In the Interest of A. H., a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services
This text of In the Interest of A. H., a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services (In the Interest of A. H., a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued April 3, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00772-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF A.H., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 306th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 22CP0026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated appeal,1 appellant, mother, challenges the trial court’s
order, entered after a bench trial, awarding the godparents of mother’s minor child,
1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4. A.H., managing conservatorship of A.H.2 and awarding mother possessory
conservatorship.3 Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
Mother’s court-appointed counsel, Marcela Ortiz-Taing, filed a motion to
withdraw, along with an Anders brief, asserting that mother’s appeal is without merit
and there are no arguable grounds for reversal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgment but deny counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
Discussion
The procedures set forth in Anders are applicable to an appeal from the trial
court’s order in a suit brought by the Department of Family and Protective Services
for the protection of a child, for conservatorship, or for termination of parental rights
when the appointed attorney concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues to
assert on appeal. See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.); see also In re Interest G.C.L., No. 01-23-00591-CV, 2024 WL
234744, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
An attorney has an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal. In re
2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.005 (appointment of managing conservator); see also id. § 156.101 (grounds for modification of order establishing conservatorship or possession and access). 3 See id. § 153.006 (appointment of possessory conservator); see also id. § 156.101 (grounds for modification of order establishing conservatorship or possession and access).
2 Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). If counsel determines the
case is wholly frivolous, the attorney is obligated to withdraw. Id. at 406. Counsel’s
obligation to the appellate court is to assure, through an appellate brief, that a
complete review of the record supports the request to withdraw. Id. at 407.
Counsel’s brief meets the minimum requirements of Anders. In her brief,
mother’s court-appointed counsel presents her professional evaluation of the record
and explains why no arguable grounds exist for reversal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at
744.
Counsel informed the Court that she provided mother with a copy of her brief
and informed her of her right to file a response to counsel’s Anders brief and examine
the appellate record. Counsel also provided mother with a form motion to obtain the
appellate record and the mailing address for the Court.4 See Kelly v. State, 436
S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.
Mother did not request a copy of the record or file a response to the Anders brief.
4 This Court also notified mother that court-appointed counsel had filed an Anders brief and informed mother that she had a right to examine the appellate record in the appeal and file a response to her counsel’s Anders brief. And this Court provided mother with a form motion to access the appellate record. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
3 We have conducted our own review of the entire record and counsel’s Anders
brief. See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d at 67. We agree with counsel’s assessment that
the appeal is frivolous and without merit.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court. We deny court-appointed counsel’s
motion to withdraw from representing mother. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016) (stating motion to withdraw brought in court of appeals may be
premature); In re G.C.L., 2024 WL 234744, at *2 (denying appointed-counsel’s
motion to withdraw because counsel’s duty to his client extended through exhaustion
or waiver of all appeals); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 582–83 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (denying appointed-counsel’s motion to withdraw).
Counsel’s duty to her client extends through the exhaustion or waiver of “all
appeals.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.016(2)(B). Thus, if mother wishes to pursue
an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, “appointed counsel’s obligations can be
satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders
brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Guiney.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
In the Interest of A. H., a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-a-h-a-child-v-department-of-family-and-protective-texapp-2025.