In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00394-CV
IN THE MATTER OF A.A.R., A CHILD
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Williamson County, Texas Trial Court No. 22-3488-FC1, Honorable Dawn Baardsen, Presiding
April 4, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Keaire Alvin Webb, pro se, filed this restricted appeal attacking an order declaring
him the biological father of AAR, establishing conservatorship over the child, and
designating child support obligations, i.e., “Order Establishing The Parent-Child
Relationship.” His brief is rife with citation to inapplicable federal statutes, rules,
regulations, and other authorities. 2 And in many instances, the content of his argument
1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent
should it conflict with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 For instance, Webb mistakenly invokes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and suggests standing principles under Article III of the United States Constitution control. Though such authority may have similarity to principles or rules adopted in Texas, the latter control here. Furthermore, Texas state courts are not created under Article III of the United States Constitution, as Webb seems to think. is difficult to comprehend. Nevertheless, after discerning the content of his argument as
best we can, we affirm.
Background
In December 2022, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) filed a petition to
establish the parent-child relationship between Webb and AAR, a child. In it, the OAG
asked the court to order parental testing, to appoint appropriate conservators and to order
current and retroactive support. On February 8, 2023, the court ordered Webb to submit
to testing. Through this same order, the court also scheduled a final hearing on the matter
of parentage to be held on April 21, 2023, at 1:00 p.m. The consideration of temporary
orders was also scheduled for that day. Of further note was a passage in the order
stating: “[t]he parties acknowledge they are entering a general appearance in this cause
by their signatures on this order.” Webb’s signature appeared on same, as did counsel
prosecuting the cause and the child’s mother, JFR, at the end of the order under
“Approved.”
JFR and representatives of the OAG appeared at the April 21 hearing. Webb did
not. Thereafter, the trial court signed its order holding AAR to be Webb’s child,
designating conservatorship, and setting child support obligations. Webb subsequently
filed this restricted appeal challenging the aforementioned order.
Applicable Law
To sustain a restricted appeal, the filing party must show that 1) he filed notice of
the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; 2) he was a party
to the underlying lawsuit; 3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the
judgment complained of or timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings
of fact and conclusions of law; and 4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ex parte 2 E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Tex. 2020). Upon liberally construing appellant’s brief, we
find no properly briefed error apparent on the face of the record.
First, appellant questions, in a myriad of ways, the validity of citation upon and
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Yet, he generally appeared, as evinced on the
face of the trial court’s February 8, 2023 order directing him to submit to paternity testing.
Having generally appeared, he waived complaints about citation and personal jurisdiction.
In re A.B., No. 07-22-00232-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 545, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that a general appearance waives complaints
about citation and personal jurisdiction).
Second, appellant questions the OAG’s standing, in a myriad of ways, to initiate a
suit to determine parentage, set child support, and collect same from delinquent parents.
Texas statute provides it with the requisite standing. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.001
(designating OAG as the state’s Title IV-D agency); § 102.007 (Title IV-D agency may file
a child support action); § 231.101 (Title IV-D agency may provide paternity determination
services and establish child support and medical support).
Third, appellant questions the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over matters
of parentage, conservatorship, child support, and support arrearage. Statute again
creates such jurisdiction. When the OAG sues in a county that has a Title IV-D court,
such as Williamson County, such cases are automatically transferred to the Title IV-D
court. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 201.101(d); In re L.D.C., No. 13-17-00053-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 10244, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.). And though the associate judge assigned to the Title IV-D court may not issue a
final judgment, id. § 201.104(b), if its recommended order is not appealed to the referring
court, it becomes final at that time. In re L.D.C., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10244, at *10-11. 3 Thus, the Title IV-D court executing the order which Webb attacks had subject matter
jurisdiction over the proceeding. And, being a court created under the authority of Texas
law, it is not, as Webb suggests, a federal court without jurisdiction to entertain divorce or
like family law proceedings. In short, his objections to subject matter jurisdiction are
baseless.
Fourth, Webb’s complaint about the absence of a jury trial is also baseless. Again,
he made a general appearance in the cause, and nothing within the record illustrates he
requested a jury trial prior to the April 21 hearing. The right to such a trial is not self-
executing; one must take steps to perfect it. In re Troy S. Poe Trust, 646 S.W.3d 771,
778 (Tex. 2022). Webb neglected to show he took those steps.
Fifth, Webb next complains of the OAG’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a)(1). Federal rules of court procedure do not regulate proceedings
transpiring in Texas state courts.
Sixth, Webb believes the trial court’s order to be unenforceable under the doctrine
of separation of powers. His argument seems to be premised on the theory that the Title
IV-D associate judge issuing the order at issue was an “administrative judge” of some
executive agency. Nothing was cited to support that proposition. Nor was the proposition
accompanied by substantive analysis. Thus, it was waived due to inadequate briefing.
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Vaclavik v. Di Addison, No. 03-19-00528-CV, 2021 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3308, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Approximately
$23,606.00 U.S. Currency v. State, No. 07-19-00297-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2602, at
*8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Yet, assuming it were not so
waived, it remains baseless.
4 Associate judges act as an arm of the judiciary, as exemplified in Office of Attorney
Gen. v. C.W.H., 531 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2017). They assist courts in meeting various
deadlines governing resolution of Title IV-D cases and are appointed to do so by the
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00394-CV
IN THE MATTER OF A.A.R., A CHILD
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Williamson County, Texas Trial Court No. 22-3488-FC1, Honorable Dawn Baardsen, Presiding
April 4, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Keaire Alvin Webb, pro se, filed this restricted appeal attacking an order declaring
him the biological father of AAR, establishing conservatorship over the child, and
designating child support obligations, i.e., “Order Establishing The Parent-Child
Relationship.” His brief is rife with citation to inapplicable federal statutes, rules,
regulations, and other authorities. 2 And in many instances, the content of his argument
1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent
should it conflict with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 For instance, Webb mistakenly invokes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and suggests standing principles under Article III of the United States Constitution control. Though such authority may have similarity to principles or rules adopted in Texas, the latter control here. Furthermore, Texas state courts are not created under Article III of the United States Constitution, as Webb seems to think. is difficult to comprehend. Nevertheless, after discerning the content of his argument as
best we can, we affirm.
Background
In December 2022, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) filed a petition to
establish the parent-child relationship between Webb and AAR, a child. In it, the OAG
asked the court to order parental testing, to appoint appropriate conservators and to order
current and retroactive support. On February 8, 2023, the court ordered Webb to submit
to testing. Through this same order, the court also scheduled a final hearing on the matter
of parentage to be held on April 21, 2023, at 1:00 p.m. The consideration of temporary
orders was also scheduled for that day. Of further note was a passage in the order
stating: “[t]he parties acknowledge they are entering a general appearance in this cause
by their signatures on this order.” Webb’s signature appeared on same, as did counsel
prosecuting the cause and the child’s mother, JFR, at the end of the order under
“Approved.”
JFR and representatives of the OAG appeared at the April 21 hearing. Webb did
not. Thereafter, the trial court signed its order holding AAR to be Webb’s child,
designating conservatorship, and setting child support obligations. Webb subsequently
filed this restricted appeal challenging the aforementioned order.
Applicable Law
To sustain a restricted appeal, the filing party must show that 1) he filed notice of
the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; 2) he was a party
to the underlying lawsuit; 3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the
judgment complained of or timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings
of fact and conclusions of law; and 4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ex parte 2 E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Tex. 2020). Upon liberally construing appellant’s brief, we
find no properly briefed error apparent on the face of the record.
First, appellant questions, in a myriad of ways, the validity of citation upon and
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Yet, he generally appeared, as evinced on the
face of the trial court’s February 8, 2023 order directing him to submit to paternity testing.
Having generally appeared, he waived complaints about citation and personal jurisdiction.
In re A.B., No. 07-22-00232-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 545, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that a general appearance waives complaints
about citation and personal jurisdiction).
Second, appellant questions the OAG’s standing, in a myriad of ways, to initiate a
suit to determine parentage, set child support, and collect same from delinquent parents.
Texas statute provides it with the requisite standing. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.001
(designating OAG as the state’s Title IV-D agency); § 102.007 (Title IV-D agency may file
a child support action); § 231.101 (Title IV-D agency may provide paternity determination
services and establish child support and medical support).
Third, appellant questions the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over matters
of parentage, conservatorship, child support, and support arrearage. Statute again
creates such jurisdiction. When the OAG sues in a county that has a Title IV-D court,
such as Williamson County, such cases are automatically transferred to the Title IV-D
court. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 201.101(d); In re L.D.C., No. 13-17-00053-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 10244, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 13, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.). And though the associate judge assigned to the Title IV-D court may not issue a
final judgment, id. § 201.104(b), if its recommended order is not appealed to the referring
court, it becomes final at that time. In re L.D.C., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10244, at *10-11. 3 Thus, the Title IV-D court executing the order which Webb attacks had subject matter
jurisdiction over the proceeding. And, being a court created under the authority of Texas
law, it is not, as Webb suggests, a federal court without jurisdiction to entertain divorce or
like family law proceedings. In short, his objections to subject matter jurisdiction are
baseless.
Fourth, Webb’s complaint about the absence of a jury trial is also baseless. Again,
he made a general appearance in the cause, and nothing within the record illustrates he
requested a jury trial prior to the April 21 hearing. The right to such a trial is not self-
executing; one must take steps to perfect it. In re Troy S. Poe Trust, 646 S.W.3d 771,
778 (Tex. 2022). Webb neglected to show he took those steps.
Fifth, Webb next complains of the OAG’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a)(1). Federal rules of court procedure do not regulate proceedings
transpiring in Texas state courts.
Sixth, Webb believes the trial court’s order to be unenforceable under the doctrine
of separation of powers. His argument seems to be premised on the theory that the Title
IV-D associate judge issuing the order at issue was an “administrative judge” of some
executive agency. Nothing was cited to support that proposition. Nor was the proposition
accompanied by substantive analysis. Thus, it was waived due to inadequate briefing.
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Vaclavik v. Di Addison, No. 03-19-00528-CV, 2021 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3308, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Approximately
$23,606.00 U.S. Currency v. State, No. 07-19-00297-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2602, at
*8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Yet, assuming it were not so
waived, it remains baseless.
4 Associate judges act as an arm of the judiciary, as exemplified in Office of Attorney
Gen. v. C.W.H., 531 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2017). They assist courts in meeting various
deadlines governing resolution of Title IV-D cases and are appointed to do so by the
presiding judge of each judicial administrative region. Id. at 181. And, as expressed
earlier, they may sign orders that generally are not final on the merits and recommend
orders after a trial on the merits. Id. Their orders or judgments are also subject to de
novo review by the referring court, if such a review is timely requested. Id. Associate
judges being an arm of the judiciary tasked with assisting in the disposition of Title IV-D
cases, their actions while addressing Title IV-D matters do not evince the performance of
judicial duties by any branch of government other than the judiciary.
Seventh, Webb next seems to assert that the cause must be dismissed because
the location of the court was not within Texas. The frivolity of his argument is illustrated
through the understanding of Texas geography. The court sat in Williamson County.
Williamson County sits within Texas borders. Thus, the court was and is located in Texas.
Eighth, Webb’s comments about promissory estoppel somehow forming an
impediment to imposition of the order under attack lack basis as well. Simply put, he
never pleaded the defensive theory. Brogan, Ltd. v. W. Charles Brogan P.A., No. 07-05-
0290-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8125, at *31 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 11, 2007, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (describing promissory estoppel and a defensive plea). So, it was
never before the trial court. Nor did he explain how its application resulted in error
apparent of the face of the record.
Ninth, Webb’s contention that the associate judge executing the order under attack
lacked immunity is of no moment, either. Nowhere does he explain how immunity or the
lack thereof constituted error on the face of the record. And, it is not our obligation to fill 5 the void left by him. This too is another instance of deficient briefing waiving the
complaint. Vaclavik, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 3308, at *2.
Tenth, Webb alleged that a “governmental child support debt collection agency
that is part of executive branch of state government or federal government is an act of
executive imprisonment causing the dispossession of property without the required
judgment by peers is considered oppressive and lawless.” This somehow denied him
due process and exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment. How being an “agency”
“is an act of executive imprisonment” and why such purportedly evinced error appearing
on the face of the record went unexplained. The same is true of his allusion that the order
exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, a parent has a duty to support
his child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001(a)(3). Holding him to that duty is neither
punishment nor cruel or unusual.
Eleventh, Webb finally argues that “[t]he United States District Court Denied the
Defendant/Appellant, Webb, Request for Relief in its Entirety.” Having no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of a United States District Court, that matter is not properly
before us. And, assuming he was attempting to refer to the Williamson County Court at
Law Number 1 in which the OAG filed its petition, he cites to no order denying him relief
on any timely-filed, post-April 21 motion. Nor did we find one. So too does he fail to
provide substantive analysis establishing error on the face of the record.
We overrule Webb’s contentions and affirm the April 21, 2023 “Order Establishing
the Parent-Child Relationship.”
Brian Quinn Chief Justice 6