In the Int. of: Q.D.R., Appeal of: A.J.

Opinion

J-S09030-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.D.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: A.J., FATHER : : : : : No. 2415 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000453-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2025

A.J. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered by the Philadelphia

County Court of Common Pleas (“orphans’ court”) involuntarily terminating

his parental rights to Q.D.R. (“Child”), born in January 2018, pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.

Father is the father of Child.2 On February 7, 2019, the Philadelphia

Department of Human Services (“DHS”) received a Child Protective Services

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By separate decree, the orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, C.W. (“Mother”). Mother has filed an appeal from this decree at 2760 EDA 2024. Mother also filed an appeal from the order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption at 2759 EDA 2024.

2 Father was not listed on Child’s birth certificate as the father. However, Father does not dispute he is Child’s father. J-S09030-25

report which alleged that Mother had punched Child in the face. Child’s face

was bloody and swollen, and he suffered pain from the incident. Father was

not involved in Child’s care at this time. On February 11, 2019, DHS obtained

an order of protective custody and Child was placed in foster care.

The orphans’ court held a shelter care hearing on February 13, 2019, at

which it lifted the protective custody order, but allowed the commitment to

DHS to stand. On February 21, 2019, a single case plan was created. Father’s

parental objectives included visiting with Child, attending parenting classes,

complying with Clinical Evaluation Unit for dual diagnosis, performing drug

screens, and allowing the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) access to his

home.

On February 15, 2019, DHS filed a dependency petition, seeking an

adjudication of dependency based on the above information. On March 18,

2019, following a hearing, the orphans’ court adjudicated Child dependent. In

a separate order entered on March 18, 2019, the orphans’ court found

aggravated circumstances existed as to both parents, as Child was the victim

of physical abuse while in Mother’s care and Father was required to register

as a sexual offender because of his prior conviction of involuntary deviate

sexual intercourse with a minor.

The orphans’ court held a permanency review hearing in June 2019, and

ordered Father to comply with anger management and parenting services,

complete three random drug and alcohol screens, and comply with all services

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and recommendations. In September 2019, the orphans’ court held another

permanency hearing, at which it found Father to be in minimal compliance

with his single case plan (“SCP”) objectives. At the December 17, 2019

permanency review hearing, the orphans’ court found Father to have no

compliance with the plan.

In April 2020, Father was arrested and charged with numerous charges

arising out of the sexual assault of a minor. Ultimately, Father pled guilty to

unlawful contact with a minor and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with

a child, and thereafter was sentenced to two to six years in prison, followed

by three years of probation.

In the interim, on September 16, 2020, a new SCP was created, which

set forth parental objectives for Father to follow, including visiting with Child,

complying with court orders, completing the dual diagnosis screening,

submitting three random drug screens, and availing himself to CUA for case

planning. Father was noncompliant with his objectives and visitation.

On May 14, 2024, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s

parental rights to Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).

The orphans’ court held a hearing on June 12, 2024.3 Ultimately, the orphans’

court entered a decree terminating Father’s parental rights under section

3 Separate counsel represented Child’s best and legal interests at the hearing.

See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).

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2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 4 Father filed a timely appeal. Both Father

and the orphans’ court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925.

Father raises the following question for our review: “Did the [orphans’]

court commit an abuse of discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights by

finding the testimony presented by [DHS] was sufficiently competent evidence

supported by clear, direct, weighty and convincing facts?” Father’s Brief at 5

(some capitalization omitted).

In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we

adhere to the following standard:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the [orphans’] court if they are supported by the record, but it does not require the appellate court to accept the [orphans’] court’s inferences or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported, we must determine whether the [orphans’] court made an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the [orphans’] court’s decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized our deference to [orphans’] courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However, we must employ a ____________________________________________

4 On September 24, 2024, the orphans’ court also entered an order changing

Child’s goal to adoption. Father has not appealed this order.

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broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the [orphans’] court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. 2021) (quotation marks,

brackets, and citations omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which

requires a bifurcated analysis. See C.M., 255 A.3d at 359. “Initially, the

focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the

statutory grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a).” In re

C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). If the

orphans’ court determines the petitioner established grounds for termination

under section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court then must

assess the petition under subsection 2511(b), which focuses on the child’s

needs and welfare. Int. of Z.N.B., 327 A.3d 241, 248 (Pa. Super. 2024).

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of

Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 48-49 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted).

As stated above, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s rights to Child

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). This Court “may affirm the

[orphans’] court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with

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regard to any one subsection of [s]ection 2511(a).” In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d

989, 992 (Pa. Super. 2013). We focus our analysis on section 2511(a)(2),

which provides as grounds for termination of a parent’s rights:

The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

Termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) requires

that the petitioner show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is

presently unable to care for the child and will not be able to care for him for

the foreseeable future. Int. of A.R., 311 A.3d 1105, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2023).

A child has a right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting. When a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct her life in a manner conducive to providing a safe environment for a child, and the behavior is irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified.

Id. at 1111. The grounds for termination of parental rights under section

2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may also

include “acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In

re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Incarceration alone is insufficient to support termination of parental

rights under any subsection of Section 2511(a). In re K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465,

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474 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc). Nevertheless, “incarceration will certainly

impact a parent’s capability of performing parental duties, and may render a

parent incapable of performing parental duties under subsection (a)(2).” Id.

(citation and emphasis omitted). In fact, “the length of the remaining

confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether the conditions

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be

remedied by the parent, sufficient to provide grounds for termination” under

section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012)

(citation omitted). “Each case of an incarcerated parent facing termination

must be analyzed on its own facts, keeping in mind that the child’s need for

consistent parental care and stability cannot be put aside or put on hold.” In

re K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 474 (citation, ellipses, and brackets omitted). “[A]

parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental

relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles

placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.” Id. (citation

Father argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion in failing to

consider that his incapacity was temporary as he would be released from

prison soon. Father’s Brief at 8, 11. Father highlights that he was scheduled

to have a parole hearing in April 2025, and hoped to be released shortly

thereafter. Id. at 9. He contends that the CUA caseworker did not inform

him about his parental objectives or offer him visits with Child. Id. at 9-10.

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According to Father, CUA failed to provide him any updates about Child. Id.

at 11. Father maintains that he spoke with Child during Mother’s visits. Id.

Upon his release from prison, Father states that he plans to purchase a home

and re-open his flower shop business. Id.

At the termination hearing, Whitnee Crawford (“Crawford”), a CUA case

manager, confirmed that Child had been in DHS’s care for sixty-four months

at the time of the termination hearing. N.T., 6/12/2024, at 9. Crawford

indicated that there were no records that Father visited Child. Id. at 10, 12.

According to Crawford, she sent letters to Father, but never received any

response. Id. at 14, 16-18.

Samir Ismail (“Ismail”), a CUA case manager for approximately one year

on Child’s case, testified that he sent the case plan to Father, but received no

response. Id. at 22-23, 25-26. Ismail stated that Father would periodically

contact Mother via phone and ask about Child, and that he talked to Child on

one occasion. Id. at 22-24, 26. Jasmine Brown, a CUA visitation coach who

worked on Child’s case, testified that Father did not speak to Child during visits

she observed and Child did not mention Father. Id. at 27-28.

Father testified that he only received one letter from CUA, but that he

sent multiple letters to CUA and received no response. Id. at 30-31, 37-38,

39. Father explained that he believed talking to Mother was enough to allay

any questions or concerns about his parental role. Id. at 31-32. He stated

that he sent birthday cards to Child. Id. at 39.

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Father indicated his earliest release date from prison would be April

2025. Id. at 33. He further testified that he would buy a home upon release

from prison and continue his flower shop business. Id. at 33-34. Father also

stated he would take care of Child, including dealing with doctor’s

appointments and school. Id. at 34.

The orphans’ court found that “Father’s incarceration for various sexual

offenses against children was clearly an obstacle to achieving reunification

with [] Child.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/2024, at 18. “However, it was

not an entirely insurmountable obstacle. Father took no affirmative steps to

foster any kind of relationship whatsoever with [Child] and doing so resulted

in his parental rights being forfeited.” Id. The orphans’ court further found

that the DHS witnesses were credible and Father’s testimony was “self-serving

and unpersuasive.” Id.

The record confirms Father has made no progress on his SCP objectives

during the time Child has been in DHS’s care. See In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d at

262 (“Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably

prompt assumption of full parental duties.”); In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1120

(Pa. Super. 2010) (“The focus is on whether the parent utilized resources

available while in prison to maintain a relationship with his child. An

incarcerated parent is expected to utilize all available resources to foster a

continuing close relationship with his [child].”) (citation and ellipses omitted).

Additionally, Father has not engaged in any visits with Child. Father’s

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suggestion that the short length of his remaining incarceration should preclude

termination overlooks the plain language of section 2511(a)(2). Under section

2511(a)(2), courts must determine whether a parent is incapable of providing

“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and whether “the conditions

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be

remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). Father’s potential

imminent release from prison does not allow courts to ignore his lack of

compliance with his goals or his failure to provide Child with essential parental

care, control or subsistence for the entirety of Child’s life. See In re C.M.K.,

203 A.3d at 264 (“The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a

child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and

hope for the future.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the orphans’ court did

not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights under section

2511(a)(2).

We next determine whether termination was proper under section

2511(b). Here, Father has failed to present any argument concerning section

2511(b) in his brief; as such, he waived any such challenge. See In re

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well-settled that this

Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of

an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.”).

Even if Father preserved a challenge to section 2511(b), we would

conclude that it lacked merit. Under section 2511(b), the orphans’ court must

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consider “the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

child” to determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interest of

the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “[T]he determination of the child’s needs

and welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent

and child. The utmost attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the

child of permanently severing the parental bond.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,

267 (Pa. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The orphans’ court must

determine whether the bond is “necessary and beneficial” to the child, such

that “maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105-06

(Pa. 2023). The needs and welfare analysis must also include the

consideration of factors such as: “the child’s need for permanency and length

of time in foster care …; whether the child is in a preadoptive home and

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. at 1113 (citations omitted).

Here, there was ample evidence that Child has no bond with Father and

they have no parent-child relationship. Pointedly, Father admitted at the

termination hearing that he and Child do not share a bond. See N.T.,

6/12/2024, at 35 (“I’m locked up. How can I have a bond with my son if I’m

locked up? I barely get a chance to talk to him. [Mother] don’t answer the

phone any longer. So I don’t have the opportunity to talk to my son.”); see

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also id. at 13-15, 18-19, 24, 26, 28 (noting that Father has had very little

contact with Child).

Additionally, the record reflects that R.S., Child’s resource parent,

provides for Child’s needs and welfare, Child is happy and thriving in R.S.’s

home, and he is bonded with R.S. Id. at 13, 24-25. Indeed, Crawford and

Ismail opined that terminating Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best

interest. Id. at 13, 15, 24. Thus, if Father properly raised this claim before

us on appeal, we would conclude that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse

its discretion in determining that Child’s developmental, emotional, and

physical needs and welfare are best met by terminating Father’s parental

rights.

Decree affirmed.

Date: 3/21/2025

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