J-S40018-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: A.C., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 1090 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000061-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: A.C., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 1091 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000062-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2026
A.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the July 7, 2025 orders changing the
permanency goals of her son, E.C., born in November of 2017, and daughter, J-S40018-25
L.C., born in January of 2019 (collectively, “the Children”), from reunification
to adoption.1 After careful review, we affirm.
We gather the relevant factual and procedural history from the certified
record. This family has a history of involvement with the York County Office
of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) dating back to 2018 regarding, inter
alia, housing concerns. See Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/16/24,
at 1. On February 24, 2024, CYF received a report alleging that then-six-
year-old E.C. was locked in a makeshift cage for extended periods of time in
maternal grandmother’s home, where Mother resided with the Children.2 See
id. The report also alleged that then-five-year-old L.C. was regularly left
strapped in a car seat in the home that was too small for her size. See id.
Finally, the report alleged that Mother neglected the Children’s medical care.
See id.
On the day the report was received, CYF sent a caseworker to the family
home. See id. at 1-2. Mother was not there, but CYF spoke with maternal
grandmother, who reported that she was acting as the full-time caregiver for
the Children because Mother was not consistently present to parent them.
See id. at 2. At this visit on February 24, 2024, and three subsequent
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1 The Children’s father, J.R., did not appeal the goal change and did not participate in this appeal.
2 Mother consistently resided with maternal grandmother throughout these dependency proceedings.
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unannounced visits over the following week, CYF observed E.C. locked in the
makeshift cage, which consisted of two cribs stacked on top of each other,
and L.C. restrained in the small car seat. See id. Although CYF explained the
inappropriateness of these restraints to Mother and maternal grandmother,
neither of them stopped using them. See id.
During CYF’s investigation, Mother admitted that the Children had not
been seen by a doctor or dentist in at least four years. See id. CYF arranged
for the Children to be seen by a dentist, which revealed that L.C. required “full
extraction of all [] her top teeth due to extensive decay[.]” Id.
On March 19, 2024, upon medical advice, CYF took the Children to the
emergency room. See id. at 3. After examination, the Children were
admitted to the hospital for malnutrition. See id. E.C. also had extensive
bruising all over his body and “erythema to his penis and scrotum[.]” Id. at
3. The hospital expressed concern that the Children, then ages six and five,
respectively, were not toilet trained and wore diapers. See id.
On March 20, 2024, the Children were placed in the emergency
protective custody of CYF. Following a shelter care hearing two days later,
the court confirmed the Children’s separate placements in foster care.
The court adjudicated the Children dependent on April 16, 2024, and
maintained their foster care placements. The court established the Children’s
permanency goals as reunification with concurrent goals of adoption. In the
order, the court found that Mother and maternal grandmother committed child
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abuse against the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303, specifically that
they “knowingly and recklessly caused the unreasonable restraint of [the
Children] and caused serious physical neglect” of the Children with respect to
their medical needs.3 Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/16/24, at 4,
7.
In furtherance of reunification, Mother was ordered to, inter alia,
complete a threat of harm assessment along with any resulting
recommendations and parenting classes. Notably, on April 16, 2024, the
juvenile court did not grant Mother visitation due to a finding that it would
pose a “grave” threat to the Children. Id. at 7. The court later clarified that
contact of any kind between Mother and the Children was prohibited. See
Permanency Review Orders, 7/2/24, at 4-5. Mother did not appeal from any
of these orders. The prohibition on contact and visitation between Mother and
the Children has remained in place throughout these proceedings.
On May 17, 2024, CYF filed motions requesting the court to issue
findings that aggravated circumstances exist with respect to Mother. The
juvenile court held a hearing on June 10, 2024, and granted the motions. In
addition, the court ruled that reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the
family shall not continue. See Aggravated Circumstances Orders, 6/10/24, at
1-2. (“Reasonable Efforts to Reunify: No efforts are to be made to preserve
3 Mother and maternal grandmother were not criminally charged in relation to
the child abuse they committed against the Children.
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the family and reunify the Child[ren] with [] Mother.”). Again, Mother did not
appeal from these orders.
In the aggravated circumstances orders, the court found that Mother’s
physical abuse and neglect of the Children caused them to have “significant
lower body muscle deficits,” developmental delays to their speech and social
skills, and “seriously impaired” functioning. Aggravated Circumstances
Orders, 6/10/24, at 1. The Children required physical therapy to address their
delayed “gross motor” development. Orders of Adjudication and Disposition,
4/16/24, at 5. Specifically, E.C. suffered from “lower extremity weakness”
and “impaired balance,” which affected his ability to walk. Order of
Adjudication and Disposition (E.C.), 4/16/24, at 5. L.C. needed a “medical
stroller to address her extremely limited mobility and gait for her age.” Order
of Adjudication and Disposition (L.C.), 4/16/24, at 5.
The juvenile court held permanency review hearings on July 2, 2024,
January 14, 2025, and July 7, 2025.4 Each of the permanency review orders
from these hearings stated that “[i]t has been determined that visitation with
[] Mother is contrary to the safety or well-being” of the Children. Permanency
Review Orders, 7/2/24, at 4-5; Permanency Review Orders, 1/14/24, at 4;
Permanency Review Orders, 7/7/25, at 4.
4 The court also held status review hearings on October 8, 2024, November
19, 2024, and April 15, 2025.
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Despite the court’s directive that CYF make no reasonable efforts toward
reunification, it provided Mother with services through Catholic Charities. The
permanency review orders up through and including January of 2025, revealed
that Mother’s compliance and progress with her objectives was minimal. On
July 7, 2025, Mother’s compliance and progress were rated as moderate for
the first time. Mother completed the threat of harm assessment, which
recommended continued support from CYF. In addition, the certified record
reflects that Mother had been attending the assessment’s recommended
dialectical behavior therapy (“DBT”) for three months. She was also attending
a parenting program, but there was no evidence that she completed it.
The juvenile court held the subject permanency review hearing on July
7, 2025, by which time the Children had been in placement for fifteen months.
CYF presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Suzanne Kearse,
Mother’s family therapist at Catholic Charities; Moira LeCount, Mother’s family
advocate at Catholic Charities; Destiny Michael, CYF caseworker; E.C.’s foster
mother; maternal grandfather, L.C.’s kinship resource; and D.R., the
Children’s court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”). Mother testified on her
own behalf and presented the testimony of maternal grandmother.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court sua sponte ruled on
the record and in open court that the Children’s permanency goals will be
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changed from reunification to adoption.5 See N.T., 7/7/25, at 98. On July 7,
2025, the court entered the subject orders, which included a provision
continuing the suspension of visitation and contact of any kind between
Mother and the Children. See Permanency Review Orders, 7/7/25, at 4. The
court also found that CYF did not have a documented compelling reason for
not proceeding with petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights. See id. at 3-4.
Mother timely filed notices of appeal and contemporaneous concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The trial
court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 29, 2025.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion in finding that reasonable efforts have been made by CYF to finalize the Children’s permanency plans when there had been no efforts to discern whether the Children had suffered any trauma or should otherwise be precluded from having contact with Mother?
2. Whether the juvenile court erred in changing the goal from reunification to adoption?
3. Whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion in finding that there was no justification for maintaining the goal of reunification or directing CYF to proceed with a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights when Mother had ____________________________________________
5 A goal change “may occur as a result of a petition by the responsible agency
or sua sponte by the trial court during its mandatory review of the dependency matter.” Interest of K.C., 319 A.3d 596, 600 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
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made moderate progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement?
4. Whether the juvenile court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in continuing to deny Mother visitation when there had been no evidence of trauma and only speculation?
5. Whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion in finding that it has been determined that visitation with Mother is contrary to the safety or well-being of the Children? Specifically, was it error or an abuse of discretion to find that there should be a no contact order, when there is no evidence of trauma or other issues to preclude such contact?
Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (cleaned up; reordered for ease of disposition).
We review goal change orders for an abuse of discretion. See K.C., 319
A.3d at 599 (internal citation omitted). This Court is not bound by the trial
court’s legal conclusions, but we must “accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record.” Id. at 599-600. This deference has been explained, as follows:
Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during the hearing, but usually . . . they have presided over several other hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must defer to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be placed on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success of the current permanency plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial court.
Id. at 600.
A child’s permanency goal in a dependency matter is governed by the
Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-65. This Court has outlined the following
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relevant legal principles for trial courts when considering changing a child’s
permanency goal:
The policy underlying the [Juvenile Act] is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, ... the focus of dependency proceedings, including change of goal proceedings, [is] on the child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of the parents.
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when considering ... a goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the child's safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court.
K.C., 319 A.3d at 600 (some emphasis added).
Trial courts must also consider whether “reasonable efforts were made”
by the agency “to finalize the permanency plan in effect.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
6351(f)(5.1). However, “[i]f the court finds from clear
and convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, the court shall
determine whether or not reasonable efforts to . . . preserve and reunify the
family shall be made or continue to be made.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(e)(2). It
is well settled that this determination is within the court’s discretion. See In
the Interest of S.U., 204 A.3d 949, 965 (Pa. Super. 2019).
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Regarding a parent’s progress, we have held that, while “parental
progress toward completion of a permanency plan is an important factor, it is
not to be elevated to determinative status, to the exclusion of all other
factors.” K.C., 319 A.3d at 600. “Ultimately, a child’s life simply cannot be
put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 600-01 (internal punctuation marks
omitted).
We address Mother’s first three issues together as they are interrelated.
In her first issue, Mother argues that the court abused its discretion in finding
that CYF made reasonable efforts to finalize the family’s permanency plan
because it had not yet made a concrete plan to reintroduce the Children to
Mother. See Mother’s Brief at 31-33. In her second and third issues, Mother
argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it changed the
Children’s permanency goals from reunification to adoption. See Mother’s
Brief at 18-21, 26-28. Specifically, Mother asserts that the court failed to
consider “the extent of the progress” that she had made over the pendency
of the case. Id. at 19. She blames the court’s suspension of visitation with
the Children for her inability to make further progress. See id. at 19-20, 27.
We disagree.
We emphasize that when the court found aggravated circumstances
existed as to Mother, it expressly provided that CYF not make reasonable
efforts to reunify the Children with her. See Aggravated Circumstances
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Orders, 6/10/24, at 1-2. The record clearly shows that the juvenile court was
acting appropriately to protect the children and provide them with stability to
resolve the numerous issues created by Mother. Mother’s first issue fails for
this reason. To the extent that CYF nonetheless provided services to Mother,6
and Mother started to comply by the time of the July 7, 2025 permanency
hearing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court changing the Children’s
permanency goals.
Contrary to Mother’s bald assertion, the court explicitly stated that it
considered the “entirety” of Mother’s compliance and progress with her
objectives. Juvenile Court Opinion, 7/7/25, at 7-8. The court recognized that
Mother was participating, but failed to complete, DBT therapy and a parenting
course. See Permanency Review Orders, 7/7/25, at 1-2; see also Status
Review Orders, 4/15/25, at 2.
To the extent that Mother acknowledges her lack of progress in
satisfying her objectives, she contends that it is due to the court’s suspension
of her visitation from the outset of the case. Further, Mother argues that the
suspension was unjustified, as discussed further infra. We disagree inasmuch
as Mother continued to demonstrate a lack of accountability for the Children’s
6 The record does not reveal why CYF graciously continued to provide reunification services to Mother, nor why the court allowed such services to continue after its order for no reasonable efforts to be made.
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placements. See N.T., 7/7/25, at 70 (Mother testified, “I don’t feel like I was
being the monster I was made to sound like.”).
Moreover, Ms. Michael testified that Mother continued to reside with
maternal grandmother and that it “doesn’t seem like there is any intention to
separate[.]” N.T., 7/7/25, at 65. Ms. LeCount similarly testified that Mother
did not have any plans to live independently from maternal grandmother. See
id. at 38. This was of concern due to maternal grandmother’s participation in
the Children’s abuse and neglect, along with the conclusion from the threat of
harm evaluation that maternal grandmother is not an appropriate parenting
support for Mother. See Permanency Review Orders, 1/14/25, at 5.
The record is clear that the Children’s best interests are served by a goal
change to adoption. As described above, the court found that Mother’s abuse
and neglect significantly impacted the Children’s physical, emotional, and
mental development. See Aggravated Circumstances Orders, 6/10/24, at 1.
Since being removed from Mother’s care, the Children have improved overall
in their physical and emotional well-being. For example, E.C. is finally toilet
trained. See N.T., 7/7/25, at 47. He attends physical, occupational, speech,
and play therapy, and has a one-on-one support teacher in summer camp to
assist with his behaviors. See id. at 39, 41-42; Permanency Review Order
(E.C.), 1/14/25, at 2. According to L.C.’s kinship provider, she successfully
completed physical and speech therapy and will complete occupational
therapy in the near future. See id. at 54. L.C. also attends play therapy.
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See id. The Children’s respective foster and kinship parents testified that
they were doing well in their homes, which their CASA corroborated. See id.
at 39, 53, 77.
To the extent that Mother argues in her third issue that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by directing CYF to file a petition for involuntary
termination of her parental rights, there is no such directive in the subject
order. Relatedly, the court determined that the Children had been in
placement for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, as mandated by Section
6351(f). This determination required the court to decide whether CYF has
documented “a compelling reason for determining that filing a petition to
terminate parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare” of the
Children. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(9)(ii). The court found that CYF did not
have a documented compelling reason. See Permanency Review Orders,
7/7/25, at 3-4. Ms. Michael testified that CYF did not have a compelling reason
and had been internally discussing moving forward with an involuntary
termination petition. See N.T., 7/7/25, at 67. She stated that she believed
it was in the Children’s best interests to pursue permanency through adoption.
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The above record evidence clearly establishes that a goal change to
adoption was in the best interests of the Children.7 Therefore, we discern no
error of law or abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to change the
Children’s permanency goals from reunification to adoption. Therefore,
Mother’s first, second, and third issues merit no relief.
Mother’s fourth and fifth issues concern the court’s continued
suspension of visitation and contact between her and the Children. See
Mother’s Brief at 22-25, 29-30. As these issues are essentially identical, we
address them together. Collectively, Mother contends that the court’s
suspension of visitation was an abuse of discretion because there was “never
any evidence of trauma” previously suffered by the Children or that the visits
would be “harmful” to them. Id. at 22-24. We are not persuaded by Mother’s
arguments.
Initially, the court explained that it is “self-evident” that the Children
suffered trauma as a result of Mother’s severe abuse and neglect and that “a
formal finding of trauma” is not required. Juvenile Court Opinion, 7/7/25, at
9-10.
Indeed, Pennsylvania case precedent requires a finding of “grave threat”
for a court to deny visitation between parents and dependent children when
7 We note that the evidence discussed below regarding Mother’s remaining issues also supports that a goal change was in the best interests of the Children.
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the placement goal is reunification. In the Interest of L.V., 127 A.3d 831,
840-41 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that the “grave threat standard is met
when the evidence clearly shows that a parent is unfit to associate with his or
her children; the parent can then be denied the right to see them.”). The
court made this finding in the Children’s adjudication and disposition orders
and suspended Mother’s visits. See Orders of Adjudication and Disposition,
4/16/24, at 7. Mother did not appeal. In addition, Mother did not appeal from
the two subsequent permanency review orders that continued the visitation
suspension.
Nevertheless, the record verifies that, fifteen months into the Children’s
dependencies, it was not in the Children’s best interests to reintroduce contact
with Mother at that time.8 See N.T., 7/7/25, at 18, 20-21, 23-27, 41; see
also Status Review Order (L.C.), 4/15/25, at 3. Ms. Kearse, Mother’s family
therapist at Catholic Charities, testified that the professionals involved had not
yet made a definitive determination that contact with Mother would be
appropriate for the Children. See N.T., 7/7/25, at 23.
Ms. Kearse testified that she conducted several observations of the
Children in their respective placements, school, and summer camp. See id.
at 18, 20-21. With respect to E.C., Ms. Kearse testified that he was unable to
8 This Court has stated that “when the goal is an alternative to reunification,
the juvenile court may limit or deny visitation as long as the reduction satisfies the best interest of the child.” In the Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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express his emotions, and, therefore, she opined that reinitiating contact with
Mother at this time was inappropriate. See id. at 24-25, 27, 41. With respect
to L.C., the record reveals that in the April of 2025 status review order, just
three months prior to the subject hearing, the court found that L.C.’s kinship
resource showed her a picture of Mother and she “pushed the picture away
and ran into her room.” Status Review Order (L.C.), 4/15/25, at 3. Further,
L.C. had nightmares for the following two nights from simply looking at a
picture of Mother. See id. Therefore, Mother’s fourth and fifth issues fail, as
the record clearly supports the decision of the juvenile court.
Based upon the foregoing, we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion by the juvenile court changing the Children’s permanency goals to
adoption. Thus, we affirm the orders.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 02/03/2026
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