J-A10015-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.R., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: T.D., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 2324 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000926-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2021
T.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on November 16, 2020,
that adjudicated her son, E.R. (“Child”), dependent under the Juvenile Act,1
based on Mother’s present inability to adequately care for Child. Additionally,
as part of the disposition, the juvenile court ordered that it was in Child’s best
interest to be removed from Mother’s home, and legal custody to continue
with the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) as well as
placement to remain in kinship care. On appeal, Mother contends the court
erred in finding that Child met the definition of dependent child pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 and in determining that Child should be removed from
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301, et seq. J-A10015-21
Mother’s care where there was no showing of clear necessity to remove Child.
After careful review, we affirm.
The record reveals that Child is approximately one year old, born in
August 2020. DHS had previous contact with Mother when they became
involved with her other child, L.D. (“Half-Sister”),2 beginning on May 17, 2020.
At the time, Mother was 25 weeks pregnant with Child and Half-Sister was
two years old. See N.T., 11/16/2020, at 22. On that date, at around 10:00
p.m., Mother took Half-Sister to the emergency room at Saint Christopher’s
Hospital for Children in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with concerns for multiple
injuries on the child’s face. See id., at 21. Based on the child’s injuries, Dr.
Norell Atkinson, M.D., a child abuse pediatrician, was asked to evaluate Half-
Sister. Id.
Mother reported to Dr. Atkinson that she left Half-Sister in the care of
Child’s father, J.E. (“Father”), and one of his friends, J.A. (“Father’s Friend”),
for approximately five hours from 10:00 a.m. to 3 p.m. Mother shared the
reason she left was because she was pregnant and had been vomiting blood.
See id., at 22. She called for an ambulance to take her to Temple Hospital.
Id., at 45. She expressed that Father “was not happy about having to look
after” Half-Sister. Id., at 22-23.
2 Half-Sister shares the same biological mother as Child, but they have different fathers.
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When Mother returned, she found the house was a mess and Father
appeared to be high. See N.T., 11/16/2020, at 23. She immediately went
upstairs to check on Half-Sister, who was lying in a wet puddle and her face
was very red and swollen. See id. Mother asked Father what happened to
Half-Sister; he denied that anything had occurred. See id.
Mother’s mother suggested that it might be an allergic reaction and
advised Mother to give Half-Sister Benadryl. See id. Mother gave Half-Sister
the medication and allowed her to sleep for several hours. However, Half-
Sister showed no significant change in the amount of swelling. See id. Mother
also noticed there were now black-and-blue marks underneath the red areas,
and Half-Sister had a busted lip. See id., at 24. Moreover, there were blood
stains on the child’s mattress. See id. Mother again asked Father what
happened, but he again denied any knowledge. Mother said they continued to
fight but “due to a prior history of violence,” she decided to take Half-Sister
to the hospital. Id.
Dr. Atkinson then conducted a physical examination of Half-Sister. He
observed that the child “still had some redness and swelling to her face” and
she had “areas of bruising as well as petechiae bruises, which are sort of like
pinpoint areas of bruising, to the face.” Id. The examination indicated Half-
Sister also had petechiae bruises to her neck and chest area, and areas of
swelling to the front of her scalp. See id., at 24-25.
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Dr. Atkinson determined “the presence of the petechiae bruising that
was on her chest, her face and her neck would not be something that a child
of this age would be able to sustain accidentally, and it was concerning for a
pattern of injury that you can see in the setting of kind of forceful compression
of the … chest or neck area.” Id., at 25. The doctor also noted the compression
injury indicated the child suffered from some level of strangulation or her
airway was occluded. See id. Dr. Atkinson diagnosed Half-Sister’s injuries as
the result of “child physical abuse.” Id.
DHS was immediately notified of the matter and assigned the Child
Protective Services (“CPS”) report for Half-Sister to Stephanie English, an DHS
investigative social worker, on May 18th. The report identified Half-Sister as
the victim and Father as the alleged perpetrator. In addition to setting forth
the allegations describing the child’s injuries, the report indicated there was a
concern because Father had a history of substance abuse. See id., at 39-41.
English went to the hospital and spoke with both Mother and Father.
Mother disclosed the reason for her own hospital admission was that she and
Father were engaged in a heated argument that included Mother complaining
about Father’s drug use and “that he needed to step his game up[.]” Id., at
42. She indicated Father choked her, and while she was sitting on the bed,
Father hit her with a pillow and used such force that she was knocked off the
bed into the corner of the room. See id., at 42-43. Half-Sister was sitting on
the bed screaming during the altercation. When English asked how Mother got
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Father to calm down, she said that she threw a chair at him, but he also ran
into a wall and knocked himself out. See id., at 44. Mother stated that the
next morning, she woke up with stomach pains and started to throw up. See
id. She then decided to call the ambulance.
Mother acknowledged that the couple had a history of domestic violence.
See id., at 45. Furthermore, Mother admitted she had a history of being
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), depression, and an
anxiety disorder. See id., at 46. She stated she had not been in treatment
since June 2019, and her last prescribed medication was Celexa which she last
took in May 2019. See id. She did not admit to having a history of drug use.
See id., at 45.
During English’s conversation with Father, he confirmed that he was
home when Mother went to the hospital and stated that he did not know what
happened to Half-Sister, but he denied harming Half-Sister. See id., at 49.
He did not say that he left the child with anyone else while she was in his care.
See id. Father did not inform English that he had a history of mental health
issues. See id., at 49-50. Based on the evidence and conversations with the
parents, English determined the report to be “indicated” with Father being
perpetrator. Id., at 50.3
3 On cross-examination, English acknowledged that prior to this incident, there
were no instances of abuse or neglect while Half-Sister was in Father’s care. See id., at 52.
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On May 19th, as Half-Sister was ready for discharge, DHS obtained an
order of protective custody (“OPC”) and placed her in a confidential setting.
One day later, at the shelter care hearing, the court removed the OPC and
ordered temporary physical and legal custody to DHS. Half-Sister was placed
with her maternal great aunt though the Turning Points Agency (“TPA”). See
id., at 74.
Subsequently, Shaylin Crayder, a DHS worker, was assigned a GPS
report regarding the family on August 30, 2020, after Mother gave birth to
Child. See id., at 58. In the report, it alleged Mother had tested positive for
marijuana during two prenatal visits on April 16, 2020, and July 4, 2020, and
Half-Sister was not in her care. See id., at 58-59. The report also indicated
Mother said she was receiving mental health treatment at Pan American at
the time, and she no longer smoked marijuana. See id., at 59.
Crayder met with Mother and Father at the hospital. Mother admitted
that she smoked marijuana while she was pregnant4 and stated that the only
domestic violence she endured was with Half-Sister’s biological father. See
id., at 60. She denied any current domestic violence with Father. See id.
Moreover, Mother stated that she did not believe that Father had caused any
4 On cross-examination, Crayder confirmed that Mother was in treatment. See
id., at 63. She also indicated she was not aware of Mother having any positive drug screens from July to September, and Child was not born with marijuana in his system. See id.
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harm to Half-Sister and she placed the blame on Father’s Friend. See id., at
60-61.
Mother also told Crayder that she had been evicted from her apartment
in June of 2020 and that she had been residing with a friend, but that
individual was no longer allowing her to stay there so she was now staying
with another friend. See id., at 61.
Father informed Crayder that he and Mother were no longer in a
relationship and that he had his own housing, which consisted of sleeping in
the living room of his grandmother’s home. See id., at 61-62. He also stated
that he was on probation for selling drugs but denied any current illegal
substance use. See id., at 61. He reported that he was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder but that he was not in any treatment. See id. Based on the evidence
presented, Crayder determined the report to be “valid.” Id., at 62.
Crayder also went to the residence where Mother was residing at the
time. Crayder noted Mother occupied one bedroom in the home, and that it
was “appropriate” housing as long as they “had proper sleeping
arrangements.” Id., at 64.
On September 1, 2020, DHS obtained an OPC and Child was placed with
his paternal great aunt through the TPA. See id., at 75. At the shelter care
hearing on the following day, the court lifted the OPC and ordered temporary
commitment to DHS to stand.
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On September 10th, DHS filed a dependency petition with respect to
Child. In the petition, DHS summarized the information in the GPS report and
detailed its prior history with Mother concerning Half-Sister as well as its visits
with Mother and Father. DHS indicated Child is currently under its legal
custody.
On November 16, 2020, the court held a consolidated adjudicatory and
child abuse hearing for both Child and Half-Sister.5 DHS presented the
evidence and testimony concerning the history of the case and the factual
basis for the allegations of dependency, including the testimony of Dr.
Atkinson, English, and Crayder, as recited above. Notably, Crayder expressed
that DHS had numerous concerns: (1) that Mother and Father were still in a
relationship; (3) that Mother did not believe that Father had harmed Half-
Sister; and (3) that Mother had an unstable housing situation. See id., at 65.
Crayder mentioned that Mother also did not provide her with the names of
any individuals identified as “supports” that could assist her with the children.
Id.
Additionally, Tamara Sledge, the family’s Community Umbrella Agency
(“CUA”) case manager, testified that Mother completed her parenting classes
prior to the hearing and continued to participate even though she met the
requirement. See id., at 83. Sledge stated that while she had not received a
5 Mother and Father did not testify at the hearing.
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report from Mother’s therapist, Mother told Sledge that she attends therapy
two times a week. See id., at 84. Sledge believed her agency could safely
monitor the children if Father was not present. See id., 86.
However, Sledge was concerned that Mother was still in a relationship
with Father6 and that Mother “may put [Child] over [Half-Sister] because
[Father] is the biological father of [Child].” Id., at 87. Moreover, Sledge stated
that Mother has “a temper” and she could not give Mother advice without “her
counter reacting, … sometimes in a negative way.” Id.
Sledge also noted that Mother still denied that Father had abused Half-
Sister. See id., at 88. Mother opined that Father had cared for Half-Sister in
the past and would not want to cause any harm to her. See id. Sledge testified
that she spoke to Mother about the possibility of putting a safety plan or a
court order in place so that Father would not be in the home, and Mother
stated she already had a protection from abuse order for Half-Sister and she
“would not lie to get any documents” against Father because he “did not do
anything” to Mother nor did she believe he did anything to Half-Sister. Id., at
91. Sledge recommended that Child stay with his paternal great aunt. Id., at
90.
6 Sledge’s fear was based on a report by a family member at a family meeting
conference that Mother still visits Father at another family member’s house. See id., at 87.
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Moreover, the court heard testimony from Robert Buckhoffer, the
Community Behavioral Health representative, who testified to Mother’s and
Father’s mental health diagnoses and therapies. See id., at 68-73. Buckhoffer
stated Mother’s last diagnosis was in 2005, her last outpatient therapy session
was on October 26, 2020, and her last drug screening was on November 11,
2020. He indicated he did not have access to those test results. See id., at
69-70.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that “clear and
convincing evidence” had been presented to adjudicate Child dependent based
on Mother’s “present inability.” Id., at 107. By order entered on the same
day, the court adjudicated Child dependent pursuant to definition (1) of
“Dependent Child” provided in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, and that it was in Child’s
best interest to be removed from Mother’s and Father’s homes, and legal
custody to continue with DHS as well as placement to remain in kinship care.
See Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 11/16/2020, at 1-2. The court also
found DHS made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal of Child
from the home. See id., at 2. It referred Mother to Behavioral Health Systems
(“BHS”) for a mental health consultation and evaluation and for domestic
violence classes. See id. Lastly, the court granted Mother weekly supervised
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visits, in person or virtually, and the placement goal for Child was to return to
parent.7 See id. This timely appeal followed.8
We review dependency adjudications with deference to the trial court’s
findings of fact, but not its conclusions of law:
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).
Dependency matters are governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
6301, et seq. A “dependent child” is defined, in relevant part, as one who "is
without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by
law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional
health, or morals.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1).
A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian, or other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.] The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care or control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental care and control, and if so, whether such care and control are immediately available.
7 The court found child abuse by Father as to Half-Sister but her adjudication
was deferred pending paternity test results for putative father. See N.T., 11/16/2020, at 106.
8 While Father filed a participant’s brief, he is not a party to this appeal. See
generally Brief for Father, J.E., Third Party, 2/18/2021.
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The burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a child meets that statutory definition of dependency.
In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “Clear and convincing evidence" is defined as
evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier
of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue.” In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(internal quotations omitted).
Following a finding of dependency, the juvenile court may enter an order
for the child’s disposition which is “best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a). In
order to properly assess the proper disposition, the court must ascertain
several facts:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child.
...
(b) Required preplacement findings.—Prior to entering any order of disposition under subsection (a) that would remove a dependent child from his home, the court shall enter findings on the record or in the order of court as follows:
(1) that continuation of the child in his home would be contrary to the welfare, safety or health of the child; and
(2) whether reasonable efforts were made prior to the placement of the child to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, if the child has remained in his home pending such disposition; or
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(3) if preventive services were not offered due to the necessity for an emergency placement, whether such lack of services was reasonable under the circumstances[.]
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b).
Lastly, we note that even after a child has been adjudicated dependent,
“a court may not separate that child from his or her parent unless it finds that
the separation is clearly necessary. Such necessity is implicated where the
welfare of the child demands that he [or she] be taken from his [or her]
parents’ custody.” In re G., T., 845 A.2d at 873 (citations and quotations
marks omitted)
Here, Mother’s issues are related so we review them together. Mother
first contends that the court erred in finding DHS presented clear and
convincing evidence that Child was dependent based on definition (1) of
“Dependent Child” under Section 6302. See Appellant’s Brief, at 19. She
states that she was separated from Father and residing with a friend who
passed background clearances and was willing to allow social workers in the
home. See id. Mother also points to the following: (1) she had a room that
was deemed appropriate for her and both children; (2) she was compliant with
services; (3) she was attending mental health therapy; (4) she already
completed a parenting class at the request of DHS; and (5) there was a PFA
order protecting Half-Sister from Father. Id., at 19-20. Mother argues the
testimony at the adjudicatory hearing from the social workers “at best shows
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that they had a fear or concerns that [M]other might not protect the child from
his father,” but the evidence supporting DHS’s concern “does not rise to level
of clear and convincing evidence of dependency.” Id. at 20 (quotation marks
omitted).
Next, Mother complains that the court erred in finding DHS presented
clear and convincing evidence that there was a “clear necessity” for Child’s
removal from the home. Id. Mother argues that inadequacies in the child’s
home alone are not enough to place the child in the custody of a state agency
and the court “must first consider if ordering a state agency to take steps to
instruct the parents in the skills needed to rectify the inadequacies and
providing follow up supervision in the home would allow the unity of the family
to be preserved.” Id.
Mother states DHS did not make any effort to prevent the placement of
Child and he was removed from her care after birth because Half-Sister had
been temporarily removed from the home due to injuries suffered while in
Father’s care. See id., at 20-21. Mother asserts the evidence is to the
contrary: (1) Crayder testified that when she removed Child, she did not ask
if Mother would be willing to ensure that Father did not have contact with Half-
Sister because Crayder did not believe it was an option since Half-Sister was
already placed with the relative; (2) Mother and Child did not test positive for
marijuana at that time of his birth, and there was no evidence that Mother
tested positive after July 2020; (3) there was no evidence that Mother suffered
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from any mental health issues that would affect her ability to care for her
child; and (4) there was no evidence that Mother continued to reside with
Father or that Father made attempts to live at or visit Mother’s new residence.
See id., at 21. Mother again points to the fact that she has appropriate
housing, is compliant with services, completed her requested parenting class,
and attends mental health therapy.
Mother also claims that DHS’s concern that Mother might not protect
the children from Father is not supported by the record. She asserts that there
were no previous injuries to Half-Sister while they lived with Father, DHS did
not find her to be an abuser of Half-Sister, and Mother was “appropriately
concerned and attentive” to Half-Sister when she took the child to the hospital.
Id., at 22. Mother alleges, “Nothing in testimony indicated that [she] tried to
conceal the injuries to protect [Father] or any other person. Mother clearly
placed the concerns for her injured child above any concerns she may have
had for [Father].” Id. Likewise, she states:
The fact that [M]other can not be sure whether or not [Father] or [Father’s Friend] was the individual who ultimately struck and injured [Half-Sister], and while the child was left in the care of [Father] does not establish that [M]other would permit [Father] to care for [Child] or his sibling in the future. Likewise, the allegations that [M]other and [F]ather had an argument that got physical, in [Half-Sister]’s presence on one occasion while [Father] and [Mother] were living together before [Child]’s birth does [not] establish an ongoing threat of such exposure existed under the current situation where [Father] and [Mother] have separated.
Id., at 23.
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Lastly, Mother argues that the court did not make an explicit finding on
the credibility of Sledge so it was unclear if the evidence she presented was
the basis for any part of the court’s decision. Further, the court did not address
the clear necessity standard nor explain why the social work services were
inadequate to permit Child to remain in her care. Id.
It is well-settled that “a finding of dependency can be made on the basis
of prognostic evidence and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden
of proof necessary to declare a child dependent.” In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10,
14 (Pa. Super. 2003). In Matter of DeSavage, 360 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super.
1976), this Court rejected the argument that a child cannot be adjudicated
dependent unless the child is actually in custody of the parents, and they are
shown to be unable to render care or control as defined in the Juvenile Act.
We explained:
Obviously, state interference with a parent-child relationship is a most serious intrusion ... such an intrusion is properly tolerated only in cases in which the Commonwealth sustains a very strict burden of proof.... The rule of law appellants request us to announce is overly restrictive. The legislature defined [“dependent child”] in exceedingly broad terms precisely because it is impossible to foresee all the possible factual situations that may arise. Further, the broad definition enables the experienced juvenile court judge to apply his training and compassion to the unique facts of each case. The proposition asserted by appellants would compel the juvenile court judge to place the child in the home of the natural parents to determine whether they are able to render proper care, and ignores the possibility that if the “experiment” proves unsuccessful, the consequences to the child could be seriously detrimental or even fatal.
Id. at 241–242.
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In its concise Rule 1925(a) statement, the court relied on its statements
and the testimony from numerous witnesses at the November 16, 2020
hearing. Furthermore, it noted its determination that “it is in the best interest
of Child to be adjudicated dependent” was also based on the “credible”
testimony of Crayder. Trial Court’s Notice of Compliance with Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a), 1/12/2021, at 1.
Our review of the record reveals that evidence supports the juvenile
court’s determination that Child is a dependent child, as there is evidence of
conduct that places the health, safety, and welfare of Child at risk. The
testimony was sufficient to show credible concerns on DHS’s behalf, bolstered
by its history of involvement with Mother. DHS made an effort to observe and
assist Mother prior to the adjudicatory hearing, but still had valid concerns
regarding the relationship between Mother and Father, her adamant denial of
Father’s physical abuse of Half-Sister while Half-Sister was in his care, her
unstable housing situation, and her ability to manage her mental health and
drug use issues.
Initially, we defer to the juvenile court’s determination of credibility,
absent an abuse of discretion, and discern no such abuse in the court’s finding
credible the testimony of Dr. Atkinson, English, Crayder, Buckhoffer, and
Sledge. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Moreover, contrary to Mother’s
argument, while the court only specifically identified Crayder’s testimony as
credible in terms of Child’s best interests in its Rule 1925(a) notice, the
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inference can be made by the court’s decision that it did credit testimony from
all the witnesses, including Sledge.
Additionally, we find guidance in this Court’s prior decisions, In Re
M.W., 842 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. 2004) and G., T., supra, with respect to
Mother’s handling of Father’s abuse of Half-Sister. In M.W., the mother of six
children appealed the court’s order adjudicating five of the children
dependent. The remaining child, who was not involved in the appeal, had been
sexually abused by the father. Mother had permitted the children to have
contact with the father even after learning of the abuse. See M.W., 842 A.2d
at 426-427. The mother made the argument that there was no evidence the
father had abused or would abuse the other children and therefore, the court’s
adjudication was in error.
The M.W. Court determined that the recent amendments to the Juvenile
Act were “significantly more sensitive to the fact that siblings of sexually
abused children may be without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his
physical, mental or emotional health, or morals.” Id., at 429 (quotation marks
omitted). The Court further opined:
In our view, the Juvenile Act properly takes into consideration the sense of vulnerability, fear, and helplessness that siblings may feel when living in an environment where their brother or sister has been sexually abused by one parent, and the other parent (i.e., the other parent who has a duty to protect the emotional welfare of the children) has taken inadequate steps to stop it. In other words, the focus is not on whether the other siblings are actually at risk of sexual abuse themselves. Rather, the key
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question is whether the siblings fit the broader definition of lacking proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental or emotional health, or morals. In our view, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine that siblings of sexually abused children fit that definition, even if there is no evidence that the siblings themselves will be sexually abused.
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In G., T., this Court applied M.W.to a factual scenario involving parental
neglect of a sibling who was not involved in the appeal. See G., T., 845 A.2d
at 874. The Court stated that pursuant to the Juvenile Act and M.W., it was
permitted to assume that any medical problem the child in the case might
have developed would have been similarly ignored by the parents as they did
with the sibling. See id.
We find the same to be true here where the underlying matter involved
the physical abuse of a sibling. The court properly determined Child “was
lacking proper parental care and control” because Mother lacked awareness
of his sibling’s needs. See id. Accordingly, the evidence in this case is
compelling and supports the court’s finding that Child qualified as “dependent”
based on definition (1) of “Dependent Child” pursuant to Section 6302.
Likewise, the record supports the court’s determination that Child’s
removal from Mother’s home was clearly necessary. We conclude there is no
reason to disturb the court’s placement in light of physical abuse Child’s sibling
sustained and Mother’s failure to acknowledge Father’s role in the abuse, not
to mention the domestic violence Mother endured by Father.
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Furthermore, to the extent Mother alleges that she is complying with
numerous DHS and court-ordered requests like attending parenting classes
and therapies, and she was deemed to have appropriate housing, we note that
given the limited period involved, it would not have been feasible for DHS to
have done more prior to the November 2020 hearing that would have been
able to assuage its concerns regarding Mother. This is evident by the fact that
the court ordered more treatment and consultation for Mother after reviewing
the evidence presented at the hearing. Additionally, it merits reiterating that
Child was placed in kinship care, and Mother was granted liberal visitation with
the placement goal of returning Child to Mother.
As such, we discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court based
on the totality of the circumstances in this case and the appropriate legal
principles. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s adjudicatory and dispositional
order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/2021
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