J-S35016-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.A.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.D.M., FATHER : : : : : No. 792 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at No(s): A-9312
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2023
K.D.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree terminating his parental
rights as to his minor child, A.J.A.M. (“Child”). We affirm.
Child was born in March 2014. In August 2020, Child was adjudicated
dependent and placed in the custody of Luzerne County Children and Youth
Services (“Agency”) after Child’s mother (“Mother”)1 overdosed on heroin in
the presence of Child. N.T., 11/30/22, at 30-31. At that time, Father was
incarcerated and had been in prison since 2018. Id. at 31, 37-38. Child was
placed with his maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”). Id. at 65.
In January 2022, Father was sentenced to five to 10 years’ incarceration for
voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 32. Father has remained incarcerated
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Mother consented to the adoption of Child and is not a party to this appeal. J-S35016-23
throughout the life of this case, most recently at SCI Frackville. Id. at 31-32,
42.
Approximately 20 months after the adjudication of dependency and
placement of Child, in April 2022, the Agency filed a petition for the
involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights. The court held a hearing
on the petition on November 30, 2022.
The Agency presented the testimony of case worker Mindy Jenkins.
Jenkins testified that Father’s goals were to attend parenting education and
undergo mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations. Id. at 31. Jenkins
stated that she had no verification or documentation as to Father’s
engagement in any of the services that were ordered by the court. Id. at 33-
34. She stated that she last spoke to Father in July 2022, at which time Father
did not indicate that he was involved in any services. Id. at 34. Father told
Jenkins that he was having some phone contact with Child but there was not
a set schedule. Id. at 35. Jenkins asked Father for his corrections counselor’s
name so that she could inquire as to the prison’s visitation policy, but Father
was unable to recall his counselor’s name. Id. at 34-36. Father indicated to
Jenkins that prior to being transferred to SCI Frackville, he was having regular
phone contact with Child at his previous prisons through Maternal
Grandmother. Id. at 36-37, 49. Father indicated to Jenkins that when he is
released from prison, “he would be open to having [Child] with him and his
current wife.” Id. at 37.
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Jenkins provided her phone number to Father, but Father never
contacted Jenkins regarding the case or to request visits with Child. Id. at 39,
57. Jenkins stated that Father has had minimal contact with Child and is not
able to care for Child at the present time. Id. at 38.
Jenkins further testified that Child has resided with Maternal
Grandmother since he came into placement in 2020. Id. at 64-65. Jenkins
stated that Maternal Grandmother’s home is “always appropriate,” and that
Maternal Grandmother meets all of Child’s physical, medical, developmental,
and emotional needs. Id. at 66-67. Jenkins indicated that Child is very
comfortable in Maternal Grandmother’s home, plays sports, and is doing very
well in school. Id. at 66-68. She testified that Maternal Grandmother is very
nurturing to Child and observed that Maternal Grandmother and Child are very
affectionate with each other. Id. at 67. She stated there is a “very strong
bond between the two of them” and Maternal Grandmother wishes to adopt
Child. Id. at 65, 68. Jenkins testified that although Child has a bond with
Father and enjoys phone and FaceTime contact with Father, she believed “that
a parental bond is more established with [M]aternal [G]randmother.” Id. at
50, 73. Maternal Grandmother indicated to Jenkins that she would allow Child
to have contact with Father if she was to adopt him. Id. at 70. Jenkins opined
that it was in Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated
and Child would suffer no detrimental impact. Id.
Upon cross-examination, Jenkins testified that there have been six case
workers from the Agency involved in Father’s case since the case was opened.
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Id. at 41. She indicated that the case file reflected that the Agency contacted
Father on two occasions from August 2020 to July 2022. Id. at 43. Jenkins
noted that when this case first arose, Father was incarcerated at Luzerne
County Correctional Facility where court-ordered services offered by the
prison were restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 48. Jenkins
agreed that Father could not be held responsible for not engaging in services
that were not available at Luzerne County Correctional Facility due to the
pandemic. Id. at 49. Jenkins stated that according to Maternal Grandmother,
Father was having regular contact with Child up until he was transferred to
SCI Camp Hill and subsequently to SCI Frackville. Id.
The Agency also presented the testimony of Father’s corrections
counselor at SCI Frackville, Nicole Citeron. Citeron testified that Father
entered SCI Frackville in April 2022. Id. at 12. At that time, there were no
COVID-19 restrictions in place, except that the inmates were required to eat
their meals in their cells. Id. at 19. Citeron stated that Father’s minimum date
of incarceration is September 2023 and his maximum date is September 28,
2028. Id. at 12-13. She testified that Father was enrolled in a violence
prevention program at the prison and was scheduled to complete the program
in January 2023. Id. at 13-14. She indicated that Father was not
recommended for any drug and alcohol or mental health programs by his
previous prison at SCI Camp Hill, but he could voluntarily participate in those
programs at SCI Frackville. Id. at 15, 19-21. Father did not have any
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certificates for any other voluntary or educational programs offered at SCI
Frackville. Id. at 14-15.
Citeron testified that Father completed a written form to have in-person
visits with Child in May 2022. Id. at 24-25. She stated that typically when a
child is in the custody of the Agency, she sends the visitation form to the
Agency’s case worker to coordinate the visits between the inmate and the
child. Id. at 26-28. However, Citeron stated that Father never informed her
that Child was in the custody of the Agency or provided her with the case
worker’s name, so the form was never sent to the Agency. Id.
Father testified at the termination hearing. He stated he was currently
incarcerated at SCI Frackville and over the course of this case, he was
previously incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, SCI Smithfield, and Luzerne County
Correctional Facility. Id. at 77-78. Father stated that because of the COVID-
19 pandemic, he had problems having physical visitation with Child. Id. at 78.
He said he was unable to access court-ordered services at SCI Camp Hill, SCI
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J-S35016-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.A.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: K.D.M., FATHER : : : : : No. 792 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at No(s): A-9312
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2023
K.D.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree terminating his parental
rights as to his minor child, A.J.A.M. (“Child”). We affirm.
Child was born in March 2014. In August 2020, Child was adjudicated
dependent and placed in the custody of Luzerne County Children and Youth
Services (“Agency”) after Child’s mother (“Mother”)1 overdosed on heroin in
the presence of Child. N.T., 11/30/22, at 30-31. At that time, Father was
incarcerated and had been in prison since 2018. Id. at 31, 37-38. Child was
placed with his maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”). Id. at 65.
In January 2022, Father was sentenced to five to 10 years’ incarceration for
voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 32. Father has remained incarcerated
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Mother consented to the adoption of Child and is not a party to this appeal. J-S35016-23
throughout the life of this case, most recently at SCI Frackville. Id. at 31-32,
42.
Approximately 20 months after the adjudication of dependency and
placement of Child, in April 2022, the Agency filed a petition for the
involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights. The court held a hearing
on the petition on November 30, 2022.
The Agency presented the testimony of case worker Mindy Jenkins.
Jenkins testified that Father’s goals were to attend parenting education and
undergo mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations. Id. at 31. Jenkins
stated that she had no verification or documentation as to Father’s
engagement in any of the services that were ordered by the court. Id. at 33-
34. She stated that she last spoke to Father in July 2022, at which time Father
did not indicate that he was involved in any services. Id. at 34. Father told
Jenkins that he was having some phone contact with Child but there was not
a set schedule. Id. at 35. Jenkins asked Father for his corrections counselor’s
name so that she could inquire as to the prison’s visitation policy, but Father
was unable to recall his counselor’s name. Id. at 34-36. Father indicated to
Jenkins that prior to being transferred to SCI Frackville, he was having regular
phone contact with Child at his previous prisons through Maternal
Grandmother. Id. at 36-37, 49. Father indicated to Jenkins that when he is
released from prison, “he would be open to having [Child] with him and his
current wife.” Id. at 37.
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Jenkins provided her phone number to Father, but Father never
contacted Jenkins regarding the case or to request visits with Child. Id. at 39,
57. Jenkins stated that Father has had minimal contact with Child and is not
able to care for Child at the present time. Id. at 38.
Jenkins further testified that Child has resided with Maternal
Grandmother since he came into placement in 2020. Id. at 64-65. Jenkins
stated that Maternal Grandmother’s home is “always appropriate,” and that
Maternal Grandmother meets all of Child’s physical, medical, developmental,
and emotional needs. Id. at 66-67. Jenkins indicated that Child is very
comfortable in Maternal Grandmother’s home, plays sports, and is doing very
well in school. Id. at 66-68. She testified that Maternal Grandmother is very
nurturing to Child and observed that Maternal Grandmother and Child are very
affectionate with each other. Id. at 67. She stated there is a “very strong
bond between the two of them” and Maternal Grandmother wishes to adopt
Child. Id. at 65, 68. Jenkins testified that although Child has a bond with
Father and enjoys phone and FaceTime contact with Father, she believed “that
a parental bond is more established with [M]aternal [G]randmother.” Id. at
50, 73. Maternal Grandmother indicated to Jenkins that she would allow Child
to have contact with Father if she was to adopt him. Id. at 70. Jenkins opined
that it was in Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated
and Child would suffer no detrimental impact. Id.
Upon cross-examination, Jenkins testified that there have been six case
workers from the Agency involved in Father’s case since the case was opened.
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Id. at 41. She indicated that the case file reflected that the Agency contacted
Father on two occasions from August 2020 to July 2022. Id. at 43. Jenkins
noted that when this case first arose, Father was incarcerated at Luzerne
County Correctional Facility where court-ordered services offered by the
prison were restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 48. Jenkins
agreed that Father could not be held responsible for not engaging in services
that were not available at Luzerne County Correctional Facility due to the
pandemic. Id. at 49. Jenkins stated that according to Maternal Grandmother,
Father was having regular contact with Child up until he was transferred to
SCI Camp Hill and subsequently to SCI Frackville. Id.
The Agency also presented the testimony of Father’s corrections
counselor at SCI Frackville, Nicole Citeron. Citeron testified that Father
entered SCI Frackville in April 2022. Id. at 12. At that time, there were no
COVID-19 restrictions in place, except that the inmates were required to eat
their meals in their cells. Id. at 19. Citeron stated that Father’s minimum date
of incarceration is September 2023 and his maximum date is September 28,
2028. Id. at 12-13. She testified that Father was enrolled in a violence
prevention program at the prison and was scheduled to complete the program
in January 2023. Id. at 13-14. She indicated that Father was not
recommended for any drug and alcohol or mental health programs by his
previous prison at SCI Camp Hill, but he could voluntarily participate in those
programs at SCI Frackville. Id. at 15, 19-21. Father did not have any
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certificates for any other voluntary or educational programs offered at SCI
Frackville. Id. at 14-15.
Citeron testified that Father completed a written form to have in-person
visits with Child in May 2022. Id. at 24-25. She stated that typically when a
child is in the custody of the Agency, she sends the visitation form to the
Agency’s case worker to coordinate the visits between the inmate and the
child. Id. at 26-28. However, Citeron stated that Father never informed her
that Child was in the custody of the Agency or provided her with the case
worker’s name, so the form was never sent to the Agency. Id.
Father testified at the termination hearing. He stated he was currently
incarcerated at SCI Frackville and over the course of this case, he was
previously incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, SCI Smithfield, and Luzerne County
Correctional Facility. Id. at 77-78. Father stated that because of the COVID-
19 pandemic, he had problems having physical visitation with Child. Id. at 78.
He said he was unable to access court-ordered services at SCI Camp Hill, SCI
Smithfield, and Luzerne County Correctional Facility due to the pandemic. Id.
at 78-79. According to Father, he completed a victims awareness program at
SCI Frackville. Id. at 80. He stated that he “want[ed] to start enrolling in”
drug and alcohol, mental health, and parenting classes at SCI Frackville. Id.
at 80-81. He testified that he had phone contact with Child up until April 2022,
but was having difficulty scheduling phone contact once he was transferred to
SCI Frackville. Id. at 84-85.
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Father further testified that he was sentenced to five to 10 years’
incarceration for voluntary manslaughter, but an appeal was pending. Id. at
83. He indicated that his minimum release date was September 28, 2023, and
he was scheduled to appear before the parole board in May 2023. Id. at 84.
Father stated that he has had multiple case workers from the Agency and was
contacted twice by the Agency’s case workers since the case began. Id. 87-
88. Father conceded that he never informed Jenkins or the Agency that he
was having issues contacting Child. Id. at 91, 95. He also acknowledged that
he never attempted to contact the Agency by telephone or letter at any time
after learning Child was in the Agency’s custody. Id. at 95-96. Father
maintained he loves Child and wished to retain his parental rights. Id. at 88,
92.
The trial court found that the Agency proved by clear and convincing
evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated under Section
2511(a)(2) and Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act. Father filed a notice of
appeal and raises the following issues:
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or committed an error of law in determining the parental rights of [Father] to [Child] should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or committed an error of law in determining the tenets of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) have been satisfied and the best interests of [Child] served by terminating the parental rights of [Father].
Father’s Br. at 4.
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We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018). In
termination cases, we “accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re
T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support in the record,
we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of
discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018).
We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re Adoption of
S.P., 47 A.3d at 826 (citation omitted).
A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of
establishing grounds for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” In
re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473 (citation omitted). Clear and convincing
evidence means evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as
to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d
726, 728-29 (Pa.Super. 2008)).
Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this
provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to
terminating parental rights:
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the court terminated Father’s parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2). That Section provides:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
Section 2511(a)(2) thus requires the moving party to prove three things
by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;
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and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(citation omitted). “The grounds for termination of parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are
not limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may also include acts of
refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt
assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of Adoption of M.A.B.,
166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
As to incarcerated parents, “incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be
a determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination
exist under [Section] 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity
of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity
cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828.
While incarceration alone is not sufficient to support termination,
“incarceration will certainly impact a parent’s capability of performing parental
duties, and may render a parent incapable of performing parental duties under
[Section 2511](a)(2).” Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa.Super. 2020)
(en banc) (citation omitted) (emphasis removed). An incarcerated parent is
expected to “take affirmative steps to support a parent-child relationship” and
“utilize whatever resources are available to him while in prison in order to
foster a continuing close relationship with his children.” In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d
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79, 83 (Pa.Super. 2008). Further, the length of the confinement can be
considered as “highly relevant” in a Section 2511(a)(2) analysis. In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830.
Here, Father argues that the Agency failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to warrant the termination of his parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2). While he concedes that he has been incarcerated since
before the case’s inception, he argues incarceration alone is not per se
evidence of parental incapacity and that the court impermissibly gave undue
weight to the fact of his incarceration. Father’s Br. at 8-9.
Father further contends that he completed an assessment by the
Agency, which recommended that he attend parenting education and undergo
mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations. Id. at 8. However, he argues
that he was precluded from accessing those services at Luzerne County
Correctional Facility, SCI Smithfield, and SCI Camp Hill due to COVID-19
restrictions. Id. at 9-10. Father points out that Citeron testified that since
being incarcerated at SCI Frackville, he was engaged in a violence prevention
program and that no other drug and alcohol or mental health programs were
recommended for him. Id. at 10. He further highlights that the Agency made
only two attempts to contact him throughout the case. Id. at 12.
Lastly, Father’s appellate brief claims that Father went before the parole
board in May 2023 and “it now appears he will be released from incarceration
in September 2023.” Id. at 13 (emphasis removed). He thus concludes that
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“it would appear that the [t]rial [c]ourt’s sole basis for terminating [Father’s]
parental rights will no longer be of concern.” Id. at 14.
In finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(2), the court stated:
Credible testimony at the termination hearing was presented to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father is incapable of presently providing a safe and healthy living environment for [C]hild. Father has been incarcerated throughout the entire period of [C]hild’s placement. His maximum date of release from incarceration is September 28, 2028. Father is incapable of providing parental care which is necessary for the physical and mental well[-]being of [C]hild. Father’s lengthy incarceration precludes him from being able to provide the essential parental care to ensure the physical and mental well-being of [C]hild.
Trial Court Memorandum Issued Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed July 13,
2023, at 9 (citation to transcript omitted).
A review of the record supports the court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Father has been incarcerated
continuously since 2018 to the present time. His minimum release date was
September 2023 and his maximum release date is September 2028. Although
Father’s brief claims that Father went before the parole board in May 2023
and that it “appears” he would be released from prison in September 2023,
there is no evidence in the record of this. See Commonwealth v. McBride,
957 A.2d 752, 757-58 (Pa.Super. 2008) (observing that statements contained
in appellate briefs are not evidence and cannot be considered part of the
record on appeal). It is thus speculative as to when and if Father will be in a
position to provide parental care for Child. Child had been in care for over two
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years at the time of the termination hearing and cannot wait for permanency
any longer.
To the extent Father argues that termination was improper because of
the Agency’s lack of communication or failure to make reasonable efforts to
reunify him with Child, Section 2511(a)(2) does not require “a court to
consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to termination of
parental rights.” In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 2014); see id. at 672-
73 (holding that the provision of reasonable efforts to reunify parents and
children is not a requirement for termination). Moreover, the evidence was
that Father was notified that Child was in the custody of the Agency when
Child was adjudicated in August 2020. Father admitted that he never
attempted to contact the Agency by telephone or letter regarding any
concerns about the case, including requesting assistance with visitation with
Child. It was Father’s responsibility to make diligent efforts toward assuming
his parental responsibilities, and thus, to make reasonable inquiries about
Child. See In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d at 83; Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166
A.3d at 443. The record demonstrates that Father’s repeated and continued
incapacity due to ongoing incarceration has caused Child to be without
essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes of Father’s incapacity cannot
or will not be remedied. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court
in concluding that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) was warranted.
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In his second issue, Father contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that termination of his parental rights was in the Child’s
best interest pursuant to Section 2511(b). Father’s Br. at 14. He argues that
he consistently had phone contact with Child through his incarceration at
Luzerne County Correctional Facility and that “[p]roblems only arose after [he]
was transitioned into the state correctional system in March 2022.” Id. at 14-
15. Father also points out that Jenkins acknowledged that Child has a bond
with Father and Child enjoys talking to him and seeing him on FaceTime. Id.
at 15.
The focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, but on the child.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa.Super. 2006). Under
Section 2511(b), the trial court must consider “the developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare of the child” to determine if termination of
parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
This inquiry involves assessment of “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super.
2005). The court must also examine the parent-child bond, “with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id.
However, the “mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super.
2011). Rather, the trial court must consider whether severing the bond “would
destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. (citation
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omitted). The court must also examine any pre-adoptive home and any bond
between the child and the foster parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
Here, the trial court determined that the Agency had established by clear
and convincing evidence that termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
The record supports the court’s finding. Jenkins testified that Child has a very
nurturing and strong bond with Maternal Grandmother, with whom he has
consistently lived since he was placed, and Maternal Grandmother meets all
of Child’s physical, medical, developmental, and emotional needs. Child is
thriving in Maternal Grandmother’s care, and she is eager to adopt him.
Although Child has a bond with Father, the testimony was that Child has his
parent-child bond with Maternal Grandmother. The evidence also showed that
Child would suffer no detrimental impact if Father’s parental rights were
terminated. Accordingly, we agree with the court’s finding that the Agency
proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental
rights was in Child’s best interest.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/2023
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