J-S30017-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.J.R.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.A., MOTHER : : : : : No. 691 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 16, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2024-0025a
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.A., MOTHER : : : : : No. 692 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2024-0024a
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 7, 2024
S.A. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her biological son L.J.R.A., born April of 2018, and biological
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S30017-24
daughter L.M.A., born September of 2015 (collectively, “the Children”). 1 We
affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this case follows. The York County
Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) first became involved with this
family in 2019 due to concerns of substance abuse by Mother and Father
(collectively, “Parents”) and domestic violence. See N.T., 4/15/24, CYF Ex. 1
(1/13/21 permanency plan) at 2.2 CYF initiated services for the family and
ultimately closed them approximately fourteen months later. See id. In July
2022, CYF received another report containing similar allegations. See N.T.,
4/15/24, at 91. Subsequently, Mother tested positive for fentanyl and
methamphetamines, and CYF’s investigation validated the concerns noted in
the report against Parents. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/24, at 4; see also
N.T., 4/15/24, CYF Ex. 1 (9/1/22 permanency plan) at 2. CYF implemented a
safety plan, but it was soon violated by Father driving while impaired with the
Children in the vehicle, after which Mother locked herself in their home with
the Children. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/24, at 5; see also N.T. 4/15/24,
1 Upon review of the certified docket, the trial court involuntarily terminated
the parental rights of the Children’s father, D.A. (“Father”), by separate decrees. Father did not file notices of appeal.
2 The record shows that at some point during the relevant time, Mother obtained a Protection from Abuse order against Father. See, e.g., N.T., 4/15/24, at 106; see also id., CYF Ex. 2 at 6.
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at 91. Shortly after this incident, the Children, at ages four and six, were
placed in the emergency custody of CYF in August 2022. See N.T. 4/15/24,
at 91.
The trial court adjudicated the Children dependent on August 11, 2022,
and placed them in kinship care. See N.T., 4/15/24, CYF Ex. 1 (9/1/22
permanency plan at 2). The court established the Children’s respective
permanency goals as reunification. In furtherance of that goal, Mother was
ordered to: complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all
recommendations; participate in drug testing; complete a domestic violence
evaluation and follow all recommendations; and complete a mental health
evaluation and follow all recommendations. See id. at 14-16. In addition,
Mother was required to participate in supervised visitation with the Children.
See, e.g., N.T., 4/15/24, at 51. The trial court held permanency review
hearings at regular intervals throughout the dependency proceedings.
Throughout the dependency proceedings, the Children were placed in three
different homes before being placed with their maternal aunt, B.A., and her
husband, M.H. See Interest of L.A., 180 MDA 2024, 181 MDA 2024, 2024
WL 3494534 (Pa. Super. Jul. 22, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).3
3 As discussed infra, the trial court later changed the Children’s permanency
goal from reunification to adoption. Mother filed an appeal from the goal (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Regarding Mother’s drug and alcohol issues, we note the following:
Mother completed the evaluations required by her permanency plan. With
respect to her drug and alcohol evaluation, Mother complied with the
recommendations following her evaluation by participating in treatment
through Rehab After Work and the RASE Project throughout the dependency
matters. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 98.4 Mother attended JusticeWorks for her
court-ordered drug testing. She tested positive for methamphetamines in July
2023. See id. at 142-143. In September 2023, the trial court ordered Mother
to complete toenail testing due to her “long history of gamesmanship” with
CYF’s drug testing. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/24 at 5 n.3.5 However,
Mother cut her fingernails and toenails immediately before her scheduled
appointment, so the lab was unable to complete the test. See id. at 5; see
also N.T., 4/15/24 at 19. During the Children’s dependency proceedings,
change orders, which this Court affirmed. See generally Interest of L.A., 2024 WL 3494534.
4 Relatedly, Mother was previously employed as a nurse before she lost her
nursing license due to her substance abuse. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 137, 152. After the Children were removed from Mother’s care, Mother’s RASE project caseworker assisted her in working to, inter alia, regain her nursing license. See id. at 152. The record suggests that Mother’s nursing license had not been reinstated at the time of the termination proceeding. See id. at 137- 138, 152.
5The trial court explained that toenail testing could give the court a “look back” to substance use from the prior three to six months. N.T., 4/15/24 at 17.
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Mother reported two drug relapses to her caseworker at RASE project. See
N.T., 4/15/24, at 152-55, 159-60. Additionally, Mother admitted to her most
recent relapse when she tested positive for methamphetamines in March
2024, the month before the termination proceeding. See id. at 172.
As for Mother’s domestic violence permanency goals, the record shows
that Mother completed a domestic violence evaluation. According to a CYF
caseworker, Shania Wright (“Wright”), Mother was required to participate in
domestic violence classes; however, Mother admitted that she failed to do so.
See id. at 92, 172-73. Wright testified that CYF remained concerned about
Mother’s ongoing relationship with Father and the potential for domestic
violence. See id. at 96, 99. Wright noted that Parents were arrested together
in December 2023 for retail theft. See id. at 93; see also id., CYF Ex. 2 at
6.
The record reveals the following about Mother’s visitation with the
Children. Mother was granted unsupervised visitation with the Children on
December 14, 2022. See N.T., 4/15/24, CYF Ex. 1 (2/12/23 permanency
plan) at 2. However, on the first weekend of her unsupervised visitation,
Mother allowed Father to have in-person contact with the Children despite his
visits being ordered to remain supervised. Id. Mother’s visitation with the
Children returned to supervised up through and including the time of the
termination hearing. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 97-98. Mother participated in
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supervised visits once a week with the Children since at least March 2024.
See id. at 69. The record shows that Mother’s visitation consistently went
well. See generally N.T., 4/15/24, CYF Ex. 1; see also N.T. 4/15/24 at 46-
47. The Children were happy to see Mother and engaged positively with her.
See id. at 46-47.
As noted above, the Children were placed with kinship parents, a
maternal aunt, B.A., and her husband, M.H. M.H. testified that he and B.A.
loved the Children “very much,” and that the Children get along well with
kinship parents’ children, an eight-year-old daughter and 19-month-old son.
See id. at 77, 84. M.H. takes the Children to most of their appointments.
See id. at 86. Kinship parents prophylactically placed the Children in therapy
to manage any difficulties that might arise for the Children in the event they
are adopted. See id. at 77-78. Kinship parents, additionally, expressed their
desire to facilitate safe, healthy, and appropriate relationships between the
Children and their biological parents. See id. at 85. CYF caseworker Wright
opined that “the [C]hildren are in kinship . . . and they are in a home and
family[,] and they’ve built a stable consistent home environment for the
children.” Id. at 102.
In December 2023, the trial court changed the Children’s permanency
goals from reunification to adoption following a hearing. See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/5/24, at 2. In February 2024, CYF filed petitions for the involuntary
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termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). The involuntary termination
proceeding occurred on April 15, 2024. The Children, then ages six and eight,
had been in care for twenty months at the time of the hearing. The Children’s
best interests were represented by their court-appointed guardian ad litem
(“GAL”), Daniel Worley, Esquire. The Children’s legal interests were
represented by court-appointed counsel, Kristina Forrey, Esquire.6
CYF presented the following witnesses in support of its petition to
involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights: Linda Tirado-Lopez (“Tirado-
Lopez”), Mother’s drug tester from JusticeWorks; Jessica Myers (“Myers”),
visitation supervisor from Pressley Ridge; M.H., kinship parent and husband
of paternal aunt B.A.; and Wright, the CYF caseworker. Mother testified on
her own behalf and presented the following witnesses: Bruce Norton
(“Norton”), a representative from Families Renewed, which is an organization
that helps families in crisis; Sheila King-Miller (“King-Miller”), a representative
from TrueNorth Wellness, who provided dialectical behavior therapy for
Mother; and Kelsey Myers (“Myers”), Mother’s previous caseworker from RASE
6 Attorney Forrey was appointed counsel for the Children as to the termination
proceedings by orders of the court dated February 26, 2024. Because separate counsel was appointed for the termination proceeding, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) is satisfied. See In re K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1238 (Pa. 2020) (holding appellate courts should engage in “limited sua sponte review” concerning a child’s statutory right to counsel in the termination context).
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Project, who worked with Mother on various goals including her recovery from
substance abuse. Additionally, following Mother’s request, the court
interviewed the Children in camera separately and in the presence of their
GAL and legal counsel. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 8-10, 56.7 At the hearing, the
trial court heard the evidence summarized above.
By decree dated April 15, 2024, and entered on April 16, 2024, the trial
court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.J.R.A. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). By decree dated and entered on April 15,
2024, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.M.A. pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother timely filed notices of
appeal and she and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issue for our review:
7 All counsel, including legal counsel for Mother and the Children, agreed that
the Children would not testify at the termination hearing. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 8-10. Mother, however, requested that the Children be removed from school and brought to testify despite all counsels’ recommendation. Id. As discussed further below, the trial court concluded that the Children’s testimony, in which they stated they desired to return to live with Mother, was the product, to some extent, of coaching by Mother.
Additionally, the trial court incorporated and admitted “all prior testimony, exhibits, petitions, and orders filed” in the Children’s dependency docket at the termination hearing without objection. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 7-8. However, no exhibits from the Children’s dependency matters were included in the certified record for the present appeals.
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Whether the [trial] court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion[,] as [CYF] failed to meet its burden to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Mother’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).8
Our standard of review is as follows: in this context, we consider
whether the trial court’s order is supported by competent evidence. See In
re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). In applying this
standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and
credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See Interest
of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual
findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb
the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of
discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).9
Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination
of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Subsection
8 CYF, the Children’s GAL, and the Children’s legal counsel filed a joint brief in
support of affirming the decrees.
9 “An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion,” or “the facts could support an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will.” Id. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.
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2511(a) provides grounds for the involuntary termination of parental rights.
If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence
of one of the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court
must then consider whether termination would best serve the child under
subsection (b). See id., § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with one of
the grounds set forth in subsection (a) to affirm, provided subsection (b) is
also satisfied. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to, inter alia, section 2511(a)(2) and (b),10 which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
****
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
10 The trial court noted in its opinion that while CYF sought termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the transcript includes the court terminating under section 2511(a)(9), which was a stenographer’s error. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/24, at 32-33. As noted above, CYF did not petition for termination pursuant to section (a)(9), and Mother does not dispute the error inasmuch as she cites as a grounds for termination section 2511(a)(2), and not section 2511(a)(9), in her brief.
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(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. . . ..
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).11
The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2)
due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those
grounds may also include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental
duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated
on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023).
Section 2511(a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present and future need for
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being,” especially “where disruption of the family has already
occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994
A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and emphasis omitted).
11 As this Court need only agree with the trial court’s determination as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm termination, see Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384), we need not consider Mother’s arguments with respect to section 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8).
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We have long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. See In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.
Super. 2017). At a termination hearing, the trial court may properly reject as
untimely or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow through on necessary
services when the parent failed to co-operate with the agency or take
advantage of available services during the dependency proceedings. See In
re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105.
If the trial court concludes that adequate grounds for termination exist
pursuant to section 2511(a), the court then turns to section 2511(b), which
requires that it “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); see also
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Our Supreme Court has generally
outlined this inquiry as follows:
[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.
Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.
Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
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further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always consider. The courts must consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not always an easy task.
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06 (internal citations, quotations, and
footnotes omitted). The Court further explained that “[i]t is only a necessary
and beneficial bond, after all, that should be maintained.” Id. at 1109. The
Court recognized that “case law indicates that bond, plus permanency,
stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the determination
of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare,
and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.” Id.
The extent of the “bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321,
324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is within the province of the trial court to “consider
the totality of the circumstances when performing a needs and welfare
analysis.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d at 839.
In considering the affection which a child may have for his or her natural
parents, this Court has stated the following:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and
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abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and its mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Further, this Court has clarified that it is “within
the discretion of the [trial] court to prioritize the safety and security” of
children “over their bonds with their parents.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d at
839. Thus, we will not disturb such an assessment if the trial court’s factual
findings are supported by the record. See id.
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court’s termination decrees pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b). See
Mother’s Brief at 16-28. We note that Mother does not assert any specific
arguments as to how the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion as to
section 2511(a)(2). See id. at 16-20.12 As such, we deem her challenge to
the sufficiency of termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) waived. See In
re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that a
12 In the argument section, Mother simply states the law as to section 2511(a)(2) and moves right into the law for section 2511(a)(5) without any specific arguments for section 2511(a)(2). See Mother’s Brief at 19-20.
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claim is waived where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of the
claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any
other meaningful fashion capable of review).
However, even if Mother had not waived this issue, we would conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). The trial court concluded that Mother
failed to progress beyond supervised visitation; and demonstrated her
continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal to provide for the Children’s needs
by, inter alia, failing to control her drug use. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/24,
at 34, 37-38.
The court’s findings are supported by the record evidence. It is well-
established that Mother suffers from repeated and continued incapacities,
namely, her substance abuse troubles, including several methamphetamine
relapses up to March 2024. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 92, 96, 142-43, 152-53,
155, 172. She failed to address the domestic violence in her ongoing
relationship with Father, insofar as she did not complete domestic violence
classes. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 92, 94, 172-73. Wright, the CYF caseworker,
testified that Mother’s progress with her permanency objectives were minimal
at the time of the termination proceeding due to “ongoing substance abuse”
and concerns that Parents continue to be in a relationship. See id. at 96,
101-02. Additionally, Wright testified that outside of visitation, Mother has
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not performed any parental duties for the Children in the past twelve months.
See id. at 101.13 Wright further testified that she could think of no other
services CYF could have afforded to Mother and, despite the services offered,
she only made minimal progress after twenty months. See id. at 92, 96, 100,
102.14 Thus, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother’s
incapacities have caused the Children to be without essential parental care,
control, and subsistence, and Mother’s incapacities cannot or will not be
remedied.
We now turn to Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s findings pursuant
to section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration of the developmental,
13 To the extent that Mother contends she has performed her parental duties
by visiting the Children, bringing them food, gifts, and clothing, we reject her assertion of error because our review of the record shows that Mother made minimal progress in satisfying her permanency requirements for twenty months leading up to the termination hearing. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 92, 96, 102.
14 Indeed, the record shows various reported relapses and positive tests for
methamphetamine in the months leading up to the termination hearing, the most recent being after the involuntarily termination of parental rights petition had been filed and just one month before the termination hearing which Mother admitted to in her testimony. See id. at 142-43, 152-53, 155, 159- 60, 172.
While Mother asserts that domestic violence has been addressed because she and Father live separately, there was ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that the domestic violence has not been addressed. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 90, 93, 96, 106, 173-74; see also CYF Ex. 2.
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physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(b). Specifically, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the court’s finding that her relationship with the Children is “toxic.”
Mother’s Brief at 27-28. Mother asserts, to the contrary, that her bond with
the Children is strong. See id. at 28.
The trial court considered Mother’s arguments and concluded
termination was in the Children’s best interests. While the trial court
acknowledged that there are “bonds of sorts” between Mother and the
Children, see Supplement to Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/24, at 2, the court
concluded that the bond is “toxic.” See N.T., 4/15/24, at 187; Supplement
to Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/24, at 3. The court’s conclusion is based on
finding that the Children’s testimony regarding their desire to return home
was not genuine but manufactured and unreliable due to Mother’s attempted
manipulation of the Children’s desires. See Supplement to Trial Court
Opinion, 6/19/24, at 3-4. The trial court also found that the Children have a
strong and healthy primary bond to the kinship parents. See N.T., 4/15/24,
at 187; Supplement to Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/24, at 4. The trial court
concluded that intangibles, including the Children’s safety and need for
permanency, trumped the bond that existed between Mother and the Children.
Initially, we note that, Myers, the visitation supervisor at Pressley Ridge,
when asked at the termination hearing about the Children’s bond with Mother,
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testified that “the [C]hildren are happy to see [M]other. They engage
positively together. It’s a positive experience in the visit.” See N.T., 4/15/24,
at 46. We consider next the Children’s testimony. L.J.R.A., then age six,
testified that he likes living with his kinship parents, they take good care of
him, they love him, and he loves them. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 61. He also
testified that he likes visits with Mother. See id. L.J.R.A. testified
affirmatively when asked if he was “good to go back with” his kinship parents,
but he “want[s] to go home . . . with mommy and dad” because he loves
them, and their family dog, Boomer, is there. Id. at 62. Notably, L.J.R.A.
disclosed that Mother “did tell me . . . to tell the judge . . . if you want
to go home.” Id. at 63 (emphasis added). When asked whether L.M.A. also
told him to tell the judge this information, L.J.R.A. shook his head no and
responded affirmatively that just Mother told him what to say to the judge.
See id. at 63-64. L.M.A., then age eight, testified that Mother told her she
was in court today “to see if I’m going to get adopted.” Id. at 66-67. She
testified that she loves both Parents and kinship parents and knows that they
love her too. See id. at 70. Her testimony showed that she likes seeing
Mother. See id. at 69. L.M.A. testified that Mother told her “[t]ell the
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judge . . . you want to go home. I do want to go home.” Id. at 73
(emphasis added).15
Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in finding the bond between Mother and the Children was not necessary and
beneficial; that the Children were bonded to their kinship parents; and that
termination was in the Children’s best interests. While the Children harbor
affection for Mother, which is evident from their testimony, and have positive
experiences during their visitation, this is not sufficient to find a necessary
and beneficial bond between parents and children. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 61-
62, 69-70; see also In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535. Indeed, the best
interests analysis includes a child’s bond with the biological and foster parents,
as well as the child’s need for permanency, stability, and the intangibles
15 The trial court found that while the Children had a sincere desire, to some
degree, to return to Mother, Mother had “coached and instructed” the Children how to testify. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 187. The trial court based its finding on concrete observations, such as, when the court asked L.M.A. who told her the termination proceeding was an adoption proceeding, L.M.A did not immediately disclose that it was Mother, but then admitted it had in fact been Mother, after which the court observed, “And all the time up until I asked that question[,] we were looking at one another, but when I asked you who told you that, you started looking everywhere else. Your mom told [you] that information. So I know when I am getting lied to.” Id. at 67. This Court is unable to overturn the trial court’s credibility determinations. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826 (providing that, “[a]s in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record”).
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necessary for the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare. See Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06, 1109. Here, there is
no dispute that the Children had been in care for twenty months at the time
of the termination hearing. Within those twenty months, the Children had
been in three different kinship placements.16 As the trial court found, and the
record evinces, the Children have a strong and healthy primary bond to the
kinship parents. See N.T., 4/15/24, at 187 (trial court’s finding); id. at 102
(Wright testifying that the kinship parents have built a stable, consistent home
for the Children, and the Children are bonded to the kinship parents’ biological
children who also reside in the home); Supplement to Trial Court Opinion,
6/19/24, at 4. For the foregoing reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion
or error of law in the trial court’s conclusion that CYF met their evidentiary
burden pursuant to section 2511(b).
16 As noted above, the Children’s placement with their current kinship parents
is pre-adoptive.
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Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2024
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