J-S10017-26 J-S10018-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: M.R. : : : : : No. 1610 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000051-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: M.R. : : : : : No. 1612 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000053-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: M.R. : : : : : No. 1614 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000050-2023 J-S10017-26 J-S10018-26
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: M.R. : : : : : No. 1625 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-000052-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: D.R., SR. : : : : : No. 1611 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000051-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: D.R. SR. : : : : : No. 1613 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): Cp-59-DP-0000053-2023
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IN THE INTEREST OF: N. H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: D.R., SR. : : : : : No. 1615 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000050-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: D.R., SR. : : : : : No. 1626 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000052-2023
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: JUNE 10, 2026
M.R. (“Maternal Grandmother”) and D.R., Sr. (“Maternal Grandfather”)
(together, “Maternal Grandparents”), appeal separately from the October 20,
2025 permanency review orders that changed the permanency goals from
“return to parent or guardian” to adoption, with a concurrent goal of
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permanent legal custodianship (“PLC”),1 and removed Maternal Grandparents
as parties to the dependency proceedings involving B.G. (a female born in
June of 2012), Q.R., (a male born in April of 2013), N.H. (a female born in
April 2017), and A.R. (a male born in November 2021) (collectively,
“Children”).2 Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the orders.
Facts and Procedural History
S.R. (“Mother”) is the natural mother of N.H., B.G., and A.R. She is the
adoptive mother of Q.R., whose natural mother and father are deceased.3
K.H. is the natural father of A.R. and N.H., and he was incarcerated during the
underlying dependency matters. G.G. is the natural father of B.G., who was
____________________________________________
1 PLC is a permanency goal in a dependency action that arises “when a caregiver makes a commitment to accept legal responsibility to raising the child, but is unwilling or unable to adopt the child.” Interest of Z.B., 315 A.3d 153, 155 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
2 We review Maternal Grandparents’ appeals together as they raise similar issues and involves the same set of facts.
3 Q.R.’s natural mother was another daughter of Maternal Grandparents, and
she was already deceased when Tioga County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) first became involved with this family in 2017. See Order of Adjudication, 1/2/2023, ¶ 2. Therefore, Q.R. was previously the cousin of B.G., N.H., and A.R. See id., ¶ 3. Q.R. also has an older maternal half-sister, A.B., born in 2007, who has resided with Maternal Grandparents since DHS has become involved with this family. See id. A.B. is not a subject of the instant appeals.
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serving a sentence of three and one-half years to twenty-two years of
incarceration at all times relevant to these appeals.4
DHS has an extensive history of involvement with Mother and Maternal
Grandparents, beginning in 2017 when it received a General Protective
Services (“GPS”) report alleging, inter alia, Mother’s illegal drug use while
residing in Maternal Grandparents’ home. DHS learned through its
investigation that Mother and her adult brother, D.R., Jr., either resided in, or
frequently passed through, Maternal Grandparents’ home. In addition, DHS
learned that Maternal Grandparents had multiple grandchildren living in their
home, for whom Maternal Grandmother was the primary caregiver. See Order
of Adjudication, 1/2/2023, ¶ 23(a). DHS received a second GPS report
concerning Mother’s suspected drug use in 2019. Upon conducting a second
round of investigation, DHS learned that Maternal Grandmother was awarded
primary physical custody of her grandchildren pursuant to court orders, and
Mother was awarded supervised visits.5, 6 See id., ¶ 23(b).
4 Neither Mother nor any of Children’s fathers appealed the goal change decision.
5 A.R. was not alive in 2019, but there is no dispute that he was also placed
in Maternal Grandmother’s legal and physical custody after birth by order of court.
6 The record reveals that the legal and physical custody of Children resided
only in Maternal Grandmother. However, the trial court identified Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather as “legal guardian” and/or “legal custodian” in Children’s dependency matters.
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In 2021, 2022, and 2023, DHS received additional GPS reports, all of
which DHS ultimately validated. These reports alleged Mother’s illegal drug
use and that Maternal Grandmother allowed Mother to have unsupervised
contact with Children, which resulted in Mother absconding with Children, and
the police returning Children to Maternal Grandmother. See id., ¶ 23(e), (f),
(h).
Relevant to this disposition is the GPS report received by DHS on
September 15, 2023, which averred that Maternal Grandmother left Children
“unsupervised and alone with” D.R., Jr. Id. By that time, but on a date
unspecified in the record, a “founded case [existed against D.R., Jr.,] of sexual
abuse regarding his [natural] child,” who was born in 2013.7 Id., ¶ 6. In
addition, the report alleged, inter alia, that Maternal Grandmother neglected
Children’s medical and dental needs. See id. DHS made repeated attempts
to investigate the GPS report from September 20, 2023, through November
7, 2023, but Maternal Grandmother denied DHS access to Children. See id.,
¶ 7. On November 7, 2023, DHS obtained a court order requiring Maternal
Grandmother to allow DHS to interview Children and assess the safety of the
home. After interviewing Children, DHS validated the GPS report.
On November 8, 2023, Children were removed from Maternal
Grandparents’ physical custody and placed in the emergency protective
7 D.R., Jr.’s, child is not a subject of these appeals.
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custody of DHS. The trial court placed Children in shelter care on November
13, 2023, and DHS filed dependency petitions on that same date.
Following an evidentiary hearing, by orders of adjudication dated
January 2, 2024, and dispositional orders dated February 6, 2024, the trial
court adjudicated Children dependent and placed them in the legal and
physical custody of DHS.8 The trial court established “return to parent or
guardian” as Children’s placement goal and ordered that Maternal
Grandparents
shall participate in a behavioral health assessment, in lieu of a psychological assessment, and follow any/all recommendations that come from said assessment. As part of the behavioral health assessment for [Maternal Grandfather], the evaluator shall address whether or not there is an anger management issue for him.
Visitation may be expanded into semi-unsupervised visitation for [Maternal Grandmother]. [D.R., Jr.,] shall not be involved in the visitations. [Mother] shall not be involved in [Maternal Grandmother]’s visitations. Discussions shall also not take place about what is going on in [c]ourt.
Dispositional Order, 2/6/2024, at 2. The trial court held permanency review
hearings on April 2, August 6, and November 5, 2024. In the latter two
hearings, the trial court found that Maternal Grandparents were in moderate
compliance with the permanency plan because they had obtained behavioral
health assessments and psychological evaluations. The trial court ordered
8 Q.R., N.H., and A.R. were placed in kinship care with their maternal great-
grandparents. B.G. was placed in the care of a man and woman who were close friends of B.G.’s paternal grandmother.
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“that some of the visits take place in the [Maternal Grandparents’] home,” if
DHS determines that the home is safe, and that Mother and D.R., Jr., “shall
not be present during the visits….” Permanency Review Order, 11/12/2024,
at 4.
The next permanency hearing occurred on February 13, 2025, at which
time Mother was incarcerated. The trial court found that Maternal
Grandparents had made moderate progress toward alleviating the
circumstances that necessitated Children’s original placement and directed
that DHS transition Children back to the home of Maternal Grandparents while
maintaining DHS supervision. By the date of the next permanency review
hearing on May 6, 2025, Children were in Maternal Grandparents’ physical
custody, and Mother remained incarcerated. Nonetheless, the permanency
orders directed that Maternal Grandparents obtain a psychiatric evaluation,
and that Maternal Grandfather additionally obtain a BIP9 evaluation.
These permanency review orders also authorized Maternal Grandmother
to obtain “routine and emergency medical, dental, or other care on behalf of”
Children, “to access educational information regarding [Children], and … to
participate in all educational meetings and activities.” Permanency Review
Order, 5/14/2025, at 3. The order cautioned Maternal Grandmother that DHS
9 The record does not reveal the full name associated with this acronym. In its brief, DHS confirms that the evaluation was to assess Maternal Grandfather’s “propensity for domestic violence and need for related services.” DHS’s Brief (Maternal Grandfather’s Appeal) at 20 n.7.
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will not be prohibited “from obtaining medical or education records or
services[,] nor shall the authorization [of Maternal Grandmother] be deemed
to permit [Maternal Grandmother] to prohibit [DHS]’s access to [C]hildren or
their records at any time.” Id. With respect to D.R., Jr., the same
permanency orders provided: “It has been previously DIRECTED that [D.R.,
Jr.,] shall not be allowed in any way around [C]hildren. It is still DIRECTED
that [D.R., Jr.,] shall not be allowed in any way around or have any contact
with [C]hildren.” Id.
On May 27, 2025, DHS filed emergency petitions for modification of
Children’s placement, which sought to return Children to DHS’s physical
custody. DHS alleged in the petitions that on March 12, 2025, Children were
returned to Maternal Grandparents’ physical custody. Since then, DHS alleged
that (1) on May 23, 2025, Maternal Grandmother denied DHS access to her
home and to Children; (2) Children are in Maternal Grandfather’s care while
Maternal Grandmother is at work; and (3) Maternal Grandfather “has had an
increase in erratic behaviors since Children have been returned to the home,
particularly in the month of May.” Emergency Petition, 5/27/2025, ¶ 5(c).
Additionally, DHS noted that, at the most recent permanency review hearing,
Maternal Grandmother testified that “she had allowed her son, [D.R., Jr.,]
around [C]hildren.” Id., ¶¶ 5(a), 5(a)(i). Accordingly, DHS requested that
Children be removed from Maternal Grandparents’ physical custody. The trial
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court granted DHS’s petitions on May 27, 2025, and returned Children to their
prior foster care placements.
On September 9, 2025, DHS filed petitions to change Children’s
permanency goals to adoption. With respect to Maternal Grandparents, DHS
averred:
Maternal [G]randparents, the legal guardians of [Children], have been uncooperative and have shown no progress since Children were removed again in May 2025. Prior to that, the grandparents showed very, very little progress alleviating the circumstances which led to placement, even admitting to having put [C]hildren in situations unnecessarily which placed them in [D.R., Jr.]’s proximity. Grandmother has maintained only [four] out of [eight] visitations available to her since the [hearing on the petition for modification of Children’s placement]. Grandfather [has] attend[ed] no visits allowed to him and has engaged in no court- ordered services.
Petition, 9/9/2025, ¶ 27(b)(iii).
The proceeding underlying this appeal occurred on October 2 and
October 20, 2025, during which DHS presented the testimony of Karen Farrer,
the special education director for the Wellsboro School District; Meagan Gegg,
the visitation aid; Aryn VanWormer, DHS caseworker; and Ken Nowak, DHS
visitation supervisor and housing specialist. In addition, K.H., the natural
father of N.H. and A.R., testified, as did G.G., the natural father of B.G. G.G.
also presented the testimony of R.M., B.G.’s paternal grandmother. Maternal
Grandparents testified separately.
By orders dated October 20, 2025, the trial court changed Children’s
permanency goals from return to parent or guardian to adoption, with
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concurrent goals of PLC. In addition, the orders removed Maternal
Grandparents as parties to Children’s dependency cases and vacated Maternal
Grandparents’ separate court-appointed counsel. Specifically, the trial court
determined that reunification with Maternal Grandparents “is no longer
feasible nor in Children’s best interests” because they made no progress
toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated Children’s placement.10
Permanency Review Order, 10/20/2025, at 3.
There has been no cooperation or any progress for [Maternal Grandmother]; rather, a regression is noted [since Children’s removal from her physical custody on May 27, 2025]. [Maternal Grandmother] only attended half of her visits with [C]hildren. [Maternal Grandmother] continues to refuse to bring activities for [C]hildren to do during the visits and does not see a reason to as [Children] are all different ages. When visits [do] occur, they are often chaotic. [Maternal Grandfather] does not participate in any services. [Maternal Grandfather] does not meet with [DHS] staff nor does he attend an[y] visitation.
Id. at 2 (cleaned up). The trial court also found that although Maternal
Grandparents completed some of the court-ordered evaluations, they
persistently “decline[d] to give [DHS] permission to see the
10 With respect to Mother, the trial court concluded that Mother’s progress in
alleviating the circumstances that required Children’s original placement “continues to be moderate.” Permanency Review Order, 10/20/2025, at 4, ¶ 2. Specifically, the trial court found that Mother was released from prison in late June 2025, and “is in drug addiction recovery.” Id. In addition, the trial court found that K.H., the natural father of A.R. and N.H., “has been incarcerated during the pendency of this case, although he has transitioned to a halfway house….” Id., ¶ 4. Likewise, the trial court found that G.G., the natural father of B.G., “has been incarcerated during the pendency of this case[, and] hopes to be paroled in early 2026.” Id., ¶ 5. In other words, the trial court found that Children’s natural fathers are not reunification resources.
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recommendations.” Id. Further, with respect to Maternal Grandfather, the
trial court found that he (1) does not meet with the Time Limited Family
Reunification Services provider; (2) stopped attending counseling; and (3) has
not completed his BIP assessment. See id.
Maternal Grandfather filed counseled notices of appeal from the goal
change orders on November 18, 2025, along with concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which
this Court consolidated sua sponte. Maternal Grandmother filed counseled
notices of appeal along with concise statements on November 19, 2025, which
this Court also consolidated sua sponte. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on December 15, 2025.
Issues on Appeal and Standard of Review
Although Maternal Grandfather purports to raise four separate issues in
his statement of questions involved, he includes only one argument in his brief
before this Court. Compare Maternal Grandfather’s Brief at 5, with id. at
10-16. Therein, he challenges the trial court’s authority to change Children’s
goal and to remove Maternal Grandparents as parties to this matter given
their in loco parentis standing, as it was their care and custody that was at
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issue in the dependency matter.11 See id. at 11-16. He further challenges
this decision as an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.12 See id. at 10-11.
Maternal Grandmother challenges the trial court’s discretion to change
Children’s permanency goal and to remove her as a reunification resource.
Maternal Grandmother’s Brief at 7. Unlike Maternal Grandfather, Maternal
Grandmother acknowledges that the trial court had the legal authority to
11 As discussed below, this Court has recognized that a person is entitled to “party” status in dependency proceedings if that person’s care and custody of the child is in question. Z.B., 315 A.3d at 159 (citation omitted). To the extent Maternal Grandfather argues that in loco parentis standing is somehow different and entitles him more rights than this Court has previously recognized, that claim is waived. He includes one statement in his brief contending “it was improper to remove him (them) as a party, not only because he has long had in loco parentis status, but also standing based on the enumerated factors heretofore.” Maternal Grandfather’s Brief at 12. This bald assertion lacks citation to the record, citation to authority, or any development whatsoever. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well[]settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.”). Moreover, he failed to raise it before the trial court or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Maternal Grandfather’s Concise Statement, 11/18/2025; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
12 We note with disapproval that Maternal Grandfather has failed to include any citations to the record or the proceedings that occurred below. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (“If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears[.]”). We decline to quash or dismiss his appeal on this basis, as Maternal Grandmother has likewise raised this claim and we are able to dispose of both parties’ assertions together.
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remove them as parties to the case. Id. at 12. She contends, however, that
DHS did not satisfy its burden of proving that it was in Children’s best interests
to change their permanency goal. Id. at 12-13. In her view, she was working
towards reunifying with Children and complying with the court’s orders and
thus should have been allowed to continue to pursue reunification. Id. at 13-
14.
Our standard of review in dependency matters is for an abuse of
discretion. Z.B., 315 A.3d at 160. The same standard applies to our review
of the trial court’s decision to change a dependent child’s permanency goal.
See In re J.Y., 754 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. Super. 2000).
[A]ppellate courts must employ an abuse of discretion standard of review, as we are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact-specific determinations. Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during the hearing, but usually … they have presided over several other hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must defer to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be placed on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success of the current permanency plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility determination of the trial court.
Z.B., 315 A.3d at 160.
Legal Authority to Remove Maternal Grandparents as Parties
We begin by addressing Maternal Grandfather’s claim that the trial court
lacked the legal authority to remove Maternal Grandparents as parties to the
dependency action when it determined that they were no longer a reunification
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resource and changed Children’s permanency goals. The law is clear, and
DHS concedes, that Maternal Grandparents were correctly deemed to be
parties to the initial dependency case, as it was their care and control of
Children that was in question and Children were removed from their home.
See id. at 159 (“Our case law limits ‘party’ status to three classes of persons:
(1) the biological parents of the child(ren); (2) the legal custodian of the
child(ren); and (3) the person whose care and control of the child(ren) is in
question.”) (citation omitted); see also DHS’s Brief at 11.
Contrary to Maternal Grandfather’s suggestion, party status in a
dependency action is not infinite. For biological or adoptive parents, the trial
court may grant a petition to terminate their rights, ending their status as a
party in the underlying dependency matter. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2311. Legal
guardians and custodians of children do not have parental rights that can be
terminated; thus, as we previously observed, the option instead would be to
“remove the person as a reunification resource and terminate services.” Z.B.,
315 A.3d at 161. Anything less would put a non-parent in a superior position
than a parent is as it relates to his or her rights to the care and control of a
child.
This case is controlled by our prior decision in Z.B. There, the children
were removed from a caregiver who had previously been awarded PLC in a
prior dependency matter. Id. at 157. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent the former caregiver and ordered her compliance with permanency
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plan goals to reunify with the children. Id. The former caregiver failed to
comply, and the children expressed no interest in having any contact, let alone
reunifying with her. Id. at 158. The trial court therefore removed the former
caregiver as a placement resource and vacated her attorney’s court
appointment. Id. at 158, 160.
The former caregiver appealed, questioning, inter alia, the trial court’s
legal authority to remove her as a party and placement resource. See id. at
158-59. This Court observed that a trial court has an obligation to conduct
regular hearings to review the appropriateness of the child’s permanency plan,
considering myriad factors related to the goal of achieving permanency for
that child. Id. at 160 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6337(f)). “When the child welfare
agency has made reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her
biological parent, but those efforts have failed, then the agency must redirect
its efforts toward placing the child in an adoptive home.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The Z.B. Court found that these principles apply with equal force to the
legal guardian of a child as they do to a child’s parent. Id. at 161. Recognizing
that parents who fail to make diligent efforts toward reunification risk the
termination of their parental rights to their child, Z.B. held that legal
custodians who similarly fail to comply with their goals to work towards
reunifying with children removed from their care risk removal as a
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reunification resource and termination of their party status in the dependency
action. Id.
Maternal Grandfather attempts to differentiate Z.B. on the basis that
“Z.B. dealt with a former guardian who was eventually awarded permanent
legal custody to the children in that case,” and here, “we are dealing … with
biological grandparent(s), one of which was actually given custody, in a
custody order[.]” Maternal Grandfather’s Brief at 13 (cleaned up). This is a
distinction without a difference, as in both cases, the custodian has a court
order awarding legal custody of a child without any further involvement of
DHS or the trial court. See Z.B., 315 A.3d at 155 n.2 (explaining that upon
finalization of the PLC goal, “a juvenile court discontinues court intervention
as well as supervision by a county agency, and awards custody of a dependent
child, on a permanent basis, to a custodian,” without terminating the rights of
the child’s parents).
The trial court unquestionably had the legal authority to remove
Maternal Grandparents as reunification resources and parties to Children’s
dependency matter. Maternal Grandfather’s first claim is baseless.
Trial Court’s Discretion
We now address whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
changed Children’s permanency goals and removed Maternal Grandparents as
reunification resources and parties to the underlying dependency case.
Maternal Grandmother asserts that the record establishes she was making
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diligent efforts toward reunifying with Children and reunification “was still
viable.” Maternal Grandmother’s Brief at 11. She points to her completion of
a psychological evaluation, attendance at supervised visits where she fed and
worked on homework with Children, and that she signed paperwork for the
school district to address the educational needs of “two of the children.” Id.
at 13 (citing N.T., 10/2/2025, at 12-22, 28, 60, 68-69). She further states
she has moved into a new house, with room for Children. Id. (citing N.T.,
10/20/2025, at 4, 53).
Maternal Grandfather identifies no efforts he (or Maternal Grandmother)
made following the removal of Children from their care. See Maternal
Grandfather’s Brief at 10-11. He instead relies upon the care they gave to
Children prior to their removal, stating that they “stood in the shoes of each
of the parents, [for] the majority of these children’s lives, and … supported
these children, both financially and emotionally.” Id. at 11.
As mentioned above, at each permanency review hearing, the trial court
must make findings, in relevant part, regarding the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with the permanency plan developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child.
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(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
* * *
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has determined that aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling reason for determining that filing a petition to terminate parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare of the child; or
(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with necessary services to achieve the safe return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time frames set forth in the permanency plan.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9).
With regard to what constitutes “reasonable efforts,” we have
recognized, “because the focus of the Juvenile Act is on the dependent child,
as opposed to parents, any services for parents must directly promote the
best interests of the child. By requiring only ‘reasonable efforts,’ the statute
recognizes that there are practical limitations to such efforts.” Interest of
K.M., 305 A.3d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2023) (cleaned up). As our Supreme
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Court has long observed, “at a minimum,” a parent or legal custodian must
show “a willingness to cooperate with the agency to obtain the rehabilitative
services necessary for the performance of parental duties and
responsibilities.” In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 890 (Pa. 1986). “[A]
parent who cannot or will not meet the irreducible minimum requirements set
by the Juvenile Act within a reasonable time following state intervention may
properly be considered ‘unfit,’ and may properly have parental rights
terminated. Z.B., 315 A.3d at 161 (citation omitted).
The trial court in the case at bar found that Maternal Grandparents are
not compliant with their permanency goals and were not an appropriate
resource for reunification:
[] Maternal Grandparents do not have a parental, nurturing bond with [C]hildren. Individually, Maternal Grandmother is kind to [C]hildren and cares for them. However, their bond is not the type that provides security, nurture, wellness, and comfort. They cannot or will not provide [for] the educational and health needs for [C]hildren. They will not cooperate with educators and health providers for [C]hildren. For some inexplicable reason, they are hostile toward those trying to help [C]hildren. They call people rude names. They will not follow rules. It is no wonder why when [C]hildren are together chaos reigns.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/2025, at 5-6, ¶ 13.
The court reviewed the factors pursuant to section 6551(f) and
concluded that Children’s placement continues to be necessary, but the
existing plan to reunify Children with Maternal Grandparents was unworkable.
Id. at 9. It found Maternal Grandparents had made no progress toward
alleviating the need for Children’s placement—referring to their progress as
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“regressive”—and that the potential date for reunification with Maternal
Grandparents was “non-existent.” Id. at 9-10. Further, the court found
Children were doing very well in their respective placements and that Maternal
Grandparents have been a hinderance, not a help, throughout the life of
Children’s dependency. Id. at 10. It thus concluded that Children needed
and deserved permanency, and that changing the goal for Children and
removing Maternal Grandparents as a reunification resource was in their best
interests. Id. (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.
Super. 2003), as stating “[a] child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the
hope that a parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting”).
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Both Maternal
Grandparents were ordered to complete psychiatric evaluations and follow any
recommendations of the evaluators. N.T., 10/2/2025, at 95-96. Although the
record does reflect that Maternal Grandmother completed a psychological
evaluation, she had not completed the psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 95. As
to the completed psychological evaluation, Ms. VanWormer testified that
Maternal Grandmother did not permit DHS to obtain a copy of the evaluation.
Id. at 113. As a result, DHS was unaware of the recommendations, if any,
made by the psychologist. Id. at 95-96.
DHS was able to confirm that Maternal Grandfather completed his
psychiatric evaluation, but he similarly refused to sign a consent for DHS to
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receive the results. Id. As such, DHS could not confirm whether the
psychiatrist made any recommendations with which he was to comply. Id.
Visitation for Maternal Grandparents remained supervised at the time of
the goal change hearing. Maternal Grandfather had not attended any since
Children’s most recent removal from his care. Id. at 98. He blamed Mr.
Nowak for his absence: “I don’t need to be intimidated, stared at, notes taken,
while I am trying to keep a happy face for my children. I cannot show the
anger in front of them and so I avoid the whole problem.” N.T., 10/20/2025,
at 101.
For Maternal Grandmother, contrary to her claims before this Court, not
only has she missed “half of her own visits” with Children since their May 27
removal, the visits she did attend were often chaotic. See id. at 41, 55, 101.
According to Ms. Gegg, the visitation aid, “[t]he kids are constantly fighting
with each other physically and verbally. There’s not really any control over
the visit from” Maternal Grandmother. Id. at 41.
[A.R] for instance gave [Maternal Grandmother] the middle finger at one of the visits. [Children] tell [Maternal Grandmother] to shut up. They’re not her best friend anymore. They don’t love her. And they just, half of the time, are not listening to what [Maternal Grandmother] has to say.
Id. at 42. Children are unkind to each other, at times for “almost … the entire
visit going back and forth with each other.” Id. at 47. Ms. Gegg also observed
N.H. and A.R. hit and kick Maternal Grandmother, and that Children generally
are physically violent with each other during the visits. Id. at 72. She testified
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that Maternal Grandmother has told Children “to stop” and “that they act like
a bunch of animals,” but Children do not listen when reprimanded by Maternal
Grandmother. Id. at 77. According to Mr. Nowak, Maternal Grandmother
“threatens in visits a lot, but she never f[o]llows through with them. … [W]hen
she threatens to end it, they act worse.” N.T., 10/20/2025, at 15.
Ms. Gegg and Mr. Nowak described a community visit they both
attended with Maternal Grandmother and Children in July or August 2025 at
Hills Creek. During the visit, Ms. Gegg found D.R., Jr., Mother, and A.B. (the
older half-sister of Q.R.) also present at the venue, maintaining a distance of
approximately 200 yards from Children. See id. at 14-15; N.T., 10/2/2025,
at 55-56, 99. This is of particular concern because the court orders prohibit
D.R., Jr., from having any contact with Children.
As to Children’s educational needs, Ms. Farrer, the special education
director for the Wellsboro School District, testified that Q.R. has an
individualized education plan (“IEP”) for emotional support services, and that
N.H. was in the process of being evaluated for an IEP as a result of “academic
deficits in math and reading” and “emotional concerns.” N.T., 10/2/2025, at
19-20. She explained that an IEP meeting occurred for N.H. on September
25, 2025. Although Maternal Grandmother was invited to attend, she failed
to appear, prompting the DHS representative who was present to call her. Id.
at 21-22. Ms. Farrer testified that Maternal Grandmother answered but hung
up the phone before everyone present at the meeting finished introducing
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themselves, instructing the DHS representative to “send any paperwork to her
following the meeting.” Id. at 22, 24. This was troubling as Maternal
Grandmother was the educational decisionmaker for N.H. at the time, and Ms.
Farrer had hoped to obtain “feedback” from her during the meeting about
N.H.’s “strengths and needs.” Id. at 25.
The school convened an IEP meeting for A.R. on September 11, 2025,
which Maternal Grandmother initially attended, but, according to Ms. Farrer,
stated “she wasn’t going to stay and participate if I was there. The special
education teacher and myself tried to encourage her to stay and participate
and she opted to leave.” Id. at 26. Maternal Grandmother specifically told
the participants of the meeting that “it was a conflict of interest and she did
not want [Q.R.] spoken about around” Ms. Farrer. Id. at 27. Ms. Farrer
explained that Maternal Grandmother “asked if I was related to someone in
[DHS], which I answered … yes, and at that point she shut down and was
unwilling to speak with me, or stay for the meeting.” Id. Ms. Farrer denied
that she had ever spoken with her relative about Children outside the scope
of her employment. Id. at 28.
Finally, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Maternal
Grandparents are both noncompliant and uncooperative with DHS. N.T.,
10/20/2025, at 4. Although Maternal Grandmother testified that she obtained
a new residence, the record reflects that she refused to allow DHS access to
the home. Maternal Grandmother provided explanations in her testimony as
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to why she did not let DHS into her residence, which the trial court clearly
found to lack credibility. See id. at 53-54, 56 (claiming DHS “purposely
come[s] during the day because they know I’m not there, so they can say I’m
not complying”); but see id. at 4-5 (Ms. VanWormer testifying that Maternal
Grandmother was home at least three or four times when she personally
attempted to see the home).
Ms. VanWormer testified that in September 2025, she met with Maternal
Grandmother in the DHS office in an attempt “to discuss the importance of
[DHS] providing services to [her] and her allowing agency staff out to the
home.” N.T., 10/2/2025, at 97. That meeting lasted only eleven minutes,
however, because Maternal Grandmother became “very irate” and ended the
meeting. Id. at 97-98. Ms. VanWormer explained that Maternal Grandmother
took issue with Mr. Nowak, the DHS housing specialist, accompanying the
caseworkers to her house. Id. As stated above, Maternal Grandfather
testified that he felt “intimidated” by Mr. Nowak; he perceived Mr. Nowak as
thinking he was “maybe better than somebody else.” Id. at 98; see also
N.T., 10/20/2025, at 83. Notably, DHS brought “security” when they visited
Maternal Grandparents’ home because of Maternal Grandfather’s behavior.
N.T., 10/2/2025, at 98.
Although Maternal Grandmother denied this, the record supports the
trial court’s finding that Children are doing very well in their respective
placements. Compare N.T., 10/20/2025, at 64-65 (Maternal Grandmother’s
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view that Children are doing poorly outside of her care), with id. at 38-39
(B.G.’s paternal grandmother testifying that she is doing well in her current
placement), N.T., 10/2/2025, at 109 (Ms. VanWormer testifying that N.H.,
A.R., and Q.R. are doing well in their current placement, which is preadoptive),
& DHS Exhibits 2a-2c (reports from the counseling service treating B.G., Q.R.,
and N.H.). All are living with individuals willing to keep them in their care long
term. See N.T., 10/20/2025, at 108-09; N.T., 10/2/2025, at 109.
Conclusion
Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing Children’s permanency
goals and removing Maternal Grandparents as parties to the dependency
proceedings. The trial court correctly found that Children are in need of
permanency after being removed from Maternal Grandparents nearly two
years earlier and unsuccessfully returned to their physical custody from March
12, 2025, to May 27, 2025, and, further, that Children’s respective
foster/kinship care resources will provide them permanency. See Trial Court
Opinion, 12/15/2025, at 10; see also N.T., 10/20/2025 at 108-09.
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Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/10/2026
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