Opinion issued December 20, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-16-00550-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF A.D.M. AND D.D.M., JR., Children
On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2015-03517J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of a father and
a mother with respect to their two biological children. The court appointed the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services as sole managing conservator of the
children. The father and mother each separately appealed the termination decree.
Both parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination. In particular, the father challenges the trial court’s findings
of endangerment and failure to comply with a court order, see TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and the mother challenges the trial court’s finding of
endangerment, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Both parents challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best
interest of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
Because we find the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the
termination decree, we affirm.
Background
This appeal is brought by D.D.M., the biological father, and C.V.M., the
biological mother, of two children. The appellants had a daughter, A.D.M., and a
younger son, D.D.M., Jr. Five months after the boy’s birth, the mother, then 26 years
old, was voluntarily admitted to West Oaks Hospital for postpartum depression. She
was upset because she had been having thoughts of harming her two-year-old
daughter, A.D.M., and then killing herself. Two days later, on May 8, 2015, a referral
for neglectful supervision was made to Child Protective Services. It indicated that
due to mental-health issues, the mother could not provide adequate supervision to
her two children. The referral indicated that the father worked most of the time,
leaving the mother home alone with the children. It also indicated that the mother
had another older child who previously had been removed from her custody.
2 While the mother was in the hospital, the Department prepared a safety plan
which required the father to submit to drug and psychological tests and required the
mother only to have supervised contact with the children upon her release on May
14, 2015. Although both parents signed the safety plan, they did not abide by its
conditions. The father did not submit to testing, and the Department received
information that the mother had been left alone with the children. On June 3, 2015,
the Department removed the children, alleging that the father allowed them
unsupervised contact with the mother. When the children entered custody, the
daughter had a black eye, but otherwise neither child had any special needs. They
were placed in foster care and eventually moved to a foster home with their older
sister, E.F.
The court entered orders establishing the actions necessary for the parents to
obtain the return of their children. In June 2015, the court ordered the parents “to
comply with each requirement set out in the Department’s original, or any amended,
service plan,” and it indicated that failure to do so could “result in the restriction or
termination of parental rights.” On August 13, 2015, the court entered additional
temporary orders, which required each parent to do the following: (1) complete a
substance abuse treatment program if recommended; (2) complete a psychological
examination and follow all recommendations; (3) participate in counseling which
may include individual, group, or family therapy sessions; (4) complete parenting
3 classes; (5) complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations
of the drug and alcohol assessment if recommended; (6) complete random drug tests,
which may include a hair follicle test; (7) remain drug free; (8) refrain from engaging
in criminal activity; (9) maintain stable housing; (10) maintain stable employment;
and (11) complete all services outlined in the family plan of service.
The Department later sought termination of both parents’ parental rights on
the grounds that the father failed to comply with a court order and endangered the
children, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and that the mother
endangered the children as well. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
At trial, the father denied allowing the mother unsupervised access to the
children upon her release from West Oaks Hospital. He acknowledged, however,
that when the children were removed, the electricity in his apartment had been
terminated, the eviction process had begun, and there was a roach infestation. He
also acknowledged his prior criminal history, which included burglary, and his
continuing history of drug use. The father admitted using synthetic marijuana prior
to the Department’s involvement in this case. Test results admitted at trial were
positive for cocaine and marijuana in June and August 2015, and for synthetic
marijuana use in June, August, and November 2015.
The father did not complete all of the services required by the family plan of
service. He did not complete parenting classes or attend all scheduled visits with his
4 children. There was conflicting evidence about whether he completed a
psychological assessment and a psychosocial-and-drug assessment. The father did
not provide the Department with proof of income or a lease, although he testified
that he had a job and was living in a hotel. He testified that he was working for
“Michael International,” but later he testified that this was not true, and he said he
was actually self-employed, earning $800–$900 per week shining shoes. He testified
that he brought books and toys to his children at visits but that he never brought
formula or diapers, nor did he pay child support, because he was not required to do
so.
Before the Department became involved with the children, the father was
aware that the mother was abusive toward their daughter because he had seen bruises
and injuries on her. For example, the father testified that the mother had held the girl
“in a choke hold up against the wall,” and she had thrown and hit her several times,
including hitting the child’s face. But the father never saw evidence that their infant
son was abused, and he continued to leave the mother alone with the children.
The mother testified at trial. She admitted that she used synthetic marijuana
prior to the Department’s involvement in this case. She also admitted that she had
relinquished custody of an older daughter after having been charged with
abandonment or endangerment of a child. In that case, she had left her first child,
E.F., who then was one year old, alone in her crib for several hours while she went
5 to work. She received deferred adjudication for this offense, which she successfully
completed. She admitted smoking synthetic marijuana in violation of her probation,
although she did not get caught.
The mother completed all of the services on the family plan of service, and
she remained drug-free during the pendency of the case, but the Department
remained concerned about her failure to address her mental-health problems. She
had been diagnosed with postpartum depression, borderline personality disorder, and
bipolar disorder. The mother also had suicidal thoughts before and after the children
were removed by the Department. She had thoughts of physically harming her
daughter as well as her husband, whom she believed to be having an affair with a
neighbor. Although the mother was under a psychiatrist’s care throughout the
pendency of the case, she did not take her prescribed medication consistently. For at
least seven months, the mother was not medicated, and she continually denied
needing medication. The Department’s caseworker was concerned that the mother
could stop taking her medication in the future, endangering the physical well-being
of the children if they were returned to her. Yet the mother testified that she “would
be fine” “even without the medication” because she was divorcing the father.
At trial, the mother admitted hitting her daughter A.D.M. only one time, and
she denied having put her in a chokehold, saying it was only a dream. Notes in the
psychosocial report indicate that the mother admitted such abuse to the psychologist.
6 The report quoted the mother as saying that she was “having suicidal and homicidal
thoughts about her daughter,” “having blackouts” and waking up to find her daughter
“had bruises all over her body.” The mother reported that she would “snap back from
the blackouts and attempt to doctor her up.” She also recalled once “slamming” her
daughter’s face on the ground. In addition, the caseworker described one supervised
visit when the mother dealt roughly with her daughter after the child had thrown a
toy and cried, putting her in “time out” and pushing her against a wall.
The trial court granted the Department’s petition to terminate the parents’
rights, and both parents appealed.
Analysis
The parents challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s findings of predicate acts in support of termination and that
termination was in the best interest of their children.
Protection of the best interests of the child is the primary focus of the
termination proceeding in the trial court and our appellate review. See In re A.V.,
113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003). A parent’s right to the care, custody, and control
of his children is a precious liberty interest protected by the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982). Accordingly,
termination proceedings are strictly scrutinized on appeal. See Holick v. Smith, 685
7 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Clear and convincing evidence must support the decision
to terminate parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263–64 (Tex. 2002); see
also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48, 102 S. Ct. at 1391–92. Evidence is legally
sufficient if it is “such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the matter on which the State bears the burden of
proof.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; see TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. We review “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,” meaning that we “must
assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a
reasonable factfinder could do so.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “If, after conducting
its legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, a court determines that no
reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must
be proven is true, then that court must conclude that the evidence is legally
insufficient.” Id.
In a factual sufficiency review, we consider the entire record, including
evidence both supporting and contradicting the finding. See id.; In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
8 In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship, the Department must
establish by clear-and-convincing evidence that one or more of the acts or omissions
listed in Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) occurred and that termination is in the
best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Both elements must be
established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child
as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d
531, 533 (Tex. 1987).
I. The father’s appeal
The father raises four sufficiency issues in his appeal. He contends that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that
he committed the predicate acts of endangerment and failing to comply with a court
order and that termination of his parental rights was in his children’s best interest.
A. Predicate finding
The Department sought termination of the father’s parental rights on grounds
of endangerment, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and failure to
comply with a court order, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). “Only one predicate finding”
under section 161.001(b)(1) “is necessary to support a judgment of termination when
there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” A.V., 113
S.W.3d at 362.
9 The father argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
support termination for failure to comply with a court order because he substantially
complied with the family plan of service. Subsection O requires clear-and-
convincing evidence that the parent:
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O); see In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex.
2014).
On appeal, the father does not dispute that: (1) the family plan of service was
a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain
return of his children; (2) the children had been in the Department’s conservatorship
for at least nine months; and (3) they were removed due to abuse or neglect. The
final decree of termination includes these unchallenged fact findings, and we “defer
to unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by some evidence.” Tenaska
Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014); see
McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986).
The unchallenged findings of fact are supported by some evidence. The trial
court approved and incorporated the requirements of the family service plan as a
court order, and it was admitted as an exhibit at trial. Trial was held more than twelve
10 months after the Department first assumed managing conservatorship of the
children. In its “Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency and Notice of
Hearing,” the trial court found that the children had been removed pursuant to
section 262.104 of the Family Code and that there was “a continuing danger to the
physical health or safety of the children if returned to the parent.”
The father acknowledges that he did not complete all of the requirements of
the family plan of service, however, he argues that he substantially complied with
the plan by working “very hard to stabilize a job and housing.” He argues that the
Department’s evidence was insufficient to support termination on this predicate
ground in light of his substantial compliance. The evidence before the trial court was
conflicting in that regard, and substantial compliance with a court-ordered family
service plan may be insufficient to avoid termination. See, e.g., In re A.W., No. 01-
15-01030-CV, 2016 WL 3022824, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 26,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re T.T., 228 S.W.3d 312, 319–20 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)).
The father admitted his failure to complete the required actions on the family
plan of service, and the evidence supported conclusions that he failed to: complete
parenting classes, a psychological assessment, and a psychosocial-and-drug
assessment; attend all scheduled visits with his children; and provide the Department
with proof of income or a lease. We accordingly find the evidence legally and
11 factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the father failed to comply
with a court order that established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return
of his children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
B. Best interest of the children
A strong presumption exists that a child’s best interests are served by
maintaining the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846,
846–47 (Tex. 1980); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In determining whether termination of a father’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interest, we consider several nonexclusive factors,
including (1) the children’s desires, (2) the current and future physical and emotional
needs of the children, (3) the current and future physical danger to the children,
(4) the parental abilities of the person seeking custody, (5) whether programs are
available to assist the person seeking custody in promoting the best interests of the
children, (6) plans for the children by the person seeking custody, (7) stability of the
home, (8) acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the parent-child
relationship is improper, and (9) any excuse for acts or omissions of the parent.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Department is not
required to prove all of these factors, and the absence of evidence about some factors
does not preclude the factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction that
termination is in the children’s best interest. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Evidence
12 establishing one of the predicate acts under section 161.001(b)(1) also may be
relevant to determining the best interests of the children. See id. at 27–28.
Several of the Holley factors are neutral in our analysis of this appeal. Neither
of the children testified, and they are both too young to express their desired
outcome. The evidence showed that they are placed in a foster home with their
biological sister, E.F., and they are well-bonded to their foster parents, who wish to
adopt them. The record is silent as to availability of programs to assist the father in
promoting the best interests of the children or any excuse for his acts or omissions.
The father’s plan for the children was for them to live with him in a hotel room
until he was able to secure more stable housing. Stability of the home has been found
“to be of paramount importance in a child’s emotional and physical well-being.”
Quiroz v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-08-00548-CV, 2009 WL
961935, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
“Without stability,” a parent cannot “provide for the child’s emotional and physical
needs.” In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
The father did not provide the Department with a copy of a lease or evidence of
regular income. Thus, the evidence relating to plans for the children and stability of
the home supports the court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interest.
13 A parent’s drug use also may indicate instability in the home because it
exposes the children to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned.
See In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.
denied); P.W. v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 403 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). The father used synthetic
marijuana prior to Department’s involvement in this case. According to testimony
and test results admitted at trial, he continued to use illegal drugs while this case was
pending. He tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic marijuana. The
father’s continued use of illegal drugs not only exposed him to the possibility of
imprisonment but also jeopardized his continued relationship with his two young
children.
In this case, the children were young, having been removed from their parents
at the approximate ages of two years and six months. Although the children had no
known special needs by the time of trial, their young age made them vulnerable.
There was a history of the father failing to protect the daughter from the abusive
conduct by the mother, even when he was aware that the mother was not able to care
for the children safely. The father demonstrated an unwillingness to effect positive
changes within a reasonable period of time by failing to follow through on his family
plan of service, although he testified that he failed to complete these tasks because
he was working “very hard to stabilize a job and housing.” Finally, there was no
14 evidence that the father demonstrated adequate parenting skills, and some evidence,
primarily testimony from the mother, that he did not know how to take care of the
We conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was
in the best interest of the children. We overrule the father’s third and fourth issues.
Having found legally and factually sufficient evidence to support one predicate act
and a finding that termination was in the best interest of the children, we need not
consider the father’s issues that pertain to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the other predicate acts found by the trial court. See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362; see
also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
II. The mother’s appeal
The mother raises two issues on appeal. She contends that the evidence is
legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that she
committed the predicate act of endangerment and that termination of her parental
rights was in her children’s best interests.
The Department sought termination of the mother’s parental rights on grounds
of endangerment. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The predicate act of
endangerment as alleged in this case is satisfied if the parent has “engaged in conduct
15 or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. In this context,
“endanger” means to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at
533. The term means “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill
effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” Id. The parent’s conduct need not
occur in the child’s presence, and it may occur “both before and after the child has
been removed by the Department.” Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
Termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act
or omission: a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent
is required. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet.
denied). The parent’s conduct need not be directed at the child and the child need
not actually suffer injury: the danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred solely
from the parent’s misconduct. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.
“Conduct that subjects a child to life of uncertainty and instability endangers
the child’s physical and emotional well-being.” Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700,
724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Although a parent’s mental
illness alone is “not grounds for terminating the parent-child relationship,” In re
T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.),
“[u]ntreated mental illness can expose a child to endangerment . . . and is a factor
16 the court may consider.” In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). For example, a court may consider as evidence of
endangerment a parent’s failure to take medication prescribed to ameliorate mental
health issues. See In re O.D.H., No. 14-15-00489-CV, 2015 WL 6949771, *5–*6
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re L.L.F.,
No. 02–11–00485–CV, 2012 WL 2923291, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 19,
2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
A parent’s mental state also “may be considered in determining whether a
child is endangered if that mental state allows the parent to engage in conduct that
jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Jordan, 325 S.W.3d
at 723 (citing J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845). Mental illness can support a finding of
endangerment when the parent experiences suicidal thoughts, plans, or attempts. See
In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re
A.M.C., 2 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.); In re C.D., 664
S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ). Abusive, violent, or
criminal conduct by a parent also can produce an environment that endangers the
well-being of a child. T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d at 14. “Evidence that a parent
previously has engaged in abusive conduct allows an inference that the parent’s
17 violent behavior will continue in the future,” even when such conduct was directed
at a sibling. Id.
The mother argues that the evidence of endangerment is insufficient in regard
to evidence of her prior acts of abuse or violence as well as evidence that she refused
to comply with a medication regimen. The mother testified that the psychosocial
report quoting her to the effect that she would “slam and hurt” her daughter while
having a “blackout” and find her daughter with “bruises all over her body” were not
factual statements, but a recounting of a dream. She also argued that the father’s
testimony was unreliable to the extent that he said he knew that she had abused the
daughter because he had seen bruises and injuries on her, and that she had thrown,
hit, and held the daughter in a chokehold. The mother contended that the father was
biased because they were going through a contentious divorce, his character for
truthfulness was impeached by evidence of his prior criminal and bad acts, and by
other inconsistencies in his testimony. However, the trier of fact is the sole judge of
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. See City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005); In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d 157, 171
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 26, 2016, pet. denied). As such, it was up to
the court to resolve credibility issues and inconsistencies in the evidence.
The mother had been diagnosed with postpartum depression, borderline
personality disorder, and bipolar disorder, and she had thoughts of physically
18 harming her daughter and her husband and of killing herself. These conditions
caused her, commendably, to seek inpatient mental-health care. In addition, although
the mother continued to see a psychiatrist throughout the case, she did not take the
medication required to manage her conditions. She continually denied needing them,
and she refused to take them for seven months during the pendency of this case. She
offered various explanations for her failure to follow her medication regimen, but
the trial court as factfinder was free to reject her explanations. Finally, although the
mother was taking medication at the time of trial, she testified that she believed she
would be fine without medication, that she intended to “stop taking it,” and that she
believed she would be “fine” without medication.
The mother admitted that she had hit her daughter once before the children
were removed, but she argues on appeal that this isolated incident was insufficient
to support an endangerment finding. The trial court as factfinder was entitled to
believe the father’s testimony that the mother hit and slammed the child more than
once—evidence that would support a continuing course of conduct and an
endangerment finding. In addition, it is undisputed that the mother was not taking
prescription medication at the time she alleged abused or acted violently toward her
daughter. The mother also admitted to self-medicating with synthetic marijuana
during that time period.
19 Considering the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could have
concluded that the mother’s abusive and violent conduct, her refusal to treat her
mental illness with medication for long stretches of time, her history of suicidal
thoughts and plans as well as thoughts and plans of harming others including her
daughter, and her continued insistence that she does not need medication amount to
a voluntary course of conduct by which she has jeopardized the physical and
emotional well-being of her children. As such, the evidence is both legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under
section 161.001(b)(1)(E). We overrule the mother’s first issue.
C. Best interest of the children
As with the father, several of the Holley factors are neutral in our analysis of
this appeal. Neither of the children testified, and they are both too young to express
their desired outcome. The evidence showed that they are placed in a foster home
with their biological sister, E.F., and well-bonded to their foster parents, who wish
to adopt them. The record is silent as to availability of programs to assist the mother
in promoting the best interests of the children or any excuse for the mother’s acts or
omissions.
The mother’s plan for the children was for them to live with her in an
apartment. She worked at a donut shop from 5:45 a.m. until 11:00 a.m., and she
planned for them to attend day care during those hours. She denied having anyone
20 who could help or support her with the children but she testified, “I have friends that
I can call to vent to, to talk to my kids, to entertain them through the phone.” She
testified that she would be fine without medication. This factor is essentially neutral
in our analysis. Although the mother has a place to stay and a job, the record is not
well developed as to adequacy of her living arrangements, how much the mother
earns from her job, and whether the income is sufficient to care her children’s needs
now and in the future.
The Holley factor dealing with acts or omissions of the parent weighs in favor
of termination of the mother’s parental rights. First, she endangered her older child,
E.F., by leaving her home alone at the age of one while she went to work. She
subsequently lost or relinquished custody of that child and received deferred-
adjudication community supervision in connection with the related criminal case.
In addition, although the mother denies it, there was sufficient evidence to
show that she physically abused daughter A.D.M. while experiencing postpartum
depression and other mental-health issues. This evidence included statements made
to psychologists, testimony from the father, and evidence that the child had a black
eye when the Department removed the children from the home. Although the mother
completed the services on her family plan of service, she began her involvement
with the Department in this case by violating the safety plan which prohibited
unsupervised contact with her children upon her initial release from West Oaks
21 Hospital. She also failed to follow her prescription medication regimen, which put
her in jeopardy of needing repeated inpatient hospital stays which would remove her
from the family home and have a destabilizing effect on the children. See Quiroz,
2009 WL 961935, at *10 (importance of stability).
The children in this case were young, both under the age of four at the time of
trial, and although they had no special needs, their ages made them inherently
vulnerable. There was a history of the mother behaving in an abusive and assaultive
manner toward the daughter and of having thoughts of harming her. The mother
showed a willingness and ability to seek and accept beneficial counseling and agency
services, except with respect to the circumstance that brought the children into the
Department’s care in the first place: her mental health. The mother’s parenting skills
improved, but the caseworker noted that they seemed inconsistent. Although there
was only one specific incident of concern during supervised visitations, when the
mother was impatient and rough with the daughter and pushed her into a wall, this
incident occurred shortly before trial, when she should have learned and grown the
most.
Our examination of the Holley factors shows clear-and-convincing support for
the trial court’s best-interest finding. We conclude that legally and factually
sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination of the mother’s
22 parental rights was in the best interest of her children. We overrule the mother’s
second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the decree of the trial court.
Michael Massengale Justice
Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.