In the Int. of: J.N.D.B., Appeal of: S.B.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 17, 2021
• Docket: 696 EDA 2021
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S23018-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.N.D.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.B., GRANDMOTHER : : : : : No. 696 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered March 16, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000340-2018.

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.R.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.B., GRANDMOTHER : : : : : No. 697 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered March 16, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001242-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2021

Appellant S.B. (Maternal Grandmother) appeals the orders denying her

petitions to adopt her six-year-old granddaughter, M.R.M., and four-year-old

grandson, J.N.D.B. (collectively, the Children), pursuant to the Adoption Act, ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S23018-21

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2910. Maternal Grandmother brought the instant

petitions after the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the

Children’s biological mother and fathers. In denying Maternal Grandmother’s

adoptions petitions, the court determined it would be in the Children’s best

interests if they were instead adopted by T.M. and G.M. (Foster Parents), who

also filed petitions. After review, we affirm.

The record discloses the following relevant history: The Philadelphia

Department of Human Resources (DHS) became involved with the Children in

June 2014, when it received a report that M.R.M. had multiple bone fractures

to the clavicle and tibia. At the time, M.R.M. was approximately six weeks

old, and she was in the care of the biological mother, the maternal uncle, the

maternal grandfather and Maternal Grandmother. The court removed M.R.M.

from the home and placed her with the Foster Parents. In April 2015, the

juvenile court ultimately adjudicated M.R.M. dependent. In November 2016,

J.N.D.B. was born and placed with the Foster Parents immediately after

leaving the hospital, when he was two days old. J.N.D.B. was adjudicated

dependent the following month.

Both Children have remained in the home of the Foster Parents since

their original placements. Maternal Grandmother had hoped to be a

placement option; however, the juvenile court denied this kinship placement

because of Maternal Grandmother’s previous history with DHS and her

criminal history. In 2005, DHS removed Maternal Grandmother’s two

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children, including the subject Children’s biological mother. Maternal

Grandmother ultimately achieved reunification in 2007.

In August 2018, the subject Children’s respective dependency cases

proceeded to a termination of parental rights hearing, at which point the court

terminated the parents’ rights and changed goals of the Children’s dependency

cases from reunification to adoption. In May 2019, Maternal Grandmother

filed petitions to adopt the Children; the petitions were amended on

September 18, 2019. On January 24, 2020, the Foster Parents filed their

petitions for adoption.

The trial court held a hearing on Maternal Grandmother’s petitions on

March 16, 2021. Among the evidence, the court heard testimony that the

Children have resided with the Foster Parents for virtually their entire lives,

that they refer to the Foster Parents as “mom and dad” and the Foster Parents’

children as their siblings. Conversely, Maternal Grandmother testified that

she sought adoption because she was fighting for what she believed was right,

that the Children belonged with biological family. Ultimately, the court denied

Maternal Grandmother’s adoption petitions, finding that it would not be in the

Children’s best interests.

Maternal Grandmother timely-filed this appeal, wherein she presents

the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in denying Maternal Grandmother’s Petition for Adoption?

2. Did the trial court err in finding that the proposed adoption by Maternal Grandmother was not desirable?

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3. Did the trial court err in finding that the [C]hildren would be better served by remaining with their foster parents rather than being raised by her biological family?

Maternal Grandmother’s Brief at 7.

For ease of disposition, we address Maternal Grandmother’s issues

contemporaneously. We review adoption matters for an abuse of discretion,

in accordance with our well-settled standard of review:

An appellate court is not bound by findings of fact made by the trial court which are unsupported in the record, nor is it bound by the court’s inferences drawn from the facts. However, on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, an appellate court defers to the findings of the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and the demeanor of the witnesses. Only where it finds that the [order] is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record will an appellate court interfere with the trial court’s determination.

In re Adoption of A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations

and internal quotations omitted).

The polestar of adoption proceedings is the best interest of the adoptee.

See In re K.D., 144 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Super. 2016). This “best interests”

determination is made on a case-by-case basis and requires the weighing of

all factors which bear upon a child’s well-being. A.S.H., 674 A.2d at 700

(citations omitted). Under the Adoption Act:

[t]he court shall hear testimony in support of the [adoption] petition and such additional testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the desirability of the proposed adoption. […].

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23 Pa.C.S.A.§ 2724(a)

Moreover, Section 2724(b) provides, in relevant part: “In any case, the

age, sex, health, social and economic status or racial, ethnic or religious

background of the child or adopting parents shall not preclude an adoption but

the court shall decide its desirability on the basis of the physical, mental and

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” If the court is satisfied that the

statements made in the adoption petition are true, that the needs and welfare

of the person proposed to be adopted will be promoted by the adoption, and

that all requirements of this part have been met, the court shall enter an

adoption decree. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.§ 2902(a).

Instantly, the trial court heard testimony and considered evidence from

all interested parties, after which the court concluded that adoption by the

Foster Parents would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare in

accordance with Section 2724(b) of the Adoption Act. On appeal, Maternal

Grandmother does not argue that the court’s determinations were

unsupported by the record. Her only real contention is that the court erred,

because she is a biological family member, whereas the Foster Parents are

not. She argues that the Adoption Act “is clearly in favor of biological

relatives,” which she infers from the Act’s procedural subtext. See Maternal

Grandmother’s Brief at 22 (citing, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S.A.§ 2531(c), relieving

certain blood relatives from having to file a report of intention to adopt.)

On this point, Maternal Grandmother is only partially correct. “We are

mindful that, when possible, the preservation of the biological family is the

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desired outcome in custody matters. However, the goal of preserving the

family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when considering the

best interests of the children, but must be weighed in conjunction with other

factors.” K.D., 144 A.3d at 153 (citing In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26 A.3d

1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2011)). In K.D. we reversed the orphans’ court

decision to grant a grandmother’s adoption, where the court’s best interest

analysis only focused on the grandmother’s blood relationship with the child

and the children youth services agency’s purported inaction to facilitate their

contact. Id. We held that the court ignored much unrebutted evidence that

established that it was not in the child’s best interest to grant the

grandmother’s petition. Id. Thus, the biological connection between the

petitioner and the adoptee is by no means dispositive in a best interests

analysis under Section 2724(b) of the Adoption Act.

Here, after conducting a thorough analysis, the trial court concluded the

physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the Children would be

best served by denying the Maternal Grandmother’s petitions, notwithstanding

their biological connection. Paramount to this decision was that the Children

have resided with the Foster Parents practically since birth. M.R.M. entered

their care when she was approximately six weeks old, and she has lived with

the Foster Family for nearly the last seven years. J.N.D.B. lived with the

Foster Parents since he was two days old, and he has been with them for the

last four years. The Children have thrived in the Foster Parents’ home. The

court heard testimony that the Children shared a very loving parent-child bond

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with the Foster Parents. The Foster Parents provided the Children with a

consistent structure and routine. The Foster Parents were proactive with the

Children’s medical and educational needs. And the subject Children also share

a sibling relationship with the Foster Parents’ other children. The court also

heard testimony that, given this history, the Children would be emotionally

harmed by being removed from the Foster Parents’ care.

Notably, Maternal Grandmother did not appear to appreciate the

potential harm that would befall the Children if they were removed from the

Foster Parents’ care. Maternal Grandmother testified that any adverse effect

on the Children’s removal from their Foster Parents would not be her fault.

Maternal Grandmother testified that the Children’s removal from their Foster

Parents – the only family they have essentially ever known – would be no

different than when DHS decided to rip the Children from her family. She also

argues that the Children were resilient and would adjust. See Maternal

Grandmother’s Brief at 18. However, Maternal Grandmother conceded that

she does not know the Children, nor do the Children know her.

Even aside from the strong relationship the Children had with their

Foster Parents, the court had real reservations about Maternal Grandmother’s

desirability as an adoptive parent. For instance, Maternal Grandmother had a

criminal record following a 2005 incident at her child’s school, where she

apparently drove her minivan into the building to confront the staff, allegedly

about her child being bullied. The court was also wary of Maternal

Grandmother’s parenting, given her previous involvement with DHS during

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her children’s dependency cases from 2005-2007. By Maternal Grandmother’s

own admission, her children had anger toward her for the abuse they suffered

in her care. At the hearing, the court was unsatisfied by Maternal

Grandmother’s denials about previous potential for abuse in her home. For

instance, there was a 2007 report that Maternal Grandmother endangered her

children by allowing them to sleep in the same room, despite allegations that

one child had sexually abused the other. Consequently, Maternal

Grandmother was placed on the ChildLine1 registry, but at the hearing she

disputed that there was any concern with her care.

More recently, in 2019, Maternal Grandmother also appeared on the

Steve Wilkos television show to discuss the injuries that led to M.R.M.’s

placement in foster care. The title of the episode was “Who Broke My Baby’s

Bones?” Not only was Maternal Grandmother indifferent to how this notoriety

might negatively affect the Children, but at the hearing she referred to

M.R.M.’s injuries as “birth injuries,” even though M.R.M. was injured while in

Maternal Grandmother’s care. Maternal Grandmother testified that she could

____________________________________________

1 ChildLine is “[a]n organizational unit of the Department [of Human Services

of the Commonwealth] which operates a Statewide toll-free system for receiving reports of suspected child abuse established under section 6332 of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL) (relating to establishment of Statewide toll-free telephone number), refers the reports for investigation and maintains the reports in the appropriate file. In addition, it also receives reports of student abuse under Subchapter C.1 of the CPSL (relating to students in public and private schools).” 55 PA ADC § 3490.4. Often, “a ChildLine” is shorthand for the report itself.

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not say whether the injury was sustained in her home, because “it got swept

under the rug” – an apparent reference to her distrust of DHS. Of course,

Maternal Grandmother disputed many of these facts both at the hearing and

in her Brief. But to that end, we must defer credibility issues to the trial court,

which doubted Maternal Grandmother’s credibility. See A.S.H., supra.

The court also heard testimony about Maternal Grandmother’s mental

state. Maternal Grandmother admitted to having post-traumatic stress

disorder and anxiety; she attributed her anxiety to her unsuccessful efforts to

obtain custody of the Children. She conceded she has some behaviors

consistent with obsessive-compulsive disorder, though apparently there was

never an official diagnosis.

On appeal, Maternal Grandmother challenges these adverse findings by

reiterating the arguments she unsuccessfully made before the trial court.

Even then, Maternal Grandmother does not argue how the Children’s interests

would be best served if she were the adoptive parent, only that she would be

perfectly capable of caring for them. And again, she grounds her argument

in the biological connection that she shares with the Children, providing no

relevant legal authority to support her position. What Maternal Grandmother

challenges, ultimately, are the weight and credibility of the evidence, but these

matters remain directly within the purview of the trial court, sitting as fact-

finder, not with this Court. Therefore, we fail to discern how the court’s

decision was manifestly unreasonable such that our interference would be

warranted.

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In sum, we conclude the trial court did not err or otherwise abuse its

discretion when it denied Maternal Grandmother’s petitions for adoption.

Although Maternal Grandmother has a biological connection to the Children,

that connection must be weighed in conjunction with the Children’s bests

interests, not elevated above them. After hearing all the evidence and

testimony, the court determined that it was in the Children’s best interests to

be adopted by their Foster Parents, with whom they have lived for practically

their entire lives. On appeal, Maternal Grandmother does not allege that the

court’s decision was without evidentiary support – only that her biological

connection to the Children should trump. Such an argument is contrary to

our law.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/17/2021

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