in the Interes of Z.R.P. and D.A.P.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 20, 2013
Docket05-12-00134-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interes of Z.R.P. and D.A.P. (in the Interes of Z.R.P. and D.A.P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interes of Z.R.P. and D.A.P., (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed May 20, 2013.

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-12-00134-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.R.P. AND D.A.P.

On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 02-16453-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, Francis, and Fillmore Opinion by Justice O’Neill This appeal involves the October 18, 2011 order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship. Rodney Purdue, the biological father of Z.R.P. and D.A.P., argues the trial court

abused its discretion by determining it was in the best interest of the children to change primary

custody with the right to designate residence from him to the children’s maternal grandmother

and step-grandfather. We affirm the trial court’s order.

Background

Purdue and the children’s biological mother never married. Z.R.P. was born in April

2000 and D.A.P. was born in June 2001. A petition to establish the parent-child relationship was

filed on December 10, 2002, and the parents entered into an agreed order establishing the parent-

child relationship on January 21, 2003. The order named the parents joint managing

conservators and limited the children’s domicile to Dallas County and the contiguous counties.

The children resided primarily with their mother, and Purdue received standard possession. Purdue entered the military in October 2004. He participated in basic training in Georgia,

but later was stationed in Washington. He saw the children twice a year from October 2004 to

April 2006.

The children’s mother died in 2006. Because of Purdue’s military obligations, the

children lived with their maternal grandmother and step-grandfather for the next two years.

Purdue saw the children briefly in December 2006, and they spent a week with him in

Washington in December 2007.

Purdue left the military in 2008, and the trial court entered an order designating him as

the children’s conservator with the right to designate their residence within the geographical

limitations of Dallas County and the contiguous counties. Because of difficulties finding

employment, Purdue re-enlisted with the military in January 2011. He filed a petition to lift the

domicile restriction because he wanted to move the children to Washington. The grandparents

filed a counter-petition asking to be appointed conservators with the exclusive right to determine

the children’s residence.

The trial court conducted a hearing on October 5, 2011. At the time, Purdue had already

moved to Washington, and the children were living with their step-mother at Purdue’s sister’s

home in Garland.

The court heard testimony from Purdue, the children’s counselor, the children’s paternal

aunt, the grandmother, and Diane Zilka, who performed the court-ordered social study. The trial

court determined it was in the best interest of the children to not lift the geographic restriction

and instead, changed the primary possession with the right to designate the children’s residence

from Purdue to the grandparents. This appeal followed.

–2– Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s decision regarding child custody, control, possession and

visitation under an abuse of discretion standard. In re K.L.W., 301 S.W.3d 423, 424–25 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). The trial court’s judgment will only be disturbed where the record

as a whole shows that the trial court abused its discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d

449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re K.L.W., 301 S.W.3d at 425. A trial court abuses its discretion when

it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or when it acts without reference to any guiding

principles. In re K.L.W., 301 S.W.3d at 425.

When the trial court appoints joint managing conservators, the court must designate the

conservator who has the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the child and must

either establish a geographic area within which the conservator shall maintain the child’s primary

residency or specify that there are no geographic restrictions. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

153.134(b)(1) (West 2008). In this case, the court ordered that “[Grandparents], as a nonparent

joint managing conservator, shall have the following rights and duties: 1. The exclusive right to

designate the primary residence of the children within Dallas and contiguous counties; . . . .”

“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in

determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.” TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 153.002 (West 2008). These types of cases are “intensely fact driven, which is

why courts have developed best-interest tests that consider and balance numerous factors.” Lenz

v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002).

In the context of residency restrictions and authorization of relocation, the supreme court

has instructed us to consider the public policies outlined in section 153.001(a), which provides

that the public policy of this state is to (1) assure that children will have frequent and continuing

contact with parents who have shown an ability to act in the best interest of the child; (2) provide

–3– a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and (3) encourage parents to share in the

rights and duties of raising their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their

marriage. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a)(1)–(3) (West 2008).

There is a wide array of other factors that can be relevant to the determination of a child’s

best interest involving a parental relocation. These include the (1) reasons for and against the

move, (2) education, health, and leisure opportunities afforded by the move, (3) accommodation

of the child’s special needs or talents, (4) effect of extended family relationships, (5) effect on

visitation and communication with the noncustodial parent, (6) noncustodial parent’s ability to

relocate, and (7) the child’s age. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16. We may also consider the general

factors relevant to the best interest of a child, such as (1) the child’s desires, (2) the child’s

current and future physical and emotional needs, (3) any physical or emotional danger to the

child in the present or future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals involved, (5) the

programs available to those individuals to promote the child’s best interest, (6) the plans for the

child by these individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) acts or omissions by a parent tending

to show that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the

acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

Discussion

Purdue argues on appeal that the trial court disregarded the testimony of Cathleen

Caballero, the children’s counselor, and instead, relied solely on the social study and testimony

of Diane Zilka, the family court counselor. He contends Caballero was in a better position to

determine what was in the children’s best interest because she spent over a year counseling them,

whereas Zilka based her conclusions on “only six sessions, two of which included a limited

number [of] interviews with the children.”

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Related

Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
Lenz v. Lenz
79 S.W.3d 10 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
Gillespie v. Gillespie
644 S.W.2d 449 (Texas Supreme Court, 1982)

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