J-A20017-24
2024 PA Super 286
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: A.M., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 789 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000005-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and LANE, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 3, 2024
A.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on February 13, 2024
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County adjudicating J.M. (d.o.b.
8/2023) dependent. After our careful independent review, we affirm on the
basis of the trial court’s opinion.
The trial court provides a thorough procedural and factual background
in its April 29, 2024 opinion.
Mother gave birth to J.M. [in] August [] 2023. J.M. was born prematurely at twenty-four weeks gestation. Due to J.M.’s medical fragility, J.M. remained hospitalized until January 3, 2024.
On November 19, 2023, [the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)] received a General Protective Services (GPS) report alleging that Mother was not visiting J.M. at the hospital. The report alleged that Mother needed to be present at the hospital to learn how to manage J.M.’s medical needs. Hospital staff communicated to Mother that J.M. was sick. Mother responded to hospital staff but she did not visit J.M. (See Exhibit “A” Statement of Facts, at ¶ 5(b), attached to DHS Dependency Petition, filed 1/11/24). On November 3, 2023, a meeting was J-A20017-24
conducted between hospital staff, Mother, and Maternal Grandmother, N.S. Mother resided with Maternal Grandmother. The purpose of the meeting was to address whether Mother and Maternal Grandmother were facing barriers in their abilities to visit J.M. Hospital staff were told that Mother was not employed or enrolled in school. Hospital staff informed Mother they expected her to visit J.M. on a daily basis. Bus passes were offered to help overcome any transportation barriers. (See id.).
At the November 3, 2023 meeting, hospital staff did not perceive Mother to be appropriately concerned about J.M. After the meeting, and prior to the filing of the GPS report, Mother only visited J.M. on two occasions—November 8, 2023, at 12:00 [A]M and November 14, 2023, at 10:00 PM. Hospital staff were unaware why Mother was not visiting J.M. on a daily basis and were concerned about the infrequency of Mother’s visits. DHS determined the GPS report to be valid. (See id. at ¶ 5(c)).
DHS attempted to visit Mother at her home on November 22, 2023, but she was not there at the time. DHS visited again on December 2, 2023, and was able to speak with Mother and Maternal Grandmother to address visitation concerns. DHS asserted that, at this point in time, Mother had only visited J.M. in the hospital eight times. (See id. at ¶¶ 5(d)-(e)).
DHS held a Crisis/Rapid Response Meeting on December 8, 2023. Mother, Maternal Grandmother and DHS attended the meeting. DHS provided Mother with a list of training sessions that she needed to complete, including training regarding feeding, administering medications, and learning cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). (See id. at ¶ 5(f)).
By January 3, 2024, J.M. was ready to be discharged from the hospital. At this point, Mother did not provide certification of completion of the trainings requested at the December 8, 2023 meeting. Mother only visited J.M. four times between December 8, 2023 and January 3, 2024. (See id. at ¶¶ 5(g)-(h)).
Contemporaneously with J.M.’s discharge, DHS obtained an [Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”)] on the grounds that Mother was not visiting J.M., Mother and J.M. had not formed a bond, Mother needed to undergo training, and Mother had not demonstrated an adequate parenting capacity. As a result of the
-2- J-A20017-24
OPC, J.M. was placed in medical foster care through Delta Community Supports, Inc. (See id. at ¶ 5(h)).
A shelter care hearing was held on January 5, 2024, where J.M.’s temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to stand. Mother was ordered to have twice weekly, two-hour visits with J.M. at his placement. Mother was also invited to participate in J.M.’s medical appointments. [J.M. remains medically needy, requiring follow-up appointments in cardiology, ophthalmology, and St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children’s Developmental Pediatrics.] (See id. at ¶ 5(i)-(j)).
DHS filed a Dependency Petition for J.M. on January 11, 2024. The petition asked the court to adjudicate J.M. dependent, commit J.M. to DHS, and order the disposition best suited to the welfare of J.M. The hearing on the Dependency Petition was held before this court on February 13, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, this court found clear and convincing evidence to adjudicate J.M. dependent. J.M. was fully committed to DHS based on the finding of present inability of Mother to provide proper parental care and control. J.M. was to remain in medical foster care through Delta Community Supports, Inc. (See Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/13/24). Mother filed her Notice of Appeal with Statement of Errors Complained on March 14, 2024.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/24, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted;
some record citation formatting provided)).
Mother raises five questions for this Court’s review:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by adjudicating J.M. to be a “dependent child” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302 in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that J.M. was presently “without proper parental care and control … as required by law?”
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by adjudicating J.M. to be a “dependent” child pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302 and removing J.M. from his Mother’s custody, and relying, at least in part, on improperly shifting onto Mother A.M. the burden to prove to the court that she can provide J.M. with proper parental care and control?
-3- J-A20017-24
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by committing J.M. to the legal custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that removal from Mother A.M. was clearly necessary?
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by finding that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of J.M. from his home?
5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by ordering that J.M. should be placed in medical foster care in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that medical foster care was the least restrictive placement available?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4 (answers and suggested answers omitted).
Our standard of review in this matter is well settled:
The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.
Interest of R.B., 323 A.3d 828, 832 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation and brackets
omitted).
The Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child,” in pertinent part, as a child
who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-A20017-24
2024 PA Super 286
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: A.M., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 789 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000005-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and LANE, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 3, 2024
A.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on February 13, 2024
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County adjudicating J.M. (d.o.b.
8/2023) dependent. After our careful independent review, we affirm on the
basis of the trial court’s opinion.
The trial court provides a thorough procedural and factual background
in its April 29, 2024 opinion.
Mother gave birth to J.M. [in] August [] 2023. J.M. was born prematurely at twenty-four weeks gestation. Due to J.M.’s medical fragility, J.M. remained hospitalized until January 3, 2024.
On November 19, 2023, [the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)] received a General Protective Services (GPS) report alleging that Mother was not visiting J.M. at the hospital. The report alleged that Mother needed to be present at the hospital to learn how to manage J.M.’s medical needs. Hospital staff communicated to Mother that J.M. was sick. Mother responded to hospital staff but she did not visit J.M. (See Exhibit “A” Statement of Facts, at ¶ 5(b), attached to DHS Dependency Petition, filed 1/11/24). On November 3, 2023, a meeting was J-A20017-24
conducted between hospital staff, Mother, and Maternal Grandmother, N.S. Mother resided with Maternal Grandmother. The purpose of the meeting was to address whether Mother and Maternal Grandmother were facing barriers in their abilities to visit J.M. Hospital staff were told that Mother was not employed or enrolled in school. Hospital staff informed Mother they expected her to visit J.M. on a daily basis. Bus passes were offered to help overcome any transportation barriers. (See id.).
At the November 3, 2023 meeting, hospital staff did not perceive Mother to be appropriately concerned about J.M. After the meeting, and prior to the filing of the GPS report, Mother only visited J.M. on two occasions—November 8, 2023, at 12:00 [A]M and November 14, 2023, at 10:00 PM. Hospital staff were unaware why Mother was not visiting J.M. on a daily basis and were concerned about the infrequency of Mother’s visits. DHS determined the GPS report to be valid. (See id. at ¶ 5(c)).
DHS attempted to visit Mother at her home on November 22, 2023, but she was not there at the time. DHS visited again on December 2, 2023, and was able to speak with Mother and Maternal Grandmother to address visitation concerns. DHS asserted that, at this point in time, Mother had only visited J.M. in the hospital eight times. (See id. at ¶¶ 5(d)-(e)).
DHS held a Crisis/Rapid Response Meeting on December 8, 2023. Mother, Maternal Grandmother and DHS attended the meeting. DHS provided Mother with a list of training sessions that she needed to complete, including training regarding feeding, administering medications, and learning cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). (See id. at ¶ 5(f)).
By January 3, 2024, J.M. was ready to be discharged from the hospital. At this point, Mother did not provide certification of completion of the trainings requested at the December 8, 2023 meeting. Mother only visited J.M. four times between December 8, 2023 and January 3, 2024. (See id. at ¶¶ 5(g)-(h)).
Contemporaneously with J.M.’s discharge, DHS obtained an [Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”)] on the grounds that Mother was not visiting J.M., Mother and J.M. had not formed a bond, Mother needed to undergo training, and Mother had not demonstrated an adequate parenting capacity. As a result of the
-2- J-A20017-24
OPC, J.M. was placed in medical foster care through Delta Community Supports, Inc. (See id. at ¶ 5(h)).
A shelter care hearing was held on January 5, 2024, where J.M.’s temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to stand. Mother was ordered to have twice weekly, two-hour visits with J.M. at his placement. Mother was also invited to participate in J.M.’s medical appointments. [J.M. remains medically needy, requiring follow-up appointments in cardiology, ophthalmology, and St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children’s Developmental Pediatrics.] (See id. at ¶ 5(i)-(j)).
DHS filed a Dependency Petition for J.M. on January 11, 2024. The petition asked the court to adjudicate J.M. dependent, commit J.M. to DHS, and order the disposition best suited to the welfare of J.M. The hearing on the Dependency Petition was held before this court on February 13, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, this court found clear and convincing evidence to adjudicate J.M. dependent. J.M. was fully committed to DHS based on the finding of present inability of Mother to provide proper parental care and control. J.M. was to remain in medical foster care through Delta Community Supports, Inc. (See Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/13/24). Mother filed her Notice of Appeal with Statement of Errors Complained on March 14, 2024.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/24, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted;
some record citation formatting provided)).
Mother raises five questions for this Court’s review:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by adjudicating J.M. to be a “dependent child” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302 in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that J.M. was presently “without proper parental care and control … as required by law?”
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by adjudicating J.M. to be a “dependent” child pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302 and removing J.M. from his Mother’s custody, and relying, at least in part, on improperly shifting onto Mother A.M. the burden to prove to the court that she can provide J.M. with proper parental care and control?
-3- J-A20017-24
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by committing J.M. to the legal custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that removal from Mother A.M. was clearly necessary?
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by finding that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of J.M. from his home?
5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by ordering that J.M. should be placed in medical foster care in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that medical foster care was the least restrictive placement available?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4 (answers and suggested answers omitted).
Our standard of review in this matter is well settled:
The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.
Interest of R.B., 323 A.3d 828, 832 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation and brackets
omitted).
The Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child,” in pertinent part, as a child
who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]
-4- J-A20017-24
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1); see also In the Interest of J.M., 166 A.3d 408,
417 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same). “The question of whether a child is lacking
proper parental care and control so as to be a dependent child encompasses
two discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper care or
control, and if so, whether such care and control are immediately available.”
In Interest of K.S., 159 A.3d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
It is the petitioner’s burden to present clear and convincing evidence, i.e.,
evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier
of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue.” Interest of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa. Super.
2021) (citation omitted). An adjudication of dependency may be based on
prognostic evidence—which involves predicting the child’s safety, well-being,
and permanency—"and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden
of proof necessary to declare a child dependent.” In re E.B., 83 A.3d 426,
433 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
As this Court observed in E.B.:
In Matter of DeSavage, … 360 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. 1976), this Court rejected the argument that a child cannot be adjudicated dependent unless the child is actually in custody of the parents and they are shown unable to render care or control as defined in the Juvenile Act. We explained:
Obviously, state interference with a parent-child relationship is a most serious intrusion ... such an intrusion is properly tolerated only in cases in which the Commonwealth sustains a very strict burden of proof.... The rule of law appellants request us to announce is overly restrictive. The legislature defined
-5- J-A20017-24
[“dependent child”] in exceedingly broad terms precisely because it is impossible to foresee all the possible factual situations that may arise. Further the broad definition enables the experienced juvenile court judge to apply his training and compassion to the unique facts of each case. The proposition asserted by appellants would compel the juvenile court judge to place the child in the home of the natural parents to determine whether they are able to render proper care, and ignores the possibility that if the “experiment” proves unsuccessful, the consequences to the child could be seriously detrimental or even fatal.
Id. at 433 (quoting DeSavage, 360 A.2d at 241-42).
After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the Honorable Brian
McLaughlin’s well-reasoned Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, we conclude Mother’s
issues merit no relief. The trial court’s decision belies Mother’s claims that the
court abused its discretion, improperly shifted the burden of proof, or failed to
properly consider the evidence before it. In addressing Mother’s issues, the
April 29, 2024 opinion sets forth the plethora of evidence and credible,
prognostic testimony that Mother’s present inability to provide proper parental
care and control for J.M. creates a substantial risk that J.M. would suffer
detrimental or even fatal consequences if left in Mother’s care. See Trial Court
Opinion, 4/29/24, at 5-10. The decision also fully addresses the court’s
findings that DHS made reasonable efforts to prevent J.M.’s removal from
Mother’s home and that medical foster care was the least restrictive placement
available. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/24, at 10-13.
-6- J-A20017-24
We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s comprehensive April 29, 2024
opinion.
Order affirmed.
Date: 12/3/2024
-7- Circulated 11/27/2024 10:32 AM