J-A19044-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M.F., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: M.F., MOTHER : : : : : No. 352 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 28, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at No(s): A-9166
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 4, 2022
Appellant, M.F. (“Mother”), files this appeal from the order entered
January 28, 2022, in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, granting
the petition of the Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the
agency”) to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor,
female child, B.M.F., born in August 2019 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b).1 After careful review, we affirm.
Shortly after Child’s birth in August 2019, hospital staff contacted CYS
with concerns that Mother had significant difficulties caring for Child’s basic
needs (e.g. changing her diaper and feeding her). Petition for Termination,
6/30/21, at 2-3; Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 1/20/22, at 66. Hospital staff
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child’s biological father is deceased. J-A19044-22
reported that Mother exhibited resistance to their attempts to guide her with
Child’s care and Mother would not wake up to change or feed Child. Petition
for Termination, 6/30/21, at 2-3. CYS was informed that Mother has cerebral
palsy, but Mother insisted she does not need medical care. Id.
Child was placed in CYS’s care through an emergency shelter care order
several days after her birth. On August 27, 2019, the Orphans’ Court held
an adjudicatory and dispositional hearing at which Mother was ordered to
submit to parenting classes and undergo a mental health examination.
Thereafter, CYS referred the case to the Family Service Association of
Northeastern Pennsylvania, which performed an assessment of Mother’s
ability to parent Child. Mother was given a case plan in the intensive family
reunification services program with four specific goals: (1) to understand
Child’s basic safety needs and care, (2) to emphasize Mother’s ability to bond
with Child, (3) to understand the importance of the overall health and mental
health of both Mother and Child, and (4) to establish age appropriate
expectations for Child. N.T., 1/20/22, at 9-10.
Mother had weekly supervised visits at the agency from September
2019 through March 2020. When the COVID pandemic began in March 2020,
in-person visits were suspended and Mother was only permitted video/phone
visits. After Mother had spent a year in the intensive family reunification
services program, her case was closed due to her lack of progress on her goals
and her inability to progress further. Id. at 11, 21. Mother also exhibited
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significant safety concerns at the time of closure such that caseworkers felt it
would not be safe to leave Child in Mother’s care. Id. at 11.
As Child grew, medical professionals discovered that Child has genetic
chromosomal abnormalities and noted Child exhibited developmental delay.
Child was scheduled for weekly physical therapy, occupational therapy, and
speech therapy as well as visits with a genetic specialist. Id. at 67-69.
In April 2021, Mother submitted to a second assessment by the Family
Service Association to assist in the reunification of Mother with Child, given
that she now had the support of her paramour, J.A. Thereafter, Mother and
J.A. were given a family service plan with the following goals: (1) to obtain a
better understanding of their parenting skills, (2) to recognize Child’s
developmental delays, (3) to appreciate Child’s need for care and the efforts
it would take to parent a child with delay and mobility issues, and (4) to obtain
and maintain appropriate housing as well as gain self-sufficiency. Id. at 28.
Approximately twenty-two months after Child’s birth, CYS reported that
Mother exhibited minimal progress on her latest family service plan. On June
14, 2021, CYS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child. 2
The Orphans’ Court held hearings on January 20, 2022 and January 26, 2022.
CYS offered the testimony of Marisue Sack (case manager for the Intensive
Family Reunification Services program at Family Services Association),
Rebecca Ciliberto (case manager for the Intensive Family Reunification
2 CYS filed an amended termination petition on June 30, 2021.
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Services program at Family Services Association), Jessica Sprow (support
worker and social service aide at CYS), and Megan Donovan (caseworker at
CYS). Mother testified on her own behalf and called J.A. to testify as well.
By decree entered January 28, 2022, the Orphans’ Court terminated
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8) and (b).
Thereafter, on February 22, 2022, Mother, through counsel, filed a timely
notice of appeal, as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights and/or abused its discretion with respect to Title 23 Pa. Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act?
2. Whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights and/or abused its discretion with respect to Title 23 Pa. Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act?
Mother’s Brief, at 3 (suggested answers omitted).
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47 A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties
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spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free
to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even
if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
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C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).
In the case sub judice, the Orphans’ Court found sufficient grounds to
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and
(8), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: *** (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. *** (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5),(8). We need only agree with the trial court as to
any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), to
affirm an order terminating parental rights. In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 327
(Pa.Super. 2017) (citing In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 117 (Pa.Super. 2014)).
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In the instant case, we will analyze the Orphans’ Court’s decision to
terminate Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). Mother
argues the Orphans’ Court abused its discretion in finding sufficient grounds
for termination under Section 2511(a)(8), asserting that she has never been
given the opportunity to have unsupervised visits with Child to show she could
independently parent Child. Mother argues that the Orphans’ Court erred in
finding that she did not remedy the circumstances that led to Child’s
placement and alleges that the Orphans’ Court based its termination order
simply on the fact that hospital staff reported she had difficulty caring for Child
when she was first born. Mother points out that she participated in parenting
classes and visited Child consistently, but yet, agency caseworkers deemed
her progress to be unsatisfactory.
In order to terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), an
agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) that the child
has been removed from the care of the parent for at least twelve (12) months;
(2) that the conditions which had led to the removal or placement of the child
still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa.Super.
2008) (en banc) (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511
(Pa.Super. 2006)).
First, Section 2511(a)(8) requires that Child have been removed the
parent’s care for at least twelve months. In this case, Child has been out of
Mother’s custody nearly her entire life as she was placed in emergency shelter
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care just days after her birth in August 2019. When CYS filed its termination
petition in June 2021, Child had been in CYS custody for approximately
twenty-two months.
Second, we agree with the Orphans’ Court’s assessment that the
conditions that led to Child’s removal from Mother’s care continue to exist
despite Mother’s claims that she made efforts to comply with her court-
ordered service plan and made significant progress in her goals.
At the commencement of the termination hearings in January 2022,
approximately twenty-nine months after Child was placed in CYS custody,
Mother had not successfully completed a parenting program. Marysue Sack,
case manager for the Intensive Family Reunification Services program,
worked with Mother at her in-person visits from September 2019 to March
2020. Ms. Sack reported that at the end of the first parenting program, Mother
was still unable to change Child’s diaper by herself, could not walk across the
room while holding Child, and could not pick Child up without assistance. N.T.,
1/20/22, at 10-11.
In addition, Mother consistently needed help to feed Child in learning
how to hold her and position the bottle correctly. Id. at 16. There was always
an aide to help Mother care for Child and Mother was not left to care for Child
independently. Id.
While Child’s maternal grandmother informed CYS that Mother had
cerebral palsy, Mother denies having cerebral palsy but simply believes she
has balance issues. Id. at 18. Ms. Sack also reported that Mother exhibited
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cognitive limitations, as on more than one occasion, Mother did not know how
old Child was. Id. at 20. In August 2020, Mother stated that Child was
turning eight years old when it was actually her first birthday. Id. Mother’s
case was closed for her failure to make progress on her goals as well as the
continued concern for the safety of Child. Id. at 11.
Rebecca Ciliberto, caseworker for the Intensive Family Reunification
Services program, testified that Mother was given a second opportunity to
participate in this program as Mother now had the support of her paramour,
J.A. At this point, Child’s developmental delays were more pronounced with
her gross and fine motor skills as well as her speech. Child required weekly
physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy, such that Ms.
Ciliberto testified that it would be a “full-time job” to care for Child’s needs.
Id. at 29-30, 33.
Ms. Ciliberto shared that both Mother and J.A. minimized Child’s
significant developmental delay and her need to be seen at multiple medical
appointments. Id. at 33. Ms. Ciliberto was not confident that Mother fully
understood the information given to her by health care providers. Id.
In observing Mother’s visits with Child, Ms. Ciliberto noted that Mother
had to be constantly reminded on how to care for Child. Mother still needed
assistance in changing Child’s diaper and clothes, required direction on how
to carry Child with proper support, and required help to put Child in a tub or
a crib. Id. at 31-33. Ms. Ciliberto had to remind Mother to be cognizant of
Child’s safety in leaving Child on a chair where she could slide off, in making
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sure Child was sitting up straight while eating to avoid a choking hazard, and
to not leave Child unattended on the changing table. Id. at 31-32, 34-35.
In addition, Ms. Ciliberto was concerned as Mother did not appreciate
“feedback” to help her care for Child and that Mother would insist that she
would do it herself even when she required prompting to do basic tasks. Id.
at 29. Ms. Ciliberto feared that Mother would not utilize her available
resources and ask for assistance, even from J.A., if she was struggling to care
for Child. Id. at 34.
CYS caseworkers Jessica Sprow and Megan Donovan offered consistent
testimony in which they agreed that from September 2019 to the date of the
termination hearing, Mother struggled with simple tasks necessary to care for
Child and had to be constantly reminded on how to keep Child safe. Id. at
56-57.
Ms. Sprow also testified that when Child was an infant, Mother would sit
on the couch and hold her with little interaction. Id. As Child grew, Mother
would not interact with Child on the floor and give her the attention she
needed. Id. at 57-58. Ms. Sprow shared that Mother constantly needed
prompting to play with and talk to Child. Id. Mother refused to follow
caseworkers’ advice on how to interact with Child. Id.
Ms. Donovan testified that while the agency had hoped that it would
become easier for Mother to adequately parent Child when Child grew older
and more independent, the agency discovered it was the quite the opposite
circumstances. Id. at 74. At the time of the termination hearing, Child was
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twenty-nine months old and was still unable to crawl, walk, or talk. N.T.,
1/26/22, at 19-20. As the Child grew older, it became even more difficult for
Mother to hold Child, as Child was very heavy and did not have control over
her own body. N.T., 1/20/22, at 74.
Although the agency also hoped that J.A. could assist Mother with her
parenting of Child, the couple’s relationship did not prove to be the support
system Mother needed. Ms. Ciliberto testified that it would be a drastic change
for Mother and J.A. to care for Child on their own. Ms. Donovan noted that
J.A., who is sixty-one years old and not “the healthiest person,” was easily
fatigued. Id. at 75-76. Given the amount of care Child needs, Ms. Donovan
does not believe that J.A. would be able to provide care for Child on a long-
term basis. Id. at 76.
Ms. Donovan emphasized that Mother and J.A. do not grasp the
seriousness of Child’s medical issues even though health care providers have
indicated that there is a possibility that Child may never walk or never speak.
Id. at 72-73. Mother and J.A. believe that Child will speak and walk whenever
she is ready. Id. at 72. Even though Child could not walk at twenty-nine
months of age, J.A. testified that he was “not sure” that Child had
developmental delay. N.T., 1/26/22, at 28.
While Child could potentially achieve these skills, Ms. Donovan also
believes that Mother and J.A. do not appreciate the necessity of planning for
how they would provide care in the future for a child with disabilities. N.T.,
1/20/22, at 73. In addition, Ms. Donovan feared that Mother would not take
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Child to weekly therapy appointments as she believes Child does not need it
or that the appointments are too far away. Id. at 91.
Further, Mother had failed to obtain appropriate housing where she
could properly care for Child. Ms. Ciliberto testified that despite being ordered
to obtain appropriate housing, Mother did not make any accommodations in
her home for Child or have any appropriate supplies to care for Child in her
home. Id. at 36. Mother and J.A. have separate one-bedroom apartments,
but indicated that they stopped looking for a bigger apartment as they do not
want to take on a financial burden if Child would not be returned to their care.
Id. at 77. Both Mother and J.A. are unemployed, but they receive assistance
from Social Security. N.T., 1/26/22, at 12-13, 28.
Despite Mother’s protests that she was never given the opportunity to
parent Child on her own, the record shows Mother had not progressed beyond
supervised visits of Child at any point during the case due to the shared
concern of multiple caseworkers involved who believed Child was not safe in
Mother’s care. After observing Mother in separate parenting programs, both
Ms. Sack and Ms. Ciliberto testified independently that they believed Mother
lacked the ability to understand Child’s significant needs and did not provide
a safe environment for Child. N.T. 1/20/22, at 24-25, 33, 44. Caseworkers
Ms. Sprow and Ms. Donovan agreed that Child would not be safe in Mother’s
care as Mother lacks the ability to meet Child’s needs. Id. at 58-59, 73.
While Mother did make efforts to comply with parenting goals in the
family reunification program, she unfortunately has not been able to
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consistently prove that, after Child's more than 29-month placement, she can
adequately care for Child and provide Child with a stable, suitable, and
permanent home environment.
As Section 2511(a)(8) allows for the termination of parental rights when
the conditions that led to a child’s removal continue to exist after one year,
the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit eighteen (18) months, in which to complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care.
Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 447 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original).
Although Mother claims alleges that she would be able to care for Child
if she was given periods of unsupervised contact, the Orphans’ Court was
entitled to weigh the evidence, assess credibility, and ultimately accept the
testimony of the agency caseworkers who all asserted that it was unsafe to
place Child with Mother without proper supervision. Accordingly, we see no
error in the Orphans’ Court’s conclusion that the conditions that led to Child’s
placement continue to exist.
Third, Section 2511(a)(8) also expressly requires an evaluation of
whether “termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). This Court has held that the
“needs and welfare” analysis is “distinct” from the analysis required under
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Section 2511(b), such that courts are “required to resolve the analysis relative
to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the ‘needs and welfare’ of [the
child] as proscribed by Section 2511(b).” In re C.L.G., supra. However,
Mother only argues that CYS failed to prove termination would best serve
Child’s needs and welfare under section (b). We thus limit our analysis
accordingly.
As noted above, after having determined that the statutory grounds for
termination have been met pursuant to Section 2511(a), we now must
consider whether the Orphans’ Court properly found that termination serves
the best interests of Child as set forth in Section 2511(b). Mother claims that
the termination would be harmful to Child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare. Mother asserts that it would be to Child’s
detriment to break the bond Child has with Mother.
As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M. a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485 (1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71 A.3d at 267.
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Nevertheless, “the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citing In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super.
2008)). In undertaking this analysis,
“[courts] must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship. When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. See In re A.R.M.F., 837 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding court properly terminated parental rights where decision was based in part on social worker's and caseworker's testimony that children did not share significant bond with biological parents and were well bonded with their foster parents). Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation. In re K.K.R.-S., [958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008)].
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010).
As noted above, Child has been out of Mother’s care for the majority of
her life as she was placed in CYS custody shortly after her birth. As discussed
in detail above, there are major concerns with Mother’s ability to provide for
Child’s developmental and physical needs.
With respect to Child’s emotional needs, Child recognizes Mother as a
familiar face as Mother did consistently exercise visitation with Child.3 Child
3 We note the trial court did not set forth a detailed analysis as to whether CYS met its burden under Section 2511(b). Although the trial judge did not expressly indicate that it had considered the bond between Child and Mother, there is support in the record from the caseworkers’ testimony that it would not be detrimental to Child to break any bond she has with Mother in light of her limited contact with Mother and her young age. In the interest of judicial efficiency, we will not remand and instead address the issue.
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does not cry anymore when she has to leave Foster Mother during the visits
with Mother. N.T., 1/26/22, at 35. Ms. Donovan testified that while there is
a bond between Mother and Child and that Mother’s love for Child is evident,
their relationship does not appear to be that of parent and a child, where the
child has an emotional tie to the parent. Id. at 35, 37. Ms. Donovan cited
Mother’s lack of meaningful interaction with Child during their visitation
periods. Id. at 35.
In contrast, the Orphans’ Court found that Foster Parents have provided
for Child’s physical, developmental, and emotional needs and that she has
thrived in their care. Child has been assimilated into Foster Parents’ family
where she is the only child. Id. at 32-33. Ms. Donovan shared that Foster
Parents are “strong advocates” for Child’s medical needs and Foster Mother
dedicates her time to attending Child’s multiple weekly appointments. N.T.
1/20/22, at 73. Foster Parents promote Child’s developmental needs in
providing educational toys and in incorporating what she learns during therapy
at home. N.T., 1/26/22, at 33-34.
Foster Parents have provided for Child’s emotional needs, as Child
reaches out to Foster Parents when she is upset and they offer her comfort.
Id. at 34. Ms. Donovan reported that Child has a “strong bond” with Foster
Parents and she “lights up” and is “excited” whenever they come into the room
and acts like “she won the lottery.” Id. at 37.
Ms. Donovan opined that there would not be any adverse affect on Child
if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, but rather a positive effect as
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Foster Parents are dedicated to Child’s special needs and will be able to
provide for her in the future, no matter her medical prognosis. Id. at 37-38.
Foster Parents wish to adopt Child, understand that they will be
obligated to meet Child’s financial needs, and recognize that Child would
inherit from their family as if she were their natural born child. Id. at 38.
In addition, Ms. Donovan testified that Foster Parents have a good
relationship with Mother and keep in communication with her by sending
updates, photos, and videos. Id. at 46. Foster Parents are willing to have
continuing contact with Mother in allowing her to visit Child if they were
permitted to adopt Child. Id. Foster Parents recognize the importance of
Mother being a part of Child’s life. Id. at 46-47.
Thus, the record supports the Orphans’ Court’s finding that Child’s
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor termination
of parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628,
71 A.3d at 267.
While Mother may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love
and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Child is entitled to permanency and stability;
a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will
summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125.
Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his
child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in
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a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the Orphans’ Court appropriately terminated
Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/04/2022
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