In the Int. of: M.R., Appeal of: K.R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 3, 2025
• Docket: 2474 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S02043-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.R., FATHER : : : : : No. 2474 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001220-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.K.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.R., FATHER : : : : : No. 2475 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000072-2024

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.R., FATHER : : : : : No. 2476 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001221-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.K.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA J-S02043-25

: : APPEAL OF: K.R., FATHER : : : : : No. 2477 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000070-2024

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.R., FATHER : : : : : No. 2478 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001222-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.L.R., JR., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.R., FATHER : : : : : No. 2479 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000071-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 3, 2025

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K.R. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating his

parental rights to Mi.K.R., Me.K.R., and K.L.R., Jr. (collectively, “the Children”)

and the dependency orders changing the permanency placement goals for the

Children to adoption. We affirm the decrees terminating Father’s parental

rights and dismiss the appeals from the dependency orders as moot.

The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed petitions

to change the permanency placement goals and terminate Father’s parental

rights on February 15, 2024. The court held a hearing on August 23, 2024. At

the time of the hearing, Mi.K.R. was 12 years old, Me.K.R. was nine, and K.L.R.

was six. The court thereafter granted the petitions and entered orders

changing the Children’s permanency goals and terminating Father’s parental

rights. Father appealed.

Father raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated father’s parental rights where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8).

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated father’s parental rights without giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination would have on the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(b).

3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated father’s parental rights when father established he was ready, willing and able to parent his children[.]

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Father’s Br. at 8. DHS and the Child Advocate filed briefs supporting the

termination. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) did not file a brief.

On review of the termination of parental rights, “[w]e accept the findings

of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports

them.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018).

“Because trial courts are on the front lines assessing the credibility of

witnesses and weighing competing and often challenging evidence, it is

paramount that, in reviewing trial courts’ decisions in this arena, appellate

courts defer to trial courts’ first-hand observations as they relate to factual

determinations.” Int. of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1129 (Pa. 2021). “If the

factual findings have support in the record, we then determine if the trial court

committed an error of law or abuse of discretion.” K.C., 199 A.3d at 473.

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. A termination petition entails a

bifurcated analysis. Int. of Z.N.B., 327 A.3d 241, 248 (Pa.Super. 2024). First,

Section 2511(a) requires the petitioning party to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that grounds for termination exist under at least one of the

enumerated subsections. Id. Second, if the petitioner clears that hurdle,

Section 2511(b) then requires the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that, considering the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child, termination is in the child’s best interests. See id.

This Court need only affirm grounds for termination under any

subsection of 2511(a) before turning to the best interest analysis under

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Section 2511(b). Id. at 248 n.7. Here, the court found grounds for termination

under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). We will confine our review

to Section 2511(a)(2), as we agree DHS met its burden under this subsection.

Father argues the court erred in ruling that grounds for termination

existed under Section 2511(a)(2) because he substantially complied with his

single case plan (“SCP”) objectives. Father argues he is employed, maintains

housing, and has completed a parenting class. Father’s Br. at 14. He also

participated in a behavioral health services (“BHS”) evaluation and

“maintained compliance with the children’s therapist” but “was prohibited from

completing” his own therapy program. Id. He further asserts that during his

psychological evaluation he asserted that he did not require behavioral health

services or drug and alcohol treatment. Id. Father contends that he has

demonstrated an ability to care for the Children and emphasizes that he cares

for other children in his home “on a daily basis.” Id.

Section 2511(a)(2) provides that termination is warranted when,

[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) requires the petitioning party to

establish “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

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of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

Z.N.B., 327 A.3d at 249 (citation omitted).

This subsection focuses on the child’s present and future need for

essential parental care, particularly “where disruption of the family has already

occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994

A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis removed).

The parent need never have had custody of the child for subsection (a)(2) to

apply. Id. at 1118. Rather, because “[p]arents are required to make diligent

efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties,” In

re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 327-28 (Pa.Super. 2017), this subsection allows for

termination when a parent has “failed to demonstrate a concrete desire or

ability to remedy the problems that led to [the c]hild’s placement,” In re

C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa.Super. 2019). A parent’s failure to cooperate

with agency services, participate in drug treatment, and complete mental

health counseling are all relevant to this question. D.L.B., 166 A.3d at 328.

Even a parent’s seemingly “sincere efforts to perform parental duties” will not

undermine the application of subsection (a)(2), particularly “after a long

period of uncooperativeness.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citations omitted).

Here, the court found that Father’s “refusal to care for the children is .

. . evidenced by his absence from the children’s lives.” Trial Court Opinion,

filed Nov. 25, 2024, at 6. The court found that Father “has failed to perform

parental duties for all of the children for the life of the case and, furthermore,

for the lives of the children.” Id. at 5-6. The court observed that the Children

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have been in the custody of DHS since November 2021, after they were

“essentially abandoned” and were placed in the care of their maternal aunts

in January 2022. Id. at 2, 6. Since that time, Father has “failed to complete

his SCP’s and flouted court orders mandating supervised visitation with the

children.” Id. at 6.

The court noted that Father’s SCP objectives were “(1) attend domestic

violence classes; (2) attend anger management classes; (3) engage in

supervised visitation with the children; (4) attend a BHS evaluation and

treatment if deemed necessary by the evaluation; (5) attend random drug

screens; and (6) complete parenting, housing, and financial literacy

classes[.]” Id. at 2. The court observed that Father completed a BHS

evaluation but had not engaged in the treatment recommended by the

evaluation. Id. Father also completed a single parenting class at the ARC. Id.

The court found Father “denies the need for any kind of treatment or class to

alleviate the issues which initially brought the case in – neglecting his parental

duties.” Id. at 3. The court also observed that Father testified that he

knowingly violated the court’s custody order by visiting with the Children

without supervision. Id.

Our review of the record shows it supports the trial court’s findings. The

testimony at the hearing established that the Children were adjudicated

dependent in November 2021, after the death of their mother. See N.T.,

8/23/24, at 22. Father was not caring for the Children at that time, nor had

he been caring for them for most of their lives, and they were “essentially

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abandoned.” Id. In January 2022, two of the Children were placed in kinship

care with a maternal aunt, and the other child was placed in kinship care with

another maternal aunt. Id. at 36, 38, 41.

Following the dependency adjudication, the community umbrella agency

(“CUA”) developed the above-listed SCP objectives to demonstrate Father’s

ability to provide a safe and stable home for the children. Id. at 25. The CUA

case manager testified that some of the objectives arose because he was

concerned about indications of domestic violence and Father’s tendency to

become combative. Id. at 25-27.

While Father completed the BHS assessment, he ignored the resulting

referrals for mental health and drug and alcohol services. Id. at 29-31, 46-

47. He did not complete a domestic violence assessment or attend domestic

violence classes or anger management classes. Id. at 25-26. Father told the

CUA case manager that he did not need the recommended classes and

counseling. Id. at 46-47, 55. Father testified and conceded that he had not

complied with the court’s orders for treatment and counseling because he “felt

like [he] shouldn’t be in this predicament.” Id. at 85; see also 91-94.

The CUA case manager also testified that Father failed to maintain

consistent contact with the CUA – his phone number was often changed or

disconnected, and mailed correspondence would be returned as undeliverable.

Id. at 23-25. The CUA case manager stated that Father had not provided any

recent paystubs to verify his employment status, and that he did not know

Father’s current address. Id. at 32-33.

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The court ordered Father’s visits with the Children be supervised

because the CUA caseworker had never seen the Children interact with Father.

Id. at 27. Visitation was to be at the Children’s discretion. Id. at 28. The

Children opted against visitation with Father until “recently,” after Father

began visiting with the Children unsupervised. Id. at 28-29, 49. The Children’s

aunts had been taking them to see Father. Id. at 49-51. Father never engaged

in any supervised visits with the Children. Id. at 29. Father conceded he

violated the order requiring visits to be supervised. Id. at 83-84.

The CUA case manager opined he did not believe the Children could be

safely reunited with Father, at least as of the date of the hearing. The case

reasoned that Father failed to comply with the SCP objectives, violated the

visitation rules, and has never cared for the Children long-term. Id. at 32, 34.

Given the foregoing, the trial court’s subsection (a)(2) determination

was not an abuse of discretion. Father’s failure to provide essential parental

care for the Children resulted in their placement, and for over two years, he

has largely refused to comply with the objectives imposed to ensure his

capacity to assume their care.

Father next argues the court erred in finding termination would best suit

the Children’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b). Father argues he

shares a bond with Children. Father’s Br. at 16. He also argues the fact that

the maternal aunts permitted him unsupervised overnight visitation with the

Children proves their confidence that Father would be the appropriate

permanent caregiver. Id. at 16-17.

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Section 2511(b) states in relevant part, “The court in terminating the

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b). This requires the court to place the child’s “needs and welfare above

concerns for the parent.” Int. of C.S., 327 A.3d 222, 239 (Pa.Super. 2024)

(citation omitted). The court must consider “the nature and status of the

parent-child bond,” any detrimental effect on the child of permanently

severing that bond, “whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and bonded

with foster parents[,] and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. at 239-40 (citation omitted).

Here, the court found “testimony from the family’s CUA case worker is

that there is no parental bond between [Father] and the [C]hildren, and that

to remove the [C]hildren from their current placements and placing them back

with [Father] would have a ‘big, negative impact’ on the [C]hildren due to the

bond they share with their caregivers.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8. The court found

reunification with Father would not be in the Children’s best interests. Id.

The record supports this determination. The CUA case manager testified

that the Children “love their Father” but “didn’t want to live with him.” N.T. at

55, 57. He testified that the Children do not look to Father to fill their needs

and would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were

terminated. Id. at 35.

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In contrast, the CUA caseworker stated that the foster parents provide

for the Children’s daily needs, and the Children look to them for comfort and

guidance, or for care when they are sick, hungry, or hurt. Id. at 37-42. Each

child shares a strong bond with their foster parent. See generally id. at 38-

41; see id. at 37 (CUA caseworker stating oldest child’s placement is “the

only constant she’s had in her life since she lost her mother”). He testified that

removal from their pre-adoptive homes would have a significant negative

impact on the Children, and it was in the Children’s best interests to be freed

for adoption. Id. at 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45. The Children also told the CUA

caseworker that they wished to be adopted by their aunts. Id. at 55, 57.

The middle child testified, stating that he wished to continue having

visits with Father, but to remain in his aunt’s home. Id. at 70. The court

interviewed the oldest child in camera and reported on the record that she

told the court she wished to remain with her aunt. Id. at 78-79.

The Child Advocate confirmed that all three Children wished to be

adopted by their caregivers. Id. at 58. The GAL stated that she believed it to

be in the Children’s best interests to remain with their caregivers. Id. at 99.

The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of

parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. Father has had limited

contact with Children throughout their lives, whereas the Children have been

living in their pre-adoptive homes since January 2022 and share close bonds

with their caregivers.

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In his final issue, Father argues the court abused its discretion in

terminating his parental rights because “he was ready, willing and able to

parent” his children. Father’s Br. at 17 (citing In the Interest Anika H.. 505

A.2d 1014, 1015 (Pa.Super. 1986)).

This issue lacks merit. The case Father cites is not relevant to the issue

before us. It discusses the standard for determining whether children should

be adjudicated dependent. See Anika H., 505 A.2d at 1015. In the instant

case, the Children were adjudicated dependent in November 2021, and that

determination is not the subject of this appeal. Furthermore, Father’s refusal

to comply with the SCP objectives refutes his claim that he was ready, willing,

and able to parent the Children at the time of the termination hearing.

Because we affirm the termination of parental rights, the appeals from

goal change orders are moot.1 See Int. of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73

(Pa.Super. 2021).

Decrees affirmed. Appeals of goal-change orders dismissed as moot.

President Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum.

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

____________________________________________

1 Father also fails to advance any argument against the goal change orders.

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Date: 3/3/2025

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