NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.S.-C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : :
APPEAL OF: C.S.-C., A MINOR :
: : : : No. 378 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered January 7, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-JV-0001148-2025
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2026
Appellant, C.S.-C., a minor, appeals from the January 7, 2026
dispositional order entered following his adjudication of delinquency for the
offenses of carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6101(a)(1),
possession of a firearm by a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1(a), and carrying a
firearm in public in Philadelphia, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. Appellant challenges the
juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress. After careful review, we
affirm.
On October 6, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition
alleging that on October 4, 2025, Appellant had unlawfully carried a concealed
firearm. Appellant’s adjudication hearing was subsequently held on January
7, 2026. As Appellant had filed a motion to suppress prior to that hearing,
the court considered his motion at the outset thereof. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion, the juvenile court set forth a detailed summary of the evidence and
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testimony presented at Appellant’s suppression/adjudicatory hearing, which
we distill into the following pertinent facts. See Juvenile Court Opinion (JCO),
4/9/26, at 2-15.
Philadelphia Police Officer Pedro Martin testified he had been in law
enforcement for approximately 11 years. Id. at 2-3.1 During his years as a
police officer, Officer Martin had made hundreds of arrests involving firearms.
Id. at 3. At around 9:30 p.m. on October 4, 2025, Officer Martin was
patrolling the area around Juniata Park, which he was very familiar with
“because it was an area he targeted on his tours frequently” due to the
numerous “calls for gunshots” received around that area, and because the
officer grew up close by. Id. The officer “explained that in Juniata Park,
around the 4:00 [p.m. to] 12:00 [a.m.] tour, … the police would receive a lot
of calls for gunshots.” Id.
Indeed, on the evening of October 4, 2025, a shooting had been
reported near the park, so Officer Martin “deployed to the area a little after
5:00 p.m. for that reason.” Id. at 4.2 Officer Martin and his partner were
patrolling when they “observed a silver Toyota Highlander idling on the east
side of the street.” Id. The officer clarified the car’s engine was running. Id.
Officer Martin shone a “spotlight into the vehicle and observed what appeared
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1 In each of our citations to the juvenile court’s opinion, we omit the court’s
citations to the record.
2 Although Officer Martin testified he was aware of the reported shooting and
decided to “spen[d] extra time in the area” because of it, he clarified “he was not responding to the shooting or acting as backup.” JCO at 7.
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to be a group of juveniles (including … Appellant) inside the vehicle.” Id. He
also “observed a very thick cloud of smoke inside it and could smell a very
strong odor of burnt marijuana.” Id.3 Officer Martin testified “the two front
passengers look[ed] in his direction and very quickly made several furtive
movements toward the center console area.” Id. The officers then exited
their patrol car, approached the vehicle, and asked the driver “if there were
any weapons in the vehicle, to which the driver responded[,] ‘No.’” Id. at 5.
Officer Martin testified the driver “began to sweat profusely and showed signs
of nervousness[,]” including “shaking a lot.” Id. The officer asked the age of
the three males and two females inside the car, and all were “identified as
juveniles under the age of [18].” Id.4 Because all the occupants of the car
“identified [themselves] as juveniles, plus the furtive movements towards the
center console and nervousness that the driver exhibited upon being asked if
there were any weapons in the vehicle, [Officer Martin] decided to remove the
front two passengers to check the center console area for a weapon.” Id.
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3 Officer Martin acknowledged the Philadelphia Police Department has a policy
that if officers observe individuals smoking marijuana in public, they simply ask them to “stop engaging in the prohibited behavior” and do not detain them for further investigation, unless “the individual refuses to cease and desist in the prohibited behavior….” JCO at 9. However, Officer Martin conducted the instant detention because the policy does not apply “to people smoking inside running vehicles.” Id. Officer Martin further “testified that because they were in a running vehicle, he not only had to investigate the presence of narcotics[,] but also had to investigate the possibility of … [driving under the influence].” Id. at 10.
4 Officer Martin indicated “the front passenger may have been [18,] but he
could not remember.” JCO at 5 n.1.
4
Accordingly, Officer Martin removed the two front passengers from the
car, but he allowed Appellant and two female juveniles to remain in the
backseat. Id. Once removed from the car, “one of the front passengers
admitted to having a knife on him for protection purposes.” Id. at 20. As the
officer then looked in the car, he observed “a burnt marijuana joint in the
center console’s … cup….” Id. at 11. He asked the backseat passengers,
including Appellant, “to remain still and keep their hands where he could see
them while he checked the area.” Id. at 5.
As Officer Martin was checking the area for weapons, he observed Appellant “kind of digging—digging something deeper into his left pants leg” starting from his waistband; “digging” was the best way Officer Martin could describe what Appellant was doing “with his arm[;] just kind of digging something deeper into his pants.” He continued, stating that at that point[,] he asked Appellant to stop moving; Officer Martin had to repeat the command several times because Appellant continued “digging down his left pants leg.” It was then that Officer Martin asked everyone to exit the vehicle so he could frisk the area [of Appellant’s pants].
Id. On cross-examination, Officer Martin further testified Appellant’s
“movement … drew his attention, ‘because it[ was] in his waistband and [he
was] shoving it from his waistband down his pants leg, and that’s a common
area for people to … carry [concealed] firearms, in the front waistband.’” Id.
at 14.
After asking Appellant and the two female passengers to exit the vehicle,
Officer Martin “frisked that area (Appellant’s left pants leg) and immediately
found what he believed to be a firearm[.]” Id. at 6. He then “recovered one
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Glock .22 semiautomatic firearm, loaded with [17] live rounds, and later
determined [it] to be in stolen status.” Id.
Pertinent to Appellant’s argument herein, on cross-examination,
Appellant’s counsel questioned Officer Martin about “complaints sustained for
improper stops” made against the officer. Id. at 12. Specifically, in May and
December of 2024, there were allegations “that Officer Martin improperly
stopped, detained, and searched people.” Id. at 13. Although defense
counsel insisted the allegations were “sustained[,]” which presumably means
they were verified as true, Officer Martin’s name was not listed on the report
regarding one of the incidents and, on redirect-examination, the officer
testified that incident was not sustained. Id. at 15.
Based on Officer Martin’s testimony and the totality of this evidence, the
juvenile court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 5 Appellant was then
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5 We note the juvenile court orally denied the motion, stating “based on … the
hearing, the testimony, … arguments, and totality of the circumstances, the motion is denied.” N.T., 1/7/26, at 78. The court issued no findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as required. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 333 A.3d 470, 475 (Pa. Super. 2025) (“A suppression court is required, at the end of a suppression hearing, to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record.”) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I)).
Previously, we have remanded for a suppression court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when the suppression court failed to do so and did not file a [Rule] 1925(a) opinion explaining its ruling. See Commonwealth v. Sharaif, 205 A.3d 1286, 1289-90 (Pa. Super. 2019). However, we have conducted appellate review in situations when the suppression court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record but issued a [Rule] 1925(a) opinion explaining its ruling. See (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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adjudicated delinquent of the above-stated offenses. The court issued a
dispositional order that same day imposing an indeterminate period of
probation with conditions, to be periodically reviewed.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he and the court complied
with Rule 1925. Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:
[I.] Did the juvenile court err by denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress where the Commonwealth failed to prove the officers possessed reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] was armed and dangerous prior to frisking him, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Preliminarily, we observe: [O]ur scope and standard of review when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress limits us to determining whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. In doing so, we do not simply comb through the record to find evidence favorable to a particular ruling. Rather, we look to the specific findings of fact made by the trial court.
Int. of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 422 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).
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Commonwealth v. Rivera, 311 A.3d 1160, 1163 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2024), appeal denied, 325 A.3d 1024 (Pa. 2024) (explaining that absent a suppression court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record “appellate review may be possible based on facts in an opinion in support of an order on appeal[]”) (citation omitted).
Id. at 475-76. Here, the juvenile court thoroughly explained the reasons for its order in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See JCO at 17-22. Thus, we conclude remand is not necessary. See Miller, 333 A.3d at 476.
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In this case, Appellant argues Officer Martin lacked reasonable suspicion
he was armed and dangerous to justify the Terry6 frisk which resulted in the
officer’s discovering a gun. We have explained:
A Terry frisk is a type of investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. In determining whether a Terry frisk was supported by a sufficient articulable basis, we examine the totality of the circumstances.
Miller, 333 A.3d at 477-78 (cleaned up).
According to Appellant, in determining the Terry frisk was valid, the
juvenile court relied only on the fact he was “trying to hide something in his
pant leg while [the officer] was searching the car for weapons[,] and another
passenger had a pocketknife.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant also alleges
the court “ignored blatant contradictions to Officer Martin’s testimony and
misapplied the facts presented[,]” which he claims “demonstrate[] that Officer
Martin formed his intention to search the car and its occupants for weapons
as soon as he saw it parked near Juniata Park, without regard [for] any
particularized facts or circumstances relating to [Appellant] and his peers.”
Id. Appellant then discusses how, in his view, the evidence demonstrated
Officer Martin was not truly “concerned for weapons[,]” but had planned to
search the car and its occupants for weapons before he observed anything
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6 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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inside the vehicle.7 Appellant also contends Officer Martin’s prior misconduct
in unrelated cases demonstrates the “[t]he officer’s decision to search the car
and frisk [Appellant] was based on his documented propensity to generally
assume people in this neighborhood illegally carry guns, and not on any
articulable and particularized reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] was armed
and dangerous, as there was no basis for any such suspicion.” Id. at 18. See
also id. at 15 (alleging the officer’s prior, unrelated allegations of misconduct
in conducting searches were “consistent” with how the search occurred in the
instant case, thereby suggesting the officer had improper motives for
conducting the search instantly).
We disagree. Initially, the juvenile court’s lengthy and detailed opinion
demonstrates it did not rely only on Appellant’s furtive movements, and the
fact that another passenger had a pocketknife, in determining the Terry frisk
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7 See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 16 (arguing the officer’s direction to Appellant
to stop moving around, after which the officer said, “thank you,” indicates Appellant complied, and because the officer “then silently continued his inspection of the console … without even looking at [Appellant] or instructing other officers to … watch his movements” indicates the officer was not concerned for his safety); id. (claiming the officer’s removing him from the vehicle in a “casual manner” and “lifting his shirt without securing his hands” shows the officer was not afraid for his safety); id. at 17 (arguing “there was no suggestion that the officer[] suspected the teens of engaging in the sort of [firearm] crime[s he] described as being common in the area”); id. at 17-18 (claiming Officer Martin’s testimony “about crime in the area” did not “include[] any connection between the type of firearm[] crimes described and smoking marijuana[,]” thus undercutting any claim the officer reasonably believed Appellant was armed and dangerous because he was smoking marijuana).
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was lawful. Instead, the court cited the following facts to support this
conclusion:
Officer Martin has been a Philadelphia Police Officer for approximately eleven years, and over the course of those eleven years[,] he has made hundreds of arrests involving firearms. He testified that he is familiar with the area in which the encounter with Appellant took place as he not only targeted that area on his typical tours of duty, but he also grew up one minute west of where the encounter took place. He testified to the types of crimes that typically occurred in the area, including armed robberies, and stated that in his experience most of these incidents involving reported guns or gunshots occurred at night. Officer Martin specified, based on his experience, that firearms were typically located along the park [and]… in the possession of persons inside cars. Early in his testimony, Officer Martin established his experiential foundation for why he became reasonably suspicious of the vehicle in which Appellant was found; he articulated his familiarity with[,] and knowledge of[,] the area in which this encounter occurred, including the types of crimes endemic to the area, the frequency of calls involving guns and gunshots fired, and where firearms were often found when the police responded to calls from the area.
Then, as the circumstances of the encounter began to unfold, Officer Martin’s suspicions continued to rise. Officer Martin was able to succinctly articulate the facts that led to each step of the encounter between himself and Appellant. Officer Martin testified that he observed a vehicle idling in a parking spot outside of a park that was often where gunshots were reported, full of what appeared to be juveniles and a “very thick cloud” of marijuana smoke (which he could smell emanating from inside the car[])[.] He testified he observed the front two occupants make furtive movements towards the center console area after looking in his direction.
A vehicle idling in a legal parking space is not, in and of itself, suspicious. However, when that idling, legally parked vehicle is observed to be full of smoke, full of people, and is emanating a strong smell of burnt marijuana, a reasonable person might infer that something was amiss. Further, if some of the occupants in that vehicle began to make furtive movements upon noticing that they were being observed, it would again be reasonable to be
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suspicious. Officer Martin testified it was a combination of the fact that all the vehicle’s occupants identified as juveniles, the nervousness exhibited by the driver when he was questioned, and the furtive movements the front two passengers made towards the center console that led Officer Martin to ask the front occupants to exit the vehicle. Smoking marijuana in public in Philadelphia is merely prohibited and results in a citation only if the subject refuses to comply with orders to cease smoking; but operating a vehicle while smoking marijuana is just as illegal as operating a vehicle while consuming alcohol[,] and being intoxicated by either while operating a vehicle is grounds for a possible DUI charge. See 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3802(d). Officer Martin testified that he was investigating the presence of narcotics and therefore the possibility of a DUI because the juveniles were in a running vehicle. It is reasonable to conclude that crime was indeed afoot under these circumstances, which Officer Martin did, as the juveniles were smoking inside a running vehicle.
Additionally, one of the front passengers admitted to having a knife on him for protection purposes. It is [also] unfortunately common knowledge that sometimes where there are drugs, there are guns, and vice versa. This is a fact well-known to those who serve as Philadelphia Police Officers. Given the totality of the circumstances as they were at that point in the encounter, Officer Martin had more than enough articulable information to justify the stop and necessity to search for more weapons. Officer Martin testified that at the point he asked the front passengers to exit the vehicle, he was concerned for his and his partner’s safety as they were outnumbered. As Officer Martin was searching the center console for weapons, he observed more furtive movements from Appellant in the backseat. After Appellant ignored Officer Martin’s demand to stop moving (Officer Martin described Appellant’s movements as “digging” down his pants leg), he ordered the rear passengers to also exit the vehicle. It was at this point, in the interest of officer safety and due to reasonable suspicion that weapons were present in the vehicle (as one passenger had already admitted to possessing a knife) that Appellant was frisked.
JCO at 19-20 (cleaned up; some formatting altered).
Clearly, the court relied on numerous circumstances in determining
Officer Martin had reasonable suspicion Appellant was armed and dangerous,
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including: the frequency of night-time gun offenses in the area; guns were
often found in the possession of people parked in that area; the presence of
marijuana in the car; the furtive movements by the driver and front seat
passenger; the number of juveniles in the vehicle; the nervousness of the
driver; one of the passengers had a knife; Appellant’s furtive movements
indicating he was pushing something from his waistband down the leg of his
pants; and that Appellant continued to move in this fashion after being
repeatedly told by Officer Martin to stop.8 Thus, the juvenile court did not
only rely on Appellant’s furtive movements and the fact that another
passenger had a knife in deeming the Terry frisk valid.
Moreover, we are unconvinced by Appellant’s argument that the frisk
was unlawful because certain facts indicate Officer Martin was not
subjectively afraid for his safety, and he intended to search for weapons at
the outset of the stop. Appellant ignores the fact that we apply an objective
test to determine whether a protective search is warranted: “[t]he relevant
inquiry … is not the officers’ subjective beliefs at any given time but the
objective reasonableness of the search under the totality of the
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Carver, 318 A.3d 386, 391 (Pa. Super.
2024) (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d
1034, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2016)). We also reject Appellant’s suggestion that
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8 Appellant suggests he immediately complied with Officer Martin’s command
to stop moving. See Appellant’s Brief at 16. However, Officer Martin testified he “asked him to stop moving … several times[,]” yet Appellant “kept digging down his left pants leg.” N.T. at 14.
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Officer Martin’s prior misconduct in other, unrelated cases supports a
conclusion the instant Terry frisk was invalid. See Commonwealth v.
Campbell, No. 2834 EDA 2024, unpublished memorandum at 23 (Pa. Super.
filed Mar. 11, 2026) (“[The a]ppellant’s claim that [a detective] allegedly
engaged in misconduct in other unrelated cases even if true, is not sufficient
to establish that [the detective] engaged in misconduct in the instant case.”)
(citing Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1232-33 (Pa. Super.
2023)). 9
In sum, Appellant’s challenges to the juvenile court’s decision that the
Terry frisk was valid are meritless. As the juvenile court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, and we discern no error in the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts, we affirm Appellant’s adjudication of delinquency and
the dispositional order.
Order affirmed.
Date: 8/25/2026
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9Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.