Opinion issued June 11, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-01074-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF A.A., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-02614J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a bench trial, the trial court signed an order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to A.A. On appeal, Mother challenges the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of statutory
grounds for termination and the trial court’s best-interest finding. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions), (E) (endangering conduct),
(b)(2) (best interest of child).
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s statutory
grounds for termination and legally sufficient to support the trial court’s best-
interest finding. We hold that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the
finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in A.A.’s best interest. We
reverse and remand.
Background
A. Removal
In October 2024, law enforcement responded to a call at the home Mother
shared with her boyfriend, Christopher Herman, and four-month-old A.A. After an
argument, Mother had attempted to prevent Herman from leaving and tried to cut
his throat with a bus card. Herman hit Mother in the face, breaking her nose.
Mother was transported to the hospital.
Once she arrived at the hospital, Mother was referred for an inpatient
psychiatric stay, and she did not have anyone to care for A.A. The Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department”) received a
referral regarding neglectful supervision of A.A. Finding that there was an
immediate danger to the physical health or safety of A.A., the trial court signed an
emergency temporary order appointing the Department temporary sole managing
2 conservator of A.A., who was placed with foster caregivers. The court appointed
an attorney to represent Mother.
B. The Service Plan
After an adversarial hearing, the trial court entered an order requiring
Mother “to comply with each requirement set out in the Department’s original, or
any amended, service plan during the pendency of this suit.” The order notified
Mother that failure to comply with the court’s orders “may result in the restriction
or termination of parental rights.”
The November 2025 service plan indicated that the Department’s goal was
family reunification, with an alternative goal of family/fictive kin adoption. The
plan states that the Department was concerned that Mother’s alcohol addiction was
impairing her ability to provide a stable environment for A.A. The Department was
also concerned about domestic violence in Mother’s household and Mother’s
limited support network. The goal of the plan was for Mother to demonstrate the
ability to provide a safe, stable, and nurturing environment for A.A. through
addressing her alcohol addiction, eliminating the presence of domestic violence,
and expanding her circle of support.
Mother’s service plan required that Mother obtain and maintain stable
employment and provide recent paystubs as verification; secure and maintain
stable housing and provide proof; attend parenting classes, participate in
3 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and obtain a sponsor, attend domestic violence
classes, complete a psychosocial assessment and follow treatment
recommendations, attend individual counseling sessions, and identify and establish
relationships with supportive individuals outside her household. The plan required
Mother to provide proof she fulfilled each of these objectives.
After two permanency hearings, the case proceeded to trial in October 2025.
C. Hearing on Motion to Extend the Dismissal Date
At trial, before evidence was presented, the court held a hearing on the
Department’s motions for continuance and to extend the dismissal date to allow
more time to place A.A. in a relative placement and for A.A.’s biological Father to
work services.1 The Department’s caseworker testified that one-year-old A.A.’s
foster home was meeting all her needs and that the Department’s goal was
unrelated adoption with the current foster parents with a concurrent goal of relative
adoption.
The caseworker told the court that Mother had completed all services listed
in the Department’s service plan. Mother had verifiable, stable employment and
had provided pay stubs for a job she had held for three months. The Department
verified with Mother’s landlord that she had a three-month lease, but the
1 Father completed DNA testing two weeks before trial, and he was presented with the family service plan to sign on the day of trial. After trial, the trial court granted Father possessory conservatorship. He is not a party to this appeal. Testimony regarding Father is omitted unless it relates to Mother. 4 Department did not consider a three-month lease to be stable housing. The
caseworker testified that Mother was taking her necessary medications, testing
negative in random drug testing, and participating in all but one of her
unsupervised visits with A.A., and the missed visit was due to confusion.
Despite Mother’s progress, the caseworker asked the court to find Mother
noncompliant with her services based on lack of stable housing, lack of an
Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor, and only three months of job history.
On cross-examination, Mother’s attorney questioned why the Department’s
permanency report, filed a few weeks before trial, listed the Department’s goal as
family reunification, and the caseworker said that the report was incorrect. The
caseworker agreed that Mother was partially compliant because she had completed
her services, but she said that Mother lacked both an Alcoholics Anonymous
sponsor and stable housing because her roommate had a criminal history of
possession of illegal substances. The caseworker said that the Department would
consider allowing Mother to have more time to secure housing without a
roommate. The caseworker also said that Mother was newly “back on track” taking
her prescribed medication, but she thought Mother’s progress was only motivated
by her concern about trial and noted that Mother’s rights to five other children
were previously terminated.
5 The caseworker and the Child Advocates volunteer both agreed that A.A.
was thriving in her current placement, bonded to her foster parents, and making
progress on her milestones with therapy and practice with her foster parents. The
caseworker noted that sometimes A.A. was more anxious after visits with Mother,
mentioning one visit, in which Mother gave A.A. oat milk which led to her
vomiting. The caseworker said that A.A. was delayed in walking and talking, but
her foster parents were addressing it.
At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court held that there were no
extraordinary circumstances to justify delay, and that trial would occur later in the
day.
D. Trial testimony
1. Department Caseworker
The caseworker’s testimony was largely consistent with the previous hearing
testimony, relating the fight between Mother and her boyfriend that resulted in
Mother’s referral to a psychiatric inpatient program without any emergency care
for A.A.
After Mother was released from the hospital, the Department created a
service plan for Mother including the requirements that Mother find stable
housing, attend parenting classes, attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and
obtain a sponsor, attend substance abuse classes, attend domestic violence classes,
6 participate in psychosocial, psychiatric, and psychological evaluations and
individual therapy, and develop a social support system. The caseworker testified
that Mother completed most of the services. According to the caseworker, the
Department remained concerned about Mother’s housing and employment, her
lack of an Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor, and her ongoing medication
management. The caseworker testified that Mother initially worked services,
stopped around August, and resumed when the case was set for trial.
The caseworker was concerned about Mother’s ability to protect A.A.
because Mother returned to living with the boyfriend who assaulted her. As of the
second permanency hearing, they had broken up, and Mother was “put out” of their
“home.”
The caseworker said that A.A. was one year old with developmental delays
and that she received therapies with her current placement, and she did not know if
Mother could manage A.A.’s delays and treatment. The caseworker testified that
Mother was given less restrictive visitation, but that it was “pull[ed] back,” and the
Department did not think she was capable of expanded visitation.
The caseworker said the foster parents would like to adopt A.A. She stated
that termination was in A.A.’s best interest due to Mother’s “failure to stay
compliant with the services such as stable housing, stable employment, medication
compliance, [and] meeting with a sponsor.”
7 The caseworker said that visitation was reduced from every week to every
other week because the foster parents, who want to adopt A.A., reported observing
signs of anxiety after visits. She testified that Mother had more than ten
unsupervised visits with the child, and the only issue was that Mother fed A.A. oat
milk one time, but Mother was receptive to guidance not to do so in the future. She
stated that Mother and A.A. are bonded.
The caseworker said that she thought it was in the best interest to terminate
parental rights even though Mother had a good relationship with A.A. because
Mother was not in compliance with taking her medication, and she had only
recently been employed for three consecutive months and had had four different
jobs during the year-long case. Mother also had a history of bipolar disorder and
had not been consistently taking medication. In July when the caseworker visited
Mother, the medication bottles Mother provided were dated June 3 and full. When
asked for a new bottle, Mother did not provide it. The caseworker called Mother’s
pharmacy who informed her that Mother had not refilled the medication since
June. The caseworker concluded that even if Mother obtained medication in June,
she had not been taking it. She testified that Mother did not take her psychiatric
medication between July and September 2025. Mother had obtained new
8 medication in early October 2025 and showed recent compliance.2 The caseworker
stated that Mother needs to show that she is able to provide a safe and stable
environment by having stable housing and keeping a job for an extended period of
time and noted, again, that Mother had five prior terminations on endangerment
grounds.
2. Mother
Mother admitted that she has six children, and that her rights to five of them
have been terminated because she was using drugs and did not do any of the
Department’s services to maintain the parent-child relationship. Those children
live with her mother in Harlingen, and she maintains a relationship with them.
Mother agreed that A.A.’s case began after domestic violence with a
boyfriend. Although she did go back to live with him after the case started while he
was also voluntarily completing services for the Department, the relationship had
ended. There were no other instances of domestic violence. They attended couples
counseling together, and they later decided to break up because they could not get
along. Mother went to live with a friend and then obtained her current apartment.
She testified that she had lived in her current apartment since late August 2025 and
that she has a three-month lease. She said the short lease was the landlord’s
preference, but the landlord is willing to work with her, and she expects the lease
2 The caseworker did not specify what the medications are, how often they should be taken, or what happens if Mother does not take them. 9 will be extended. Even though her current roommate has a drug history, he told her
that he does not use drugs. Mother hopes to receive the financial housing
assistance the Department recommended and to apply for low-income housing.
As far as her employment, Mother testified that she left her first job for a
better opportunity in IT tech. She was let go from the IT tech position, and she
obtained a seasonal position. Now she is in her fourth job, working at a market
research call center. Her current job allows her to pay rent and bills without issue,
and she testified that she could provide for A.A. as well. As to her income, the
court admitted her paystubs into evidence without objection. She said she gets paid
$1,200 a month and is paid every two weeks. Mother testified that she is willing to
pay child support.
Mother testified that she attends five Alcoholics Anonymous meetings a
week. As to her sponsor, she explained that her current sponsor wanted to postpone
meetings in person while Mother attends 90 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings in 90
days, which Mother began in August. They remain in touch.
As far as medication management, Mother said that she took medication for
her mental health prior to the current case. She stopped taking the medication when
she found out she was pregnant with A.A. She did not resume taking medication
after A.A. was born because she was waiting for a mental health referral from the
hospital. Mother testified that she did not take her medication from July to August
10 2025 because the dosage was too high, making it difficult to show up to work. She
waited to see her psychiatrist to lower the dosage. She explained that the
appointment time was delayed as she waited for Medicaid. She saw a psychiatrist
on October 8, 2025, with a future appointment scheduled for the following month.
She said she understood she needs her medication every day and that it is
important to stay on top of it.3 She said she is addressing her mental health so she
can be well for her daughter.
As far as A.A., Mother testified that she had more than 15 unsupervised
visits. She typically takes A.A. to eat and then to a park. She learned not to feed
her oat milk. She knows that A.A. has some developmental challenges, and she
tries to encourage her with activity. Mother testified that she does not believe
termination is in A.A.’s best interest because she has complied with the
Department’s requests, has unsupervised visitation, and has family members
willing to care for A.A. She petitioned for the child to be returned to her, but in the
alternative, she would like to share custody with the Department.
3. Department Supervisor
The Department’s supervisor testified that even though the final permanency
report states the goal is reunification, the Department’s goal has been unrelated
3 The court admitted into evidence a photo of two prescription pill bottles in Mother’s name. Mother is prescribed hydroxyzine as needed for anxiety and daily fluoxetine. 11 adoption or relative adoption since after the second permanency hearing. When
asked about Mother’s cousin who lives in New Mexico as a potential placement,
the supervisor said that the Department stopped investigating this option after the
first permanency hearing because Mother was doing so well completing services.
After the second permanency hearing, there was another request to investigate the
cousin as a placement, and it remains pending. Additionally, the supervisor said
that if the parents’ rights are terminated at trial, the Department would complete a
home study for the paternal grandparents.
According to the supervisor, the Department seeks to terminate Mother’s
rights because of the instability of her mental health and her struggle to maintain
stable employment and housing. The Department is concerned because of Mother’s
prior history of terminations and her pattern of engagement with required services.
According to the supervisor, Mother did not participate in Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings before October 2025, and Mother did not have stable housing with her
former boyfriend. When they broke up and Mother’s name was not on the lease,
she did not have a place to stay. The supervisor said termination is in A.A.’s best
interest because it would give her stability and a safe environment.
On cross-examination, the supervisor said that Mother’s three-month lease
was not considered stable, even though the landlord refused longer leases. She said
the Department hopes for a six-month or longer lease. She said the Department
12 believes Mother restricted the caseworker’s ability to gain access to the apartment,
and the Department is worried about Mother’s roommate. She said she did not
have an answer as to whether Mother had provided three months of paystubs and
she did not know why the Department had not submitted a home study for
Mother’s cousin in New Mexico. She said that the Department never supported
Mother having unsupervised visits, and though there are no major concerns with
visits, the Department is concerned about the stability of Mother’s mental health
and would not support continued unsupervised visitation.
4. Child Advocate Volunteer
The Child Advocate volunteer testified that A.A. is very bonded to her foster
parents and her daycare provider. She has made progress with her developmental
and physical challenges and takes swimming lessons. The volunteer recommended
termination of parental rights because Mother failed to demonstrate consistency,
candor, or stability. Mother said her name was on the lease for her first home visit,
but it was not. The volunteer was concerned because Mother’s rights to her other
children were terminated for drug use, and Mother now had a roommate with a
history of drug use.
5. Testimony of Paternal Grandfather and Foster Parents
The paternal grandfather, who only recently learned he was related to A.A.,
testified that he would welcome A.A. into his home. The foster mother testified
13 that A.A.’s foster parents hoped to adopt her and mentioned that A.A. often cries
and will not sleep after visits with Mother.
E. Evidence at Trial
The evidence admitted without objection at trial includes:
• Drug and alcohol test results from January to October 2025. There are
one or two tests each month, and all results are negative.
• Pay stubs for Mother’s current employment from September 1, 2025,
through October 12, 2025.
• An Alcoholics Anonymous meeting log showing that Mother attended
meetings on the following dates: August 21, 2025, two meetings on
August 24, 2025, two meetings on September 15, 2025, and meetings
on October 12, 13, 15, 16, and 22, 2025.
• Permanency reports to the court from April and August 2025. The
April report states that Mother is in compliance with the service plan.
The report orders Mother to have weekly three-hour unsupervised
visitation with A.A. beginning April 28, 2025. The order states that
after that, the parties will decide how to proceed. The August 2025
report states that Mother is not in compliance with the service plan,
and the court orders that her visitation with A. A. will take place every
other week.
14 • A final permanency report filed October 8, 2025, states that Mother
maintains communication with the Department and demonstrates
“partial cooperation with her case plan requirements” because she
engages in visitation and communication but has not provided key
verifications. Mother supplied a copy of her lease, but it was only
valid for three months. Her new employment was verified. She
reported attending a psychiatric appointment on August 22, 2025, but
it was not verified. She remained “consistent in attending scheduled
visitations with her daughter and continue[d] to demonstrate
appropriate interactions during visits.” The report stated that the
Department’s goal is family reunification because Mother “has
demonstrated a commitment to completing all required services and
addressing the issue that led to the child’s removal, showing her
willingness to create a safe and stable home.” The Department’s
concurrent goal was adoption by a relative or fictive kin.4 The report
detailed Mother’s progress in March, July, and October 2025 on each
of her service plan goals.
4 During trial, the Department’s caseworker and supervisor testified that the goal section of the report was an error, and that the Department’s goal had changed to adoption. The caseworker suggested that an erroneous report had been filed with the court. 15 F. Closing Arguments
In closing, the Department requested that Mother’s rights be terminated
based on subsection (D) and (E) based on her failure to take her medication
consistently and the Department’s concerns about stable housing and income. The
Department argued that it was in A.A.’s best interest to have parental rights
terminated so she could grow up without worrying about her inability to provide
stable housing and income. The Department argued, “We need people who can be
parents to this child now, not in six months, not in eight months.”
Mother’s attorney argued that the Department has not met its burden on
termination and that it is not in A.A.’s best interest to terminate Mother’s rights.
Mother completed all her services. Mother’s unsupervised visits since April 2025
had raised no major concerns; A.A. is bonded to her, and termination would be
traumatic for the child. Mother’s attorney argued that the court should choose some
form of conservatorship instead of termination.
A.A.’s attorney ad litem argued that Mother has been inconsistent for the
duration of the case.
G. Termination Order
The trial court terminated the parent-child relationship between A.A. and
Mother and appointed the Department sole managing conservator. The trial court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department made reasonable
16 efforts to return the child to Mother but that a continuing danger in the home
prevented her return. The trial court further found by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother (1) “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional
well-being of the child” and (2) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The trial
court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship was in A.A.’s best
interest. Mother appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
either the predicate findings under subsections (D) and (E) or the best interest
standard under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code.5
Sufficiency of the Evidence for Termination
In a case to terminate parental rights under section 161.001 of the Texas
Family Code, the Department must establish that (1) the parent committed one or
more of the enumerated acts or omissions justifying termination and
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b).
Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a
judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the
child’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). The Department
5 Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings as to reasonable efforts to return the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(f). 17 must prove both elements by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.N.C., 384
S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012). The Family Code defines “clear and convincing
evidence” as “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.
In addition, in suits brought by the Department, courts “may not order
termination . . . unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence” that “the
[D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before
commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a
continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the
parent . . . .” Id. § 161.001(f).
A. Standard of Review
When assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a termination
proceeding, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s finding and decide “whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005)
(discussing elevated standard of review in parental termination cases). We assume
that any disputed facts were resolved in favor of the finding if a reasonable
factfinder could have done so. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. When “no reasonable
18 factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction” that the matter on which the
Department bears the burden of proof is true, we “must conclude that the evidence
is legally insufficient.” Id.
In reviewing the evidence’s factual sufficiency, we consider the entire
record, including disputed evidence. Id. The evidence is factually insufficient if,
considering the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could not have resolved in favor of the finding is so significant that the factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction. Id.; In re A.C., 560
S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018) (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings, and we cannot substitute
our own judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam). The factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the
credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 109.
B. Predicate Findings under Subsections (D) and (E)
Mother challenges the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s termination of her parental rights under subsections (D)
and (E) of section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE
§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Because termination under these subsections may justify
termination of parental rights to other children in future cases, we must review
both grounds, even though only one ground is sufficient to support termination. In
19 re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 (Tex. 2024) (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230,
235–37 (Tex. 2019)).
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) of the Family Code provides that the trial court
may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Section
161.001(b)(1)(E) provides that the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if the
trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in
conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Because evidence concerning termination under subsections (D) and (E) is
interrelated, we may consolidate our examination of the evidence for both grounds.
In re A.J.H., No. 01-18-00245-CV, 2019 WL 190050, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Jan. 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal citation omitted).
“Endanger” is a term used in both subsections. To “endanger” a child means
exposing her to loss or injury. In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (citing
Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The statute
does not require that conduct be directed at a child or that the child actually suffer
20 any injury; rather, the specific danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred
from the parent’s misconduct alone. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.J.H., 575
S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). A parent’s
conduct that subjects “a child to life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
child’s physical and emotional well-being.” In re J.S., 584 S.W.3d 622, 635 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (internal citation omitted). The
Department does not need to establish that a parent intended to endanger a child to
support termination based on endangerment. In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 407
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
Although both subsections (D) and (E) focus on endangerment, “they differ
with regard to the source and proof of endangerment.” In re. A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76,
83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (internal citation omitted).
Subsection (D) concerns the children’s environment, rather than the parent’s
conduct, although the parent’s conduct can affect the children’s environment. Id.
Under this subsection, “knowingly” does not require that a parent have “certain
knowledge that an actual injury is occurring.” In re. L.M.M., 522 S.W.3d 34, 44
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing A.S., 261 S.W.3d at 83).
Rather, a parent acts “knowingly” when she is aware of the potential danger but
disregards that risk. Id. Under subsection (E), the evidence must show that the
endangerment was the result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or
21 failure to act. In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d 157, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. denied).
In evaluating endangerment under subsection (D), we consider the child’s
environment before the Department obtained custody of the child. See In re S.R.,
452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied.). Under
subsection (E), however, courts may consider conduct occurring both before and
after the Department removed the child from the home. Id. (considering persistence
of endangering conduct up to time of trial).
1. Evidence of Endangering Environment under (D)
The record reflects that A.A. was exposed to an unstable, unsafe home
environment before she was removed. “Domestic violence, want of self-control,
and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment.” In
re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 84,1 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
The Department opened this case after law enforcement responded to a domestic
violence incident involving Mother and her then-boyfriend. While A.A. did not
suffer actual physical injury, she was present at the time of the incident and lived
in the home. Endangerment includes exposing a child to potential physical or
emotional or mental injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Mother and her boyfriend
argued, and when Mother attempted to stop him from leaving and tried to cut his
throat with a bus card, he hit her in the face and broke her nose. Mother was
22 transported to the hospital with a broken nose. When Mother needed to be admitted
for psychiatric stay, she did not have social support to care for infant A.A. Mother
admitted that she previously struggled with drug abuse that led to termination of
her rights to five other children. The record supports the conclusion that, at the
time of removal, Mother had exposed A.A. to endangering conditions by
knowingly placing or allowing A.A. to be in surroundings that endangered her
physical or emotional well-being.
2. Evidence of Endangering Conduct under Subsection (E)
In addition to conditions and conduct before removal as described above, the
record reflects that Mother’s housing arrangement remained unstable throughout
the pendency of the case. Once she left the hospital, Mother returned to live with
the boyfriend involved in the initial domestic violence incident. The caseworker
testified that she tried to advise Mother that housing problems could arise if they
broke up because Mother’s name was not on the lease, and indeed, when they
broke up, Mother did not have a place to live. Although she obtained a three-month
lease, Mother’s roommate had a history of prior drug use, and this concerned the
Department because Mother herself had struggled with drug addiction in the past.
Even though Mother testified that the landlord would work with her and only
offered short term leases, the length of the lease did not signal stability in the
Department’s opinion. Mother’s decision to move back in with her boyfriend after
23 he broke her nose in A.A.’s presence and her failure to obtain and maintain stable
housing during the pendency of the case was a factor demonstrating that Mother
could subject A.A. to a life of uncertainty and instability, endangering her physical
and emotional wellbeing. In re K.J.G., No. 04-19-00102-CV, 2019 WL 3937278,
at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(concluding Mother’s inability to provide stable housing and a consistent home
environment was endangering conduct under subsection (E)).
Mother also acknowledged mental health issues that required medication.
Mother admitted that she had stopped and started her medications, including not
taking the medication for multiple months during the pendency of the case. While
mental illness alone is not grounds for terminating the parent-child relationship,
untreated mental illness can expose a child to endangerment and is a factor that the
court can consider. In re L.L.F., No. 02-11-00485-CV, 2012 WL 2923291, at *15
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering a parent’s
failure to take medication to treat mental health issues as factor in creating
environment that endangers child’s emotional or physical well-being); J.I.T.P., 99
S.W.3d at 845 (considering parent’s mental health and noncompliance with her
medication schedule as factors in endangering child).
Mother argues that the evidence suggests that she was in substantial
compliance with the services she was ordered to complete. The parties agreed that
24 Mother completed many services, including parenting classes, domestic violence
classes, and several evaluations and resulting therapeutic recommendations.
Mother also tested negative for drugs throughout the case. Yet, the record also
supported a finding that Mother did not obtain long-term housing and did not
adequately address her mental health by regularly taking medication.
Reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination
findings under subsections (D) and (E), we conclude that a reasonable factfinder
could have formed a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the finding that
Mother engaged in endangering conduct and exposed A.A. to endangering
conditions. In light of the entire record, a reasonable factfinder could have credited
the disputed evidence in favor of these termination findings. As the finder of fact
and sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court was free to
disregard any or all of Mother’s testimony. We hold the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to support the predicate termination findings under subsections
(D) and (E).
We overrule Mother’s first two issues.
C. Best Interest
Mother contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in A.A.’s
best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2) (requiring that trial court find
25 that termination is in best interest of child). There is a strong presumption that the
best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with the child’s natural
parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); In re D.R.A.,
374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012 no pet.). Prompt and
permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in
the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). Because of the strong
presumption in favor of maintaining the parent-child relationship and the due-
process implications of terminating a parent’s rights to her minor child without
clear and convincing evidence, “the best interest standard does not permit
termination merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere.” In re
J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 121–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet.
denied) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, in a parental-rights termination
suit, the Department bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the parent should no longer have any relationship with the child
whatsoever. In re. D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2020, no pet.) (citing In re K.N.J., 583 S.W.3d 813, 827 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2019, no pet.)).
Courts may consider the following non-exclusive factors in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the best-interest finding: (1) the desires of
the child; (2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the child; (3)
26 the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental
abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those
persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the stability
the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may
indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse
for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These factors are not exhaustive, and evidence is not required on each factor
to support a finding that terminating a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest.
Id. Moreover, evidence supporting termination under one of the grounds listed in
section 161.001(b)(1) can also be considered in support of a finding that
termination is the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.
2002) (holding same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1)
grounds and best-interest finding).
In addition, the Texas Family Code sets out factors to be considered in
evaluating the parent’s willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe
environment, including: the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;
whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who
have access to the child’s home; the willingness and ability of the child’s family to
seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and
facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; the willingness and ability of
27 the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a
reasonable period of time; whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate
parenting skills, including providing the child with minimally adequate health and
nutritional care, a safe physical home environment, and protection from repeated
exposure to violence even though the violence may not be directed at the child;
whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and
friends is available to the child; and an understanding of the child’s needs and
capabilities. TEX. FAM. CODE § 236.307(b).
The factfinder may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and
the totality of the evidence as well as direct evidence when conducting a best-
interest analysis. See In re E.A.P., No. 01-24-00934-CV, 2025 WL1460737, at *25
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). A parent’s
past conduct is probative of her future conduct when evaluating the child’s best
interest. See id. A factfinder may also infer that past conduct endangering the well-
being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent when
assessing the best interest of the child. Id.
1. Application of the Holley Factors
(1) Desires of the Child
At the time of trial, A.A. was about sixteen months old, and no direct
evidence was presented of her desires. In general, when a child is too young to
28 express herself, this factor is neutral in our analysis. In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d
813, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). In some cases, we have
held that circumstantial evidence of a child’s bond with a foster family in the
absence of a bond with a parent may support termination. Id. In this case, A.A. had
regular contact with Mother, who had unsupervised visitation for months before
trial. The evidence showed that A.A. had a bond with both Mother and the foster
parents. This factor is neutral in our analysis. See id.
(2) Present and Future Physical and Emotional Needs of the Child; Present and Future Emotional and Physical Danger to the Child
A.A.’s Needs
While some have extraordinary needs, all children have physical and
emotional needs that must be met daily. In re C.G., No. 14-18-00412-CV, 2018
WL 4702403, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 2, 2018, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) The record reflects that A.A.’s needs included additional support or
therapy for walking and talking. She was thriving and with this additional support,
and she was catching up in milestones. Mother testified that she was willing to
support A.A.’s continued advancement.
The Department presented no evidence that Mother could not meet A.A.’s
therapeutic needs, or that termination of Mother’s parental rights would improve
the outlook for A.A.’s needs. See M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 412 (holding evidence
insufficient to support trial court’s finding termination of parental rights in child’s
29 best interest where no evidence presented that child’s needs would go unmet if
returned to parent’s care); In re D.D.M., No. 01-18-01033, CV, 2019 WL 2939259,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding
because no evidence contradicted parent’s testimony that he was able to mitigate
emotional and physical danger stemming from child’s mental-health issues, this
factor weighs against termination under factual-sufficiency analysis).
Danger to A.A.
Mother exposed A.A. to domestic violence during the removal incident,
though A.A. was not physically harmed. Mother returned to living with the man
involved in the domestic violence incident once she was released from the hospital.
He also participated in services with the Department until they broke up. Mother
was not taking her psychiatric medication at the time of the incident and did not
regularly take the medication during the pendency of the case. Mother also testified
that her roommate at the time of trial had previous drug issues, and Mother’s rights
to other children had been terminated for issues related to drug abuse. The record
also reflects that Mother tested negative for drug and alcohol use during the
pendency of the case. Despite Mother’s substantial life changes during the
pendency of the case, a reasonable factfinder could have inferred from Mother’s
pre-removal behavior that she may fail to protect A.A. again in the future. See
30 E.A.P., 2025 WL 1460737, at *25 (noting parent’s past conduct is probative of
future conduct in best-interest evaluation).
Given the domestic violence involved in the pre-removal conduct, this factor
weighs in favor of termination.
(3) Parental Abilities of the Persons Seeking Custody and the Stability of the Home or Proposed Placement
The evidence at trial reflected that since A.A.’s removal, Mother completed
the Department’s required services and programs. Mother was regularly employed
throughout the pendency of the case, though her job changed. Mother completed
parenting classes, domestic violence classes, drug testing, individual therapy,
intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment, and several psychological and
psychosocial evaluations and their recommendations. Mother attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, though her regular attendance was disputed. The
Department did not think that Mother’s three-month apartment lease satisfied the
stable housing requirement. She told the caseworker that the landlord would not
offer a longer lease but that the landlord was willing to work with her to maintain
the apartment, and she was willing to look for other housing with a longer lease.
There was no evidence in the record on the condition of Mother’s home either
before A.A. was removed or at the time of trial. The Department also had concerns
about the housing because Mother’s roommate had a prior drug history. The
caseworker testified that Mother prevented the Department from accessing the
31 housing or interviewing the roommate, although the final report to the court says
she gave the Department the roommate’s name and social security number.
The service plan also required Mother to increase her social support
network. The record at trial does not show that Mother had any local family to call
on for support, and the maternal grandmother was unable to care for A.A. Mother
felt her mother and brother were supportive of her, though they did not live locally.
As described supra, Mother admitted that she did not take her medication
regularly during the pendency of the case and was not taking the prescribed
medication at the time A.A. was removed. The caseworker testified that in the
summer before trial, she contacted Mother’s pharmacy, and Mother had not been
regularly filling her monthly prescriptions. Mother had been compliant with her
medication only in the month before trial. The record contains a photo of two pill
bottles in the record, showing that Mother takes fluoxetine daily and hydroxyzine
as needed, but it does not explain what the medication is, the condition it treats,
and what happens if it is not taken regularly. The record does not show how
Mother’s medication management impacted A.A., other than that Mother was
referred for an inpatient mental health program after the domestic violence
incident.
32 Mother attended nearly all visitations with A.A. She remained bonded to
A.A. by attending visits.6 Beginning in April 2025, Mother had three-hour
unsupervised visits with A.A. The frequency decreased to every other week in
August 2025 because the foster parents informed the Department that A.A. was
upset after visits. There was no testimony, however, that Mother’s behavior at any
visit was inappropriate or endangering. Mother agreed to provide child support and
to continue working services offered by the Department. Mother also agreed to
assist A.A. in any therapy necessary to continue her milestone development.
During the pendency of the case, she cooperated by completing the services
required of her. Mother was willing to work with the foster family to maintain
contact with A.A. if the child was not returned to her care, but Mother’s parental
rights were not terminated.
The record shows that the foster parents had shown exemplary care and love
to A.A., providing for her needs and helping her to thrive under their care.
The clear-and-convincing evidence relevant to these factors shows that while
the foster parents could meet all of A.A’s needs in a stable home, Mother was able
6 Although the child advocate and caseworker reference previous hearings, specifically one previous hearing that led to reduced visitation for Mother, none of the previous hearings constitute evidence that can support the trial court’s order terminating parental rights and finding that termination was in the best interest of the child as the records from these hearings were not admitted at trial. 33 to meet some but not all of A.A.’s needs. This factor does not weigh in favor of
irrevocably terminating Mother’s rights.
(4) Programs Available to Assist Those Persons Seeking Custody in Promoting the Best Interest of the Child
Mother expressed her willingness to abide by court orders and to complete
additional services offered by the Department to promote the best interest of A.A.
Mother also completed all the service programs required and offered to her. The
Department argued that Mother did not have stable housing because she had a
short lease and that Mother’s employment was unstable because she changed jobs
multiple times. The record reflects that Mother was regularly employed throughout
the pendency of the case, and though her job changed, the Department verified
each employer. At the time of trial, Mother was employed and provided recent
paystubs to verify her employment.
This factor does not weigh in favor of termination.
(5) Plans for the Child by the Individuals or Agency Seeking Custody
The record shows that at least until a short time before trial, the agency’s
goal for A.A. was family reunification with Mother. At the final permanency
hearing immediately preceding trial, the agency’s goal changed to placing A.A. in
an unrelated adoption with a concurrent goal of family adoption. The record
reflects that the foster parents were interested in adopting A.A. The paternal
grandparents and Mother’s cousin had not been ruled out as familial placements.
34 This factor is neutral in our analysis.
(6) Acts or Omission of the Parent that May Indicate the Existing Parent-Child Relationship is Not Appropriate and Any Excuse for the Parent’s Acts or Omissions
Mother’s pre-removal behavior, her continued sporadic compliance with
medication management, and her initial return to the partner who was part of the
domestic violence incident, may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship
is not appropriate. Mother explained that her lack of medication was due to
inability to get an appointment with her doctor to change her dosage. At the same
time, the evidence includes that Mother, even when not taking the medication, was
appropriate during unsupervised visitation with A.A. She completed numerous
classes and services through the Department, and her drug testing results reflect
that she abstained from drugs and alcohol. Mother attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings and had a sponsor. She provided the sponsor’s information
to the Department, but the Department did not verify it. Mother testified that she
was not meeting in person with the sponsor at the time of trial because she was
completing 90 meetings in 90 days.
This factor weighs slightly in favor of termination.
2. Family Code Section 236.307(b) Factors
Additionally, the record reflects that Mother had a history of substance
abuse and chose to live with a roommate who also had previous drug issues.
35 Mother was willing to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services, and she
cooperated with and facilitated the Department’s supervision. She was willing to
effect positive personal changes and demonstrated adequate parenting skills. She
also demonstrated a reasonable understanding of A.A.’s needs and capabilities.
The evidence was disputed whether her home was a safe physical home
environment for A.A. due to her roommate. There was no evidence regarding the
physical condition of her home. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 236.307(b).
3. Considering the Record as a Whole
The record reflects that A.A. was about sixteen months old at the time of
trial. She was removed from Mother’s home when she was four months old,
following a domestic violence incident. Mother admitted she had drug issues in the
past. During the case, Mother completed numerous services and programs through
the Department. She abstained from drugs and alcohol, participated in Alcoholics
Anonymous, was employed, obtained an apartment, and could financially support
herself. Mother had unsupervised visitation with A.A. for months before trial.
The Department’s argument in favor of termination being in the best interest
of A.A. rests primarily on disapproval of the length of Mother’s lease, its belief
that her employment was unstable, concerns with inconsistent medication
management, and lack of communication with her Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor.
While these details suggest that Mother was not ready to have physical custody of
36 A.A., the Department’s burden was not to simply prove Mother should not have
custody of A.A. Its heightened burden was to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that it is not in A.A.’s best interest to have any legal relationship with
Mother whatsoever. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616–17 (Tex. 2007)
(distinguishing conservatorship from termination). The evidence must therefore
permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm conviction or belief that Mother
should no longer be in A.A.’s life as her mother, not merely that she should not
have custody. See id. at 616.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s finding,
and disregarding the reasonable inferences from the undisputed evidence that do
not support the court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s rights was in
A.A.’s best interest. This conclusion rests primarily on Mother’s pre-removal
behavior. We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the court’s
finding.
When we consider the entire record, however, including the evidence that
cannot be credited to the trial court’s finding, we cannot conclude that the evidence
is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding on best interest. We
consider the evidence that Mother remained drug and alcohol free, was employed,
obtained housing, complied with the service plan, cooperated with the Department,
37 regularly visited A.A. and maintained a bond with her, and completed all required
classes, therapies, and evaluations. At the time of trial, Mother was compliant in
her medication management. The record is at best vague as to what medication
Mother is taking, what condition it treats, and what the risks of not taking it
regularly are. There is no evidence that Mother’s lack of medication impacted her
or A.A. during unsupervised visits with A.A. Mother had future appointments to
continue seeing her psychiatrist. She was also regularly attending Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings.
The caseworker testified that she was “unsure” if Mother could attend to
A.A.’s therapy needs and disapproved of the length of Mother’s lease. She also
testified that the Department would not support expanded visitation, but the record
does not reflect that A.A. was in danger or harmed during unsupervised visitation.
The caseworker’s opinions are conclusory and even if uncontradicted, amount to
no more than a scintilla of evidence. In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2013, no pet.).
The Department also seeks termination because it did not make contact with
mother’s Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor, did not approve of the length of her
lease, and felt that her medication management was poor. While these aspects may
demonstrate that Mother is not ready to have custody of A.A., a reasonable
factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of
38 Mother’s rights—meaning she will have no relationship with A.A. at all—was in
A.A.’s best interest. See In Re H.S., No. 24-0307, slip op. at 31 (Tex. June 5, 2026)
(“The [predicate acts and best interest] subsections are distinct—and require
distinct scrutiny at all stages of the judicial process—because it may well be in the
child’s best interest to remain connected with the parent even after the parent has
committed one of the actions described in [TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)]. That
outcome may be especially likely when, as here, the parent is on the path to
rehabilitation and reunification.”)
The Department failed to carry its burden to demonstrate by clear and
convincing, factually sufficient evidence that termination of Mother’s rights to
A.A. was in A.A.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Because we
hold that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best
interest finding, we reverse that part of the trial court’s decree that terminated
Mother’s rights to A.A.
39 Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s decree terminating Mother’s rights to A.A., and
we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
Susanna Dokupil Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.