In the Int. of: J.Q.T., a Minor

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 15, 2024
• Docket: 1422 MDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S19043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.Q.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : : : : No. 1422 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered August 30, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-36-JV-0000144-2023

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 15, 2024

Appellant, J.Q.T., a juvenile, appeals from the dispositional order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County adjudicating him delinquent for

the offenses of carrying a firearm without a license, possession of a firearm

by a minor, possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer number,

possession of a controlled substance, possession of a small amount of

marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 Appellant argues that the

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the gun that was the basis

of the firearms offenses on the ground that it was obtained as a result of an

unlawful search. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106, 6110.1, 6110.2, and 5104 and 35 P.S. §§ 780- 113(a)(16), (a)(31), and (a)(32), respectively. J-S19043-24

This case arises out of a traffic stop in Manheim Township, Pennsylvania.

After midnight on March 1, 2023, a Manheim Township police officer observed

a car accelerating rapidly, making a lane change without signaling, partially

crossing over the center line, and speeding. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 5-

8. The officer initiated a traffic stop, and the car, which was being driven by

a 17-year-old and was carrying Appellant and three other passengers, pulled

over. Id. at 8-11. The officer spoke to the driver, who produced a valid

drivers’ license, and directed the passengers to get out of the car because

they were interfering with his questioning of the driver. Id. at 9-10. When

the officer directed Appellant to get out of the car, Appellant was initially

hesitant getting out of the passenger seat but ultimately complied. Id. at 10-

11.

The passengers as well as the driver appeared to the officer to be

minors. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 11. Manheim Township’s ordinances

imposed a 10 p.m. curfew on minors on weeknights and the night when this

incident occurred was a weeknight. Id.; Code of the Township of Manheim

§§ 208-7, 208-8. The township’s ordinances further required that where a

minor is in violation of the curfew, the police officer must release the minor to

his or her parents or, if the parents cannot be found, an adult relative or the

parent of another minor involved in the curfew violation. Code of the Township

of Manheim §§ 208-13; N.T. Suppression Hearing at 12. The officer therefore

called for additional officers to assist in identifying the driver and passengers,

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determining whether they were minors or adults, and if they were minors,

calling their parents. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 11-12.

Appellant, who was 16 years old at the time, gave the officer who

initiated the traffic stop his correct name but an incorrect birth date.

Adjudication Hearing at 3; N.T. Suppression Hearing at 16-17. The officer,

however, determined that Appellant was a minor. N.T. Suppression Hearing

at 14-17, 43-44, 49. The officers determined that one of the other passengers

was a minor and that the two remaining passengers were adults, released the

two adults, and attempted to telephone Appellant’s parents, the driver’s

parents, and the other minor’s parents. Id. at 12, 14-16. The officer who

initiated the traffic stop reached a man who said that he was Appellant’s

father, that he could not come to pick Appellant up, and that he did not want

Appellant to be released to anyone else. Id. at 15-17. The officer also tried

to call Appellant’s mother but there was no answer. Id. at 17-18.

While he was looking on his computer to obtain a telephone number for

Appellant’s mother, the officer saw a report that Appellant had been the sole

suspect in a 2020 armed robbery involving a gun at a Marshall Avenue

address. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 18-21, 53-55, 67-68. That address

was known to the officer as a location where a shooting and a car speeding

away had been reported shortly before the traffic stop and where bullet holes

had been found in the house and the adult in the house refused to let the

police investigate. Id. at 21. In addition, one of the other passengers told

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the officer that Appellant was staying at that address. Id. at 21-22, 38, 57,

63-64. The officer became concerned that Appellant, who he could not release

yet, could be armed and conducted a pat down of Appellant for weapons. Id.

at 19-20, 22, 41, 60-64, 67-69. When he began patting down Appellant’s

waistband area, the officer felt the pistol grip of a gun. Id. at 23, 70.

Appellant resisted the officer’s attempts to remove the gun, but after other

officers helped subdue Appellant, the officer successfully removed the gun,

which was a Walther P22 semi-automatic handgun with a partially obliterated

serial number. Id. at 23-27, 70; Adjudication Hearing at 5-6. The officer

then arrested Appellant and, with the driver’s consent, searched the car and

found crack cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and a digital scale in a

crossbody bag that belonged to Appellant. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 27-

33; Adjudication Hearing at 3-5.

Appellant was charged in a delinquency petition with the above offenses.

On April 10, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the gun on the ground

that the pat down violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution,2 and the trial court held a hearing on this motion

to suppress on April 27, 2023. The officer who initiated the traffic stop and

2 Appellant also moved in the trial court to suppress the drugs and scale but

does not challenge the denial of his motion to suppress those items in this appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 11 n.2.

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conducted the pat down was the only witness who testified at the suppression

hearing. At the close of this hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion

to suppress. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 80; Trial Court Order, 4/27/23. On

May 23, 2023, the trial court held an adjudication hearing at which it found

that Appellant committed the charged offenses. Adjudication Hearing at 10-

11; Adjudicatory Hearing Order. On August 30, 2023, the trial court entered

a dispositional order adjudicating Appellant delinquent and placing him on

probation. Dispositional Order. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant raises only one issue in this appeal: whether the officer who

patted Appellant down lacked reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed

and dangerous and suppression of the gun was therefore required because

the pat down that found the gun was unconstitutional. Our standard of review

of this issue is well established:

Appellate review of a suppression decision is limited to the suppression record, considering the evidence presented by the Commonwealth as the prevailing party and any uncontradicted evidence presented by the defense. This Court is bound by the facts as found by the suppression court so long as they are supported by the record, but our review of its legal conclusions is de novo.

Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 861 (Pa. 2018) (citations

omitted).

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals and

their effects and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures.

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Valdivia, 195 A.3d at 861; Commonwealth v. Carver, 318 A.3d 386, 390

(Pa. Super. 2024); Commonwealth v. Arrington, 233 A.3d 910, 915 (Pa.

Super. 2020). A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable and

therefore constitutionally impermissible unless an established exception to the

warrant requirement applies. Valdivia, 195 A.3d at 861; Arrington, 233

A.3d at 915; Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 403 (Pa. Super.

2011).

An exception to the warrant requirement permits a limited frisk or pat

down for weapons where an officer conducting a lawful investigative detention

has a reasonable belief that the individual that he is detaining is armed and

dangerous to the officer or others. Carver, 318 A.3d at 390; Arrington, 233

A.3d at 915; Simmons, 17 A.3d at 403. For such a frisk to be constitutionally

permissible under this exception, the officer must articulate specific facts from

which it can be reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and

dangerous. Commonwealth v. Grahame, 7 A.3d 810, 816 (Pa. 2010);

Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2022);

Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 606 (Pa. Super. 2006). Whether

this reasonable suspicion sufficient for a pat down or frisk for weapons exists

is determined from an examination of the totality of circumstances. Carver,

318 A.3d at 390; Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 10; Commonwealth v. Reed,

19 A.3d 1163, 1170 (Pa. Super. 2011). The Commonwealth is not required

to show an overt threat by the defendant or a visible weapon for a pat down

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or frisk for weapons to be constitutional. Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 11;

Commonwealth v. Mack, 953 A.2d 587, 591 (Pa. Super. 2008). Reasonable

suspicion also does not require that the officer be certain that the defendant

is armed; rather, the test for reasonable suspicion is whether a reasonably

prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his

safety or the safety of others was in danger. Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 11;

Reed, 19 A.3d at 1170.

Appellant does not dispute that he was lawfully detained. The record,

moreover, is clear that the detention was constitutional, as the car was

properly stopped for erratic driving, Appellant was in violation of the

township’s curfew ordinance and could only be released to a parent or, if

attempts to reach a parent were unsuccessful, to an adult relative or a parent

of one of the other minors, and the police were still in the process of trying to

find an adult to whom Appellant could be released when the pat down

occurred. The only issue is whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that

Appellant was armed and dangerous sufficient to support the pat down.

The trial court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on

the following facts about Appellant that were known to him: Appellant had

been the sole suspect in a gun robbery, Appellant was currently staying at the

house where that robbery occurred and which was known for gun violence,

Appellant had initially hesitated to get out of the car when asked to do so, and

Appellant had given a false birth date. Trial Court Opinion at 6. We agree

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that these facts in combination were sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion

for the pat down of Appellant.

Appellant argues that the armed robbery was insufficient to create

reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and dangerous because it was

three years old and there was no conviction. Neither of these arguments

negates the reasonable suspicion for the pat down of Appellant. Information

concerning past gun crime or gun possession by a defendant can support

reasonable suspicion that the defendant is armed and dangerous.

Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 796 (Pa. Super. 2023) (officer’s

knowledge that defendant who was detained for traffic violation had revoked

gun permit supported reasonable belief that officer’s and his partner’s safety

was in danger); Reed, 19 A.3d at 1170-71 (prior armed robbery convictions

supported reasonable suspicion). Moreover, the officer had reason to believe

that Appellant was still associated with the place where the robbery occurred.

N.T. Suppression Hearing at 20-22, 38, 56-57, 68.

Although Appellant was only a suspect in the armed robbery and was

not convicted, the officer knew that Appellant was the only suspect and that

the reason that the case closed was that the victim did not cooperate, not

because a conclusion was reached that Appellant did not commit the gun

crime. N.T. Suppression Hearing at 19, 54-55, 67-68. The absence of a

determination that Appellant committed the armed robbery was not essential

for this to be considered as a fact supporting reasonable suspicion, as

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reasonable suspicion does not require certainty that the defendant is armed

and dangerous. Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 11; Reed, 19 A.3d at 1170.

Coupled with Appellant’s ties at the time of the pat down to a house that was

known for gun violence and Appellant’s hesitancy in getting out of the car and

lying to the officer, the information that Appellant was a suspect in a past gun

robbery would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that continuing

to hold Appellant, as the police were required to do, would place the officers

in danger absent a weapons pat down.

Appellant argues that the record did not show that Appellant was

connected to the house that was known for gun violence. That is inaccurate.

The officer not only testified that one of the other passengers pointed in the

direction of Marshall Avenue saying that Appellant was staying there, but also

testified that a passenger came up to him and said that Appellant was

regularly at the specific Marshall Avenue address with the gun crime history.

N.T. Suppression Hearing at 22, 38.

Appellant also argues that reasonable suspicion was lacking because

the officer did not frisk Appellant immediately and because Appellant’s lie

about his birth date showed only that he wanted to convince police that he

was an adult, not that he was armed. These arguments likewise fail. Contrary

to Appellant’s assertions, the delay shows the reasonableness of officer’s

conduct in acting only after he had sufficient information. The officer testified

that he did not immediately conduct a pat down based simply on learning that

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there was a robbery report but reached the conclusion that there was a safety

danger when he read the details of the report just before the pat down, at a

time when he also knew of Appellant’s present ties to the Marshall Avenue

house and knew that he was unable to release Appellant. N.T. Suppression

Hearing at 66-68. While Appellant’s lie by itself certainly has an explanation

that does not suggest dangerousness, that does not preclude it as a factor to

consider with other facts known to the officer in determining whether

reasonable suspicion existed. Reasonable suspicion may properly be based

on a combination of facts that by themselves would be insufficient.

Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth

v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997). Both the lie and Appellant’s

hesitation in getting out of the car could therefore properly be considered with

the other information that Appellant could be armed as showing reasonable

suspicion for the pat down.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the weapons pat down of

Appellant did not violate his Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 rights

and that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress

the gun that was found in the pat down. We therefore affirm the trial court’s

dispositional order.

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Dispositional order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/2024

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