Mother faced any threat of incarceration

that might be relevant to a subsection (E) analysis. Cf. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 314 (Tex.

2021). Furthermore, because the event that led to R.M.’s death was a single incident, it was not

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independently sufficient to support a subsection (E) finding. See, e.g., In re J.C.P.L., No. 01-24-

00723-CV, 2025 WL 757159, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 11, 2025, pet. denied)

(mem. op.).

Nevertheless, the trial court could consider that event in conjunction with other acts or

omissions to determine whether Mother engaged in an endangering course of conduct. See In re

R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 743. For example, we have previously recognized that a parent’s failure to

complete domestic violence classes is evidence of endangerment. In re M.K.V., 648 S.W.3d at 487.

Here, it was undisputed that Mother did not complete a battering intervention course required by

her service plan. Mother testified that she only needed to complete one more session to finish the

course, but other witnesses testified that she completed 10 hours of a course that usually lasts

between 26 and 52 weeks.

The Department did not present any evidence that Mother remained in a relationship with

Father. However, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that her failure to complete the

battering intervention course was relevant to a subsection (E) analysis for at least two reasons.

First, as noted above, Seamans’s testimony about the incident that resulted in R.M.’s death tended

to show that Mother voluntarily placed both herself and R.M. in danger by refusing to allow Father

to leave. Cf. A.M. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00240-CV, 2022 WL

11399256, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s failure to remove

children from instances of domestic violence supported subsection (E) finding). Second, the

evidence showed that at the time of trial, Mother was living with a new paramour, Ariana, who

had been arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was “currently out on bond[.]”

Mother testified that she had known Ariana “for a couple of years,” had never seen her lose her

temper, and had never had to use the skills she learned in her domestic violence classes with

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Ariana. Similarly, Mother’s counselor, Morales, testified that she was not concerned about

Mother’s or A.D.M.’s safety with Ariana. Morales conceded, however, that she had never met

Ariana and did not know anything specific about the assault charge pending against her. In contrast

to Mother’s and Morales’s testimony, caseworker Vigil testified that Mother’s relationship with

Ariana was concerning because she believed it showed Mother’s “decision making is not in the

best interest of [A.D.M.]. The individual that she is in a relationship with is—based on the

charges—a violent person, and that’s not appropriate for [A.D.M.] to be around. And it seems that

the history is continuing.” Cf. In re M.R.D., No. 04-19-00524-CV, 2020 WL 806656, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Feb. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidence showing parent’s “pattern of engaging in

domestic violence relationships” was sufficient to support subsection (E) finding). When asked if

Mother acknowledged Ariana’s criminal charges as a concern, Vigil responded, “She

acknowledges that I told her it’s a concern, yes.” Vigil also testified that Mother understood that

continuing the relationship could affect this termination proceeding and that she was nevertheless

still involved in the relationship at the time of trial. Based on this testimony, the trial court could

have concluded Mother’s failure to complete the battering intervention program showed a failure

to address her history of domestic violence and thus tended to establish an endangering course of

conduct. See In re M.K.V., 648 S.W.3d at 487; In re N.M.A., No. 04-21-00256-CV, 2021 WL

5812291, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 8, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The Department also presented evidence that Mother had a history of drug use. See, e.g.,

In re J.C.P.L., 2025 WL 757159, at *5 (“Evidence of a parent’s illegal drug use may support

termination under Subsection (E).”). Mother, who was 22 at the time of trial, testified that she last

used methamphetamines “when [she] was about 17 or 18” and last used marijuana “[w]hen [she]

was 21. . . . [b]efore the incident” that resulted in R.M.’s death. Barrera, on the other hand, testified

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that when she interviewed Mother at the hospital after A.D.M.’s birth, Mother “denied knowing

about use of ice [methamphetamines], but admitted to marijuana use.” Washington, Mother’s

substance abuse counselor at Crosspoint, testified that he recalled “there was some use of

methamphetamines.” Morales similarly testified that her treatment of Mother addressed

“[p]revious stimulant use.”

Barrera testified that Mother was “positive for illegal substances with a newborn” at the

outset of this case. Although Barrera testified that A.D.M. tested negative for drugs at birth, she

also testified that the Department received the report of Mother’s positive drug test on the day

A.D.M. was born. Based on that testimony, the trial court could have inferred that Mother used

illegal substances while she was pregnant with A.D.M. See, e.g., In re A.B.R., No. 04-19-00631-

CV, 2020 WL 1159043, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(mother’s illegal drug use during pregnancy is endangering conduct).

The Department did not present any evidence that Mother tested positive for illegal

substances after A.D.M.’s removal. Vigil testified that Mother appeared for her drug tests as

ordered during this case, 4 and Morales testified that Mother’s substance abuse was “in remission 3F

at this time.” However, Vigil testified that she “had concerns with [Mother’s] drug testing” because

Mother submitted diluted urinalysis samples in both October and December of 2024. The

December diluted sample occurred approximately two weeks before trial. Washington testified, “I

think for anyone that’s submitting diluted UAs who was in the process of trying to get help, I don’t

think that would be something that would support or help them in that process of getting—you

know, getting to a point where they can do without that drug or substance.”

4 Mother tested positive for alcohol twice during this case. She testified, however, that the Department had not ordered her to refrain from consuming alcohol.

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Morales testified that she “would have liked to have known” about the diluted samples,

that Mother had not shared that information with her, and that she would be surprised to hear

Mother had submitted diluted samples. She also testified, however, that she would not consider

the diluted test a setback in Mother’s recovery and that “when someone has a diluted you have to

retest” to discover whether the result “was a true positive or a true negative.” Mother testified that

she retested and received a true negative result after one diluted sample, but she denied having

submitted a second diluted sample. The trial court was not required to credit Mother’s testimony

over Vigil’s on this point. See, e.g., In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 365.

Evidence of a parent’s “want of self control[] and propensity for violence” is also relevant

to a subsection (E) inquiry. See, e.g., In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Both Vigil and Mother testified that while Mother was in jail, she

missed two visits with A.D.M. because she was on restriction for fighting with another inmate.

Mother testified the altercation occurred when “a pregnant girl tried to fight me while I was using

the bathroom. And I didn’t fight her. They, I guess, accused me when it was somebody else that

actually jumped in. So they put me on restriction for that.” Mother testified that she believed she

was put on restriction “[b]ecause [she] was arguing in the unit.” Again, the trial court was not

required to credit Mother’s explanation. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 365.

Any portion of the evidence described above may not be sufficient to support a subsection

(E) finding if considered in isolation. However, when viewed as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the judgment, the evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to form a firm belief

or conviction that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that created a potential for danger which

she was aware of but disregarded. See In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 110; TEX. FAM. CODE §

161.001(b)(1)(E). Furthermore, the evidence contrary to the trial court’s finding is not so

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overwhelming that it would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or

conviction that the finding is true. The evidence is therefore both legally and factually sufficient

to support the trial court’s predicate finding under subsection (E). See In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at

110.

We overrule Mother’s first and second issues. Because we have concluded the evidence is

sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E), we need not address

Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s finding under subsection (O). TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Best Interest

Mother also challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s finding that

termination of her parental rights was in A.D.M.’s best interest. There is a strong presumption that

a child’s best interest is served by maintaining the relationship between a child and the natural

parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the Department satisfied

this burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several factors 5 for courts to consider regarding a 4F

parent’s willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme

5 These factors include, inter alia: “(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b).

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Court has used a similar list of factors 6 to determine a child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 5F

263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

A best interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re

G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015,

no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and

“[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or

conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest[.]” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV,

2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Additionally, evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination is probative on the issue of

best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). Furthermore, in determining whether

termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of a child, a factfinder may judge

a parent’s future conduct by her past conduct. In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Finally, we presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child

in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a).

Much of the evidence detailed above in our discussion of subsections (D) and (E) is also

relevant to the trial court’s best interest finding. Specifically, Mother’s history of drug use, the

circumstances surrounding R.M.’s death, the pending charges against Mother’s live-in paramour,

and Mother’s failure to complete the battering intervention course all went directly to both

statutory and Holley best-interest factors. See id. § 263.307(b)(7), (8), (10); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at

371–72.

6 Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371– 72 (Tex. 1976).

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The evidence also showed that during the seventeen months this case was pending, Mother

moved from jail, to Crosspoint, to a residence with Ariana and Ariana’s aunt and cousin, and,

approximately two weeks before trial, to a new residence with Ariana and a roommate Mother

identified as a “family friend.” While Mother gave Vigil the necessary information to conduct a

background check on Ariana, she refused to provide information required to conduct background

checks on Ariana’s aunt and cousin. Mother testified she did not supply that information to the

Department because those individuals “don’t deal with [the Department] and they didn’t want to.”

Mother also testified that she did not tell Vigil that she had moved to the most recent residence.

Based on that testimony, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Mother did not supply

the information necessary to perform a background check on the family friend with whom she

lived at the time of trial. The trial court could have concluded that this evidence was relevant to

the stability of Mother’s home, her willingness to cooperate with the Department, and her parental

abilities, including her ability to provide A.D.M. with a safe home environment. See Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 371–72; TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10), (12)(D).

Grandmother testified that she had had custody of A.D.M. since he was three days old and

that he was “thriving.” She told the trial court that A.D.M. sees specialists for occupational skills,

life skills development, and speech therapy and that he was attending a “really good day care that

really focuses on meeting his developmental needs, allowing the specialists to come in and assist

with his various therapies. . . . [T]hey’re working with him and his food and his language, his

social skills with the other peers.” Grandmother testified that A.D.M. could “absolutely” stay with

her forever if the trial court determined that was in his best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE §

263.307(a). When asked if she believed A.D.M. could be safely returned to Mother, Grandmother

testified, “[M]y main concern with his safety has to do with, you know, mom demonstrating—she

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hasn’t applied what she’s been taught.” She believed it was in A.D.M.’s best interest for Mother’s

parental rights to be terminated, concluding: “I think it’s important that [A.D.M.] has stability,

which I’ve maintained. I think it’s important that he has safety, which I’ve maintained.” The CASA

volunteer testified that she visited A.D.M. at least once a month and believed he should remain

with Grandmother.

Mother testified that her visits with A.D.M. went well and that the child called her

“momma” and liked to hold her hand while they read together. Morales, who had been counseling

Mother for approximately a year at the time of trial, testified that she believed Mother could be

appropriately protective of A.D.M. and that she would choose him over anyone else in her life.

She also testified that she had no concerns about Mother’s safety with Ariana and that Mother and

Ariana lived in a “very nice, well-maintained home” in a “[v]ery good neighborhood.” 7 But 6F

Morales also testified that she had never met Ariana or anyone else living in the home and that she

had never seen Mother interact with A.D.M. And, as noted above, the trial court heard evidence

that tended to show Mother chose her roommates’ desire to avoid interacting with the Department

over complying with the Department’s request to perform background checks on those roommates.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence presented below

was sufficient to allow the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that termination of

Mother’s parental rights was in A.D.M.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307; Holley,

544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Furthermore, the evidence contrary to the trial court’s finding was not so

overwhelming as to prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that

the finding is true. The evidence is therefore legally and factually sufficient to support the trial

court’s best-interest finding.

7 The record does not clearly indicate whether Morales’s testimony on this point referred to Mother’s previous home or the one she moved into shortly before trial.

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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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