J-S39030-25
2026 PA Super 128
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: J.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1661 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000035-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: J.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1662 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000469-2023
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 18, 2026
Appellant J.D. (Mother) appeals from the order changing the
dependency goal for R.D. (Child) to adoption and the decree terminating her
parental rights to Child.1 We affirm the goal change order, vacate the
termination decree, and remand with instructions.
____________________________________________
1 R.D. is also identified in the caption of the adoption docket as “Baby Girl [D.]” See Docket No. 469-2023, Trial Ct. Order, 6/2/25. J-S39030-25
By way of background, Child was born in January of 2022 and tested
positive for cocaine at birth. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 2. Shortly after
her birth, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) obtained an
order of protective custody and placed Child in the care of S.W. (Foster
Mother), where Child presently remains in placement. See id.; see also N.T.,
6/2/25, at 4. Child was adjudicated dependent on February 8, 2022. See
Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 2. Over the following two years and nine months,
the trial court held eight permanency review hearings in Child’s case. See id.
at 3-6. The trial court appointed Neal M. Masciantonio, Esq., as guardian ad
litem (GAL) for Child on January 14, 2022, and then subsequently appointed
James J. DeMarco, Esq., as GAL for Child on June 7, 2022. Attorney DeMarco
appeared as GAL for Child for the remainder of Child’s dependency
proceedings. See, e.g., Dependency Ct. Order, 7/12/22; Dependency Ct.
Order, 4/15/22.
At a permanency review hearing on November 12, 2024, the trial court
found that Child was “developmentally on target” and “doing well.”
Dependency Ct. Order, 11/12/24, at 2. The trial court made similar findings
in prior permanency review orders. See Dependency Ct. Order, 7/2/24, at 1;
Dependency Ct. Order, 3/7/23, at 1.
On November 14, 2024, DHS filed a petition for involuntary termination
of parental rights (TPR) to Child. The trial court heard the petition on June 2,
2025. Mother was not present at the TPR hearing. See N.T., 6/2/25, at 4-5.
However, Mother’s counsel, Lawrence J. O’Connor, Esq., was present and
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conceded that “reasonable efforts were probably made” to serve Mother with
notice of the hearing. Id. at 5. Also present was Attorney DeMarco, who was
identified as “Child Advocate” in the transcript. Id. at 2. At the TPR hearing,
DHS presented the testimony of Dr. Jennifer Cole-Pucci, a clinical and forensic
psychologist; Javon Taltoan, a Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) case
manager; and Jasmine Brown, a visitation coach.
Dr. Cole-Pucci was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology, as well
as in parenting capacity and bonding evaluation. See id. at 7. Dr. Cole-Pucci
testified that she performed a parenting capacity evaluation of Mother on July
12, 2024 and a bonding evaluation of Mother and Child on July 25, 2024. See
id. at 8-9. Child was two and a half years old at the time of these evaluations.
Dr. Cole-Pucci testified that during the bonding evaluation Child wanted to
play with toys rather than remain seated in Mother’s lap but Mother did not
notice Child’s “cues” or “desire for independent play.” Id. at 22-23. Dr. Cole-
Pucci noted that as a result Child got frustrated, stomped her feet, and began
“whining in protest.” Id. Dr. Cole-Pucci opined that while there was a bond
between Mother and Child, it was not a strong bond and that Child sought
Mother for comfort but was also frustrated with Mother. Id. at 29; see also
id. at 37 (reiterating that Child became frustrated with Mother during the
bonding evaluation interaction).
Dr. Cole-Pucci’s bonding evaluation report reflects that, at the time of
the evaluation, Child could say words such as “ball” and “bye bye,” sing the
alphabet song, answer questions such as “‘what color is this?’” and understand
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when told to wait before taking an action. DHS Ex. 7, Bonding Eval., 9/7/24,
at 8-10 (unpaginated and some formatting altered).
Ms. Taltoan testified that she had been Child’s case manager for the
past one and a half years and, during this period, observed Child with Foster
Mother about once a month, a total of approximately fifteen observations.
N.T., 6/2/25, at 41-42, 63, 66. She also observed Child with Mother a “few
times.” Id. at 62. Comparing Child’s bond with Mother to Child’s bond with
Foster Mother, Ms. Taltoan testified that Child responds to Mother in a
“disconnected” way, similar to how Child responds to Ms. Taltoan. Id.
Conversely, Ms. Taltoan noted that Child is affectionate with Foster Mother
and that Child typically seeks out Foster Mother for her needs. Id. Further,
Ms. Taltoan testified that Child refers to Foster Mother as “mom” but does not
“really call [Mother] anything.” Id. at 64, 66-67. Ms. Taltoan described Child
as “doing really well in [Foster Mother’s] home” and explained that Child was
already reading and was “so happy” in the home. Id. at 65.2 Ms. Taltoan
also testified that she had notified Mother of the TPR hearing date in person
after the previous court date. Id. at 44-45.
Ms. Brown testified that she had served as the visitation coach for Child
and Mother since May of 2023. Id. at 74. Ms. Brown stated that, during the
2 We note that Ms. Taltoan testified that Child was four years old. See N.T., 6/2/25, at 65. However, the record reflects that Child was in fact aged three and half years at the time of the TPR hearing. See Termination Petition, 11/14/24, Ex. A (Child’s birth certificate).
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visits, Child never said “I miss you” to Mother and that Child typically led the
visits by choosing the toys and activities. Id. at 75. Ms. Brown testified that
Child did not show any signs of a bond with Mother, that Mother’s presence in
the room did not affect Child, and that Child would be happy in the visitation
room with only the toys and Ms. Brown. Id. at 76-77.
At closing arguments, Attorney DeMarco argued for the termination of
Mother’s parental rights in part because Child had been with Foster Mother for
years, had bonded with Foster Mother, referred to Foster Mother as her
“mother,” and was being well cared for by Foster Mother. Id. at 79. At the
conclusion of the TPR hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing
evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and to change
Child’s dependency goal to adoption. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 1; see
also N.T., 6/2/25, at 79. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and a
concurrent concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. 3
On appeal, Mother raises the following claims:
1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
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J-S39030-25
2026 PA Super 128
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: J.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1661 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000035-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: J.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1662 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000469-2023
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 18, 2026
Appellant J.D. (Mother) appeals from the order changing the
dependency goal for R.D. (Child) to adoption and the decree terminating her
parental rights to Child.1 We affirm the goal change order, vacate the
termination decree, and remand with instructions.
____________________________________________
1 R.D. is also identified in the caption of the adoption docket as “Baby Girl [D.]” See Docket No. 469-2023, Trial Ct. Order, 6/2/25. J-S39030-25
By way of background, Child was born in January of 2022 and tested
positive for cocaine at birth. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 2. Shortly after
her birth, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) obtained an
order of protective custody and placed Child in the care of S.W. (Foster
Mother), where Child presently remains in placement. See id.; see also N.T.,
6/2/25, at 4. Child was adjudicated dependent on February 8, 2022. See
Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 2. Over the following two years and nine months,
the trial court held eight permanency review hearings in Child’s case. See id.
at 3-6. The trial court appointed Neal M. Masciantonio, Esq., as guardian ad
litem (GAL) for Child on January 14, 2022, and then subsequently appointed
James J. DeMarco, Esq., as GAL for Child on June 7, 2022. Attorney DeMarco
appeared as GAL for Child for the remainder of Child’s dependency
proceedings. See, e.g., Dependency Ct. Order, 7/12/22; Dependency Ct.
Order, 4/15/22.
At a permanency review hearing on November 12, 2024, the trial court
found that Child was “developmentally on target” and “doing well.”
Dependency Ct. Order, 11/12/24, at 2. The trial court made similar findings
in prior permanency review orders. See Dependency Ct. Order, 7/2/24, at 1;
Dependency Ct. Order, 3/7/23, at 1.
On November 14, 2024, DHS filed a petition for involuntary termination
of parental rights (TPR) to Child. The trial court heard the petition on June 2,
2025. Mother was not present at the TPR hearing. See N.T., 6/2/25, at 4-5.
However, Mother’s counsel, Lawrence J. O’Connor, Esq., was present and
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conceded that “reasonable efforts were probably made” to serve Mother with
notice of the hearing. Id. at 5. Also present was Attorney DeMarco, who was
identified as “Child Advocate” in the transcript. Id. at 2. At the TPR hearing,
DHS presented the testimony of Dr. Jennifer Cole-Pucci, a clinical and forensic
psychologist; Javon Taltoan, a Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) case
manager; and Jasmine Brown, a visitation coach.
Dr. Cole-Pucci was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology, as well
as in parenting capacity and bonding evaluation. See id. at 7. Dr. Cole-Pucci
testified that she performed a parenting capacity evaluation of Mother on July
12, 2024 and a bonding evaluation of Mother and Child on July 25, 2024. See
id. at 8-9. Child was two and a half years old at the time of these evaluations.
Dr. Cole-Pucci testified that during the bonding evaluation Child wanted to
play with toys rather than remain seated in Mother’s lap but Mother did not
notice Child’s “cues” or “desire for independent play.” Id. at 22-23. Dr. Cole-
Pucci noted that as a result Child got frustrated, stomped her feet, and began
“whining in protest.” Id. Dr. Cole-Pucci opined that while there was a bond
between Mother and Child, it was not a strong bond and that Child sought
Mother for comfort but was also frustrated with Mother. Id. at 29; see also
id. at 37 (reiterating that Child became frustrated with Mother during the
bonding evaluation interaction).
Dr. Cole-Pucci’s bonding evaluation report reflects that, at the time of
the evaluation, Child could say words such as “ball” and “bye bye,” sing the
alphabet song, answer questions such as “‘what color is this?’” and understand
-3- J-S39030-25
when told to wait before taking an action. DHS Ex. 7, Bonding Eval., 9/7/24,
at 8-10 (unpaginated and some formatting altered).
Ms. Taltoan testified that she had been Child’s case manager for the
past one and a half years and, during this period, observed Child with Foster
Mother about once a month, a total of approximately fifteen observations.
N.T., 6/2/25, at 41-42, 63, 66. She also observed Child with Mother a “few
times.” Id. at 62. Comparing Child’s bond with Mother to Child’s bond with
Foster Mother, Ms. Taltoan testified that Child responds to Mother in a
“disconnected” way, similar to how Child responds to Ms. Taltoan. Id.
Conversely, Ms. Taltoan noted that Child is affectionate with Foster Mother
and that Child typically seeks out Foster Mother for her needs. Id. Further,
Ms. Taltoan testified that Child refers to Foster Mother as “mom” but does not
“really call [Mother] anything.” Id. at 64, 66-67. Ms. Taltoan described Child
as “doing really well in [Foster Mother’s] home” and explained that Child was
already reading and was “so happy” in the home. Id. at 65.2 Ms. Taltoan
also testified that she had notified Mother of the TPR hearing date in person
after the previous court date. Id. at 44-45.
Ms. Brown testified that she had served as the visitation coach for Child
and Mother since May of 2023. Id. at 74. Ms. Brown stated that, during the
2 We note that Ms. Taltoan testified that Child was four years old. See N.T., 6/2/25, at 65. However, the record reflects that Child was in fact aged three and half years at the time of the TPR hearing. See Termination Petition, 11/14/24, Ex. A (Child’s birth certificate).
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visits, Child never said “I miss you” to Mother and that Child typically led the
visits by choosing the toys and activities. Id. at 75. Ms. Brown testified that
Child did not show any signs of a bond with Mother, that Mother’s presence in
the room did not affect Child, and that Child would be happy in the visitation
room with only the toys and Ms. Brown. Id. at 76-77.
At closing arguments, Attorney DeMarco argued for the termination of
Mother’s parental rights in part because Child had been with Foster Mother for
years, had bonded with Foster Mother, referred to Foster Mother as her
“mother,” and was being well cared for by Foster Mother. Id. at 79. At the
conclusion of the TPR hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing
evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and to change
Child’s dependency goal to adoption. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 1; see
also N.T., 6/2/25, at 79. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and a
concurrent concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. 3
On appeal, Mother raises the following claims:
1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(1) without clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s intent to relinquish her parental claim or refusal to perform her parental duties.
2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(2) without clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s present incapacity to perform parental duties.
3 Mother filed two separate notices of appeal, one in the dependency case and
one in the adoption case. This Court consolidated the appeals on July 31, 2025. See Order, 7/31/25.
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3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§§] 2511(a)(5) and (8) without clear and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were made by [DHS] to provide Mother with additional services and that the conditions that led to placement of [] Child continue to exist.
4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b) without clear and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between Mother and [] Child and that termination would serve the best interest of [] Child.
5. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 6351 without clear and convincing evidence that adoption is in [] Child’s best interest.
6. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 6351 without clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts were made by the servicing agency to reunify [] Child with Mother.
7. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal to adoption in contravention of the mandate of 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 6302 to preserve the unity of the family whenever possible.
Mother’s Brief at 8 (some formatting altered).
Before we review Mother’s claims, we must first address Child’s right to
legal counsel in the contested TPR proceedings. See In re Adoption of
K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1224, 1235-36 (Pa. 2020) (holding that appellate
courts should review sua sponte whether the trial court appointed counsel to
represent a child’s legal interests in TPR proceedings and, in the event that
the same attorney was appointed to represent a child’s best interests as well
as legal interests, whether the trial court determined that there was no conflict
between these interests prior to making the appointment); see also In re
H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2023) (same).
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Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part:
The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child and the adopting parent or parents.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).
In applying Section 2313(a), our Supreme Court has recognized that
where “a child’s legal interests conflict with the child’s best interests, those
interests must be represented by separate individuals during the termination
proceedings to ensure that the child’s legal interests are presented to the
[trial] court.” K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1234 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at
1236 (concluding that “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best and
legal interest if those interests conflict” (citing In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080,
1082 (Pa. 2018))).
Specifically, the K.M.G. Court held that where a trial court
has appointed a GAL/Counsel to represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests, appellate courts should review sua sponte whether the [trial] court made a determination that those interests did not conflict. . . .
[T]he [trial] court must determine whether counsel can represent the dual interests before appointing an individual to serve as GAL/Counsel for a child. . . . [A]ppellate courts should verify that the [trial] court indicated that the attorney could represent the child’s best interests and legal interests without conflict. . . .
[The appellate court’s] sua sponte review . . . evaluate[s] (1) whether the [trial] court appointed counsel to represent the legal
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interests of the child[] and[,] (2) if the appointed counsel also serves as GAL, whether the [trial] court determined that the child’s best interests and legal interests did not conflict.
Id. at 1235-36 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
After K.M.G., our Supreme Court in In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d 955 (Pa.
2021) addressed how to determine whether such a conflict exists, recognizing
that children “fall within a wide range of ages, maturity levels, and emotional
capacity that all factor into a child’s ability to express a preference.” P.G.F.,
247 A.3d at 966. Within this range, there
may be a child who understands to some degree what is at stake in the proceedings, and who is capable of expressing some preference, but who is unable to do so in a fully informed and articulate fashion. In these instances, an attorney must make reasonable, but at the same time prudent, efforts to discern the child’s desires.
Id.
Subsequently, in In re Adoption of A.C.M., 333 A.3d 704 (Pa. Super.
2025), this Court noted that
in K.M.G., our Supreme Court clearly stated the primary role of trial courts in determining whether children in contested [TPR] proceedings require separate legal and best interests’ counsel. To fulfill its statutory duty under Section [] 2313, the [trial] court[] must . . . make that determination prior to appointment.
A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708 (citations omitted, emphasis original, some
formatting altered). A trial court’s failure to “appoint an attorney to represent
the child’s legal interests, i.e., the child’s preferred outcome, . . . constitutes
structural error in the termination proceedings.” K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1224
(citing T.S., 192 A.3d at 1082); see also In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 183
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(Pa. 2017) (holding that “[t]he denial of mandated counsel compromises the
framework of the proceedings and constitutes a structural error”); see also
A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708.
In A.C.M., this Court concluded that the trial court committed structural
error in “assign[ing to the GAL] the responsibility of identifying any conflict of
interest” between counsel’s duties as GAL and as the child’s legal counsel.
A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708-09. Therefore, the A.C.M. Court remanded for the
trial court to hold a hearing to determine if a conflict existed between the
child’s best interests and legal interests. See id. at 709. If no conflict existed,
the trial court was to re-enter the TPR order and, if a conflict existed, the trial
court was to hold a new TPR hearing where the child would be represented by
separate legal counsel. See id.; see also L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 183.
In determining whether a structural error occurred, our Supreme Court
has stated there is no error when a trial court fails to appoint separate legal
counsel for the child when the subject “child’s wishes [could not] be
ascertained.” T.S., 192 A.3d at 1089. Specifically, the T.S. Court explained
that where “the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment
because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict
between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests.” Id. at 1092;
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see also In re N.M.D., 430 WDA 2025, 2026 WL 92201, at *4 (Pa. Super.
filed Jan. 13, 2026) (unpublished mem.).4
Here, the record reflects that the trial court did not issue any further
orders appointing counsel for Child after DHS filed the TPR petition, and
Attorney DeMarco continued to appear on Child’s behalf in the TPR
proceedings. The record does not indicate that the trial court made a
determination as to whether there was a conflict between Child’s best interests
and legal interests prior to Attorney DeMarco’s appointment on June 7, 2022,
or at any other time during the TPR proceedings. See K.M.G., 240 A.3d at
1234-36; A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708. Further, the record does not reflect that
any party addressed Child’s “preferred outcome” in the proceedings, the
interest that the Section 2313(a) right to counsel is intended to protect. 5 See
K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1224; T.S., 192 A.3d at 1082; L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 183;
A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708; N.M.D., 2026 WL 92201, at *4. Accordingly, we
are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred by failing to appoint
Section 2313(a) counsel for Child and/or failing to place a determination on ____________________________________________
4 We may cite to unpublished memorandum decisions of the Superior Court
filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
5 DHS in its brief states that Attorney DeMarco appropriately “represented both Child’s best interests as [GAL] and legal interests as child advocate, in accordance with [Section] 2313(a).” DHS’ Brief at 6, n.5 (citing T.S., 192 A.3d at 1088). DHS describes the T.S. presumption as applicable “where a child is too young to express a subjective, articulable preference.” See id. We disagree that the record sufficiently supports such a conclusion, as the trial court made no determination on the record addressing any conflict in Child’s interests and, further, the record does not support DHS’ contention that Child could not express a preference.
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the record stating that there was no conflict between Child’s best interests
and legal interests such that Attorney DeMarco could serve in a dual capacity.
See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a); K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1234, 1236; see also T.S.,
192 A.3d at 1082; A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708; L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 183.
Further, as noted previously, although Child was young, she was not
‘pre-verbal’ and there is no indication that Child’s wishes could not be
ascertained. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1089; N.M.D., 2026 WL 92201, at *4. At
the time of the TPR hearing, Child was approximately three and a half years
old and the trial court had consistently found that Child was “developmentally
on target” and “doing well.” See, e.g., Dependency Ct. Order, 11/12/24, at
2. Dr. Cole-Pucci’s testimony reflected that, by the time Child was two and
half years old, Child was able to communicate her preferences, including her
frustration with Mother’s failure to respond to Child’s preferences. See N.T.,
6/2/25, at 23. Approximately one year before the TPR hearing, Child already
had some verbal ability, as she could sing, answer simple questions, and
understand simple instructions. See DHS Ex. 7, Bonding Eval., 9/7/24, at 8-
10. Additionally, Ms. Taltoan’s testimony reflects that by the time of the TPR
hearing Child referred to Foster Mother as “mom” but did not call Mother
anything. Id. at 64-65. Most compellingly, Ms. Taltoan testified that Child
already knew how to read and was “so happy” and “doing really well” in Foster
Mother’s home. Id. at 65.
The record does not support a conclusion that Child was incapable of
expressing her preferences, nor that efforts were made to ascertain Child’s
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desired outcome. Where a child has some ability to articulate a preferred
outcome, counsel for the child must make “efforts to discern the child’s
desires.” P.G.F., 247 A.3d at 966. Here, while Child was quite young – three
and a half years old at the TPR proceedings – nonetheless she could express
her preferences. Consequently, we are unable to apply the T.S. presumption
that there was no conflict between Child’s best interests and legal interests.
See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1089; N.M.D., 2026 WL 92201, at *4. Accordingly, on
this record, we are constrained to find that the trial court committed a
structural error in failing to appoint Section 2313(a) counsel for Child. See
K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1234, 1236; A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708; L.B.M., 161 A.3d
at 183. We therefore vacate the TPR decree below and remand for further
proceedings in the adoption matter. See K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1234, 1236;
A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 708; L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 183. We do not, however,
disturb the trial court’s goal change order in the dependency matter.
Consistent with Section 2313(a), K.M.G., and A.C.M., upon remittal of
the record, the trial court shall hold a hearing to determine whether there is
a conflict between Child’s best interests and legal interests that would prevent
Attorney DeMarco from serving in a dual capacity. See K.M.G., 240 A.3d at
1234-36; A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 709. If the trial court determines that no
conflict exists, it shall re-enter its order terminating Mother’s parental rights,
which will constitute a final, appealable order. See A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 709
(citing In re A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563, 570 (Pa. Super. 2022)). If the trial
court determines that there is a conflict between Child’s best interests and
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legal interests, then the trial court shall appoint separate legal counsel for
Child and conduct a new TPR hearing. See id.; see also K.M.G., 240 A.3d
at 1235. Notwithstanding our vacatur of the trial court’s TPR decree of June
2, 2025, we do not disturb Child’s placement with Foster Mother, where she
has remained since shortly after birth. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/25, at 2. This
will maintain the status quo while the trial court addresses Child’s right to
counsel consistent with this memorandum.6
Goal change order affirmed. Termination order vacated. Remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 6/18/2026
6 Because we resolve this appeal based on Child’s right to legal counsel in the
TPR proceedings, we need not reach the merits of Mother’s claims.
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