In the Int. of: R.D., a Minor

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER :

: : : : : No. 770 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-58-DP-0000046-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

APPEAL OF: N.C., MOTHER :

: : : : : No. 1716 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Orphans' Court at No(s): 9-AD-2025

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER :

: : : : : No. 428 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 13, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Juvenile Division at No(s): 9-AD-2025

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2026

N.C. (Mother) and D.D. (Father) appeal from decisions of the

Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas related to their now over three-

and-a-half-year-old daughter, R.D. (the Child). Both parties challenge the

orphans’ court’s involuntary termination of their parental rights to the Child,

pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (b).

Additionally, Father challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his motion for

visitation with the Child. Because these appeals raise similar issues and

involve the same facts and circumstances, we address the parents’ appeals

together in one decision. After review, we affirm.

The orphans’ court made the following factual findings in its Appellate

Rule 1925(a) opinion related to the termination of Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights:

The Agency began providing parenting and caseworker services in this matter in January 2023 in an attempt to ensure the Child’s safety and prevent court intervention. [The Agency caseworker] testified that this was after the Agency had received a concerning report of Mother’s drug use when the Child had been born [in] December [] 2022. When the Agency made contact with Mother and Father in Scranton, they were sent for drug screens, which both came back positive for fentanyl. The Agency came up with a

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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safety plan, which placed the Child with Father’s aunt until Mother and Father had a few clear drug screens and the apartment was deemed safe to return to. After six months of Mother and Father maintaining sobriety, Mother and Father completing a parenting class, Father finding work, and Mother and Father receiving six months of rental assistance, the Agency closed the case in July 2023.

However, in September 2023, the Agency began receiving reports of Mother’s and Father’s potential relapses in drug use. Mother stopped attending suboxone treatment for her opioid addiction and stopped reporting to Healthy Moms appointments after July 31, 2023. The Agency also received reports that the Child was very sick. Despite attempts to make contact with Mother, Father and the Child at their home and at family members’ homes, the Agency had difficulties finding them. [. . .]

The Agency filed a dependency petition for the Child on October 5, 2023. [The Agency caseworker] testified that Mother was arrested sometime thereafter, and that when she went to see Mother in jail, that Mother had admitted to methamphetamine usage. Shortly thereafter, Father was picked up by Great Bend police on a warrant for violating his probation, and admitted to methamphetamine usage. The Child was removed from Mother and Father’s parental care and placed in [a] kinship foster home []. The Child was adjudicated dependent on November 1, 2023. [. . .]

The first permanency review hearing occurred on March 21, 2024, at which point the Child had been in placement for five months. As of the March 2024 review hearing, Mother had tested positive for methamphetamines as recently as March 1, 2024. Mother’s compliance with the permanency plan and progress towards remedying the conditions that necessitated placement were rated as minimal. [. . .]

At said review hearing, Father’s compliance with the permanency plan and progress towards remedying the circumstances that necessitated placement were rated as minimal. Though Father was participating in visitation at that time, his last in-person contact with the Child was on

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February 16, 2024. [. . .] Between his release from custody in December 2023 and the March 2024 review hearing, Father was unsuccessfully discharged from Trehab for drug and alcohol treatment.

[. . .]

At the August 29, 2024 permanency review hearing, at which point the Child had been in placement for approximately ten months, Mother was deemed to have had no compliance with the permanency plan and to have made no progress towards remedying the circumstances necessitating placement. Mother was incarcerated as of the date of this review hearing. [. . .]

At said review hearing, Father was deemed to have had no compliance with the permanency plan, as Father had had no contact with the Agency or the Child since his last visit on February 16, 2024. At the time of the review hearing, Father had a warrant out for his arrest for a probation violation, and his whereabouts were unknown. [The Agency caseworker] testified that Father was absconding from law enforcement. It was also deemed that Father had made no progress toward remedying the circumstances which necessitated placement.

Since Father had not seen the Child in excess of six months, the Agency filed a petition seeking a finding of aggravated circumstances. On September 17, 2024, the [c]ourt entered an Aggravated Circumstances Order regarding Father, finding clear and convincing evidence that the Child was in the custody of the County Children and Youth Services Agency and that Father, whose whereabouts were unknown, had failed to maintain substantial and continuing contact with the Child for a period of six months. The [c]ourt ordered that no efforts were to be made to preserve the family and reunify the Child with Father.

[. . .]

The next permanency review hearing occurred on October 24, 2024, at which point the Child had been in dependency for approximately twelve months. As of the

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October 2024 hearing, Mother’s compliance and progress were rated as minimal [and “no”, respectively]. In November 2024, Mother was released from custody to an inpatient program at Gaudenzia for drug and alcohol treatment. She successfully completed this program and was released to White Birch halfway house in December 2024. [. . .]

Visitation began with Mother at White Birch in December 2024. [The Agency caseworker] testified that, after visits began, the Child’s foster family began reporting negative behaviors from the Child, such as waking up screaming in the middle of the night and expressing increased aggression toward her foster siblings. The Child’s daycare providers similarly reported an increase in negative behaviors after visitation, including not staying down for naps, throwing food at mealtimes, and expressing aggression toward other children at daycare.

At the October 2024 review hearing, the [c]ourt found that Father had had no compliance with the permanency plan and had made no progress toward remedying the circumstances which necessitated placement. Father was incarcerated at the Susquehanna County Correctional Facility on twenty-one (21) pending criminal charges. Father had not inquired as to the Child’s welfare for a matter of months and had only asked for visitation once during his incarceration. [. . .] [The Agency caseworker] testified that, following that request, Father made no inquiries regarding the Child’s well-being and provided no information to the Agency regarding any progress he was making.

The next permanency review hearing occurred on January 22, 2025, at which point the Child had been in dependency for approximately fifteen months, and at which point the Child’s placement goal was changed from a goal of reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption to a goal of adoption with a concurrent goal of reunification. As of this hearing, Mother’s compliance was rated as moderate and Mother’s progress towards remedying the circumstances which necessitated placement was rated as minimal. Though Mother was on Susquehanna County Drug Treatment Court, was employed while at White Birch, and

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was receiving mental health services, Mother still did not have safe housing for the Child to return to. Additionally, the Child’s sleep had been negatively affected following the three visits between Mother and the Child that had occurred since the last permanency review hearing in October.

Several visitations occurred via Zoom in March 2025, at which point the behaviors calmed down. [. . .]

At said review hearing, Father’s compliance with the permanency plan was deemed minimal as, though Father was incarcerated and had not seen his child in nearly a year, he was engaging in drug and alcohol services while incarcerated. Father’s progress toward remedying the circumstances which necessitated placement was deemed minimal.

On May 5, 2025, the Agency filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. Father filed a Motion to Modify Visitation on May 12, 2025. Said Motion was ultimately denied. In June 2025, visitation with Mother was temporarily suspended, at which point the Child’s behaviors levelled out.

The last permanency review hearing took place on July 31, 2025. On July 31, 2025, Mother was found to be in moderate compliance with the permanency plan [. . . .]

At said review hearing, Mother was deemed to have made moderate progress toward remedying the circumstances which necessitated placement. [. . .]

At said review hearing, Father’s compliance and progress were deemed minimal. During this review period, Father’s attorney had notified the Agency and had provided it with documentation that Father was engaged in inpatient treatment for substance abuse and mental health. [The Agency caseworker] testified that this information came from Father’s attorney and not Father, and that Father did not reach out to inquire about the Child’s well-being despite Father having to check in with the probation department, which is located in the same building as the Agency.

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Orphans’ Court Opinion (O.C.O.), 11/13/25, at 4-10 (the Child’s initials

removed).

The orphans’ court held a termination hearing on September 25 and

October 9, 2025. At the hearing, the Child was represented by her guardian

ad litem (GAL) from the dependency proceedings.1, 2 The Agency presented

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1 Our Supreme Court has mandated that appellate courts sua sponte “verify

that the orphans’ court indicated that the attorney [in a dual role of GAL and legal counsel] could represent the child’s best interests and legal interests without conflict.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). Counsel representing a child’s legal interests must advocate for the child’s preferred outcome even if counsel does not agree with it, whereas the GAL representing a child’s best interests must express what the GAL “believes is best for the child’s care, protection, safety, and wholesome physical and mental development regardless of whether the child agrees.” In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

Here, before the termination hearing, in its order appointing the GAL to serve as the Child’s legal counsel, the orphans’ court found “that there is no conflict of interest between the [C]hild’s best interest and the [C]hild’s legal interest and that there is no impediment to this attorney [the GAL] being appointed as legal counsel for this” Child. Orphans’ Court Order, 6/30/25. Additionally, the Child was a little under three years old as of the termination hearing. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1088 (recognizing that “where a child is too young to express a preference, it would be appropriate for the GAL to represent the child’s best and legal interests simultaneously” (citations omitted)). Given the orphans’ court’s finding and the Child’s age, we determine that the orphans’ court fulfilled the mandate of K.M.G. and Section 2313(a).

2 The Child’s GAL/legal counsel failed to file a brief in these matters or advise

us that counsel was joining the Agency’s, Mother’s, or Father’s brief. We remind counsel that their duty to the Child extends through any appeals. Nevertheless, based on counsel’s closing argument to the court at the termination hearing, we surmise that counsel supported Mother’s and Father’s parental rights being terminated and the Child being adopted. See N.T., 10/9/25, at 125-26.

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the testimony of the Child’s family doctor; a psychologist who evaluated

Mother and the Child; the Agency caseworker; and the Child’s Foster Mother.

Mother testified and presented the testimony of her probation officer. Father

testified. The orphans’ court ultimately terminated Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights.

Mother and Father timely filed these appeals.3 We will address Mother’s

appeal first. Mother presents the following three issues4 for our review:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency presented sufficient evidence and met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for involuntary termination of Biological Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2).

2. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the

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3 We note with displeasure that Father’s counsel failed to file a docketing statement and paper copies of his brief for his 428 MDA 2026 appeal, even after this Court ordered him to do so. Thus, the only reason this panel had paper copies of Father’s brief to review was because our Prothonotary’s office expended its own resources to provide us with paper copies. We remind Father that docketing statements and paper copies of briefs are required by our Appellate Rules. Pa.R.A.P. 3517; Pa.R.A.P. 124(c). Failure to file these items can result in this Court dismissing an appeal. We decline to do so here only because of Father’s and Mother’s other appeals that involve the same facts and circumstances and the important rights at stake in this appeal.

4 Mother listed a fourth issue in her statement of the questions presented, related to the orphans’ court’s alleged failure to appoint counsel for the Child to represent her interests in the termination proceedings. However, in her brief, Mother withdrew that question from our consideration. See Mother’s Brief at 7. Thus, we will not address it further, and we refer to our discussion of the orphans’ court’s appointment of legal counsel to represent the Child in footnote 1, supra.

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Agency presented sufficient evidence and met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for involuntary termination of Biological Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5).

3. Even if this Court determines the Agency presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of Biological Mother’s parental rights under either 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2) or (a)(5), whether the Trial Court nevertheless erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining termination of Biological Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the Minor Child under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 6-7 (suggested answers omitted).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108,

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1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving . . . the termination of parental rights, the appellate court

should review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence

supports that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate court should not search

the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court.”). The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a

highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the

court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also

support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Furthermore, the

“trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in

the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted).

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

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evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child . . . .

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted);

see also Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s rights under Section

2511(a)(2), (5), and (b).5 As we may affirm under any ground under Section

2511(a), we review the court’s decision as to Section 2511(a)(2). That

subsection provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

[. . .]

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

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5 The Agency’s termination petitions listed Section 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5) as

the grounds for termination for Mother, and Section 2511(a)(2) and (5) as the grounds for Father, but neither petition specifically listed (b). See Petitions for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 5/5/25. Nevertheless, the petitions discussed the Child’s best interests in a separate paragraph, including opining on the bond between the Child and her foster parents. The orphans’ court’s decree terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights but was silent as to which specific subsections the court was terminating under. Notwithstanding this omission, the court analyzed the Child’s best interests in its opinion. Moreover, Mother, Father, and all other parties to the case clearly understood that the court was terminating under Section 2511(a) and (b), and neither parent raised any issue with the Agency’s petition or the court’s procedure.

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necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(2), the petitioning party must establish: “(1)

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential

parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re

Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

Moreover, grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) “are not limited

to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied.” Id. (citation omitted). On this point, we emphasize that parents

“are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted).

On appeal, Mother argues that she was diligently working towards

meeting her parental duties, within a reasonable timeframe. Mother’s Brief at

24. She asserts that she demonstrated her continuing interest in the Child by

consistently requesting visitation and therapy with the Child and maintaining

steady communication with the Agency caseworker. Id. According to Mother,

she exhibited her determination and ability to be a capable parent to the Child

by treating her mental health and substance abuse issues. Id. at 24-25.

Moreover, the record does not support the finding that Mother was unable to

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provide permanent, safe housing for the Child. Id. at 25. Mother also

maintained full-time employment. Id. at 26.

The orphans’ court explained its rationale for terminating Mother’s

parental rights as follows:

Though Mother has moderately progressed toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement, it remains to be seen whether this progress is permanent or whether it will be subject to backslide. Though Mother has made improvements from just a few short months ago, the [c]ourt cannot ignore this relatively short term of progress in the context of an almost two-year dependency. Mother’s inconsistency in attending sessions at Trehab and the Wright Center, and her minimal progress in terms of mental health treatment at the Wright Center, do not assuage concerns of a potential regression in progress. Though Mother did reengage with Trehab, the fact that Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from this support for lack of compliance is worrying in light of concerns regarding (1) Mother’s sobriety and (2) her capacity to provide parental care and concern when not in a structured environment. Mother has every support she could possibly need right now and is still struggling to remain compliant with treatment. These developments weigh especially heavy considering they occurred after the filing of the Agency’s petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child: Mother had notice that her rights to the Child were in jeopardy at the time of these occurrences, yet they occurred, nonetheless.

O.C.O. at 14 (the Child’s initials omitted).

Here, the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision. Throughout the

case, Mother was consistently deemed to have “no” or “minimal” compliance

with the permanency plan and “no” or “minimal” progress towards alleviating

the circumstances which necessitated the Child’s placement. See N.T.,

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9/25/25, at 112, 118, 122. It was not until the January 2025 permanency

review, one year and three months after the Child was removed, that Mother

was deemed to have “moderate” compliance with the permanency plan for the

first time, although she had only made “minimal” progress. See id. at 130.

At the July 2025 permanency review, almost two years after the Child

had been removed, almost three months after the Agency filed the termination

petitions, and two months before the termination hearing, Mother was deemed

to be “moderate” in compliance and progress, for the first time. See id. at

137. However, even then, Mother had been unsuccessfully discharged from

Trehab, where she received drug and alcohol treatment, on July 14, 2025 due

to noncompliance with attendance (we note she reengaged on July 19). See

id. at 138. Although Mother was attending mental health counseling, there

was a concern regarding her consistency and compliance, and she had made

minimal progress. See id. The Agency caseworker testified that as of August

2025, there were still concerns about Mother missing appointments, being

inconsistent with treatment, and being discharged. See id. at 146-47.

Mother’s probation officer confirmed that Mother started the treatment court

program in November 2024, but in July 2025, Mother was still struggling with

missing treatment appointments. See N.T., 10/9/25, at 18.

Mother never progressed past supervised visits with the Child, and at

times her visits were suspended because of concerns for the Child. See N.T.,

9/25/25, at 132, 136-37, 145. Mother did not have suitable housing until

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September 2025, and the termination hearing began that month. See id. at

165.

Additionally, the caseworker explained that neither parent had

demonstrated an ability to maintain sobriety outside of a controlled

environment, as they were both still on probation. See id. at 146. Moreover,

throughout the case, neither parent maintained consistent contact with the

Agency and the Child, and they sometimes maintained no contact. See id. at

145-46.

We acknowledge Mother’s arguments that there was contrary evidence

in the record. However, we reiterate that it is not our function as an error-

correcting court to search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute our

judgment for that of the trial court. See S.K.L.R., supra. The record

supports the court’s decision; thus, we must affirm. See P.Z., supra; T.S.M.,

supra. Mother’s challenge to Section 2511(a)(2) merits no relief.

We turn next to Section 2511(b), the second part of the bifurcated

analysis in termination of parental rights cases. Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

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The “determination of the child’s particular developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis,” but

“courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [the

child’s] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above

concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa.

2023) (citations omitted); see also C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-62 (the focus of

Section 2511(a) is the conduct of the parent, whereas the focus of Section

2511(b) is the best interests of the child (citation omitted)).

“The plain language of Section 2511(b) clearly mandates that, in

assessing the petition to terminate parental rights, the ‘primary consideration’

must be the child’s ‘developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare.’” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. It is well-established that the child’s

“emotional needs” and “welfare” include “intangibles such as love, comfort,

security, and stability.” Id. at 1106 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267). Our

Supreme Court also requires courts to consider, not only whether the children

have a bond with their biological parent, but also whether the children are in

a pre-adoptive foster home and whether they have a bond with their foster

parents. Id. (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268; In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 677

(Pa. 2014)).

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental

rights was in the Child’s best interests. The court explained as follows:

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The termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve the Child’s best interests. By all accounts, the Child is wellcared for by her foster family. Her foster mother [] testified that the Child is happy in the [foster family’s] household and gets along well with her foster siblings. [Foster Mother] testified of her and her husband’s intent to adopt the Child and to form a post-adoption contact agreement with Mother in order to ensure the Child still has her in her life. The [foster parents] have engaged in parent-child interactive therapy with the Child to better manage the Child’s behaviors, and have gone above and beyond what is expected of them to care for the Child’s special health concerns. The [c]ourt sees that the Child has found stability in the life she has established with her foster family, and will not disrupt it for a future fraught with uncertainty. Though the [c]ourt finds that there is a bond between Mother and the Child, the Child’s responses to visitation and the uncertainty surrounding Mother’s ability to provide the Child with the parental care and concern she requires support severance of this bond to protect the Child’s best interests.

O.C.O. at 15-16 (the Child’s initials removed).

On appeal, Mother argues that the orphans’ court failed to consider that

Mother facilitated the strongest possible parent-child bond in light of the

Agency-imposed limitations on her access to, and contact with, the Child.

Mother’s Brief at 35. Mother asserts that she repeatedly requested both

therapy and visitation with the Child, and, on several occasions, the Agency

denied those requests or limited the format of visitation to Zoom visits. Id.

at 35-36 (citations omitted). Mother claims the Agency did not make

reasonable efforts towards reunification. See id. at 36, 39. According to

Mother, the orphans’ court also mistakenly assumed that visitation was the

direct cause of the Child’s behavioral issues. Id. at 37. Mother argues she

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demonstrated an ability to continue her rehabilitation in the future, and that

the orphans’ court bypassed analyzing the probable effects on the Child of

severing their bond. Id. at 38. Lastly, Mother notes that she was pregnant

at the time of the termination hearing, and Pennsylvania has a strong interest

in keeping siblings together.6 Id. at 42 (citations omitted).

Mother’s argument fails to appreciate the standard of review we must

apply in termination cases. We must accept the orphans’ court’s factual

findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record.

See T.S.M., supra.

Here, the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. By the time of

the termination hearing, the Child had been outside of Mother’s care for about

two years. The Child’s doctor recommended that visits with Mother be

suspended because the Child was having negative behaviors around the time

of the visits, and, in his opinion, the most obvious conclusion was that there

was a causal connection between the visits and the Child’s negative behaviors.

See N.T., 9/25/25, at 19, 21-22, 29-30. The Agency caseworker and Foster

Mother testified about the Child’s negative behaviors after the visits. See id.

at 125-26, 176-81. The psychologist who evaluated Mother and the Child

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6 We clarify that the record reflects that Mother was pregnant at the time of

the termination hearing, and Father was the father of her unborn child. Father also had four other children that he did not share with Mother, but he did not have custody of any of those children.

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strongly recommended that visits between Mother and the Child be by Zoom

only to prevent any further trauma to the Child, and in-person visits could be

attempted again if the Zoom visits went well. Id. at 71.

The psychologist also testified that if there was a bond between Mother

and the Child, it was minimal, and the Child would not be harmed by

termination. Id. at 70. Foster Mother testified that the foster family wanted

to adopt the Child and maintain contact with Mother and Father. See id. at

182. The Child called the foster parents “mom” and “dad” although Foster

Mother testified that the Child called Mother “mom” when viewing a picture.

See id. at 141, 181-82. Foster Mother also testified that the Child did not

talk about Mother when visits were not happening, and the Child told the

Foster Mother that she wanted to “stay here forever.” Id. at 182, 186. The

Agency caseworker confirmed that the foster family was pre-adoptive, met all

the Child’s needs, and their home was safe and appropriate. See id. at 143-

44. The Child also played like siblings with the other children in the foster

home. Id. at 142. The caseworker testified that it was not in the Child’s best

interest to be returned to either parent. Id. at 147.

As for Mother’s claim regarding reasonable efforts, the juvenile court

found in every permanency review order that the Agency had provided

reasonable efforts. See Permanency Review Orders, 3/25/24, 8/30/24,

10/25/24, 1/23/25, 8/4/25. The Agency caseworker testified that she

believed that the Agency did its due diligence in trying to reunify the family

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within the first twelve to fifteen months of the dependency case. N.T.,

9/25/25, at 148. She believed that the Agency had done everything it should

have done and made all reasonable efforts. See id. at 170. Moreover, even

if the Agency failed to provide reasonable efforts, that alone would not prevent

termination. See In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672-76 (Pa. 2014) (“Neither

[f]ather nor the Superior Court point to any Pennsylvania or federal provision

that requires delaying permanency for a child due to the failure of an agency

to provide reasonable services, when a court has otherwise held that grounds

for termination have been established and the court has determined that

termination is in the best interests of the child by clear and convincing

evidence.”).

As for Mother’s argument regarding keeping siblings together, the cases

Mother cites to support that proposition—Nomland v. Nomland, 813 A.2d

850 (Pa. Super. 2002) and In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983)—are

custody cases, not termination of parental rights cases (although Davis

included dependency and the involvement of children and youth services).

More importantly, both cases made clear that keeping siblings together is one

factor to be considered in determining the best interest of the child, but it

cannot be automatically elevated above all other factors. See Nomland, 813

A.2d at 855-56; Davis, 465 A.2d at 621. Thus, the mere fact that Mother

was pregnant with another child at the time of the termination hearing does

not outweigh the competent evidence of record that supported the orphans’

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court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. Mother’s challenge to Section

2511(b) merits no relief.

We now address Father’s appeal of the orphans’ court’s termination

decree. Father raises the following three issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in determining whether the Agency presented sufficient evidence for involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in determining whether the Agency presented sufficient evidence for involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5).

III. Even if this Court determines that the trial court properly determined that the Agency presented sufficient evidence for involuntary termination of parental rights, whether the court erred in finding that such termination was in the best interests of the Child.

Father’s Brief at 5 (excess capitalization and suggested answers omitted;

typographical errors corrected).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s rights under Section

2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b). Again, we may affirm under any subsection of

Section 2511(a). Thus, we begin with our analysis of Section 2511(a)(2),

incorporating our standard of review as described above.

Here, the orphans’ court determined that the Agency had proven the

statutory grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). The court

explained that:

Father has made no effort to see or even inquire as to the Child’s well-being besides a passing request for visitation

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after an Aggravated Circumstances Order had already been issued, and a request to modify visitation well over a year after he had last seen the Child, and only after a petition to terminate his parental rights had been filed. The Child has not seen Father in approximately a year and a half: she certainly has not been able to rely on Father for essential parental care, control and subsistence necessary for her physical and mental well-being.

[. . .]

The conditions which led to the Child’s removal continue to exist. As of the most recent permanency review hearing, Father’s compliance with the permanency plan was rated as minimal as was his progress towards remedying the circumstances which necessitated placement. Though Father is engaged in Trehab for outpatient substance abuse treatment, Father has a profusion of pending criminal charges, has shown a lack of respect for law enforcement in absconding from the law, and has shown a lack of care and affection for the Child in not inquiring as to her well-being for a period of months. Father’s pending criminal charges, his demonstrated disregard for the systems and structures in place to help him, and the uncertainty regarding Father and Mother’s ability to provide the Child with safe and appropriate housing all indicate that Father will not be able to remedy the conditions which led to the Child’s placement within a reasonable time, despite the Child being in placement for almost two years and all the resources made available to Father.

O.C.O. at 16-17 (the Child’s initials removed).

On appeal, Father argues that he was working towards meeting his

parental duties, within a reasonable timeframe, and he demonstrated his

continuing interest in the Child. Father’s Brief at 17-18. Father asserts that

he repeatedly acted to gain access to, and visitation with, the Child, both

personally and through his counsel, but those visitation requests were

consistently denied. Id. at 18-19. According to Father, he has affirmatively

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asserted a presence in the Child’s life. Id. at 19. After his release from

incarceration, Father made substantial rehabilitation efforts, including

completing drug and alcohol treatment, maintaining ongoing outpatient care,

and securing employment. Id. Father claims that he has exhibited his

determination to be a capable parent to the Child by addressing his drug

addiction, obtaining employment, completing a mental health examination

and parenting course, and doing what was necessary to address the issues

that gave rise to the dependency action. See id. at 20-21.

Father’s argument, like Mother’s, fails to appreciate the standard of

review we must apply in termination cases. We must accept the orphans’

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by

the record. See T.S.M., supra.

The record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. Throughout the case,

Father was never deemed to have higher than “minimal” compliance with the

permanency plan and “minimal” progress towards alleviating the

circumstances which necessitated the Child’s placement. See N.T., 9/25/25,

at 113, 118-19, 122, 129-30, 139. At times, Father was deemed to have “no”

progress and “no” compliance. See id. at 118-19, 122. At the July 2025

permanency review, approximately two months before the termination

hearing began, Father still had “minimal” progress and compliance. See id.

at 139.

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The juvenile court found aggravated circumstances against Father in

September 2024 for having no contact with the Child or the Agency for over

six months. See id. at 120. Father was absconding from law enforcement

during that time. See id. at 119. The court ordered that no efforts to reunify

Father with the Child were to be made, and Father did not appeal that order.

The Agency caseworker testified that up until the July permanency review

hearing, she had no idea where Father was located and had no contact

information for him. See id. at 151-54.

Additionally, the caseworker explained that neither parent had

demonstrated an ability to maintain sobriety outside of a controlled

environment, as they were both still on probation. See id. at 146.

Although Father stresses that he requested visitation, the Agency

caseworker stated that he did not keep in contact with the Agency or inquire

about the Child’s wellbeing or welfare. See id. at 123, 128, 139, 145, 151-

52. Indeed, on cross-examination, Father admitted that he had not

maintained contact with the Agency and did not reach out to the Agency for

information about the Child because he got that information through Mother.

See N.T., 10/9/25, at 96, 100. Thus, we find Father’s arguments that he

demonstrated a continuing interest in the Child and affirmatively asserted a

presence in the Child’s life to be disingenuous. Even if we were to accept

Father’s argument that he was improperly denied visitation with the Child,

there was still competent evidence on which the orphans’ court could

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terminate his parental rights. Father’s challenge to Section 2511(a)(2) merits

no relief.

We turn next to Section 2511(b), and we incorporate our standard of

review under this section as discussed above. Here, the orphans’ court

terminated Father’s rights under Section 2511(b). The court explained its

rationale as follows:

Ultimately, it is in the Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. By all accounts, the Child is wellcared for by her foster family. Her foster mother [] testified that the Child is happy in the [foster family’s] household and gets along well with her foster siblings. [Foster Mother] testified of her and her husband’s intent to adopt the Child and to form a post-adoption contact agreement with Mother [and Father] in order to ensure the Child still has [them] in her life. [The foster family has] engaged in parent-child interactive therapy with the Child to better manage the Child’s behaviors, and [has] gone above and beyond what is expected of them to care for the Child’s special health concerns. The [c]ourt finds that there is no parental bond between the Child and Father to sever. The Child has not seen Father since February of 2024, or since she was only thirteen months old. The Child has not been in Father’s care since October of 2023, or since she was only ten months old. Father did not begin to attempt to secure visitation in earnest until after the Agency had already filed the termination petition. In light of Father’s minimal progress and compliance over the course of the past year and a half and his continued incapacity to provide the Child with the parental care and concern she needs, severance of whatever bond might exist is in the Child’s best interests.

O.C.O. at 17-18 (the Child’s initials removed).

On appeal, Father’s argument consists of the following:

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In the alternative, the Trial Court failed to consider all relevant factors and, as a result, did not conduct a sufficiently comprehensive best interest of the child analysis with respect to the Minor Child. [. . .]

[. . .]

The Agency’s reasonable efforts fail as a matter of law. Instead of fostering reunification. They put up barriers to it. [Father] herein raise[d] the issue that the Agency and the [c]ourt blocked him from having contact with the [C]hild for over a year. The [c]ourt refused to grant a hearing on the matter.

Father’s Brief at 24-25.

Father’s argument is insufficient to warrant relief. Father did not raise

relevant arguments related to the bond, if any, he shares with the Child; the

bond, or lack thereof, that the Child shares with her foster family; or any other

arguments related to the Child’s developmental, physical, or emotional needs

and welfare. Instead, Father again raised his denied visitation, but as we

explained above, the orphans’ court did not terminate Father’s parental rights

based solely on his lack of visitation, and there was competent other evidence

of record to support termination. Additionally, Father’s argument regarding

the Agency’s alleged failure to provide reasonable efforts fails for the same

reasons explained above in Mother’s appeal.

As for Father’s argument that the orphans’ court failed to consider all

relevant factors and did not conduct a sufficiently comprehensive best interest

of the child analysis, he fails to tell us what factors the court allegedly failed

to consider. See B.S.G. v. D.M.C., 255 A.3d 528, 535 (Pa. Super. 2021)

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(explaining that issues can be waived due to lack of development); Interest

of R.H., 320 A.3d 706, 716 (Pa. Super. 2024) (explaining that this Court will

not act as an advocate or develop arguments on behalf of an appellant). The

orphans’ court clearly considered the fact that the Child had been in placement

since October 2023, which was two years before the termination hearing. See

O.C.O. at 17. As noted above, Father failed to contact the Agency to inquire

about the Child’s wellbeing or welfare and did not reach out to the Agency for

information about the Child. See N.T., 9/25/25, at 123, 128, 139, 145, 151-

52; N.T., 10/9/25, at 96, 100.

Conversely, Foster Mother testified that the foster family wanted to

adopt the Child and maintain contact with Father and Mother. See N.T.,

9/25/25, at 182. The Child called the foster parents “mom” and “dad.” Id.

at 141, 181-82. The Agency caseworker confirmed that the foster family was

pre-adoptive, they met all the Child’s needs, and their home was safe and

appropriate. See id. at 143-44. The Child played like siblings with the other

children in the foster home. Id. at 142. The caseworker testified that it was

not in the Child’s best interest to be returned to either parent. Id. at 147.

Thus, the record supported the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Father’s

parental rights under Section 2511(b). Father’s challenge to this decision

merits no relief.

Regarding Father’s separate appeal from the juvenile court’s order

denying his Motion to Modify visitation, we note that this appeal and the

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visitation issue are now moot. See Interest of J.L., 216 A.3d 233, 237 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (“As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at

all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. . . . An

issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter

an order that has any legal force or effect[.]” (citation omitted)). Cf. A.H.,

247 A.3d at 446 (explaining that a challenge to a goal change order is moot

when a termination order is affirmed).

Significantly, the juvenile court found aggravated circumstances against

Father for failing to maintain substantial and continuing contact with the Child

for over six months, while Father was absconding from law enforcement. It

was only after Father was reincarcerated that he requested any visits with the

Child. This was too little, too late.7

In sum, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the orphans’

court’s decision to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Father’s

appeal of the order denying his Motion to Modify Visitation is moot.

Order and decree affirmed.

____________________________________________

7 According to the Agency’s brief, in October 2025, Father was sentenced to

periods of incarceration of 5-24 months and 12-60 months, to run concurrently, followed by 18 months’ probation. As of May 2026, Father remained incarcerated.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 09/08/2026